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A History of Turin

Giulio Einaudi editore

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Foreword

In the mid-1980s the Turin Academy of Sciences launched an ambitious project: a history of Turin from the Roman origins to the end of the twentieth century. The project immediately won the support of the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, which made available the resources necessary for the enterprise. The result was nine large volumes, totalling about ten thousand pages, edited by a committee which included some eminent members of the Academy but also scholars extraneous to it. The work was published by Einaudi over a period of six years, from 1997 to 2002: the editors of the individual volumes were Giuseppe Sergi, Rinaldo Comba, Giuseppe Ricuperati, Umberto Levra and Nicola Tranfaglia.

The work differed from the traditional histories of Turin (such as the still valuable volumes of Luigi Cibrario, which date from 1846) not only in its size, but also in its approach. It was not just a politico-institutional history, nor just a politico-economic history; it devoted ample space to the development of society and to its division into classes, and to the development of culture in the Piedmontese area, in particular the history of the arts. And it was also, to a large extent, the fruit of original research, which produced new results and modified traditional interpretations. Certainly, as in all enterprises involving hundreds of collaborators, the quality of the individual contributions is uneven, and some aspects of the history of the city would perhaps have merited further study. But as a whole the *Storia di Torino* stands comparison with analogous studies of other cities in Italy and elsewhere in the world. Its attractive presentation and illustrations have made it a precious object for the libraries of many, both scholars and sophisticated general readers.

But anyone not motivated by specialist interests who wanted to get an idea of the development of the city and its various periods could hardly tackle such a large-scale work. The idea was thus born – at a conference whose aim was to assess the work and compare it with analogous projects, held in October 2003, on the two hundred and twentieth an-

niversary of the Academy – of an outline of the history of Turin, aimed at a wider and above all an international audience. The occasion was at hand: the Winter Olympics of February 2006, which have mobilised so much energy and have prompted a renewal if not of the structure, at least of the face of the city, and for which a large influx of tourists is expected. The implementation of the project was entrusted to two foreign scholars who had long specialised in Piedmontese history, Geoffrey Symcox of Ucla and Anthony Cardoza of the University of Chicago, in the conviction that a view from afar would more easily grasp the main lines of the development of the city, even if this were at the cost of a few minor details. It again received the firm support of the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, and the active collaboration of the publisher Einaudi.

The situation of Turin is now very different from that in which the larger project was born twenty years ago. The last few years have seen the crisis of Fiat and its satellite industries, a crisis from which Fiat seems to be struggling to emerge. But, above all, Turin has ceased to be the industrial capital of the country, as it had become after the First World War, a status which had been strengthened in the Fascist period and in the post-war decades; and its capacity to attract workers has also waned. The urban population, which in 1945 was about 650,000, and which had almost doubled by the end of the seventies following the migratory flows from the south of Italy, has rapidly decreased, and has again sunk below a million. The factory – the big factory – is no longer the center of economic life, and continues to lay off managers and workers, both white collar and blue collar. The "monarchy" of the Agnelli family is a memory of the past, and the court which surrounded it has now been dispersed. In what was once the city of Gramsci and of the "workers' councils", and later of resistance to Fascism, the trade unions have been forced into rearguard battles, in a desperate attempt to defend surviving jobs. The process of integration of immigrants from Asia and Africa has encountered more failures than successes. Every day small businesses open, but just as frequently they close, unable to compete with the big distributors. In the national league tables for income and wealth (not to mention the European ones), Turin has continued to fall lower and lower. As in the years after the transfer of the capital of the kingdom to Florence and then Rome, Turin is seeking a new vocation; but above all it needs to escape from the isolation to which its geographical position seems to condemn it.

On the eve of the Olympics the city is engaged in an attempt to meet a challenge, to find a new identity. If the future of Fiat is still uncertain, in Turin and the surrounding area many small hi-tech industries have grown up, which draw on the resources of the research institutes and university departments. Many of the city streets contain building sites. New districts have arisen, and continue to arise, in areas that were formerly occupied by now disused factories. After many decades of waiting work has begun on the building of an underground railway, which had long been impeded by the motor industry lobby and the short-sightedness of some left-wing politicians; and it is to be hoped that the first line will soon be followed by others. The high-speed rail link to Novara is near completion; and soon it will reach Milan, and from there the rest of Italy, while the small-minded resistance of the towns of the Susa valley are irresponsibly slowing up the link with France. Many old buildings are being restored, and the Roman heart of the city seems to have been reborn. Turin will certainly not be what it was before, the city which based itself on the Ford model; it will be a post-industrial city, with a network of businesses that is less in evidence, no longer monocentric but widespread. More than business, the crucial role will perhaps be played by cultural institutions, first and foremost the university and the Polytechnic, provided that they are able to continue to produce research, and not only applied research. In short, the city is now engaged in a process of transformation whose final outcome is still uncertain. But, unlike the situation a few years ago, there are at least reasons for hope. And hope is not merely the *ultima dea*; it is also the indispensable impulse to the building of a better future.

PIETRO ROSSI
President of the Turin Academy of Sciences

Authors' preface

We have written this book on the occasion of the Winter Olympic Games of 2006, in order to provide English-speaking visitors with a history of Turin from its origins to the present. It is to the best of our knowledge the first history of the city to appear in English; this is not surprising, for Turin has never figured on the traditional itinerary for English-speaking tourists in Italy, despite its political importance, its rich cultural heritage, its architectural distinction, the beauty of its surrounding region, and its fine culinary tradition. Today it is perhaps best known as the home of the mysterious relic known as the "Shroud of Turin" – the subject of considerable scientific investigation and scholarly debate in recent years – or as the automotive capital of Italy – a distinction it seems however to be losing, as its principal carmaker, Fiat, experiences increasing difficulties. Turin's reputation as an industrial powerhouse has tended to obscure its other claims to fame, which we personally have come to know and appreciate in the course of frequent sojourns in the city. Based on our long acquaintance with this elegant city and its many cultural resources, we believe that it deserves to be better known in the English-speaking world. So when the Turin Academy of Sciences approached us with a proposal to write a history of their city to coincide with the Winter Olympics, we gladly agreed.

Writing this book has turned out to be a demanding assignment. Turin's history extends back for over two millennia, and is not at all easy to unravel and explain. As we approached the task of writing, we were struck by two apparently contradictory facts: first, the extraordinary wealth of detailed research by local scholars on every aspect of Turin's history; and second, the lack of a comprehensive history of the city intended for the general reader. The abundant research by local scholars has proved invaluable to us in writing this book; we have leaned heavily on the recent nine-volume *Storia di Torino* (Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin 1997-2002), written under the aegis of the Turin Academy of

Sciences by a team of specialists in the city's history. We happily acknowledge our debt to their careful research, which has proven invaluable to us in writing this volume. At the same time however we found, contrary to our expectations, that there are very few general works that cover Turin's history from beginning to end. A few exist in Italian, from Luigi Cibrario's, published in 1846, to Francesco Cognasso's, published in 1964, but they have no counterpart in English. Our bibliography of titles in English therefore lists a variety of specialized studies on different aspects of Turin's history, but no general account of the city's development from its Roman origins to the present. So somewhat to our surprise, we came to realize that our book is a pioneering effort, both because of its general scope, and because it is the first history of the city designed for an English-speaking audience.

We have found it impossible to write the history of Turin in isolation. The city's development cannot be understood if it is divorced from its regional context. From the time of its foundation Turin was a crossroads and a gateway; geography has always played a decisive part in its development, and its history cannot be separated from the regional and national contexts in which it unfolded. Turin was founded by the Romans; became a strategic frontier outpost in the early middle ages; evolved into a small independent commune; and finally fell under the domination of the House of Savoy, which ruled it for almost seven centuries. In order to tell this complex story, the focus of our work moves beyond the confines of the city itself, to situate it within the broader historical development of Piedmont, its surrounding region; of the western Alps, where it gradually assumed the role of a regional capital; of the Italian peninsula; and of western Europe as a whole. Turin's history is also inseparable from that of its rulers, the House of Savoy, who seized control of the city in the thirteenth century, transformed it into the capital of their Alpine domains, and finally made it the springboard for the unification of Italy in the mid-nineteenth century. Turin's history is inextricably intertwined with that of the Savoyard dynasty, but the relationship between the city and its rulers was always complicated, and often contentious. Turin never gave its unqualified loyalty to the House of Savoy. Its role as the capital of the Savoyard state certainly brought important political, economic and cultural benefits, but Savoyard domination also provoked tension, for it ran counter to a deep-rooted tradition of municipal independence, dating from the city's medieval past.

For much of the past century, Turin's fortunes have been tied to that of another dynasty, the Agnelli family, and – as with the House of Savoy – this relationship brought many benefits, but was also fraught with multiple tensions. Through Fiat, the automotive manufacturing company they founded, the Agnelli family spearheaded Turin's transformation into an industrial metropolis, initiating decades of explosive economic and demographic growth. For much of the twentieth century Fiat and the Agnelli family dominated every aspect of the city's life, but over the past couple of decades Fiat has entered a period of prolonged decline, calling into question Turin's position as a dominant center of manufacturing in Italy and Europe. The death of the last great patriarchs of the Agnelli family, Gianni and Umberto, in the first years of the new millennium thus fittingly mark a turning point in our story, as Turin now enters a new, uncertain post-industrial era. By hosting the Winter Olympics of 2006 Turin is seeking to relaunch itself as a different kind of metropolis, by drawing on its rich history and culture. The directions that this renewal will take are only just beginning to be imagined and explored. In this book we have tried to provide an overview of Turin's distinctive historical development. We think our account demonstrates that – like any great city – Turin has experienced cycles of decline and recovery, but that it has emerged stronger from each crisis, forging a new identity for itself in the process. This story of adversities surmounted is our contribution to the initiatives now under way to revitalize Turin, a city to which we are linked by many close personal friendships.

GWS
ALC

Los Angeles and Chicago, September 2005.

A History of Turin

Chapter 1
Origins. From Prehistory to the Romans

1. *The Power of Place*.

Until quite recent times, Turin's development as a city was conditioned primarily by its geographical position. Even before the city was founded by the Romans in the first century B.C.E, its site was already a strategic and commercial crossroads, and for much of its subsequent history it would be sought after and fought over by conquerors and invaders because of its location. Turin is sited on the west bank of the river Po, commanding the surrounding region, which would come to be known in the middle ages as Piedmont – "Pedemontium" in Latin, "the land at the foot of the mountains". Nature has clearly defined this region. It is a fertile plain intersected by the river Po and its tributaries, and almost encircled by mountains and hills: the Alps to the west, the Ligurian Apennines to the south, the hills of Monferrato to the east. Turin is situated where the plain formed by the Po flowing northwards between the Alpine foothills and the hill country of Monferrato reaches its narrowest point, becoming a corridor only eight or nine miles wide. Here the Po is joined by its tributaries the Dora Riparia and the Stura di Lanzo, which flow down from the Alps to join it just north of the city. Thus Turin has always been a nexus of communication for land and water traffic along the upper reaches of the Po, before the river turns eastwards to follow its course across the plains of Lombardy towards the Adriatic. The city also commands what was for many centuries one of the few easy crossing points over the upper Po for east-west traffic. From the earliest times, merchants, pilgrims and armies moving between Lombardy and the Alpine passes had to cross the river here, making the river-crossing at Turin a prize of great military and commercial value, and the city itself a staging-post on the road between southern France and northern Italy.

Westwards from Turin the road follows the course of the Dora Riparia, climbing up the steep valley of Susa to the twin passes of the Mont-Cénis and the Mont-Genèvre. This is in all probability the route that Hannibal's army and its elephants followed in 218 B.C.E on their

march to attack Rome; Charlemagne's knights rode through the same passes on their way to conquer Italy in 773; today it is still the main arterial road and rail link over the Alps. In the middle ages, control of this route would form a vital element in the rise of the dynasty that in the thirteenth century would come to rule Turin, and ultimately the whole of Italy: the House of Savoy. The counts of Savoy first appear in the eleventh century as minor feudatories in the French Alpine region from which they take their name. Over time they gradually extended their rule into Piedmont, piecing together a multi-lingual principality that straddled the mountains and dominated the passes over them. The rulers of the House of Savoy became "the gatekeepers of Italy", their strategic location astride the Alpine passes conferring on them a political and military significance far out of proportion to the power they could summon from the meager economic and demographic resources of their upland domains. From the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries this Alpine dynasty would play a decisive part in the city's history.

The Alps are a constant, inescapable presence in Turin; they form a wall close at hand to the west, rising abruptly out of the plain, their peaks looming over the city. This face of the mountain chain is very steep, in contrast to the gentler slope on the western face in France, where the Alpine range descends gradually towards the Rhône valley. The mountains form an inseparable part of Turin's history, for from the earliest times they have served both as an avenue of communication and as a protective barrier. Besides the passes west of the city accessible through the valley of Susa, other, more distant passes link the two sides of the mountain chain: the Great and Little St Bernard in the Val d'Aosta to the north, and the narrow defiles of the Maddalena and Tenda communicating between southern Piedmont and Provence. But the passes leading to Turin through the Susa valley are easier of access than these others, and so have constituted the principal thoroughfare for Alpine communication at least since Roman times. Turin in consequence has always been the main gateway into Italy for armies, pilgrims, and more recently tourists coming from the west, commanding the route of choice for merchants and travelers heading from northern Italy to France. Even today the Alps remain a formidable barrier. The highest peaks in the region, like the Monviso, from which the Po springs, tower well over 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). Negotiating the Alpine passes was until recent times often a risky adventure, as many travelers' accounts bear witness, and once the snows fell in winter they became virtually impassable.

To the east, Turin is hemmed in by the hills of Monferrato, which slope down to the banks of the river Po opposite the city. Their sum-

mits, like the hill of Superga, crowned by its magnificent church, are tall and easily visible from the city, a constant tangible presence like the Alps on the opposite side. This range of hills forms a barrier along the eastern side of the river, and has always checked the city's expansion in that direction. Since the middle ages these pleasant hills have been the place where Turin's better-off citizens have chosen to build villas with gardens and vineyards, where they could take their ease away from the heat of the city in summertime. The hills, though steep, form no great obstacle to communication, for they are intersected by river valleys. Since Roman times one of the main routes leading westward from Lombardy has passed through this broken, undulating country to reach the crossing at Turin, while another route reached it by skirting the hills along the eastern bank of the Po.

Just as the encircling ring of hills and mountains has conditioned Turin's historical development, so too have the waterways on which the city is situated. Its site was originally chosen because it commanded a point where the Po could be crossed with relative ease, first by a ford, and later by a bridge. Close to this crossing point the Dora Riparia flows into the Po from its source in the valley of Susa. Its course originally lay beyond the city's walls, but today it is engulfed by urban sprawl. For centuries the Dora and the canals derived from it supplied much of the city's water, and provided the motive power that drove Turin's silk-spinning plants, the machinery of its cloth manufactories and metallurgical workshops, and the mills that ground its grain. The ready availability of water-power called forth an industrial suburb north of the city walls before the factory age. Like its sisters, the Po, the Stura di Lanzo a little to the north, and the torrent of the Sangone to the south, the Dora today is a domesticated river, although even today in the winter floods they can still reveal some of the primal strength that once swept away everything in their path: dwellings, bridges, mills, manufactories, dikes, sluices, and canals.

These rivers provided water to irrigate farmlands in the nearby Piedmontese plain and in the market gardens that were cultivated just outside the city walls. Because they are fed by the melting snow from the Alps, for much of the year they provide a dependable source of water, and from the middle ages a network of canals and ditches was gradually constructed, radiating out from the rivers, to irrigate the plain in which Turin is situated. What little archaeological information we possess suggests that originally this plain was covered by forest, scrub and marsh. Neolithic farmers began the slow process that has modified the landscape into its present form. Today almost nothing remains of the an-

cient forests that once covered the land. Already by the seventeenth century, the advance of farmland, and constant cutting for timber and fuel (mainly in the form of charcoal), had depleted the forests around Turin to such an extent that the city fathers were compelled to bring in supplies of firewood from the Alps, a considerable distance away, where thick forests still flourished. The work of draining the marshes began later than the clearance of the forests; it started in earnest in the middle ages, and has continued down to modern times, as the need for agricultural land increased with the rise in population. The flocks and herds that once grazed much of the plain gradually disappeared. Pastoral farming was relegated to the Alpine foothills and uplands, where it had always been the dominant form of agriculture; a kind of symbiosis was created between the farmers of the mountains and the plains, exchanging animal products – wool, milk and cheese – for grain. In this way, centuries of unremitting human toil gradually transformed the landscape around Turin and created the agrarian economy on which it depended until very recent times.

However, Turin's history was not determined by its geographical position alone. Political factors have also shaped its destiny, from the moment the Romans chose to found a town on the site. From Roman times and until the later middle ages the city was a small provincial town, overshadowed by richer, more vigorous neighbors like Asti or Vercelli, which expanded their territories, their political influence and their commerce across the region, while Turin languished in relative obscurity. Turin took on a new significance in the thirteenth century, when the counts of Savoy established their lordship over the city, initiating a new phase in its history. The counts of Savoy chose to establish themselves at Turin because it commanded the eastern outlet of the passes that linked their domains on the opposite sides of the Alps, and provided a springboard for territorial expansion into Piedmont and northern Italy. But we should not overestimate the importance of this development. After the Savoyard dynasty took control, Turin functioned only as an outpost of their authority, and still played only a secondary role in the economic and political life of the region. The Savoyard counts' capital and court remained at Chambéry, on the western side of the Alps, where the bulk of their lands were located. Through the later middle ages Turin remained a small city, growing and gradually eclipsing the other urban centers scattered across the Piedmontese plain by reason of its newfound political role as center of the expanding Savoyard domains east of the Alps.

In the later sixteenth century its destiny changed radically, when the

House of Savoy moved their capital from their ancestral seat at Chambéry and established their court and government in Turin. The city's development was no longer primarily conditioned by its role as a vital node of communication. Turin's new role as the dynastic capital of the House of Savoy made it unequivocally the dominant city in Piedmont, and made it a magnet for immigrants. Its population and economy expanded; while the other Piedmontese cities stagnated or declined, it grew rapidly. Turin did not grow in a haphazard fashion, however. Its rulers took the lead in directing their new capital's expansion, so that by the eighteenth century the city had become a showplace of baroque urban planning, one of the finest in Europe. It has preserved this character down to the present day, despite sometimes misguided architectural interventions in the twentieth century, and the ravages of aerial bombardment in World War II. The straight streets, wide piazzas and elegant façades that form Turin's historic core date from this period, and are a testimony to the care that its successive rulers and their architects took to turn it into a dignified, elegant city, worthy of its new role as the capital of a growing dynastic state. Its orderly growth continued in the nineteenth century, as the House of Savoy assumed the lead in the movement to unify Italy, and when that goal was achieved, for a brief moment between 1861 and 1864, Turin became the first capital of their new Italian kingdom. But this glory was short-lived. To the intense displeasure of Turin's citizens, the national capital was soon moved, first to Florence, then to Rome, and Turin reluctantly reverted to its former role as a regional capital. By then, however, its development was taking a decisive new turn: it was fast becoming a center of the industrial revolution in Italy.

The coming of the industrial revolution opened what we might term the third phase in the city's historical development: its emergence as one of the pillars, along with Milan and Genoa, of northern Italy's "industrial triangle". Until the mid-nineteenth century the economy of Turin and Piedmont was predominantly agrarian. Industrial development was mainly limited to textile manufacturing, for although the region around Turin is relatively fertile and well-watered, it is not rich in mineral resources. Marble, slate and stone were readily available for building, but other minerals were lacking. Small quantities of iron, gold and other metals have been mined from time to time in the Alpine foothills, but mining has never been an intensive activity, and down to the present day the region's metallurgical industries have been forced to depend largely on imported raw materials. Sources of energy too were lacking, apart from water power and wood for fuel. There are no de-

posits of coal or petroleum in the region, a factor which held back Turin's industrial development until the Alpine torrents were dammed at the end of the nineteenth century to provide hydroelectric power. The industrial revolution came late to Turin, but when it came, its impact would transform the city and the region beyond all recognition, in the space of little more than a century. The results of millennia of slow agrarian development and centuries of political dominion as the capital city of a regional state were rapidly overlaid by the headlong rush of industrialization. Around Turin's symmetrical urban nucleus, a widening belt of factories and industrial suburbs would spread into the countryside, in the pattern we see today. Turin today is a great industrial metropolis, but the industrial development that gives the city its character today is of recent vintage.

2. *The Earliest Inhabitants.*

The first evidence of human life in Piedmont can be dated to some time between 190,000 and 130,000 years ago. Stone tools characteristic of the late Palaeolithic era have been found in a few places, left by early hunters and gatherers. The first stable human habitation, however, dates from the Neolithic era, between 5,000 and 4,000 years ago. At that time the land would have been covered by forest and scrubland, interspersed with broad expanses of marsh. The Neolithic farmers carved small scattered villages out of the forest with their primitive tools. With the passage of time they developed more advanced technology that allowed them to take greater control of their environment. At some point they began to smelt copper, and to use scratch-plows to till the soil. The archaeological record is sparse, but it seems to indicate that by the late Neolithic era human settlements had become fairly numerous, and that the population was relatively dense. Technological development continued: by about 1800 B.C.E there is clear evidence of the use of bronze, and from this time the archaeological record of the region that would become Piedmont can be followed continuously.

The earliest inhabitants of Piedmont whom we can identify by name are Celts and Ligurians. It seems likely that some Celtic tribes may have migrated into Piedmont well before the fourth century B.C.E. We know that by that time a group of Celtic peoples, probably originating in central Europe, had established themselves in northern Italy. These migrating Celts would have found Piedmont already inhabited by several Ligurian tribes, part of an earlier pattern of settlement that had spread

various offshoots of the Ligurians across most of northwestern Italy. The archaeological record indicates that they were a people of farmers with a relatively low level of material culture and political organization. They lived in scattered settlements in forest clearings, cultivated rye and other coarse grains, and kept herds of sheep and pigs. They seem to have absorbed some cultural influences from the Celts who became their neighbors. All traces of their language have vanished, except for some characteristic place-names ending in *-asca* or *-asco*, which are found here and there across the region. Two Ligurian tribes inhabited the area of Piedmont where Turin would later arise: they were the Insubres and the Taurini. The latter tribe would give its name to the city, Augusta Taurinorum, that the Romans later founded on the banks of the Po, which is the ancestor of modern Turin. Their tribal name has been linked etymologically to their supposed totemic animal the bull (*taurus*), but this is probably incorrect. (Nonetheless the city's emblem today is a rampant bull). The name more probably derives from a word meaning "mountaineer", for Latin writers use the terms "taurinus" and "montanus" interchangeably. The Taurini thus probably took their name from the mountains in whose shadow they lived.

The Taurini enter the historical record in 218 B.C.E, at the start of the Second Punic War, when they unsuccessfully opposed Hannibal's march into Italy. Intending to attack and destroy Rome, Hannibal and his Carthaginian troops advanced from their base in Spain through southern France. They would have crossed the Alps by the shortest available route, which must have been one of the passes leading down through the valley of Susa. They debouched into the Piedmontese plain and found their path blocked by what was in all likelihood the chief tribal settlement of the Taurini, probably occupying the site on which the Romans would later found their city. At that moment the Taurini were at war with their neighbors the Insubres; since the latter apparently favored Hannibal's invasion, the Taurini opposed it, and suffered direly in consequence. The Greek historian Polybius records that in the space of three days Hannibal's professional soldiers captured the settlement of the Taurini and put its inhabitants to the sword. His path now clear, Hannibal marched on into Italy to engage the Romans in the Second Punic War. After almost two decades of bitter fighting, the Romans finally emerged victorious, becoming the unchallenged masters of the Mediterranean and the Italian peninsula. Eventually their power would reach out to engulf the territory in which the Taurini lived, radically transforming its economy, its political structure, its language, and its culture.

After the disaster caused by Hannibal's invasion, we hear no more of the Taurini for almost two centuries, until they were drawn into Rome's cultural and political orbit. From the middle of the second century B.C.E, the Romans began to conquer and colonize the Ligurian coast and parts of the subalpine region of northwestern Italy, founding cities as they did so. They defeated the important tribe of the Salassi in northern Piedmont, and in about 100 B.C.E they founded a colony at Eporedia – the future Ivrea – as a strongpoint to control their territory. Further extensions of Roman influence into northwestern Italy followed, but the territory of the Taurini remained largely untouched until the middle of the first century. The decisive moment came when Julius Caesar crossed the Mont-Genèvre with five legions to begin the conquest of Gaul in 58 B.C.E. The Gallic war lasted for five years, and each winter Caesar and some of his troops crossed back into Italy; he may well have established his winter quarters on the site that would soon become Roman Turin. The region that is now Piedmont passed under Roman rule. Its population was granted Roman citizenship in 49 B.C.E, and it was formally incorporated as a province of the empire seven years later. Caesar's conquest of Gaul had made control of the lands of the Taurini and the Alpine passes a strategic necessity for Rome. The stage was now set for the Romans to found a town, as they did throughout their empire, to act as a military strongpoint and a center of government, and to control communication along the route over the Alps. They chose a site on the banks of the Po, close to its confluence with its tributaries the Dora Riparia, the Stura di Lanzo and the Sangone, at an easy crossing-place: this was the origin of the city of Turin.

3. *Augusta Taurinorum*.

The exact date of the foundation of Augusta Taurinorum – "the Augustan city of the Taurini", to give it its full Roman name – is disputed, as are the circumstances in which it occurred: there may in fact have been two separate foundations, the first by Julius Caesar, the second by his successor the Emperor Augustus. This confusion stems in part from the two forms of the Roman colony's name. One form is "Iulia Augusta Taurinorum", suggesting that it was founded either by Julius Caesar, presumably during his Gallic campaigns, or soon after his death by his followers, who named it in his honor. The more common form of the name, "Augusta Taurinorum", has been taken to suggest on the other hand that the foundation did not take place until the reign of Cae-

sar's heir Augustus, and that the new town was named after him. (He ceased using his original name, Octavian, and assumed the title "Augustus" in 27 B.C.E). We can thus hypothesize that there may have been two distinct but sequential foundations, separated by the climactic phase of the civil wars that brought down the Roman republic, and left Augustus the sole undisputed ruler of the Roman world. Such archaeological evidence as we have is inconclusive, but tends to support this hypothesis. The Roman field-system around Turin seems to have been laid out in two phases, for the strips of arable land around the town – whose outline is still discernible in aerial photographs – are oriented in two different directions, suggesting that the land might well have been surveyed and divided up among the new town's inhabitants at two different times.

The Taurini already had a settlement on this site, and the Romans – whether under Julius Caesar or Augustus – took it over and developed it into a Roman military colony, just as they were doing with many other indigenous settlements all over northern Italy at this time. Following the usual Roman practice, this original colony subsequently evolved into a town with its own administrative structure, or *civitas*. The rudiments of municipal organization may have begun to take shape in the earlier period, during Julius Caesar's campaigning in Gaul, and would then have achieved their final form under Augustus. The definitive establishment of the new colony probably occurred soon after 25 B.C.E, when the end of the civil wars and the return of political stability made it possible for Augustus to organize the recently-acquired territories in northwestern Italy, and to endow them with permanent political institutions. At this time he was completing the conquest of the Alpine tribes in order to secure the entire frontier zone from the Mediterranean to Lake Geneva. The foundation of Augusta Taurinorum should therefore be seen as part of a systematic campaign to pacify the region and Romanize it, by planting new towns at strategic points in it, with populations of loyal immigrants. To this end the colony of Augusta Pretoria – today the city of Aosta – was established about the same time, to bring the valley around it firmly under Roman control, and to guard the entry to the Great and Little St Bernard passes, just as the new colony of Augusta Taurinorum controlled access to the Susa valley and its passes.

The actual building of Augusta Taurinorum took place in the last decades of the first century B.C.E. and the early first century C.E. All traces of the original settlement of the Taurini were erased by the Roman foundation. It is possible that a bridge may have been built across the Po, although it is more likely that the crossing was by means of a ferry, or a nearby ford. Following their standard practice, the Roman

surveyors and architects laid out the new colony as a rectangular grid surrounded by a circuit of walls about 3,000 yards around, enclosing an area of about 110 acres. The space within the walls was divided by two principal streets, the *cardo* and the *decumanus*, running respectively north-south and east-west, which led from the four city gates to meet at right angles at the forum near the center of the town. (The exact site of the forum is uncertain, but it was probably in the area occupied today by the city hall: striking evidence of the continuity of urban life). Construction was solid and intended to last. The Roman walls have vanished – although some sections were still protecting the city in the early seventeenth century – but one of the original gates, the Porta Palatina, still stands on what was once the northern perimeter of the Roman city, its massive brick and stone towers, much restored, rising above the surrounding buildings. The eastern gate (Porta Pretoria) still exists too, although it is no longer visible. In the early fifteenth century it was incorporated into a new fortress, known formerly as the Castello, today as Palazzo Madama, which was constructed by adding two more towers to the towers of the Roman gate to form a roughly square urban fortress. The conical tops of the Roman towers can still be seen peeping above the roofline of Palazzo Madama today. Inside the walls, the secondary streets divided the urban space into roughly equal-sized residential blocks or *insulae*. The streets were provided with underground sewers for drainage and were paved in the traditional Roman way with carefully-fitted slabs of stone, which can still be seen, a few feet below the surface, when the streets are excavated for repairs. The Praetorium, the residence of the local governor, stood in the northeast corner of the town's rectangle of walls, some distance from the forum. The present-day royal palace (Palazzo Reale) occupies more or less the same site – a further indication of continuity in the city's plan. Finally the new town was endowed with the customary amenities of urban civilization: an aqueduct to provide a regular water-supply, public baths, temples, and a theater, whose ruins can still be seen today next to the royal palace.

The importance of the Roman foundation cannot be overstressed, for it set its stamp on the city for all time. The rectilinear ground-plan laid out by the Roman surveyors would remain the basis of Turin's urban plan, the starting-point for all later development, almost to the present day. The passage of two millennia has effaced the Roman grid in some places and softened its sharp outline in others, but it can still be discerned in the rectilinear layout of the historic center of the city. For a long time Turin did not outgrow its Roman walls, but when the city expanded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Roman grid at its center

would provide the template for the new extensions. The streets extending the Roman grid into the new areas were wider, and were interspersed with grand public spaces, but the rectilinear pattern of the city's Roman nucleus was replicated by the architects of the baroque era, who fashioned Turin into a classic example of regular urban planning.

We do not know where the original inhabitants of the new Roman colony came from, except that they must have been mostly immigrants. We can surmise that some were military veterans, who were given building plots in the city and allotments of farmland just outside; others may have been part of the overflow from Rome's own burgeoning population; yet others would have been indigenous Taurini, judging by the names on a number of gravestones found in the city and its immediate vicinity. At its height the Roman population may have totaled as many as 5,000 – far more than it did during most of the middle ages. The new town prospered: the bulk of its wealth came from the farmlands around it, but revenues also flowed in from the tolls levied on transit traffic along the road to and from the Alpine passes, and along the Po, which

Map 1.
Roman Turin, *Augusta Taurinorum*.



the Romans had opened up for commercial purposes. Augusta Taurinorum became a key junction on the great network of highways the Romans built across northern Italy for the movement of troops, goods and imperial messengers. Here the Via Postumia from the east joined a branch of the Via Aurelia coming up from the coast; other roads led from Eporedia in the north, and along the river Po from Ticinum (present-day Pavia). At Augusta Taurinorum all these routes converged to join the highway leading to Segusio (modern Susa) and the Alpine passes. By creating this system of arterial roads and opening the Po to river traffic the Romans capitalized on the strategic and commercial potentialities inherent in Turin's site, making the city a vital node in the communications between Italy and western Europe. The Romans thus created the fundamental conditions that would determine the city's history for the next one-and-a-half millennia, until it took on its new role as the capital of the Savoyard state in the sixteenth century.

For more than two centuries, as far as we can tell, the history of Augusta Taurinorum was uneventful. The repercussions of distant political upheavals were occasionally felt, as in 69 C.E, "the year of the four emperors", when after the death of Nero troops loyal to the would-be emperor Vitellius campaigned in the Po valley against the army of his rival Otho. The campfires of a detachment of troops stationed close to the walls started a conflagration which destroyed part of the town. Vitellius emerged victorious in this struggle, but was soon defeated in his turn by Vespasian, who secured the imperial throne. But for the most part the citizens of Augusta Taurinorum lived a tranquil, provincial exist ence, untroubled by the march of armies and the rise and fall of emperors. Like any Roman town, it was governed by a civic elite of the better- off citizens. The elite was fairly open to ascent from below; families that accumulated wealth would have been readily inducted into it. The civic leaders' wealth came mainly from their estates; numerous villas belonging to them dotted the countryside outside the city walls, and they probably spent much of their time in these rural retreats. This group of elite citizens provided the members of the city council, monopolized the local magistracies, and met in an exclusive religious brotherhood that celebrated the cult of the emperor. There were also other, less exclusive, fraternities: we know of one dedicated to the worship of Jupiter, and another, drawn it seems from the lower classes, which worshipped the Matronae, female deities whose origin can probably be traced to the indigenous Taurini. Still other brotherhoods united practitioners of the same trade or craft. The civic elite does not seem to have been overgenerous in endowing the town with monuments and amenities, for

there are no traces of public buildings beyond the original ones dating from the colony's foundation. They seem to have been content to pursue an unremarkable civic existence, untroubled by grand cultural or political pretensions.

4. *The Fall of Rome.*

For the first two centuries after its foundation, Augusta Taurinorum remained a provincial backwater, placid and unremarkable. This happy state of affairs would be brutally upset in the third century C.E, however, when civil war, economic recession, and barbarian incursions combined to threaten the empire's very existence. During the long crisis that tore apart the fabric of the empire after the death of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Po valley became the front line of defense against successive waves of Germanic invaders who crossed the Alps seeking to penetrate the rich heartlands of the Italian peninsula. To counter this danger, the imperial capital was moved from Rome to Milan, so that the emperors would be able to respond quickly to incursions across the northern frontier. The waning of the Pax Romana forced Augusta Taurinorum, located in this dangerous frontier zone, into a new strategic role, confronting its citizens with threats they had never known before. A new, unsettled period now began in the history of this once quiet provincial city.

Through the third century, Augusta Taurinorum witnessed the periodic passage of armies on their way to suppress disorders and confront invasions, in Gaul and along the Alpine frontier. And although the tide of invasions was finally stemmed by the soldier-emperor Diocletian in the late third century, the political climate remained uncertain. Conflict over the imperial throne continued, despite Diocletian's attempt to lay down rules to ensure peaceful succession. In 311 the would-be emperor Constantine crossed the Alpine passes above Augusta Taurinorum and overcame a detachment of troops loyal to his rival Maxentius close by: he then marched on to defeat his rival at the Milvian Bridge just outside Rome, and win the imperial crown in the following year. Constantine and his successors managed to restore a degree of political stability to the empire, but this respite ended in the late fourth century. The fragile peace was shattered by waves of invasion and internal conflict that would finally extinguish the Roman empire in the west, leaving Italy in the hands of a succession of barbarian warlords, and radically transforming its economy and society.

Like the rest of northern Italy, Augusta Taurinorum could not avoid being caught up in these struggles. Around this time we learn of the presence of a new kind of official in the city: a count or military commander, charged with organizing the defense of the region. His presence is a clear sign that the centralized structure of the empire was beginning to break down, and that power was devolving to local authorities. Augusta Taurinorum had become a military outpost on the dangerous Alpine frontier, increasingly left to fend for itself. And as political horizons narrowed in the twilight of the empire, economic activity also contracted into more localized units. Agriculture and commerce were disrupted by the continual warfare. Recent research suggests that the economic decline in the region around Turin was not as serious as was once thought, and that the increasingly localized economy was more resilient than has been assumed, but it is nonetheless clear that population and trade were contracting. The cities seem to have fared rather better than the countryside. As the waves of barbarian invaders marched through northern Italy, plundering and destroying wherever they went, the rural population abandoned the countryside and fled to the safety of the walled cities. Some of the invaders stayed to repopulate the partially deserted countryside, and bands of foreign mercenaries in the service of Rome, or *foederati*, were invited to settle on empty land by the Roman authorities themselves. Since Constantine's reign, various foreign troops had been given land from time to time in the area around Augusta Taurinorum, in return for aiding in local defense. This trend would accelerate through the climactic period of barbarian invasions in the fifth century, when Piedmont became a primary theater of conflict. In 400-401 the Visigoths under their king Alaric overran Liguria and Piedmont, until they were defeated at Pollenzo by the Roman general Stilicho. Four years later it was the turn of the Ostrogoths under Radagaisus; they crossed the Mont-Genèvre pass and ravaged the north Italian plains until they too were overcome by Stilicho. Rebellious peasants from Gaul – the so-called Bagaudae – spread their insurrection across the Alps into northern Italy. In 410 the usurper Constantine III crossed the Alps from Gaul with the ostensible intention of attacking Alaric and his Visigoths, who had just sacked Rome. Soon afterwards Alaric died, and his people migrated through northern Italy into Gaul, probably once again through the Mont-Genèvre pass.

The marching and counter-marching of armies and the migrations of peoples through the Alpine passes and over the northwestern Italian plain continued until the middle of the fifth century, although the record is fragmentary and the sequence of events is far from clear. The cumu-

lative effect of these successive incursions wore down Roman imperial power in Italy and finally provoked its downfall: in 476 the last emperor in the west, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed by his military commander, the Germanic chieftain Odoacer. In the place of the Roman empire Odoacer established a shadowy new political structure, the Kingdom of Italy. This new kingdom was destined to have a tumultuous history, in which Augusta Taurinorum – soon to be known simply as Taurinum – would play a vital and troubled role.

5. *The Coming of Christianity*.

In the power vacuum left by the collapse of Roman administrative and political institutions a new center of authority had emerged: the local bishop, representing the rising power of the Christian Church. Through the first three centuries of its existence Christianity was a proscribed religion, but in spite of official disapproval and intermittent persecution the underground communities of Christians had built up their own administrative structures and forms of leadership: eventually, by default, their leaders would step in to take the place of the moribund Roman authorities. In 313 the new Emperor Constantine issued the Edict of Milan, officially recognizing the Christian Church and granting it full toleration. Constantine understood that the Christian Church had come to constitute a parallel authority within the empire, and intended to use it to bolster and reinforce the battered structure of the imperial government. In 395 the Emperor Theodosius outlawed all other cults and made Christianity the empire's sole religion. Ecclesiastical and political power were now inextricably intertwined. As imperial power waned and secular officials disappeared in the fourth and fifth centuries, bishops everywhere took over both the spiritual and the political leadership of the urban communities. The cities, where Christianity was by now well entrenched, became the centers from which the faith radiated into the countryside, where attachment to the old religions had remained much stronger. At Taurinum, or Turin as we shall now start to call it, the bishop became a dominant force in urban politics. For many centuries he would maintain this ascendancy over the urban community, sometimes alone and unchallenged, sometimes collaborating with the secular authorities, but frequently at odds with them too.

The early history of Christianity in Piedmont is shrouded in legend. Later hagiographic tradition recounts how a legion of Christian soldiers from Thebes in Egypt, bound for Gaul under their commander Mauricius,

were supposedly martyred in 286, either for their refusal to fight against fellow-Christians, or for their refusal to worship at the altar of the imperial cult. The martyrdom took place, we are told, somewhere in the vicinity of Martigny, in what is today southern Switzerland, and to commemorate the martyrs' sacrifice, in the sixth century a monastery was founded at St-Maurice-en-Valais. It still stands today. Legendary or not, the martyrs of the Theban legion soon came to play a central part in the developing Christian tradition in Piedmont, where their cult had spread from the Valais. At Turin, the cult of three of the martyrs, Octavius, Avventore and Solutore, was already being celebrated in the late fourth century. They became the city's first patron saints, until their cult was eclipsed later on by that of St John the Baptist. They were claimed as local martyrs because after they had supposedly escaped the massacre they were hunted down and killed at Turin. Their relics were supposedly found there and preserved by a pious matron, Julia, who built an oratory in their honor. From that moment their cult flourished and put down deep roots in the region. Later on, the House of Savoy would adopt the reputed commander of the Theban legion, St Maurice, as one of its patron saints, and would found an order of chivalry in his name.

It seems clear that a community of Christians was already in ex istence at Turin by the middle of the fourth century. Towards the end of the century we find this community headed by a bishop, perhaps installed there by the redoubtable bishop of nearby Vercelli, Eusebius, who vigorously spread the faith across Piedmont. Turin became the center of a diocese over which the bishop exercised spiritual jurisdiction and in which he accumulated various territorial rights. It extended from the city into the surrounding countryside and into the mountains, to Susa and beyond. Its boundaries long remained fluid, and were the subject of constant disputes with neighboring lords, ecclesiastical and lay, but the new territorial reality it represented would be crucially important. The bishop's diocese would form the basis on which the city of Turin would construct its dependent rural territory in the middle ages, embracing the valley leading to Susa and over the Alps. For a long time the bishop of Turin's jurisdiction over the valley of Susa was contested by the bishop of Maurienne on the other side of the Alpine divide, but ultimately in vain: this critical zone was finally adjudicated to the see of Turin. The configuration of the episcopal territory thus maintained the crucial strategic linkage between Turin and the Alpine passes that had been the city's *raison d'être* since its foundation.

As far as we know the first bishop of Turin was a certain Maximus. We know very little of his birth and origins; he was probably a protégé

of Eusebius of Vercelli, and also perhaps of the great Ambrose, archbishop of Milan. Like them, he was later canonized for his staunch defense of orthodoxy in the bitter theological disputes of his age, and for his exemplary life as a bishop, tending his flock in troubled times. The information we possess concerning his life and governance is fragmentary, and even the dates of his tenure as bishop are uncertain. It seems that he was already the bishop of Turin in 398, when an important synod was held there to decide a number of knotty doctrinal and organizational issues. We know that he was highly reputed as a biblical scholar, and so might well have played a leading part in these debates. He died at some point in the early or mid-fifth century. He was a representative figure of militant Christianity in its struggle against the forces of paganism, which reached its climax in his lifetime. He seems to have been an early propagator of the cult of the Theban martyrs, which was already a central feature of Christian devotion at Turin. Bishop Maximus was devoted to the monastic life, with its constant penances and self-mortifications. Ascetic and misogynistic, he feared and condemned the world as an endless array of temptations: his ideal was the life of a desert hermit, barren of earthly delights and above all of the company of women, whom he denounced as "the root of all evil".

Almost everything we know about Bishop Maximus comes from the large corpus of homilies and sermons he composed for the edification of his flock. These writings leave one with the impression of a powerful, even imperious personality. He constantly rebukes his flock for their shortcomings, in often irascible tones, upbraiding them for their failure to live up to his own example of austere Christian virtue and self-abnegation. His rebukes – if we are to believe them – tell us much about the ambiguous religious outlook of his time, still far from perfectly Christian. He constantly berates his flock for what he saw as its self-indulgence and backsliding. His followers did not observe the feasts of the Church in a fittingly reverential manner, he thundered, but desecrated them with gluttonous banquets. They were constantly flirting with pagan practices, and were a prey to every kind of ancient superstitions. The attachment to heathenism and idolatry was particularly marked in the countryside, where the peasants clung stubbornly to the old ways. Maximus chided the peasants' aristocratic masters for their unwillingness to convert their serfs; out of idleness or diffidence they preferred to leave them alone, putting their worldly interests before their Christian duty.

Maximus's sermons give us a colorful – or perhaps lurid – picture of Turinese society in this transitional age, when Christianity was gradually vanquishing the old religions and developing its own doctrinal and

institutional structures. He was well aware of the vastness of this task, and the inadequacy of the means at his disposal. He denounced the clergy under his command as lazy and venal. They charged extra fees for their services, over and above their stipends, and often failed to attend church. Many were guilty of the sin of concubinage – a grave fault in his eyes. The magistrates were no better: they were worldly, corrupt and inattentive to their duties. The soldiers quartered in the city were drunken, violent, and given to thieving. In terms typical of his age, Maximus denounced Turin's Jews, who were then active in public life and trade, as the enemies of Christ; for him, their mere presence constituted a "pollution" that threatened the purity of the Christians' tenuous faith. The Arian heretics in the city, who denied the divinity of Christ (in accordance with the teachings of the fourth-century Alexandrian heresiarch Arius), posed a special danger according to Maximus. He portrayed them as secretive and underhand, constantly plotting to seduce those who followed orthodox doctrine. The ordinary Christians – by whom Maximus probably meant the more substantial classes of society – were addicted to their pleasures, especially hunting. He complained that they treated their hounds better than their servants, whom they starved and abused. The peasantry he dismissed as drunken and idle.

Bishop Maximus seems to have been an energetic builder, eager to transform the Roman city and exorcise the pagan demons believed to lurk in its ruined temples, by erecting Christian churches and shrines. The earliest ecclesiastical building in Turin was apparently a church, dedicated it seems to St Salvatore, and constructed at some uncertain date by the local count, on the site now occupied by the cathedral. It was perhaps here that the synod, in which Maximus played a prominent part, was held in 398. To the south of this church there was a basilica, perhaps founded by Maximus himself. It was dedicated to St John the Baptist, and therefore also functioned as the baptistery. Nearby there was apparently a third church, dedicated to the Virgin. This cluster of churches formed the original architectural nucleus of Christian Turin, and probably owes its existence to Maximus's desire to build a Christian community on the ruins of the pagan city.

In sum, the picture painted by Bishop Maximus of the first Christian community at Turin appears far from edifying, if we are to believe his unsparing criticism of his flock, his calls for repentance, and his prophecies of doom. He saw the evil and injustice around him as undeniable proof that God's vengeance would soon be unleashed on sinful humanity, and that the world would shortly come to an end. He saw another clear sign of the imminent end of the sinful world and the pun-

ishment about to befall it in the endless barbarian invasions that spread ruin and death all around: to Bishop Maximus, the ravaging barbarian hordes were a scourge sent by God to chastise his people for their many transgressions. In this time of troubles, he warned them, safety and salvation could not be found behind the city's walls, but only through prayer and sincere repentance; the pursuit of a truly Christian form of life was the only way to avert God's wrath.

Maximus thus appears as a kind of prince-bishop, typical of the tumultuous transitional age in which he lived. Although the Emperor Theodosius had made Christianity the sole official religion of the empire and banned the old pagan cults, they did not immediately disappear at the emperor's bidding. Although Christianity now enjoyed the backing of the state and was guided by the forceful leadership of bishops like Maximus, or Eusebius of Vercelli, it only gained acceptance slowly and gradually; the old gods did not die easily. Maximus's struggle against the deeply-rooted paganism of his diocese was part of a vast, long-drawn cultural conflict fought out throughout the dying Roman empire. Meanwhile, as the political and military strength of the empire waned, the institutional Church was assuming the leadership of state and society. Maximus resembled his near-contemporaries Ambrose of Milan, Gregory of Tours, and Augustine, bishop of Hippo, all ecclesiastical potentates who, like him, did not hesitate to pick up the reins of political authority in addition to conducting their pastoral duties. His successors on the episcopal throne of Turin would follow his example. Like Maximus, they ministered to their flock's material needs, tried to protect the city from the barbarian hordes that threatened it, cared for the refugees who fled before them, and ransomed the captives seized by the barbarians. They continued to foster the cult of the three Theban martyrs, which by now had spread to southern France and across northern Italy. But they also began to stimulate popular devotion to St John the Baptist. His cult had first been celebrated at Rome, and spread from there across Christendom. By the mid-fifth century a vigorous traffic had sprung up in supposed relics of the saint, in response to the popularity of his cult. At some point in the mid-fifth century a pious woman supposedly carried one of these relics, a bleeding thumb, to the episcopal see of Maurienne across the Alps, where it became the object of veneration. It aroused the jealousy of the bishops of Turin, who coveted it for themselves. Their initial attempts to acquire it failed, but at some time in the seventh or eighth century this relic was transferred to the main episcopal basilica at Turin, which was then dedicated to him. From that time St John the Baptist became the city's patron, and remains so down to the present day.

Chapter II

The Barbarians, the Carolingian Empire, and the March of Turin, ca. 500-1100

1. *Turin in the Dark Ages.*

The period from the fall of the Roman empire to the emergence of the feudal principality that became known as the March (frontier principality) of Turin spans over six centuries. During this turbulent period we can trace only the barest outlines of the history of Turin and its surrounding region, for the evidence we possess is extremely sparse and fragmentary. It consists mainly of ecclesiastical documents such as charters and chronicles, and a smaller number of documents left by secular rulers. These sources concern only the great ones of the world – kings and emperors, warrior nobles, bishops and abbots. They tell us next to nothing about how ordinary men and women – especially the latter – lived their lives and earned their daily bread. Statistics on fundamental questions like trade and manufacturing, for instance, or on population and life expectancy, are completely lacking. The historical and archaeological evidence we have allows us to speak only in the most general terms: we know that urban life regressed, commerce shrank, and the population fell, but we cannot measure these declines, or offer adequate explanations for them. We are confronted by great gaps in the chronology of events. Reconstructing the history of Turin in the Dark Ages is therefore extremely difficult, and our explanations can be at best partial.

We know that in these insecure times, walled cities like Turin offered some protection from the waves of invaders that ravaged the region; the more vulnerable rural areas however suffered heavily. Many villages and hamlets disappeared, and the surviving population grouped itself in manors under the protection of some local warrior and his men, eking out a meager existence through subsistence agriculture. The political and administrative structure of the Roman empire withered away, to be replaced by a sequence of short-lived barbarian kingdoms. After the fall of Rome, Turin was absorbed into the kingdom of the Ostrogoths, who had conquered much of Italy. Within a century they were replaced by the Lombards, whose kingdom lasted until the later eighth

century, when it was conquered by the Franks. Turin then became part of a Kingdom of Italy (*Regnum Italiae*) that embraced the northern and central regions of the peninsula. It formed part of the empire that the Frankish ruler Charlemagne had conquered, extending from northern Spain to the Low Countries and central Germany. Within this empire Turin and its Alpine passes formed the link between the heartland of the Frankish empire, its Italian territories, and its spiritual capital at Rome.

By the end of the ninth century, however, the Frankish empire had dissolved into a welter of warring kingdoms and dukedoms. In the Kingdom of Italy the great territorial magnates fought among themselves, while trying at the same time to repel the repeated invasions of Saracen and Magyar raiders. Turin formed both a bulwark against the Saracen incursions across the Alps, and a vital strongpoint for any ruler seeking to dominate the Italian kingdom. Finally, in the later tenth century the fragmented Italian kingdom was incorporated by the Emperor Otto I into the Holy Roman Empire. Turin fell under the sway of a local warlord, Arduin "the Smooth-Faced", who ruled the city, its surrounding territory and the Alpine corridor as a frontier territory that came to be known as the March of Turin. His dynasty governed the city and the March for four generations as vassals of the emperor, with the title of counts and marquises of Turin, until the death of Arduin's last descendant, Countess Adelaide, in 1091.

The Arduinids however did not rule Turin alone. Like the Ostrogoths, Lombards and Franks before them, they shared power with the bishops, who since the time of St Maximus had wielded both spiritual and temporal authority over the city and its diocese. Kings and dukes, counts and marquises might come and go, but the episcopal government remained, providing an administrative structure for the city – albeit rudimentary – and a thread of political continuity. Through these chaotic centuries the bishops' authority waxed and waned; powerful rulers would encroach on it, but in the long intervals when Turin had no effective secular ruler the bishops resumed control over the city. Moreover the bishops and their clergy possessed an important advantage that enhanced their political strength: they were revered as spiritual leaders, and they constituted the only source of higher culture in the city. Along with the monastic institutions that began to spring up in the surrounding territory, at Novalesa and San Michele della Chiusa, the bishops and the clergy embodied an alternative to the warrior ethos that dominated this turbulent, brutal world. They were almost alone in being literate, and literacy conferred political power. The ability to draft documents and keep records was an indispensable skill, without which even bar-

barian kingdoms could not function. So what little we know of the history of this period is the work of the clergy who drafted the monastic chronicles, titles to properties, episcopal decrees, and imperial charters that are the only written sources we have. The scribes who labored in the episcopal curia, the monastic scriptoria and the imperial chancery created the fund of historical memory on which we rely when we try to reconstruct the events that transpired in Turin and its surrounding region during these long centuries of obscurity.

2. *After the Fall of Rome: The Ostrogoths.*

The final passing of the Roman empire in 476 would have had little if any perceptible impact on Turin and its citizens. The deposition of the last Roman emperor by the barbarian general Odoacer would have done nothing to change the political situation at the local level: life would have gone on as before. The bishop would have continued to govern the city, ministering to his people's spiritual needs and striving to protect them from the perils that threatened on all sides. Nor did the situation change significantly when in 493 Odoacer in his turn was overthrown by the invading Ostrogoths under their leader Theoderic. The Ostrogothic conquest seemed for a time to promise some stability and order to the people of northern Italy. A rudimentary "Pax Barbarica" took shape on the ruins of the "Pax Romana". Theoderic made himself king of Italy, with his capital at Ravenna, and attempted to preserve the basic elements of the Roman system of government. In one respect at least the rule of the barbarian Ostrogoths marked an improve ment over the late Roman administration, for Theoderic reduced taxation, easing the burden on the general populace. He installed garrisons to guard the frontiers of his new kingdom. One of these would have been based at Turin, which remained a critical frontier post for the Ostrogoths, as it had been for the Romans. We know that early in Theoderic's reign an invading army of Burgundians penetrated northern Italy from the west, through the Val d'Aosta, and went on to ravage the Lombard plain as far as Milan. The invaders took many of the local inhabitants captive, and Theoderic deputed the bishop of Pavia together with Victor, the bishop of Turin, to negotiate with the Burgundian king for their release. The two clerics carried out their dangerous mission with great success: we are told that the prisoners were set free without the payment of any ransom. In 508 Theoderic expelled the Burgundians from Lombardy and Piedmont into the Val d'Aosta, where some of them

settled. He then fortified the Alpine frontier, making Turin a strongpoint in his line of defenses.

But the fleeting stability that Theoderic's rule conferred on northern Italy came to an abrupt end after his death in 526. The Ostrogothic kingdom was torn by a succession dispute, giving the Byzantine Emperor Justinian the opportunity to intervene in Italy. His intention was to destroy the Ostrogothic kingdom and restore Roman rule over Italy, thus reuniting the lost western provinces with the eastern empire he ruled from Constantinople, and winning undying glory for himself by reuniting the ancient Roman empire. In 535 a Byzantine army led by Justinian's brilliant general Belisarius landed in Italy and began the reconquest. A long, savage war resulted, which laid waste much of northern and central Italy. The Ostrogoths, though divided, fought back tenaciously. They could draw on wide popular support, for the Byzantine army reimposed the late-Roman fiscal system, with its punitive levels of taxation, which the Ostrogoths had done away with. But by about 553 the last Ostrogothic resistance had been crushed, and Theoderic's former kingdom had dissolved.

3. *The Lombard Kingdom.*

Justinian's victory soon proved hollow. By destroying the Ostrogothic kingdom the Byzantine reconquest merely cleared the way for another barbarian invasion. In 569 the Lombards, led by their king Alboin, swept across the Alps from central Europe and quickly overran northern and central Italy. The defeated Byzantine army and its attendant officials took refuge in Ravenna: Byzantine rule in most of Italy was now effectively at an end. Within a couple of years the Lombards had occupied Piedmont and established themselves at Turin; the city would become a vital stronghold in the kingdom they now established in northern Italy, with its capital at Pavia. They ruled Turin and northern Italy for the next two centuries, leaving a lasting mark on the land. The north Italian plain still bears their name: Lombardy.

Who were the Lombards? Legend has it that they were a Germanic people whose name, "long-beards", was bestowed on them by their supreme deity, Wotan. Recent research however has shown that the Lombards who invaded Italy were not a single people, but a confederation of several different peoples, not all of them Germanic, led by the Lombards. Like the Ostrogoths before them, the Lombards were not simply an invading army in search of plunder, but an entire people – or

federation of peoples – on the move, in search of lands to settle. The warriors who conquered and occupied northern Italy were accompanied by their families and dependents, but even so they cannot have been very numerous: they were a warlike minority that imposed itself by force of arms on the far larger indigenous population, who called themselves Romans. Until recently historians believed that by the time the Lombards invaded Italy they were no longer pagan, having converted to Arian Christianity – a heresy that denied the divinity of Jesus Christ, and that had deeply divided the Church in the fourth century. But the question of their religious affiliation no longer seems so simple: although the majority of the Lombards were probably Arian, some may still have been pagan, while yet others apparently adhered to the Catholic orthodoxy upheld by the popes and the Italian bishops.

Arianism may not have been the Lombards' sole creed, but even so it created a religious dividing line between them and their Roman subjects, especially in the period immediately after the conquest: we know for instance that Bishop Ursicinus of Turin, who held the see from 562 to 609, was imprisoned for a time by the Lombard duke of the city, who was an Arian. But with the passage of time the religious divide seems to have grown less sharp, as increasing numbers of Lombards, either Arian or pagan, embraced the Catholic faith. By the end of the next century the diocese of Turin was once again in full communion with the popes at Rome, a sign that Catholic orthodoxy now prevailed there. But nevertheless the popes and the Catholic clergy remained irreconcilably hostile to the Lombards: Pope Stephen III in 770 denounced them as the kin of lepers, "perfidious and fetid". His hostility stemmed not only from theological differences, but from the Lombard kings' persistent attempts to conquer Rome and the Papal territories around it – the so-called Lands of St Peter.

The Lombards were first and foremost warriors, who settled disputes with the sword and carried on blood-feuds for generations. Their symbol of kingship was not a crown, but a spear. Their government rested on their military domination over the pre-existing Roman population. But they do not seem to have decimated and enslaved this population, as was formerly believed. They left the peasants and townsfolk to pursue their tasks, and let the bishops minister to their flocks. Turin is a case in point: as far as we can tell, despite the initial tension between the Arian rulers and its bishops, the latter continued in more or less unbroken succession after the conquest, although for a time they had to share their see with Arian prelates. And while some elements of the old Roman landowning class were swallowed up in the conquest,

many survived and merged with the Lombards to form a new composite landed elite. Lombard nobles took possession of lands around Turin: the hill of Superga across the Po from the city supposedly takes its name from a Lombard lady, Saroperga, who was once its owner. The story of the Lombard kingdom is thus one of gradual social and cultural assimilation between conquerors and conquered. Over the two centuries during which they ruled northern Italy the Lombards became gradually Romanized. One unmistakable sign of this slow cultural fusion is the disappearance of the Lombard language, as the late Latin vernacular of the indigenous population became the common language of Romans and non-Romans alike. Another indication of this cultural shift is the steady progress of Catholic orthodoxy at the expense of Arianism: by the end of the seventh century there were no more Arian bishops at Turin.

The Lombards did not attempt to preserve the Roman forms of government, as Theoderic and the Ostrogoths had done, although they maintained the use of Latin as the language of administration. They developed their own law-code, drawn up in the middle of the seventh century at the order of King Rothari, to serve as a parallel system of jurisprudence alongside the Roman law of the indigenous population. The Lombards abandoned the Roman tax system and supported their warriors directly from the produce of the soil: a sign that economic regression was causing a scarcity of money, which made it impossible to levy taxes and pay the army in cash. The Lombards also did away with the old Roman provincial organization, and replaced it with a system of about thirty duchies, centered on strategic cities, and governed by their local military commanders, or dukes. In northwestern Italy Turin, Ivrea, Asti and Novara became the seats of Lombard duchies. The dukes enjoyed a wide degree of autonomy: in the duchy of Turin this was especially necessary because of the need to mobilize forces quickly to repel possible incursions across the Alps. All the Lombard dukes owed allegiance – nominally at least – to their king, whom they chose as their supreme leader in war, and who held court at Pavia. But the control he exercised over his subordinate dukes was limited, for they disposed of considerable military forces, under their direct command. Nonetheless the Lombard kingdom, loose and decentralized as it was, formed a coherent political structure, and constituted the point of origin out of which the later Kingdom of Italy, the *Regnum Italiae*, would emerge under Frankish rule in the ninth century.

The dukes of Turin played a prominent part in the history of the Lombard kingdom, reflecting the strategic importance of their duchy. In the early years after the conquest the throne remained vacant, until

in 590 Agilulf duke of Turin, "dux Taurini", was chosen king by his fellow-dukes. He reigned until his death in 616. His election may well have been a response to the threat of invasion and demands for tribute from the powerful Frankish kingdom to the west: he stabilized relations with the Frankish kings and ended the payment of tribute to them. He became a champion of orthodox Catholicism against the Arians, because he had married Theodelinda, a Bavarian princess who subscribed to the orthodox or Roman form of Christianity. He became the protector of the Irish missionary-monk Columbanus, who arrived at his court in 610, and two years later founded the monastery of Bobbio, near Piacenza. King Agilulf supported this foundation, and over the years it would grow into a great center of learning, with an extensive library of rare manuscripts. Agilulf was succeeded by his son Adalualdus, who was in turn deposed by Agilulf's son-in-law Arioldus: succession to the Lombard throne was a turbulent affair, decided by the military strength of the contenders. But gradually the political structure of the kingdom began to achieve greater stability and political maturity. And once settled on the land the Lombard warriors evolved into a landowning elite whose primary concern shifted from military service to the management of their estates. The ebbing of their earlier warrior spirit helps to explain why the Lombard kingdom would crumble with remarkable speed in the face of the Frankish invasions in the later eighth century.

The Lombard dukes of Turin transformed the Roman city, by then degraded by war and neglect, and added to its stock of Christian monuments. In all probability one of the city's original three churches, dating from the time of St Maximus, was taken over and used for worship by the Arians, at least for a time. We know that the cathedral-baptistery of St John was the scene of a dramatic murder at Easter 662, when Duke Garipaldus was killed by a retainer of his brother (whom he had defeated and slain in a dispute over succession to the throne). The assassin lay in wait for him on top of the baptismal font, which must have been an imposing structure. We also know that the Lombards constructed a ducal palace in the northeast corner of the city; it was probably a fortified enclosure, built on the site of the former Roman Praetorium, more or less where the royal palace now stands. A new church was built close to this palace, probably by the Lombard dukes. It was dedicated to St Peter (a saint the Lombards particularly revered), and was distinguished by the appellation *de curte ducis* – "of the duke's residence". Several other churches in the city and its vicinity may also date from the Lombard era, and the convent of St Peter, which stood in the southwestern quarter of the city, was almost certainly a Lombard foun-

dation. The archaeological evidence we possess, though scanty, reveals that the city's Roman ground-plan was losing some of its regularity, as houses were rebuilt with little regard for the boundaries of the streets. The Lombard buildings were no longer constructed of stone or brick, in the Roman manner, but were made of timber, or on a timber frame with rough stone filling. The fabric of the city was changing, unmistakably and irreversibly.

4. *The Frankish Conquest and the Carolingian Empire.*

From the first, the Lombards had lived in the shadow of their powerful neighbor to the west, the kingdom of the Franks, in what is today France. During the seventh century the threat of attack abated, because of the growing weakness of the Merovingian kings who ruled the Frankish state, but in the early eighth century Frankish power began to grow once more, as the family of a powerful nobleman, Pepin of Heristal, began to supplant the Merovingian dynasty: his family would later rule the Frankish state as the Carolingian dynasty. One indication of resurgent Frankish influence along the sensitive Alpine frontier was the foundation in 726 of the abbey of Novalesa, in the mountains west of Turin, by Abbo, the Frankish governor of Susa. The abbey would evolve into an important center of learning, and would attract the generous patronage of Turin's rulers.

In 751 Pepin III, the grandson of Pepin of Heristal, was proclaimed king of the Franks after he had deposed the last Merovingian ruler, and secured the approval of Pope Zacharias to legitimize his family's seizure of power. In return for this moral support the new Frankish dynasty deployed its formidable military power to defend the pope against the Lombards, who were threatening Rome. Pope Stephen II appealed for aid to Pepin, whom he anointed king of the Franks, confirming him as their legitimate ruler. Pepin then led an army into Italy, and defeated the Lombard king Aistulf. The Lombard kingdom was now clearly subject to Frankish military power, and given the aggressive territorial ambitions of the new Frankish rulers, its demise was only a matter of time. In 771 Pepin's son Charles – later to be known as Charlemagne, or Charles the Great – became sole ruler of the Frankish kingdom. Throughout his reign he would use his army of mounted knights to wage continual wars of conquest against his neighbors, creating a Frankish empire that ultimately stretched from the river Elbe to Catalonia. In 800 Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Ro-

mans by Pope Leo III: with the endorsement of the papacy, the semi-barbarian Carolingians had revived the Roman empire in western Europe, at least in name.

The Lombard kingdom was quickly incorporated into this empire. Responding to yet another papal appeal for help, in 773 Charlemagne launched the final invasion of Italy that put an end to Lombard rule. His main army crossed the Alps by the Great St Bernard pass, while he himself led a smaller detachment over the Mont-Cénis and down the valley of Susa towards Turin. The Lombards tried to bar the bottom end of the pass with fortifications, close to where the abbey of San Michele della Chiusa now towers above the entry to the plain, but Charlemagne's forces outflanked these defenses – perhaps using mountain paths pointed out to them by one of the monks of Novalesa – and quickly overwhelmed the Lombard army. In all probability Turin would have been the first city to fall to the Franks. Within a year Charlemagne had captured Pavia, the Lombards' capital, and deposed their last king. Charlemagne now assumed the title of "King of the Franks and Lombards", demonstrating his intention to rule his Italian kingdom as one of the provinces of his Frankish empire. It retained its separate identity, and was still known as either the Kingdom of Italy, the *Regnum Italiae*, or the Kingdom of the Lombards, the *Regnum Langobardorum*. Pavia remained its capital, the place where its kings were proclaimed. But Charlemagne did not rule this realm in person; his capital was far to the north of the Alps, at Aachen, and he ruled as an itinerant monarch, fighting wars across the length and breadth of his empire, and issuing edicts from wherever he halted in his travels. In 781 he installed his son Pepin the Younger as king of his Italian domains, and had him crowned by the pope. But Pepin died young, and the royal title temporarily reverted to his father. Locally, authority was exercised in the emperor's name by Frankish officials, or counts, whom he appointed to govern the Italian territories. Several times Charlemagne passed through Turin, notably in the year 800, on the way to his coronation in Rome, but his presence there, as in all of Italy, was fleeting.

Charlemagne's government in Italy built on the structure created by the Lombards, but modified it in significant ways. In certain respects there was obvious continuity: Carolingian counts merely replaced the Lombard dukes in key cities like Turin. Frankish local administration was probably more effective than that of the Lombards. The Carolingian counts were more numerous than the Lombard dukes had been, and governed smaller areas. Furthermore, the emperor dispatched itinerant officials – the *missi dominici* – to investigate abuses, administer

justice, and supervise local administration where he deemed it necessary. Following his usual practice, and in accordance with the multiethnic character of his empire, Charlemagne did not impose Frankish law on the conquered realm, but left the old law-codes in place. In other respects, however, the military and political institutions of the Kingdom of Italy were transformed. Unlike the Lombards, the Franks had not entered Italy as a migrating people, but as a conquering army. They formed a new military aristocracy, superimposed on the existing structure of society, displacing but not eliminating the former Lombard-Roman ruling class; over time this new aristocracy would blend with elements of the old, as the Lombards had gradually merged with the Romans.

The most salient feature of the new Carolingian regime, which differentiated it sharply from the old Lombard government, was its close reliance on the Church. The orthodox Franks had always been close allies of the popes. As the Carolingian empire took shape, clerics came to occupy many of the high posts in the imperial chancery and the administration. The Carolingian governmental machine, such as it was, therefore relied heavily on members of the clergy, because of their administrative skills, which the military aristocracy lacked. The Church also functioned as a valuable source of patronage, through which Charlemagne and his heirs could reward faithful service and create ties of obligation. Even more importantly, the Church provided the ideological underpinning for the Carolingian regime. The anointment and coronation of successive Carolingian rulers by the popes at Rome conferred legitimacy on the dynasty and sanctified its exercise of power. The concept of a revived Roman empire, no longer pagan but Christian, over which the Carolingians reigned as heirs to the Caesars, originated with the papacy. This ideology legitimized the Carolingians' military expansion, presenting their conquests as a civilizing and Christianizing mission.

Turin provides a good example of this system of government at work. The city and its county, whose borders now included the valley of Susa, were more strategically important than ever, for they commanded a critical axis of Carolingian power, from the Frankish heartland, through the Kingdom of Italy, to papal Rome. The route across the Alpine passes now took on a new name: the *strata francigena*, or "Frankish Road". We possess little information on the Frankish counts who governed Turin and guarded this vital artery, but we know that their administration was more sophisticated than that of the Lombard dukes, which had consisted of little more than a grouping of military retainers. The count administered the county in the emperor's name, and dispensed justice with the aid of his chief men, lay and clerical. One of the few surviving

records from the count's court provides a rare and fleeting glimpse of everyday life in the region at this time. In 827 Count Ratbert and the imperial *missus* Boso adjudicated a case between the abbot of Novalesa and seventeen peasants, who denied that they were his serfs, bound to the soil and to his service, as he claimed. The court gave judgment in favor of the abbot. A similar verdict was handed down in a case brought before the count's court by two peasants in 880. These cases reveal both the spread of serfdom in the region, and the resistance of peasants who refused to accept servile status, and were ready to go to law to challenge even a powerful landlord like the abbot.

The historical record provides some information about the way the clergy functioned as a pivotal element in the Carolingian administration. In 816 the Emperor Louis the Pious, Charlemagne's son and successor, appointed his former chaplain and adviser Claudius as bishop of Turin. The choice was clearly motivated by the need to ensure that this strategically-located diocese was in trusted hands. Probably thanks to Claudius's influence Turin was named by an imperial edict of 825 as one of the cities in which a *schola* or cathedral school was to be established. By imperial order these institutions of higher learning were set up in regional centers, to train the local clergy: the *schola* at Turin was designated as the institution for students from Piedmont and Liguria. We do not know how long it functioned, however, and we are forced to conclude that it did not survive for very long. Bishop Claudius seems to have been a vigorous, even contentious person. He campaigned against the popular cult of holy images, which were very popular because of their supposed miraculous powers, arousing much opposition among the people of his diocese. He was also a warrior-prelate who directed the defense of the region against the bands of Saracen raiders who had started to launch attacks across the Alps from southern France. In 832 he was succeeded by Bishop Witgar, who had also served as an imperial official. Witgar's successor, a certain Regimirus, reformed the cathedral chapter of Turin, in line with the ideology of Christian renewal that was central to the Carolingian imperial ideal. He instituted the rule of St Chrodegang of Metz, promulgated a century earlier, under which the canons of the cathedral lived a form of monastic life. But rather than living as monks, in seclusion from the world, the rule required them to take an active part in administering the diocese and its lands, in collaboration with their bishop.

The Carolingian empire, though powerful and extensive, was beset by grave internal weaknesses, which would ultimately destroy it. First and foremost among these was the uncertainty surrounding the right of

succession. When Charlemagne's son Louis the Pious died in 840 a civil war erupted between his three sons; it ended with the partition of the empire between them. Louis's eldest son, Lothar, received a middle kingdom stretching from Italy to the Low Countries. In 870 another succession war was followed by another round of partitions which carved up this middle kingdom, leaving Lothar's son Louis II as ruler of the Kingdom of Italy alone. As a result of these partitions it now re-emerged as a separate territorial unit. Louis II struggled to defend his Italian kingdom against external attackers, and to curb the growing independence of his great vassals, the counts and dukes who ruled vast swathes of the kingdom under him. When Louis II died in 875, another round of succession wars ensued, as his uncles fought over his kingdom. His uncle Charles the Bald, ruler of the western Frankish state, succeeded in winning the Italian crown, but was then defeated by an alliance of the kingdom's magnates who swung their support behind his brother, Louis the German, ruler of the eastern Frankish realm. Charles was forced to retreat through Turin and Susa over the Alps to Maurienne, where he died late in 877.

Louis the German had died in 876, and was soon followed to the grave by his son Carloman: the male line of the Carolingian dynasty was fast dying out, creating the possibility for the great territorial magnates to put forward their own claims to the throne. Charles the Fat, son of Louis the German and last of the Carolingians in the male line, was elected king of the western Franks, then assumed the imperial title, and was crowned by the pope in 881. But he faced overwhelming difficulties: besides the unruliness of his great lords, his empire was under attack from fierce foes, the Vikings in the north and the Saracens in the south. Charles proved incapable of overcoming these dangers, was judged incompetent by his great vassals, and was deposed by them in 887. The direct line of Carolingians came to an end. With no undisputed king to rule it, the Kingdom of Italy became a battleground in which the territorial magnates contended for the crown. A century of anarchy ensued.

5. *After the Carolingians: The March of Turin.*

In the twilight of the Carolingian empire, power was passing from the descendants of Charlemagne to their great vassals. In the course of the ninth century a handful of great lords – counts, dukes, marquises – had taken advantage of the weakening of imperial authority to assert a hereditary right to their offices. They ruled extensive territories, levy-

ing their own armies and extending their dominance over the towns and the peasantry. The succession wars of the preceding century had afforded them many opportunities to extort privileges and land from the different contenders for the crown, in return for their support. As the Carolingian dynasty faded away, these territorial magnates fought to reign over the Kingdom of Italy in their stead. In these recurring contests for the crown, might made right. The title of king went to the strongest magnate, who could defeat his rivals and win the support – or at least the acquiescence – of his fellow lords. But none of these contending warlords could hold onto power for long: their reigns as kings of Italy were brief and unstable. Events in the county of Turin illustrate how political and military power had devolved to the territorial magnates, and how they constantly fought one another for supreme power.

In the last years of Carolingian rule, Turin and its county formed part of a conglomeration of territories ruled by Count Suppo II. His family was allied by marriage to the powerful feudatory Berengar, lord of Friuli in northeastern Italy. After Suppo died, some time between 882 and 888, the county of Turin passed under the sway of his three sons. But their rule was short-lived, for the deposition of Charles the Fat in 887 precipitated a contest for the crown of Italy which destroyed Suppo's lineage and transferred the lordship of the county of Turin to other hands. Early in 888 Berengar of Friuli proclaimed himself king of Italy at the ancient capital of Pavia, with the support of Suppo's lineage. In addition to being the most powerful territorial magnate in northern Italy, Berengar could also boast his descent from the Carolingian dynasty through the female line. But he was soon defeated in battle by a rival claimant, Guy Duke of Spoleto, who was then proclaimed king in his turn. The repercussions of this conflict were felt at Turin. To secure his hold on the crucial northwestern frontier of his kingdom, in 891 Guy created a new territorial unit, the March of Ivrea; it covered a vast area that embraced the county of Turin, and extended as far south as the coast of Liguria. This territory he entrusted to one of his loyal followers, a Burgundian noble named Anscar. Suppo's sons now vanish from the historical record, and Anscar's lineage would dominate the region for several generations to come. After Anscar's death in about 899 the March of Ivrea passed to his son Adalbert, with the title of marquis (or ruler of a March). In a move typical of the volatile political allegiances of the time, he soon abandoned the dukes of Spoleto and aligned himself with Guy's former foe, Berengar of Friuli, one of whose daughters he married.

Guy of Spoleto died in 894 and Berengar then reclaimed the crown.

But his reign was intermittent and chaotic, interrupted by continual challenges from other claimants to the crown. At last in 915, having overcome or outlived his rivals, Berengar had himself crowned emperor at Rome. He retained his title until he died a decade later, despite a serious revolt by some of his vassals, among them Adalbert of Ivrea. This endless fighting shattered what was left of the Carolingian governmental system, but even more dangerous threats were looming from outside the kingdom. At the end of the ninth century a band of Saracen raiders had established themselves at a place called "Fraxinetum" (supposedly present-day La Garde-Freinet) in southern France, from which they launched raids across the Alps into the March of Ivrea and beyond. These so-called "Saracens" were apparently Muslims from Spain and North Africa, aided and abetted by an assortment of local bandits. They occupied the Alpine passes and preyed on the merchants and pilgrims who ventured across them. In a spectacular raid in 921 they sacked the monastery of Novalesa and drove its monks to seek refuge inside the walls of Turin. During their sojourn there, Marquis Adalbert granted the monks the use of a small church in the northwestern corner of the city, which would later become the city's most revered sanctuary, dedicated to the Virgin, under the name of La Consolata. Almost a century would elapse before the Saracen raids ceased and it was safe for the monks to return to Novalesa and rebuild their monastery. Meanwhile an equally dangerous threat was gathering in the east. In 898 a band of Magyar raiders crossed the Alps from Hungary and attacked Berengar's Friulian March. The sudden onset of these fierce warriors, from a hitherto unknown race, spread panic across the Kingdom of Italy. Next year they returned in force and inflicted a catastrophic defeat on Berengar's army, and for the next few years they ranged unchecked across the north Italian plain, raiding as far west as Vercelli. Then their incursions ceased, but in 924 they returned and destroyed Pavia. Faced by the danger from Magyar and Saracen raiders, the rural population fled to the walled cities, or to the castles that were being hastily erected as places of refuge by the local magnates, who had taken over the task of local defense in the absence of any effective central government.

As lord of the March of Ivrea, Adalbert led the fight against these invaders. In 929 he died, to be succeeded by his sons Berengar II and Anscar II, who apparently divided the March between them and continued directing the resistance to the Magyar and Saracen raids. In 940 Anscar was killed in one of the recurring struggles for the crown, and his brother Berengar of Ivrea fled to Germany, where he was granted protection by the new Emperor Otto I. In 950 he returned to Italy, de-

feated his rivals, and was proclaimed king. To improve the defenses of the northwestern frontier he radically reorganized the March of Ivrea, retaining Ivrea itself under his own control, and splitting the remainder into three separate marches, which he granted to members of the region's three leading families. Marquis Oberto received southern Piedmont and Liguria, Marquis Aleramo the eastern region centering on Monferrato, while the newly-created March of Turin was awarded to a certain Arduin, nicknamed "the Smooth-Faced". Under Arduin the territory around Turin and the Alpine passes now re-emerged as a separate territorial entity, formally constituted as a frontier March. These four great dynasties, Berengar of Ivrea's Anscarid lineage, the Obertenghi of southern Piedmont and Liguria, the Aleramids of Monferrato, and the Arduinids of Turin, would dominate Piedmont for generations to come, and would give birth to the great feudal dynasties that ruled the region in the middle ages.

From the first, Berengar of Ivrea's position as king of Italy was threatened by Otto I, who had established himself as the unchallenged ruler of Germany. Otto laid claim to the title of emperor in succession to the defunct Carolingians, and was eager to assert his authority over the lesser sovereigns, whom he treated as his vassals. In 962 he marched into Italy, overthrew Berengar, and had himself crowned emperor by the pope at Rome. This date marks the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, the self-styled successor to the revived Roman empire of Charlemagne, which in its turn had claimed to revive the empire of the Caesars. The basis of Otto I's power however was not to be found in Italy, but in the support of the great feudal princes of Germany. The Empire's center of gravity lay north of the Alps, with the Kingdom of Italy forming its southern appendage, vital above all for its symbolic importance. To legitimize their rule, the emperors would always travel to Rome for the coronation ceremony, without which they could not truly call themselves emperors. As with the Carolingian dynasty, the moral and ideological support of the Church was an essential underpinning for imperial authority. And like the Carolingians, the Ottonian emperors used their superior military power to dominate the Kingdom of Italy, seeking to bend its territorial magnates to their will.

6. *Arduin, Marquis of Turin, and his Lineage.*

Among these territorial potentates Marquis Arduin of Turin figured prominently. He had risen from obscure beginnings: his forebears were

apparently knights of Frankish or Burgundian origin, who profited from the anarchy brought about by the collapse of the Carolingian dynasty to carve out a place for themselves in Piedmont. We first encounter Arduin around the year 945, already bearing the title of count. By then he was already established at Turin, in a fortress at the western gate leading towards Susa and the Alps, which served as his headquarters in his constant struggles against Saracen incursions. He proved himself to be an effective soldier and a resourceful – even unscrupulous – politician. About 950 he was invested with the March of Turin, probably by Berengar of Ivrea. He was also granted the right to administer the lands of the then-vacant abbey of Novalesa, in the upper valley of Susa. These lands, which Arduin had probably seized some time before, were a valuable acquisition, giving him control of the Mont-Cénis and Mont-Genèvre passes. When the abbot of Novalesa demanded that he give these lands back to the monastery, Arduin refused. His refusal earned him the undying enmity of the monks. The monastic chronicle of Novalesa, our sole source for Arduin's deeds, condemns him bitterly and unsparingly: he was "puffed up with pride", "avaricious", "a ravening wolf in the white clothing of a sheep".

If we discount this rhetoric, it is clear that Arduin was acting like every successful warlord of his time, aggrandizing his power and expanding his territorial holdings at the expense of his weaker neighbors, both lay and clerical; bowing to superior force when he had to; and consolidating his family's influence through well-chosen marriages. Although linked by marriage to his overlord Berengar of Ivrea – he married one of his daughters to the latter's son Conrad – he was probably involved in the conspiracy that overthrew Berengar in 961-62 and secured the Italian crown for Otto I. This well-timed shift of allegiance from one patron to another left him in undisputed command of the March of Turin, and evidently earned him the favor of his new overlord, the emperor, who rewarded him by elevating him to marquis of Turin. Arduin greatly increased the security of the March by maintaining an energetic defense against the Saracen raiders, and finally rooted them out. In 972 they kidnapped the abbot of Cluny, an august clerical dignitary, as he crossed the Alps on pilgrimage to Rome. This outrage sparked an immediate reaction. Next year Arduin mobilized his men, crossed the Alps, joined forces with the lords of Provence, and destroyed the Saracens' stronghold at Fraxinetum, putting an end once and for all to their depredations.

Arduin died some time around 976. As custom dictated, his lands were divided between his three sons: the eldest, Manfred, inherited the

title of marquis of Turin, while the younger sons received the title of count. But in the next generation this partition would not be repeated; the March would not be divided any further. Like the other great lineages of the Kingdom of Italy, the Arduinids were beginning to stabilize their rule, as the general political climate improved. This improvement came about largely because the Saracen and Magyar raids had ended. Arduin's victory over the Saracens was paralleled by the decisive defeat that Otto I inflicted on the Magyars in 955, halting their incursions for good. The relative peace that ensued in the later tenth century allowed Arduin and his heirs to foster the economic development of their March. They resettled peasants on deserted farmlands, and levied tolls on the commercial traffic over the Alpine passes, which was now starting to revive.

Their relationship to the emperor remained fraught with ambiguity, however. The power of territorial magnates like the Arduinids, not only in Piedmont but throughout the length and breadth of the empire, posed an inherent threat to the political order that Otto I and his successors were trying to create, and to the program of revitalized imperial authority – the *renovatio imperii* – they wished to implement. For all their military strength, and despite the luster conferred on them by the coronation ceremony at Rome, in practice the emperors disposed of only limited means for controlling their great vassals and compelling their obedience. So like the Carolingians before them, they came to rely on the clergy as the only authority that could offset the power of the great territorial lords. The empire was grounded in an alliance of the secular and religious authorities. The cornerstone of the emperors' policy was to appoint loyal bishops, who would uphold their interests against the territorial magnates.

For a time the new imperial order functioned smoothly in Piedmont. As far as we can tell from the scanty historical sources for the period, Marquis Manfred of Turin seems to have remained on good terms with his imperial overlord. When he died in about 1001 his son Ulderic Manfred succeeded without incident to his lands and titles. But the danger inherent in the way power was shared between the emperor and his great vassals was revealed dramatically by events in the neighboring March of Ivrea. Shortly after Ulderic Manfred's accession, Marquis Arduin of Ivrea proclaimed himself king of Italy, in defiance of the new Emperor Henry II. (This Arduin came from the Anscarid line that ruled the March of Ivrea, and was not a member of the Arduinid lineage of Turin, despite the similarity of names). His bid for the crown had been triggered by a dispute with the bishop of Vercelli, which climaxed in the latter's

murder by Arduin's followers in 997, drawing down on him papal condemnation and the wrath of the emperor. With the backing of the lesser nobility of his March, and the support of the powerful clans of the Obertenghi and the Aleramici, he managed to hold out for years against the emperor, until in 1014 he withdrew to a monastery, where he soon died.

Ulderic Manfred had remained neutral during this conflict, but after Arduin's death he quickly occupied the March of Ivrea. Although he was soon forced to relinquish it, his bold action won him the loyalty of Arduin's former partisans, and helped to extend his family's influence in northwestern Italy. This influence was underpinned by the network of marriage alliances the Arduinids had been contracting over the past two generations with the kingdom's other great feudal lineages. Ulderic Manfred was descended on his mother's side from the marquises of Canossa, whose lands extended from the southern Lombard plain to Tus cany, and he was married to Bertha, from the House of the Obertenghi that held sway over Liguria and southern Piedmont. He ruled his March from the residence – described as a *castrum* or castle – that his grandfather Arduin had built at the Susa gate on the western side of Turin. His power was reinforced by his close relationship to the Church. He seems to have been a generous patron of religious establishments, founding or helping to endow abbeys in the lands he ruled, at Caramagna, at Susa, and at Turin, where shortly before his death he established a monastery dedicated to San Solutore, one of the Theban martyrs formerly revered as the city's patron saints. Besides being an outward sign of his piety, these ecclesiastical foundations also served to root his family's authority more firmly in the territories it ruled.

For most of Ulderic Manfred's reign the diocese of Turin was governed by the energetic Bishop Landulf, with whom he seems to have maintained a harmonious political relationship, although it was marked at times by tension. Landulf was German by birth and had served as chaplain to the Emperor Henry II, who placed him in command of the see of Turin because of his proven loyalty. Bishop Landulf was an efficient administrator; he founded the important abbey of Santa Maria at Cavour, rebuilt or established churches to serve the villages now springing up in the countryside, improved the administration of his diocese's lands, and fortified a ring of townships to protect them, at Chieri, Piobesi, Rivalba, Cavour and other key points. His vigorous leadership revived the spiritual and economic life of his diocese. The abbeys that he and Ulderic Manfred founded stimulated the agricultural and demographic revival that was taking off in the countryside; the monks

supervised the clearing and draining of the land gifted to them, turning it into productive farmland, tilled by a dependent peasantry.

The partnership between the bishop and the marquis of Turin exemplified the kind of alliance between secular and religious authorities that formed the basis of the imperial system of governance. But this harmonious relationship was destined not to last, for by the early eleventh century a movement was gaining ground to reform the Church and free the clergy from their entangling relationship with the emperor and the feudal nobility. The reformers viewed the clergy's ties to the feudal order as a corrupting influence that made them too attentive to the affairs of this world, and distracted them from their spiritual mission. In the middle of the eleventh century the rising tension between the emperor and the popes who espoused reform would erupt into open conflict, and would be replicated lower down the imperial hierarchy in struggles between reforming bishops and the great territorial magnates.

Meanwhile tension of another kind was rising between the great lords of the Italian kingdom, both lay and clerical, and the knights who formed their armed retinues. These minor vassals demanded hereditary rights over the lands they held from their lords in return for service, a concession the lords were unwilling to make, for it would fragment their patrimonial estates. This issue came to a head at Milan, where the lesser vassals rebelled against their lord the archbishop. In solidarity with his fellow-magnate the archbishop, Ulderic Manfred intervened in the dispute and was killed fighting against the rebels in 1034. He left behind his widow, Countess Bertha, and three young daughters. Bertha assumed control of the March of Turin as regent for her eldest daughter Adelaide, who inherited her father's lands and titles. Bertha sought the protection of the Emperor Conrad II, who used this opportunity to arrange marriages for her two elder daughters, to ensure that the March of Turin would remain in safe hands. Adelaide was married to the emperor's stepson and trusted vassal, Duke Herman of Swabia. Her younger sister Ermengarde was married to another of the emperor's loyal followers, Duke Otto of Schweinfurt. Following the usual family practice of building alliances with local magnate lineages, the youngest sister, Bertha, married a scion of the House of the Obertenghi. Under Countess Adelaide, who became the real ruler of the March of Turin for much of the next half-century, the fortunes of the Arduinid lineage would reach their apogee.

7. *Adelaide, Countess and Marchioness of Turin.*

On Ulderic Manfred's death his daughter Adelaide had inherited the March of Turin (the succession passing through the female line in default of male heirs). The fact that her succession was uncontested demonstrated that the March had evolved into an ordered territorial principality, in which administrative continuity was maintained. Since Adelaide was still young, her mother governed the March until her death in 1042, in her daughter's name. By then Adelaide's first husband had also died. Shortly afterward she was married to Marquis Henry of Monferrato, of the Aleramic lineage, but he too soon died. In about 1045 Adelaide married her third husband, Count Oddo of Savoy. Each of her husbands in turn was formally invested by the emperor as marquis of Turin, a right they acquired through their marriage to her. She herself held the title of countess of Turin, but in time she would take the title of marchioness as well. In contrast to her first two marriages, that to Oddo of Savoy would prove lasting: he lived until about 1060 and she bore him at least five children. This marriage would be of great historical significance, for it constitutes the point of origin for the House of Savoy's claim on Turin and its territory. In time this claim would lead to the establishment of Savoyard overlordship over the city and its county, creating a composite domain spanning both sides of the Alpine chain and controlling the passes across it. But the fulfillment of that claim lay still far in the future.

Oddo was a younger son of Humbert "the White-Handed", count of Maurienne and Savoy, Alpine territories southwest of Lake Geneva which at that time formed part of the Kingdom of Burgundy. In the succession wars that broke out in Burgundy following the death of its last king in 1032, Humbert had expanded his domains to include the provinces of Belley and Bugey to the west, and the Val d'Aosta across the Alps to the east, making himself a force to be reckoned with in regional politics. This growing power helps explain why the Emperor Conrad II chose his son to be Adelaide's new husband; furthermore, like Adelaide and the Arduinid line, Humbert was also a loyal partisan of the emperor. After his father and older brothers died, some time after his marriage, Oddo inherited all the Savoyard domains west of the Alps, uniting them briefly with the March of Turin, and foreshadowing the shape of the future Savoyard state. But this union was destined not to last. The children of Oddo and Adelaide died one by one, and the dynastic link between their two patrimonies came to an end. The lands

west of the Alps were severed from the March of Turin, and reverted to the House of Savoy, while Turin became an independent city ruled by its bishop and its citizens. These two territorial units would remain separate until the end of the thirteenth century. But a connection had been established that would lead eventually to the union of the two Alpine territories under the House of Savoy.

After Oddo died, some time around 1060, Adelaide governed the March of Turin for a time as regent for their eldest son Peter, with the title of marchioness, until he came of age and was invested with the March in 1064. Her daughters meanwhile had made brilliant marriages, carrying the Arduinid lineage to the apex of the imperial hierarchy. The elder daughter, Bertha, was betrothed to the young Emperor Henry IV in about 1055, and married him a decade later. The younger daughter, also named Adelaide, married Rudolf duke of Swabia, from one of Germany's greatest families. By 1078 Adelaide's son Peter was dead, leaving behind him a young daughter, Agnes. Peter's younger brother Amadeus then became marquis of Turin, but in 1080 he too died, leaving no successors. The March of Turin then reverted to Agnes and her husband, Count Frederick of Montbéliard, but in fact Adelaide governed it with the titles of both marchioness and countess, until her own death in 1091. She either created or inherited an embryonic administration for her domains, consisting of a number of "vicecomites" or viscounts, each in charge of a different area of the March, and removable at the countess's pleasure. These subordinate officials, who were also described as "judges", apparently lived in a special compound adjoining the countess's fortified residence at the Susa gate of the city.

For most of her adult life, and even when supreme authority was tech nically vested in her husbands or her sons, Adelaide remained a central figure in the politics of the March. What we know of her suggests that she was a commanding personality, very conscious of her exalted position, and jealous of her authority. It is not surprising therefore that she showed little sympathy for the reforming movement in the Church, or for the communal movement, which took root only late in Turin, while in Piedmont during these early years it was spearheaded by the densely populated and active city of Asti, whose citizens repeatedly rebelled against their bishops. Since Asti and its county formed part of her March (an uncle of hers, Alrico, had held the office of bishop), Adelaide was deeply concerned by this conflict. So twice, in 1070 and again in 1091, her forces intervened against the rebellious citizens, defeated them, and sacked the city. Ultimately, however, this military repression failed. Asti won its independence, flourished, and became a powerful commune.

At this point we should perhaps try to place the rise of the Italian communes in perspective, for it is a historical development of fundamental importance. The communes laid the foundation of a new urban political culture, in opposition to the feudal, landed order around them, and gave rise to the flowering of city-state culture that was the distinctive feature of medieval Italian civilization. As the eleventh century progressed, groups of citizens in northern and central Italy – lesser nobles, lawyers and judges, merchants, sometimes artisans – began to demand the freedom to manage their own affairs, unfettered by the traditional authority of their feudal lords, either lay or ecclesiastical. In some cities, like Milan, these demands were also linked to popular pressure for religious reform. These disparate groups of citizens banded together in associations, formally united by a sworn oath, which they called "communes"; by this term they meant a collectivity united to protect and advance its members' common interests, economic, political, legal, administrative. The members of the commune elected their own officials, usually titled consuls, in opposition to the magistrates who governed their cities on behalf of the feudal lords. These communal organizations did not hesitate to challenge their lords and seize power by force, as the citizens of Asti did in the later eleventh century. The first mentions of fully-fledged communes come at the end of the eleventh century: at Pisa in 1081, Asti in 1095, Genoa in 1099, although by the time they make their appearance in the historical record they had probably existed for some time already. The Italian communes represented a revolutionary departure in urban life; strictly speaking they originated as extra-legal organizations, outside the existing constitutional framework of their cities, or rather in direct opposition to it. Gradually they won legal recognition and acquired legitimacy, until finally they supplanted the old authorities and took over the government of their cities. Given the revolutionary potential of the communal movement and the threat it posed to the prevailing feudal order, it is small wonder that Countess Adelaide strove to crush it.

By reason of her importance as a leading territorial magnate and her dynastic ties to the imperial elite, Adelaide was called upon to play a central part in the politics of the Empire. This was a critical moment: in the middle decades of the eleventh century the political structure established by Otto I, based on the close relationship between secular and religious authority, was breaking down. Conflict was brewing between the emperor and the reform movement in the Church, over the emperor's right to appoint bishops and invest them with their lands. Adelaide's son-in-law, the Emperor Henry IV, was at the center of this con-

flict. He firmly believed that he must retain control of episcopal appointments, because his government's effectiveness depended on his ability to choose bishops – like Landulf of Turin – who would act as reliable local administrators. The reformers, on the other hand, saw the bishops' political function as a corrupting influence. To purify the Church, the reformers contended that they must break free of their symbiotic relationship with the secular power, epitomized by the emperor's appointment and investiture of bishops. They demanded that bishops be chosen and appointed by their fellow clerics, and not by the emperor. They extended their criticism to other abuses which they believed were part and parcel of this same web of worldliness: simony (the sale of clerical offices), and concubinage (which created clerical dynasties eager to divert the Church's property into their own hands). Countess Adelaide seems to have been sympathetic to some of the reformers' demands, and she was in fact a friend of one of the leaders of the reform party, Peter Damian. In his letters to her he urged her to use her influence on the side of the reforming party. But his hopes went largely unfulfilled. Adelaide was by all accounts a very pious woman – she founded a number of monasteries and convents in different parts of her extensive domains – but although she might sympathize in principle with the reformers' program, she could not approve of the manner in which they sought to implement it. She favored reform from above, through the existing political and ecclesiastical hierarchies, rather than reform brought about by pressure from within the body of the Church.

The dispute over the investiture of bishops came to a head after the election of Pope Gregory VII in 1073. He had been one of the leaders of the reform party, and as soon as he was elected pope he began to issue decrees implementing its program. In 1075 he banned the investiture of bishops by lay persons. Henry IV saw this decree as a direct challenge to his authority and to the integrity of his government, and retorted by convoking a council of loyal German bishops, who declared Gregory deposed. Gregory responded by excommunicating the emperor and releasing his subjects from their oath of allegiance, sparking a revolt that forced Henry to flee from Germany and seek the pope's forgiveness. In a dramatic confrontation at Canossa in the northern Apennines early in 1077 Henry did penance and received absolution from the pope. Countess Adelaide was closely concerned in these events, but her loyalties were divided. On the one hand Henry IV was her son-in-law (he was the husband of her daughter Bertha), but she was also related by marriage to Matilda, the powerful countess of Tuscany, who was a supporter of the reformers, and who had given sanctuary to the

pope in her castle at Canossa. Adelaide helped mediate the dispute and acted as a guarantor of the resulting settlement. But this agreement did not quell the revolt against Henry IV in Germany. In March 1077 his opponents elected Rudolf of Swabia, Adelaide's other son-in-law, as emperor in his place. Her two sons-in-law thus headed opposing sides in the civil war that was convulsing the empire, until it was cut short by Rudolf's death in 1080. And though the civil war ended, the dispute between the emperor and the pope went on unabated; the agreement that Countess Adelaide had helped to mediate between them proved to be only a truce in their long-drawn conflict.

Countess Adelaide's own attitude to the issue of Church-Empire relations was exemplified in her good relationship with the bishop of Turin, which continued the tradition of cooperation between her father and Bishop Landulf. Bishop Cunibert had come to the diocese of Turin in 1046, about the same time that the countess had entered the political arena, and his moderate views on religious reform were very close to Adelaide's. The best remedy for the ills that afflicted the Church, he believed, lay not in following the dictates of reforming pontiffs, but in ensuring that bishops like himself performed their duties conscientiously, and that the clergy acted collectively to uphold standards within their order. His unreceptiveness to reforming initiatives earned him the rebukes of Peter Damian, who also upbraided Adelaide for the same reason. In 1066 Bishop Cunibert was confronted by an outburst of reform in his own diocese, when the monks of San Michele della Chiusa elected a reformer as their abbot. The abbey, situated dramatically on a steep rock above the entrance to the valley of Susa, had been founded about a century earlier on the site of an old chapel dedicated to St Michael. Since its foundation it had developed rapidly into an important center of Christian learning, attracting endowments from pious benefactors. The monks refused to acknowledge the bishop of Turin as their superior, claiming that their institution was responsible to the pope alone. Cunibert's clash with them, besides being a conflict between a religious traditionalist and adherents of the reform movement, was thus also a dispute over the bishop's claim to exercise jurisdiction over a powerful monastery within the confines of his diocese. Bishop Cunibert refused to recognize the abbot's election, but the monks took their case to Rome and secured a favorable judgment. Cunibert rejected the papal verdict as outside interference in his diocese, and with Countess Adelaide's backing continued to assert his claims to jurisdiction over the monastery. His defiance led Gregory VII to suspend him: undaunted, he led two armed attacks against the monastery, seeking to impose his own candi-

date as abbot. Finally the pope himself intervened to mediate this long-drawn quarrel, and a settlement was reached shortly before Bishop Cunibert died in 1081.

Countess Adelaide had supported her bishop throughout this dispute because his views closely coincided with her own. Her attitude in political and religious matters was that of a feudal magnate born to command, brooking neither challenges to her authority nor external meddling in her domains. Under her administration the March of Turin enjoyed relative peace and stability, and when she died in 1091 she left it in good order. But its stability was already being undermined by forces inimical to her traditional concept of hierarchical order. The investiture conflict between the emperor and the pope dragged on, stirring up social and political tensions between the two sides' partisans. The towns were increasingly restive as the movement to establish self- governing communes gained momentum. Meanwhile the political and military power of the Arduinid lineage was eroding as its landed patrimony shrank, undercut by the need to make constant gifts of land to maintain the loyalty of its followers. And most dangerous of all in the short term, the countess left no clear successor to inherit her domains, opening the way for a succession struggle that would destroy the political cohesion of the March her forebears had built up.

Chapter III

The Bishop, the Commune, and the Count of Savoy, 1100-1280

1. *The Rise and Fall of the Commune.*

In the course of the twelfth century the citizens of Turin developed the institutions that transformed their city into a self-governing commune. This process was not a simple linear transformation from dependency to autonomy; it was slow and halting, for in their struggle for independence the citizens had to contend with the entrenched power of their bishop, and the intervention of external powers, notably the emperor. Nevertheless, by the end of the century the institutional structure of the commune was complete. Turin had by then become a small city-state, with all the attributes of sovereignty: it chose its own officials, levied taxes, administered justice, made laws, and fought wars against its neighbors. In the early thirteenth century the now-mature commune eclipsed the bishop as the dominant force in the city's political life.

This hard-won autonomy was destined not to last, however, for Turin never developed the strength to defend its independence and expand its territory. The city was never big enough or rich enough to assume more than a minor role in the politics of its region. Hemmed in by many nearby cities and local lords, it was never able to acquire a large dependent territory, as Milan, Venice and Florence did, and as a result it lacked the resources to become politically powerful, and ultimately to safeguard its independence. In the harsh political environment of northern Italy it was constantly menaced by its neighbors, whether rival communes like Asti or Vercelli, or feudal princes like the marquises of Saluzzo and Monferrato, and the counts of Savoy. So in the later thirteenth century Turin fell under the sway of one after another of these predatory neighbors, in a pattern that was repeating itself throughout northern and central Italy: the smaller cities were either swallowed up by their neighbors, or were taken over by a powerful magnate, who made himself *signore* or lord of the city. In the later thirteenth century, after first coming under the domination of Asti, and then being forced to accept the marquis of Monferrato as *signore*, Turin was subjugated by Thomas III

of Savoy, in 1280. It would remain a possession of the House of Savoy from that time onward.

We should be careful not to assume that the Savoyard takeover of Turin was the result of some long-meditated design that reached its inevitable dénouement in 1280. For two centuries before that date the counts of Savoy had tried to expand into the Piedmontese plains from their bridgehead at Susa, and had intermittently advanced their hereditary claims to Turin, but had never been able to seize the prize they coveted. Too many rivals stood in their way. Thomas III of Savoy finally attained this long-cherished objective by exploiting the chaotic political situation that developed in late thirteenth-century Piedmont after the death of the Emperor Frederick II in 1250. The resultant collapse of his political following, the Ghibellines, created a power-vacuum in which the bigger cities and feudatories competed for dominance within the region. In this vicious competition Thomas III outmaneuvered his rivals through a combination of guile and inspired opportunism, seized Turin from his most dangerous rival, and was proclaimed *signore* in 1280. But this coup did not lead to secure domination; the Savoyard dynasty's hold on Turin would remain precarious for a long time, and the city would not be fully integrated into the Savoyard domains for more than a century to come.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries we begin to have a fuller and more detailed picture of Turin and its people than we had for the earlier period, thanks to the more abundant documentation that has survived. A wider variety of source-materials – above all a growing number of private documents and official acts, in addition to the ecclesiastical documentation – is now available. These sources are still discontinuous and fragmentary, but they allow us to form an idea of how the city's political structure evolved, how its economy developed, and how its citizens lived in an era of rapid economic and demographic growth. We can begin to follow the fortunes of some of the city's leading families, and even in a few cases to reconstruct how particular individuals amassed and disposed of their wealth. In a more general way we can see how the city's economy functioned and how its urban fabric may have looked, as new churches and public buildings were constructed. In this way we can trace the history of Turin and its people in some detail between two critical moments: from the end of the Arduinid dynasty at the end of the eleventh century, through the ascendancy of the bishops and the emergence of the commune, to the seizure of power by Thomas III and the beginnings of Savoyard domination.

2. *Conflict over the Succession.*

The death of Countess Adelaide in December 1091 opened a new era in the history of the Turinese March that she had ruled so firmly for so long. The political climate was changing fast; the factors that had created the March had now given way to new forces that threatened its existence. The investiture conflict between the pope and the emperor continued unabated, eroding the latter's moral and political authority, spreading divisions among the ruling elites of the Kingdom of Italy, and undermining their allegiance to the emperor. The conflict also facili tated the north Italian cities' push for autonomy; the communal movement was gathering strength. Within the March of Turin itself the power of the Arduinid lineage was threatened by the rise of the communes and the growing independence of the lower nobility. Adelaide and her predecessors had made extensive grants of lands and privileges to their vassals in order to secure their loyalty. This policy worked in the short run, but over time it diminished the family's patrimony, undercut its authority, and strengthened the local lords. Furthermore, given the absence of a clearly defined successor to the March, conflict was bound to ensue when Adelaide died; several branches of her family put forward claims to it. Adelaide's death thus precipitated a crisis that would destroy the March of Turin.

First and foremost among the claimants was the Emperor Henry IV, the husband of Adelaide's daughter Bertha. Eager to ensure that the March remained under his control, he claimed it on behalf of his wife and their son, Duke Conrad of Franconia, whom he formally invested as its lord. But the investiture had no practical effect: Conrad never set foot in the March, and died within a few years. On the other hand, Adelaide's grand-daughter Agnes, the daughter of her eldest son Peter, had the advantage of actually residing in Turin. Her husband, who had ruled the March – in name at least – since 1080, had died recently, leaving their young son Peter as the titular heir. Agnes took over the government as regent for her son, but he too died young, leaving no heir. Meanwhile two other contenders moved to assert claims based on their dynastic ties to the Arduinid lineage, which they tried to make good by seizing parts of the March. Marquis Boniface del Vasto, of the powerful Aleramid clan entrenched in Liguria, occupied some of its southern territories, on the basis of his descent from Adelaide's sister. At the same time Count Humbert II of Savoy, Adelaide's grandson, occupied Susa and its valley, and then advanced on Turin. Although he failed in his

bid to occupy Turin, he had staked out the Savoyard family's claim to the Arduinid lands east of the Alps, creating a precedent for the future. He and his successors consolidated their hold on Susa and the surrounding region, putting their own officials in charge of the localities, and setting up a mint to issue their own coinage. Humbert II was also careful to secure the support of the Church by endowing new monastic foundations and making generous gifts to those already in existence – the abbeys of Novalesa, San Giusto at Susa, Santa Maria at Pinerolo, and San Michele della Chiusa. The piety that motivated these gifts should not be underestimated, but neither should the political calculation behind them: the House of Savoy could not do without the support of these great monasteries as it worked to extend its influence. By securing their hold on Susa and its valley the counts of Savoy estab lished a bridgehead east of the Alps, from which they gradually expanded their territories in Piedmont. For a long time their advance would be fitful, however. Humbert II died in 1103, leaving a young son, the future Amadeus III, who would not come of age for many years; his long minority interrupted the line of policy his father had laid down.

In the end, none of these rivals made good their claims to the Arduinid inheritance. Their struggles dismembered the March, but none of them was able to occupy Turin, which now became a separate territorial unit, split away from the rest of the former March. Authority reverted to the traditional head of civic life, the bishop, who emerged as the real winner in the succession struggle. While the Arduinids ruled the city, the bishops had been forced to defer to them, but in the power vacuum created by Countess Adelaide's demise the bishops regained their dominant place in city politics. With the support of the local lords, successive bishops fought to make good their rights over their diocese, which embraced the city and the lands around it. In course of time their efforts turned their diocese into a small ecclesiastical principality, in which the bishops ruled as princes over an agglomeration of villages and local lords.

By this time Turin and its surrounding district constituted a prize worth fighting for. The local economy was prospering, as traffic along the Frankish Road grew, and the tolls levied at the city gates increased. Since the early eleventh century a market had been held in the city – perhaps on the site of the old Roman forum – where local manufactured goods and foodstuffs were bought and sold. The bishops had every interest in keeping control over the growing economic and political asset that Turin represented. So when Humbert II advanced from Susa towards Turin in 1098 it was Bishop Vitelmo who blocked his way, by

gathering his vassals and their men at his castle at Rivoli. By repelling Humbert's bid to capture Turin Vitelmo assured the bishops' ascendancy over the city for the future. The only potential alternative to their authority was the citizen body, but unlike the citizens of Asti or Vercelli or Milan, who were organizing themselves into communes, the citizens of Turin were still only an embryonic political force. Turin lagged behind these more assertive neighbors in developing the institutional framework of urban autonomy. Its citizens would not appear as a formally constituted commune for half a century to come, and would not finally supplant their bishop as the dominant force in city politics until the beginning of the next century.

3. *The Bishop and the Emerging Commune.*

The power of Turin's bishops derived primarily from their authority as spiritual leaders of the urban community and as heads of the diocesan clergy, and from their long history as the city's leaders and protectors since the time of St Maximus. They were also the city's cultural leaders, in an age when the only culture was that of the Church. The bishop's court, or curia, and the great monasteries in the area offered the sole exemplars of the life of the spirit and the intellect in a roughhewn world of illiterate rustics and soldiers. But the bishops' power also rested on more mundane foundations. By this time they disposed of considerable landed wealth, which allowed them to maintain their own military forces, and to found castles and villages in the countryside. They were in fact prince-bishops, ruling a small principality centered on the city of Turin. Their patchwork of lands – the fruit of purchases and pious bequests over many centuries – yielded increasing revenues, as the rural population expanded and agricultural production rose. So too did the proceeds from their judicial and fiscal prerogatives: the fines assessed by their courts, and the tolls on traffic moving along the roads through their domains. Personal prestige strengthened their ascendancy too, for the bishops usually came from important local lineages: Bishop Vitelmo, who repelled Humbert II of Savoy in 1098, hailed from a clan of viscounts who had risen to prominence through their service to Countess Adelaide.

Finally the bishops enjoyed another important advantage: they had at their disposal what was by the standards of the time a sophisticated administrative apparatus, staffed by literate officials who kept their records and handled their judicial and fiscal business. The documents

that have come down to us from the eleventh century give us glimpses of the episcopal chancery and its *scriptorium* at work. Its scribes, some of whom we know by name, like a certain Adam Presbiter, were trained professionals capable of drafting a range of edicts, title-deeds and contracts, in competent Latin and a well-formed script. In the twelfth century these scribes were joined by a number of notaries, whose skills further augmented the administrative efficiency of the bishops' chancery.

The professional skills of the notary were an essential element in the revival of urban culture in this period, vital for the development of civic administration, law and commerce in the emerging communes. The "art of the notary", as it was called, was a complex and demanding discipline, so important that in theory the emperor alone could award diplomas granting entry to the profession; in practice, however, the emperors delegated this authority to local lords and bishops, and to the cities. Men entering the notarial profession were required to study under a master, who initiated them into the complexities and responsibilities of their craft. Somewhat later, a system of examinations was developed in order to regulate entry to the profession. The art of the notary required a knowledge of Latin, of the technical terminology used in official documents, and of Roman and customary law. The notary's function was to draft both official acts, and private documents like contracts, land sales and wills, giving each of the parties involved a true copy, and retaining one in his own hands as a permanent record. The notary thus functioned as the keeper of the public trust, and his profession demanded not only technical competence, but impartiality, accuracy and integrity. In the course of the twelfth century we see notaries beginning to figure in the administration of the emerging Turinese commune, as well as those in the episcopal chancery, and others who handled private transactions. By the middle of the twelfth century Turin's notaries had formally constituted themselves into a guild. Their skills had become indispensable in the increasingly complex political and commercial life of the city, and these skills were well rewarded. We can identify several notaries who grew rich through the exercise of their profession and whose families rose into the ranks of the urban elite.

The notarial profession thus formed a vital thread in the fabric of Turin's urban life and the political culture of the incipient commune. So too did the legal profession. Together, notaries and lawyers formed the vanguard of a new secular culture that was emerging in the cities of northern and central Italy, distinct from the hitherto-dominant culture of the clergy. Judges and men learned in the law had always figured among the urban elites of northern Italy, even in the depths of urban

decline, but unlike the notaries, who tended to come from the middling strata of society, the legal specialists often came from the urban aristocracy. In the more complex social and political conditions of the twelfth century the numbers of lawyers steadily increased. The contemporary revival of Roman law – Justinian's Code, the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* – by the scholars at the University of Bologna can be seen both as a response to the growing demand for legal specialists, and as a sign of the growing esteem in which their profession was held. Roman law was becoming an essential instrument for the conduct of public and private business. It furnished principles for regulating the transfer and ownership of property, and for public administration, that did not differ from place to place like the multifarious rules of local customary law. It also provided an excellent foundation for the concepts of civic autonomy and secular sovereignty that were developing in the communes of northern and central Italy: these fledgling city-republics sought legitimacy by claiming descent from the republic of ancient Rome. The use of Roman law helped substantiate this claim, and provided the conceptual framework for a concept of political authority distinct from that of the Church or the aristocracy. Without the intellectual contribution of the legal and notarial professions the urban civilization of northern and central Italy would not have developed as fast and as fruitfully as it did.

Communal institutions were slow to appear in Turin, but from the early twelfth century the citizen body – the *cives Taurinenses* as they are styled in the records – appear as a recognizable entity. This designation probably refers to a nucleus of the better-off citizens, rather than to the entire urban population. The citizen body had probably begun to coalesce as a political force in the previous century, for there are occasional hints of friction between it and Countess Adelaide, but after 1091 her powerful presence no longer checked its emergence. The first formal recognition of Turin's citizens as a collective body comes in a charter issued by the Emperor Henry V in March 1111. In gratitude for the citizens' loyalty – we do not however know what events are referred to here – the emperor granted them jurisdiction over the road that led down from Susa and on towards Rome, with its pilgrim traffic and its trade: a lucrative privilege. This charter was renewed five years later, but this time with a proviso that upheld the bishop's rights, while at the same time guaranteeing the citizens' "liberties". The ambiguity of this formulation suggests that a dual structure of authority operated in the city. The bishop was the senior partner, but the charter indicates that the citizens had established their own jurisdictional sphere in which they

were not answerable to him. The emperor's overriding motive in making these concessions, at Turin as in his grants to other cities, was to foster urban independence as a counterweight to the power of the aristocracy, always the main threat to his authority. The charters asserted his sovereignty over the citizens as their overlord, denied the jurisdiction of the local counts and marquises over them, and made them (and their bishops) his direct subjects. And in this instance the emperor had a specific aim in mind: it was to gain the loyalty of Turin's citizens and ensure that the route to the Alps remained in friendly hands.

The charter of 1116 reveals that relations between the bishop and the citizens were tense. This tension increased: a decade later an uprising of the citizens forced the bishop to flee from Turin. His flight seems to have created the opportunity for a new political actor, the count of Savoy, to intervene. Until then the counts of Savoy had not figured on the urban political scene, but in 1131 Amadeus III, the son of Humbert II, occupied the city and proclaimed himself *comes Taurinensis*, or count of Turin. He was presumably acting at the request of the citizens, or at least of a faction of them, who wished to enlist his aid in their conflict with the bishop. But he could not maintain his hold on the city for very long. In 1136, during one of his periodic appearances in the Kingdom of Italy, the Emperor Lothar II expelled Amadeus III from Turin and punished the citizens who had supported him, probably at the instigation of the new Bishop Arbert, who had recently succeeded to the diocese. It is important to note, however, that this episode did not bring down the emperor's lasting wrath on Turin and its people. Maintaining an amicable relationship with the city was too important to him. So after he had put Amadeus III to flight, Lothar issued a new charter to the citizens, describing them as his "faithful" subjects and confirming their "liberties", while reserving the rights of the bishop as before.

These events set a pattern that would be followed for decades to come. Successive bishops would rely on the emperor to maintain them in command of their city, and in turn they would support the emperors in their struggle with the papacy. But the bishops' rights were contested: the count of Savoy had shown himself ready to seize any opportunity to advance his family's claims to Turin. Given the opposition he faced, however, Amadeus III could not pursue these claims. Instead he concentrated on improving the administration of his transalpine domains, until finally in 1147 he joined the Second Crusade and departed for the Holy Land. This was the second time Amadeus had embarked on crusade; he had already done so as a young man, probably about 1111. Taking the crusader's vow was probably the reason why he adopted the cross

as his personal emblem, and henceforth it became the heraldic device of the House of Savoy, passed down from generation to generation to the present day. Amadeus died a year later in Cyprus, where he had escaped after the crusading army suffered humiliating defeats in Syria. Another minority ensued, and it would be some time before his young son, Humbert III, could reassert the House of Savoy's claims over Turin and its diocese.

The bishop however now faced a challenge from another quarter: the citizenry. By mid-century there is clear evidence that a fully-fledged commune had been established at Turin. It probably consisted of the wealthier citizens, backed by elements of the lower classes, who however would have had no say in the government. The first mention of the commune's chief officials, who rejoiced in the grand Roman title of "consuls", appears in a notarial act of 1149 sealing an alliance between Turin and a neighboring lord. Another document from the same year records an alliance between Turin's "citizens" and the communes of Asti and Vercelli, directed against the new count of Savoy, Humbert III. At this juncture the emerging commune seems to have been acting in concert with the new Bishop Charles, who had succeeded to the diocese in 1147, and who would dominate the city until his death in 1169. An interval of two decades elapses before the consuls reappear in the historical record, probably because the bishop's forceful personality thrust the commune and its officials into the background. They finally reappear in 1170, after Charles's death. Until then it seems clear that the bishop was once again the supreme arbiter of Turin's political life.

The power and influence of the Church were evident too in the flowering of monastic life. The twelfth century saw the foundation of a number of important monasteries in the region around Turin. Some of these – as we have seen – were Alpine houses founded or sponsored by the counts of Savoy, but other pious benefactors endowed foundations in the Piedmontese plain within a short radius of the city. Many of them also functioned as hospices for the pilgrims who frequented the Frankish Road in growing numbers, bound for Rome or even in some cases for the Holy Land. Such were the monasteries of San Giacomo, whose hospice stood close to the crossing over the river Stura a little way north of the city, Santa Maria di Pozzo Strada west of the city, and Sant'Antonio di Ranverso, a few miles further west on the road to the Alps. This latter house was founded in 1156 as an offshoot of the Order of Hospitallers of St Anthony from Vienne in Provence. The Order specialized in treating the disease known as St Anthony's Fire, a painful in-

flammation caused by eating bread made from rye infected with the ergot fungus. This monastery complex included a hospital where the brothers treated their patients with a preparation of pigs' fat. (The symbol of their patron, the hermit St Anthony of Egypt, was the pig; he is usually depicted with a porcine companion). Further away from the city were the Cistercian monastery of Staffarda, founded in 1135 by Marquis Manfred of Saluzzo, and the Augustinian abbey of Vezzolano, which claimed to have been founded by Charlemagne, but whose actual establishment probably dates from the end of the eleventh century.

Besides dedicating themselves to a life of prayer and meditation, and ministering to the flow of pilgrims, the monks were also instrumental in developing the agricultural land deeded to them by their benefactors. The monastic houses were among the most innovative landowners, whose extensive estates served as models for other proprietors. The Cistercians, who had founded another house at Rivalta southwest of Turin, were particularly important as agricultural pioneers. They deliberately chose remote rural sites for their monasteries, far from the temptations of urban life. There, in obedience to their rule, they labored at clearing forests and scrublands, and making the waste land productive. They and the other new monastic communities that sprang up at this time thus helped to spearhead the region's economic development, besides enriching its cultural and spiritual life.

4. *Turin and Frederick Barbarossa.*

In 1155 Frederick I of Hohenstaufen, known as Barbarossa, was elected emperor and traveled from Germany to be crowned in Rome. In 1158 he convoked an assembly of his vassals at Roncaglia, near Piacenza, where he unveiled an ambitious program to reverse the decline of imperial power in the Kingdom of Italy. He proclaimed his intention to reimpose direct imperial rule, appointing his own officials to govern the cities, and levying taxes that had fallen into abeyance. Over the next two decades Barbarossa would conduct six campaigns in his Italian kingdom, endeavoring to implement this program and turn the shadowy sovereignty of the emperors into a concrete political reality. But in the end his grand design would fail, because he was forced to fight too many enemies on too many fronts: constant rebellions by the great lords in Germany distracted him, while in Italy he had to contend with the stubborn opposition of the papacy, and the determined resistance of many of the north Italian cities, led by Milan. These cities had enjoyed de facto

independence for decades and were unwilling to submit to him; he, as their supreme overlord, could not countenance their insubordination. The ideological gulf between the emperor and the Italian communes was summed up by Bishop Otto of Freising, the emperor's uncle and close confidant, who wrote a history of the early part of his reign. The Italian cities, he noted with alarm, defied their bishops and forced the nobles of their surrounding territories to acknowledge their authority. They did not observe accepted social distinctions, for they granted knighthood to men of inferior status, or even to "workers in the mechanical arts", as Otto disdainfully observed. But he had to conclude that they now surpassed "all other states" in wealth and power. Their riches, their military strength, and their lack of respect for social hierarchies all made them a formidable threat to the feudal order embodied by the emperor.

Turin was only peripherally involved in this epic struggle, whose storm-center lay further to the east, in Lombardy. But Bishop Charles was a staunch ally of the emperor, and was caught up in the thick of the conflict. The bishop looked to the emperor for support in maintaining his authority over the ecclesiastical principality comprised by the city and his diocese, and in return was ready to give him unwavering loyalty, even against the pope. As a reward for this loyalty Barbarossa issued a charter in January 1159 confirming the bishop's rights over his diocese, which was defined as including all the territory in a radius of ten miles around Turin. The diocese thus comprised some neighboring towns, notably Chieri, which by then had established its own commune and was trying to break away from the bishop's overlordship. Furthermore, the charter denied any Savoyard rights over Turin. It is important to note too that although the charter was granted to Bishop Charles, it also benefited the citizens of Turin, for the diocese corresponded to the territory the city claimed for itself: by legitimizing the bishop's authority over this territory the charter also legitimized the city's claims to it. The citizens and their bishop thus shared a common interest in establishing their undisputed legal right to this territory, in trying to bring Chieri and the other towns to heel, and in excluding the count of Savoy.

At first, fortune favored Barbarossa's Italian campaigns. In March 1162 he conquered the rebellious city of Milan and laid it waste. In August he entered Turin in triumph with his consort, was crowned with her in the cathedral at the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin, and then departed. But resistance soon sprang up again. Pope Alexander III resolutely opposed the expansion of imperial authority, and Milan quickly recovered. In 1167 it formed an alliance with other north Italian com-

munes, the Lombard League, which soon made Barbarossa's military position untenable. Under Bishop Charles, Turin remained loyal to the emperor and, like the other Piedmontese cities, did not adhere to the League. In January 1168 Barbarossa retreated from Lombardy to Turin, and then decamped ignominiously across the Alps through Susa. As the emperor's fortunes declined, so did those of Bishop Charles, his ally and protégé. The bishop had never been able to count of the undivided support of Turin's citizens; a few years earlier an opposing faction had declared him deposed, and had briefly installed their own candidate on the episcopal throne. After Barbarossa's defeat, Bishop Charles's hold on Turin and his diocese rapidly weakened. Rebellions broke out against him at Chieri and elsewhere in his diocese, and he was confronted by a new threat, from the count of Savoy. Humbert III, who for a long time had avoided committing himself to the emperor, had aided him in his flight across the Alps, and in return had extracted a number of concessions from Barbarossa. These apparently included some kind of recognition of the Savoyard claim to Turin. Humbert would soon make use of this supposed imperial grant to claim the lordship of the city and its territory, although in all probability he would never appear there in person.

In 1169 Bishop Charles died. His successor, Bishop Milo, adopted a radically different political stance. Born to a prominent Milanese family, he sympathized with the Lombard League and aligned himself with the anti-imperial faction at Turin, which had probably helped place him on the episcopal throne. Unlike his predecessor, he accepted the existence of the commune, and collaborated with it. The commune now revived as an administrative institution: the consuls reappear in the documentary record after 1170. They numbered seven in all, and were divided into two ranks, major and minor, probably on the basis of their social status. This division within the consular leadership would now become permanent. At the same time two new institutions start to appear in the records: a general assembly of the citizens, and a smaller council whose functions are not clear, but which was probably an advisory body composed of the leading citizens. Turin's communal government was now mature. From this time on it would function more or less continuously, and in the next century it would eclipse the bishop and assume sole direction of the city's affairs.

Meanwhile the war between Barbarossa and the Lombard League dragged on. In 1174 the emperor returned in force to northern Italy, crossing the Alps by the Mont-Cénis and passing through Turin. But this campaign too was destined to end in failure. At Legnano in 1176

the Milanese and their allies defeated him, forcing him to call a truce, and then in 1183 to sign a final peace treaty recognizing their autonomy. Barbarossa's defeat forced him to look around for new allies. One of them was Humbert III of Savoy, hitherto guardedly neutral, but now happy to profit from this display of imperial favor. With Barbarossa's backing, Humbert occupied a few places in the diocese of Turin, infringing on Bishop Milo's rights: it seems too that the commune may have acknowledged him as their lord, at least for a short time. But once Barbarossa concluded the final peace with the Lombard League in 1183, he had no further need of Humbert's self-interested support. In an evident effort to place Turin under the control of a more trustworthy ally he realigned himself with Bishop Milo, denied Humbert's claims to the lordship of the city, and forced him to evacuate the places he had occupied in the surrounding territory. As before, during Bishop Charles's time, episcopal command over the diocese was ultimately dependent on the emperor's support.

Defeat at Legnano had not completely dashed Barbarossa's hopes of restoring imperial authority in the Kingdom of Italy, and Turin figured in these plans because of its strategic position. He seems to have established some kind of official residence in the city, for we hear of an "imperial palace" there in the years after 1178. Meanwhile he was placing his own judicial officers, known as Podestàs, wherever he could in the north Italian cities. They acted as administrators and judges, kept the peace, and also collected the tolls and taxes due to the emperor. The office of Podestà proved to be a valuable administrative innovation and was soon adopted by many of the cities of northern and central Italy. The men who held the offices of Podestà came from a new class of professional administrators which was emerging in response to the demand for more sophisticated urban government. They were trained in the law, and backed up by their own personal staffs of secretaries and armed retainers. They were itinerant, holding their positions for six months or a year, then moving on with their staffs to take up a post in another city. Because they were outsiders, not tied to any particular faction in the cities they helped to govern, and serving only for a short term and then moving on, they were held to be more impartial than the consuls and other local officials. Handbooks soon began to appear for the use of this new class of public officials, counseling them on their moral obligations as keepers of the public peace, and detailing the administrative techniques and legal expertise they needed to discharge their multifarious duties. Turin's first Podestà is mentioned in 1196. He was probably an imperial appointee, but it seems that the emperor quickly lost the

prerogative of choosing who would hold the office. The rotating office of the Podestà soon became part of the commune's institutional framework alongside the consuls, and brought a new level of expertise to the business of governing Turin.

5. *The Urban Elite ca. 1200.*

By the end of the twelfth century the commune and its officials had come to dominate Turin's political life. The consuls and Podestàs followed one another in regular succession, the communal assembly met to deliberate, and its decisions were collected to form a corpus of statute law by which the city was governed. A small elite of wealthy families monopolized the offices of consul and the membership of the communal council. Now, as the bishop's power waned, this consular elite would assume undisputed control over the city. And thanks to the more abundant public and private documentation that we possess for this period, we can begin to identify the individuals and families who comprised this elite, and to form an idea of how they lived, how they made their money, and how they conducted their political affairs. Unfortunately, however, there is no corresponding body of evidence that would allow us to see how the mass of the citizens lived: our knowledge is restricted to the small circle of families that dominated the city's political and economic life.

By this time Turin had a total of perhaps 3,500 inhabitants, fewer than during the Roman period. Most lived within the circuit of the Roman walls, which still formed the city's defensive perimeter, but some were to be found in the suburbs that had sprung up outside the gates, where churches and monasteries formed nuclei around which clusters of houses coalesced. One suburb lay to the north, along the road to the bridge over the river Dora. Water was diverted from the river to irrigate fields and gardens, and to provide power for several mills. The Dora, like its sister the Po, was still an untamed river that frequently burst its banks and changed course, making it necessary periodically to relocate the bridge and the mills, and redirect the irrigation canals. The biggest suburb was located outside the western gate on the road to the Alps, clustering around the abbey of San Solutore and a handful of pilgrim hospices maintained by local monasteries, which offered free lodging to pilgrims traveling the "Frankish Road", or the "Roman Road" as it was now also known. In these hospices the wayfarers could find food and a bed for the night. In the course of the twelfth century this west-

ern suburb expanded, and the monks of San Solutore divided part of the land they owned there to provide building plots. The suburbs to the south and east of the city did not develop to the same extent, for the city's main commercial axis was between the western and northern gates, the road between Lombardy and the Alps. As time passed, however, the route from the eastern and southern gates across the Po towards Asti and Genoa gained in importance, as trade with those cities increased. It seems likely that until the end of the twelfth century the crossing over the Po would have been by means of a ferry, or by the ford opposite the hamlet of San Vito. From there the road wound over the hills towards the town of Chieri and on to Monferrato, Asti and Genoa. Our first documentary reference to a bridge over the Po is in 1204, and it refers to what was evidently a recent structure, perhaps erected in response to the increase in traffic along the road to the east. This bridge would have been built of timber, and would have required constant repair; a stone bridge would not be built until much later. The river Po itself was not a commercial axis at this time. Fluvial traffic was slow to develop, and the river's value lay in its fisheries and a few mills along its banks, which were owned by a couple of nearby monasteries.

Judging from what we know of other cities at this time in northern and central Italy, many – or most – of Turin's inhabitants would have been recent immigrants from the countryside, drawn to the city by the hope of finding employment and a better life, and by a desire to escape the domination of their rural lords. They remained attached to the countryside, and lived by farming the land around the city. They kept animals and stored their produce in barns next to their dwellings, giving Turin a distinctly rustic character. Farming was probably the mainstay of the city's economy, followed by the traffic passing through its gates, where various tolls were charged. Turin did not function as a place where goods were exchanged and redistributed; it lived off the movement of goods and people in transit. Frederick Barbarossa's charter of 1159 had granted the proceeds from some of these tolls to the bishop; others were the property of various lords, or the emperor himself. But these tolls were actually collected by a small group of local families, who leased the right to levy them from their nominal owners and reaped handsome profits from them. Merchants and travelers who tried to evade the tolls faced stiff penalties in the form of fines or the confiscation of their goods. The passage of pilgrims and merchants along the "Frankish Road" also benefited the city's innkeepers, since the law required travelers to spend a night in the city.

Turin at this time was not a center of manufacturing; consequently

no guilds of craftsmen developed there, as they did in many towns in Lombardy and Tuscany, where they gradually carved out a place for themselves in the city governments. Turin's guilds would emerge onto the political stage much later and much less assertively. Nor did Turin evolve into a center of banking and finance with far-flung connections, as Asti did. Its modest prosperity depended on its position astride the main trade route between northern Italy and France, and on the revenues from the surrounding territory, where its leading citizens acquired farms, mills and vineyards, or leased them from the Church and the nobility. These urban landowners and leaseholders profited from the rising demand for foodstuffs as the city's population expanded. Agricultural contracts preserved from this period reveal that they closely supervised the peasants who worked the land for them, stipulating that their fields must be carefully plowed and manured, their vines properly staked. In a phrase that frequently recurs in these contracts, the peasants were enjoined to cultivate the soil "diligently" for their masters.

A typical member of Turin's urban elite, with interests in the city and in the countryside, was a certain Pietro Porcello. He first appears as an official in the bishop's administration, and as his vassal, commanding one of the bishop's castles in the countryside. He also had ties to the rural nobility. In 1193 and again in 1199 Porcello appears as one of the commune's major consuls, indicating that he figured among the upper reaches of the city's elite. The top level of urban society was composed of men like him, who styled themselves "nobiles", and in some cases were descended from the knights and judges who had constituted the urban elite under the Arduinids. Like the landed nobility, they seem increasingly to have conceived of their families as lineages, structured patrilineally. In the course of the twelfth century new men rose to join this original stratum of leaders, enriched by the transit trade, by administrative offices, by the income from their urban properties and agricultural lands, and by moneylending – or rather usury. By the beginning of the thirteenth century the top ranks of this elite consisted of about fifteen families. Some of them, like the Della Rovere, Borgesio, Calcagno, Beccuti, and Zucca, would maintain their elevated position in Turinese society for centuries. Others would disappear; within the families that formed the urban elite there was always a certain turnover, although as a group it remained relatively stable in comparison to the elites of other cities in the region.

Part of the wealth these families enjoyed came from collecting tolls for the bishop and the nobility, but a greater part probably came from the land. They owned lands in their own right, or as vassals of the bish-

op and local nobles. Possession of these lands often gave them seigneurial jurisdiction over the peasants who tilled the soil, an attribute of noble status that set them apart from the common run of citizens and bolstered their aspiration to be considered noble. These leading families formed a close-knit bloc, united by intermarriage, and monopolizing access to the consulate and the communal councils. Situated just below them was another group of perhaps fifteen or so well-to-do families, who did not enjoy such exalted status, but who also had access to positions of power, and whose wealth would have been accumulated in the same way. Together these two groups of families constituted Turin's small urban elite. They alone could claim the privilege of full citizenship, which distinguished them from the rest of the population and gave them alone the right to hold office in the communal administration.

The will of Enrico Maltraverso, drafted in 1214, provides a good example of the kinds of fortunes these elite families were amassing. He stipulated that his considerable wealth was to be shared between his four daughters and several ecclesiastical institutions. He had no male heirs and only one of his daughters was married, so that he had not been able to found a lineage that would bear his name in future generations. In consequence he bequeathed the bulk of his wealth to the Church. Part of this fortune came from his lands. His will lists a number of properties in the city and the surrounding countryside: houses and gardens, a butcher's shop, a vineyard, parcels of farmland. Like other members of Turin's elite, he had spread his holdings between the city and the countryside. He also owned the rights to a toll levied at Rivoli, which had once belonged to the bishop, but which had apparently been ceded to Maltraverso as repayment for a loan. One part of his estate went to a daughter, who was the abbess of the convent of San Pietro, which thus became the effective legatee. The bulk of the legacy however went to the monastery of San Solutore, where Maltraverso endowed a chapel served by two priests. His motive for this bequest becomes clear when we remember that he had accumulated much of his wealth by lending money at high rates of interest. By making a generous bequest to his favorite ecclesiastical institution he was evidently hoping to avert the punishment that awaited him in the next world as a usurer. But even though he made this gesture to appease divine wrath, he still did not forgive his debtors: instead he charged a fellow-usurer, Giovanni Cane, to collect the credits due to him for the benefit of his legatees. Cane would go on in his turn to become one of the city's wealthiest men. In his will, drawn up in 1244, he bequeathed lands and money to endow a hospice for the

poor, situated near the church of San Francesco, explicitly stating that he did so in order to atone for his sins as a usurer.

The wills of Maltraverso and Cane suggest that the wealth of Turin's elite typically came from a combination of land, tolls and moneylending; they make no mention of commercial activity or manufacturing. Men like Maltraverso and Cane recycled the profits from the land into the far more remunerative business of making loans to the bishop, to local monasteries, to impecunious nobles, to neighboring communes, or to private citizens. They charged an average of about 23% per annum for large sums, or 40% for smaller sums, but these rates often went much higher. Moneylenders were able to charge these usurious rates because cash was always in short supply and no other sources of credit existed. Maltraverso's will also highlights the connections between Turin's leading families and the Church. Besides making donations to the Church and endowing hospitals and charitable institutions, they loaned money to the bishop and to local monasteries, with land or tolls as security, so that over time they gradually whittled away the Church's patrimony of lands and revenues. Cane for example stripped the canons of Rivalta, just outside the city, of most of their lands, which they had pledged to him as security for loans. But the ties between Turin's leading families and the Church were personal too, as evidenced by the presence of Maltraverso's daughter at the head of the city's most important female monastic house. Families like his habitually procured canonries in the cathedral or places in prestigious monastic foundations for some of their offspring, as part of their strategy of social advancement. In this way they built up a network of personal, political and financial ties that assured their place at the apex of urban society, in the administrative machinery of the commune, and in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

By the early thirteenth century men like Porcello, Maltraverso and Cane had attained a commanding position in Turin's affairs: their star and that of the commune were rising as the bishop's waned. His economic position had been steadily eroding as his lands and seigneurial rights in the diocese were alienated to creditors, or were usurped outright by powerful local families. This economic malaise sapped the bishop's power just as the economic and political strength of the communal elite was increasing. Furthermore, for the past century Turin's bishops had aligned themselves steadfastly with the emperors, who provided the ultimate guarantee of their ascendancy over Turin and the episcopal principality around it. But after Barbarossa's defeat the power of the emperors was on the wane, and inevitably the bishop's

power waned too. The final blow that destroyed the bishop's authority came in the renewed political turmoil that flared up in the early thirteenth century between the north Italian communes, the emperor, and the popes. Turin's communal government was able to weather these storms more successfully than the bishop. But they both faced the same danger, from the neighboring great lords who were profiting from the growing political instability to expand their territory and influence in Piedmont. By the end of the century one of them, the count of Savoy, would become the lord of Turin, effacing the authority of the bishop and the commune alike.

6. *The Commune and the Emperor in the Thirteenth Century.*

Frederick Barbarossa departed on crusade in 1187, and died two years later on his way to the Holy Land. His son Henry VI did not continue Barbarossa's efforts to restore imperial authority in the Kingdom of Italy, and allowed the administrative machinery set up by his father to fall into disuse. After he died in 1197, leaving an infant son who bore the family name of Hohenstaufen (he became the Emperor Frederick II), two rival claimants fought for the imperial throne. In the ensuing decade of civil war imperial authority was severely weakened. The absence of a strong emperor deprived the bishop of Turin of the main source of support that had sustained him over the past century, and his authority eroded. The commune expanded its authority at his expense, and assumed the lead in governing both the city and the episcopal diocese, which it now treated as its own territory. To uphold the bishop's nominal sovereignty over his diocese – and thereby to assert its own claims to the territory – the commune engaged in a series of little wars with its neighboring towns and some of the local feudatories. These conflicts drew it into wider regional conflicts and obliged it to navigate between the rival webs of alliance centering on the two most powerful Piedmontese cities, Asti and Vercelli. Turin was overshadowed by these more powerful communes and, lacking the manpower and resources to match theirs, always played a subordinate role in the region's politics.

Meanwhile the counts of Savoy were on the alert for any chance to make good their longstanding claims on the city. Their hereditary claim on the city gave them an advantage over the other great feudatories in the region, the marquises of Monferrato and Saluzzo, who could boast no comparable right. The counts of Savoy had advanced these claims from time to time during the preceding century, but had never managed

to prosecute them successfully. In part this was because they had been primarily concerned with extending their hold on their domains west of the Alps, but it was also because each count of Savoy in the twelfth century had succeeded at a very young age. The resultant lengthy minorities and unsettled regencies had interrupted the continuity of policy and limited the Savoyard rulers' ability to pursue their aims consistently. In the early thirteenth century however this situation changed. Count Thomas I succeeded as a boy in 1189, but after him no more minorities interrupted the continuity of Savoyard policy for a century. Thomas I and his successors established firm control over their transalpine lands, built up a network of alliances with the royal families of western Europe that immeasurably strengthened their diplomatic and military position, and worked to expand the patchwork of lands and seigneurial rights they were accumulating on the Italian side of the Alps. By the end of the twelfth century the counts of Savoy possessed the Susa valley, together with footholds around Pinerolo and Avigliana, where the road from Susa debouches into the Piedmontese plain. The bounty they granted to the major monastic institutions in their zone of influence assured them valuable support; Amadeus III had been particularly generous in his pious benefactions. In the course of his reign Thomas I added to this bridgehead by acquiring other lordships beyond the Alpine foothills, over a number of minor local feudatories, and over the little towns of Vigone and Cavour, Rivalta and Collegno, the last two perilously close to Turin itself. Savoyard expansion was by no means unopposed, however. The commune of Turin and the bishop strove to check it, for they were both directly threatened, but it also alarmed Turin's powerful neighbors: the communes of Asti and Vercelli, and their rival feudatories, the marquises of Monferrato and Saluzzo, who were eager to capture Turin for themselves.

The commune's chief antagonist in the years after Barbarossa's death, however, was not the young count of Savoy but the nearby commune of Chieri, which refused to acknowledge the bishop (and thus also the commune of Turin) as its overlord. Since Chieri sought protection in an alliance with Asti, the Turinese commune allied with Vercelli. Several local feudatories also refused to acknowledge the authority of the bishop and the commune; some were adherents of the count of Savoy. Several years of inconclusive skirmishing ensued, interspersed with short-lived truces. The citizen militias of Turin and Chieri clashed, a few castles changed hands, and at one point Turin's bishop was captured by a local lord; the commune ransomed him. These little wars however were soon overshadowed by the renewal of conflict between the

emperor and the pope. In 1209 Emperor Otto IV had been crowned at Rome by Pope Innocent III, but the amity between them broke down almost at once. Otto was bent on reviving Frederick Barbarossa's grand design for effective imperial rule over the Kingdom of Italy, which posed a direct threat to the pope's interests as ruler of the Papal State. Innocent therefore championed the claims of the young Frederick II of Hohenstaufen to the imperial crown, and helped foment the opposition that defeated Otto in 1214. Frederick II was crowned emperor in the following year, and was quickly recognized as overlord by the bishop of Turin, Giacomo di Carisio, reaffirming the traditional link between the bishops and their imperial protectors.

Count Thomas I of Savoy pointedly did not acknowledge Frederick II as his lord, and instead joined in a league against him with Vercelli and Milan, the traditional foe of imperial power. Turin and Bishop Giacomo perceived this league as directed not only against the emperor but against themselves, and so in 1222 allied against Thomas with his rival the marquis of Saluzzo. Fighting broke out, which was ended two years later in a treaty mediated by the city of Asti. This treaty contained a clause very detrimental to Turin's commercial interests; the merchants of Asti abandoned the use of Turin's bridge over the Po in favor of another crossing a short distance upriver at Carignano, which Thomas had recently acquired. They would then cross the Alps on roads passing through his territory and no longer pay tolls at Turin. This treaty foreshadowed a formal alliance between Asti and Count Thomas, by which the two parties would work together to extend their influence in Piedmont, and by which Asti recognized the Savoyard claims over Turin. This web of alliances extended Thomas's influence in Piedmont and threatened to encircle Turin. Meanwhile Thomas was constructing a wider web of alliances with other European rulers. One of his many sons, also named Thomas, married the heiress to the rich county of Flanders; another son became archbishop of Canterbury; one of his daughters married the count of Provence. She in turn bore four daughters, who would all marry kings: Louis IX of France; Henry III of England; his brother Richard Earl of Cornwall, who was elected King of the Romans (the title given to the designated heir to the Holy Roman Empire); and Charles Duke of Anjou, who would conquer the kingdom of Sicily. Backed by this network of alliances, the House of Savoy was fast becoming an international power. The wealth, military force and diplomatic influence that these alliances brought with them made the counts of Savoy a formidable factor in the politics of northwestern Italy.

Thomas's plans to dominate Piedmont and annex Turin were tem-

porarily thwarted by the conflict that soon broke out between the Emperor Frederick II and the same forces that had opposed his grandfather Frederick Barbarossa. Like him, Frederick II had ambitions to revive the power of the emperors in Italy, and predictably this grand design resurrected the same coalition that had defeated Barbarossa: the pope and many of the north Italian communes. In 1226 Milan reconstituted the Lombard League, and in the following year Frederick II was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX. The centuries-long struggle between the emperors and the popes now entered its climactic phase, polarizing northern Italy into two warring camps: a pro-imperial, or Ghibelline party, and a pro-papal, or Guelph. In a reversal of alliances, Thomas I of Savoy now joined the Ghibelline camp, and was rewarded by being named imperial vicar of Lombardy, Frederick's chief military and political lieutenant in northern Italy. Faced by this threat from the House of Savoy and the Ghibellines, Turin reversed its long-standing pro-imperial stance. The commune of Asti, similarly threatened by the resurgence of imperial power and the expansionist designs of the House of Savoy, made common cause with Turin. Its merchants returned to their familiar route across the Po and through the city towards the Alps and France.

For a time, Frederick II prevailed. In 1237 he defeated the Lombard League at the battle of Cortenuova. He followed up his victory by appointing captains to govern many of the towns of northern Italy in his name, including Turin. Frederick's ascendancy also benefited the counts of Savoy. Thomas I had died in 1233, but his sons Amadeus IV and Thomas pursued the lines of policy he had laid down, maintaining good relations with the emperor, continuing the gradual encirclement of Turin by acquiring new territories in Piedmont, and extending the dynastic alliances of the House of Savoy. Amadeus's daughters married the two most powerful lords in northwestern Italy: one married the marquis of Monferrato, while the other married the marquis of Saluzzo, and then, after his death, married Frederick II's son, King Manfred of Sicily, as her second husband. In 1248 Frederick II rewarded the House of Savoy for its devotion to his cause. He granted the title of imperial vicar of Lombardy, which Thomas I had formerly held, to his younger son Thomas, the former count of Flanders. The latter had returned to Italy in 1244, after the death of his wife, and had been appointed ruler of the Savoyard domains in Piedmont by his brother Amadeus. The emperor also granted Thomas II a charter confirming his lordship over Turin and many lesser places in its territory, with the right to levy certain tolls. This charter greatly strengthened the House of Savoy's claims

over the city, for it placed the full weight of the emperor's authority behind them; significantly, the charter did not mention the territorial and jurisdictional rights of Turin's bishop, or those of the commune.

7. *The Advent of the House of Savoy.*

These successes were rapidly canceled out by the death of Frederick II in 1250, which plunged the Ghibelline party into disarray. Because of Pope Innocent IV's hostility no new emperor was elected to succeed Frederick, and the imperial throne remained vacant until 1273. The Ghibelline party in northern Italy fragmented, as leadership devolved to a number of warring local magnates. Meanwhile Innocent IV and his successors wreaked implacable vengeance on Frederick's descendants, the last of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. The pope declared Frederick's son King Manfred of Sicily deposed, and granted the rights over his kingdom to Charles of Anjou, a younger brother of Louis IX of France. In 1266 Charles defeated and killed Manfred, and two years later defeated Frederick II's grandson Conradin, who made a last desperate attempt to reconquer the kingdom of Sicily. With Charles of Anjou's help the popes had destroyed the "viper's brood" of the Hohenstaufen, and throughout Italy the Guelph cause triumphed.

The dramatic events in southern Italy produced immediate repercussions in Piedmont. On the news of the emperor's death Thomas II of Savoy moved quickly to occupy Turin, on the basis of the charter Frederick II had recently granted him. But he did not manage to hold the city. He therefore pursued his aim by changing sides, abandoning the imperial cause and aligning himself with Innocent IV. To cement this new relationship he arranged to marry the pope's niece, and in return the pope issued a charter of his own confirming Thomas's lordship over the city. Savoyard claims to the lordship of Turin had now been endorsed by both of the supreme authorities in western Christendom. Thomas's adroit maneuvers would have assured his dominance over Turin and its territory, but for the alarm they provoked among the other lords and communes, who were seeking the same prize. The city of Asti took the lead in thwarting him; in 1252 it formed a league with a number of local lords, and the cities of Chieri and Turin, to block his advance. In the resultant fighting Thomas was defeated in November 1255 and captured by the Turinese. They held him in close captivity, and constrained him to renounce his claims to rule their city, along with the places he held in the surrounding district.

Thomas meanwhile was bargaining from his prison cell with the government of Asti, in the hope that it would force its Turinese ally to release him. Asti declared its willingness to mediate between the count and his captors, for it had designs of its own on Turin and hoped to use the negotiations to supplant him as its lord. The Turinese however refused to free their prisoner. To put pressure on Asti to expedite his release Thomas then enlisted the aid of his relatives in the ruling families of France and England. They confiscated the goods of the city's merchants who were trading in their countries, demonstrating the long international reach that the House of Savoy had now achieved through its dynastic alliances. Finally in February 1257 the commune of Turin handed Thomas over to Asti, whose government soon released him. He died two years later, leaving two young sons, Thomas III and Amadeus V, who would eventually succeed him. The lordship of Turin, once almost in his grasp, had eluded him.

The dominant force now in Turinese politics was not the House of Savoy but the commune of Asti, which was seeking to turn the smaller city into its satellite. As part of the agreement to free Thomas II, the Turinese had agreed to accept the rule of a Podestà appointed by the commune of Asti, to be chosen from among that city's leading men. Turin's city council reached this crucial decision only after a stormy debate, which revealed deep fissures in the communal leadership. The pressure of the conflicts that had raged for the last generation had split the civic elite into opposing factions, some favoring alignment with the House of Savoy, others seeking alliance with Asti. In the end the commune accepted Asti's terms, despite the consequent limitation on its sovereignty, in order to ward off a greater peril that had now appeared; Turin needed Asti's protection against the Guelph leader Charles of Anjou, who was rapidly extending his influence in Piedmont. Buoyed by his victory over the last Hohenstaufen princes and his conquest of the kingdom of Sicily, he was winning the allegiance of a number of cities and local lords in southern Piedmont, who accepted him as their overlord and declared for the Guelph cause. In this way he quickly built up an extensive but heterogeneous – and ultimately fragile – principality for himself. The advance of Angevin power alarmed many of the region's communes and great lords. Asti formed a league of local cities and nobles to combat him, under the Ghibelline banner. Turin originally formed part of this alliance, but in 1270 the commune changed sides and expelled the Podestà Asti had installed at the head of its government. This change of sides was probably motivated by Turin's new bishop, Goffredo di Montanaro, a loyal Guelph and a determined enemy of



Map 2.
Evolution of the Savoyard state from the 12th to the 15th century.

the House of Savoy. The conflict between Charles of Anjou's Guelph partisans and the Ghibelline league headed by Asti rapidly widened. A powerful local magnate, Marquis William VII of Monferrato, joined the league, along with the commune of Chieri, and a variety of minor feudatories. In November 1275 the league's combined forces defeated Charles's army at Roccavione in southern Piedmont, and the loose-knit agglomeration of lordships and cities he had accumulated began to dissolve.

The victors now fell to fighting among themselves over the spoils. William of Monferrato formed a league of his own, ostensibly to further the Ghibelline cause and combat Charles of Anjou's remaining partisans, but in fact to extend his own domains. Turin was left unprotected by the collapse of Charles's forces, and early in 1276 William entered the city, proclaimed himself its lord, and compelled it to adhere to his league. Both the communal authorities and the bishop were powerless to resist him. Predictably however William's successes caused his rivals to unite against him. The city of Asti and Thomas III of Savoy, erstwhile enemies, were now drawn together by the danger he posed to them both. They soon overcame William and put an end to the lordship he had briefly enjoyed over Turin. In May 1280 he was waylaid and captured by agents in the pay of Thomas III. To regain his freedom he had to give up his rights over Turin, its bridge and some nearby communities to Thomas, who then quickly took possession of the city. This change of overlord was the seventh that Turin had experienced over the previous eight decades, but this time the new lord's dominion would prove lasting. Henceforth Turin would remain under the rule of the House of Savoy, two centuries after the marriage of Countess Adelaide and Oddo of Savoy that had given rise to the dynasty's claim to the city.

What sort of a prize did Turin represent for Thomas III? Its value was first and foremost strategic: the city and its territory constituted an advanced bridgehead into northwestern Italy. Up to this moment the counts of Savoy had managed to conquer or acquire a scattering of towns and castles in the Alpine valleys and foothills, from Susa and Pinerolo, to Rivoli and Avigliana. The acquisition of Turin consolidated their hold on these territories, while also placing them firmly astride the road from the Alps to the rich plains and cities of Lombardy. Turin gave the counts of Savoy a strategic center from which to govern and extend their domains in Piedmont. In the course of the next century the city, under a junior branch of the dynasty, would become the focal point for their territorial expansion. The seat of Savoyard power still remained on the western side of the Alps, but the opportunities for future expansion

beckoned from the east. From this moment the House of Savoy began, slowly and imperceptibly, to reorient its interests away from its ancestral lands, towards northern Italy. This geopolitical movement would eventually shift their state's center of gravity across the Alps and turn the House of Savoy into an Italian dynasty, with Turin as their capital city.

Chapter IV

The First Centuries of Savoyard Rule, 1280-1536

1. *The Later Middle Ages: An Era of Dramatic Change.*

Two fundamental developments shaped Turin's history in the later middle ages: the establishment of Savoyard domination at the end of the thirteenth century, which put an end to the commune's autonomy; and the catastrophic onset of the Black Death in 1348, which was followed by recurring, virulent epidemics that caused cumulative population losses and gravely disrupted economic life. These two events represent a turning point, both political and economic, in the city's history.

The imposition of Savoyard lordship curbed the influence of the powerful clans that comprised the oligarchy that had dominated Turin for the past century. This oligarchy did not however form a single united front against the House of Savoy; since at least the middle of the thirteenth century it had split into opposing factions, and its divisions facilitated the imposition of Savoyard rule. One faction had aligned itself with the city of Asti or the great Piedmontese feudatories against the counts of Savoy, while the other faction had favored the Savoyards, and it was this faction that triumphed when Thomas III of Savoy seized control of the city from William of Monferrato in 1280. The fissures within the urban nobility would persist into the next century, and the Savoyard princes would exploit them to strengthen their hold over the city. Turin's ruling oligarchy was forced to adjust as best as it could to the new conditions of Savoyard rule. Its autonomy and sovereignty, already compromised in the political turmoil of the thirteenth century, were now things of the past. The council that had once acted as the supreme authority in the commune had to accept a subordinate role, and defer to its lord's legislative and political will. Most of the city's elite families accepted the new situation; a few did not. In the long run, however, Savoyard rule brought some compensations for the loss of urban autonomy. Although at first the Savoyard princes did not make Turin the capital of their domains in Piedmont, by the early fifteenth century it had become the seat of government, the residence of the court when it visited the Savoyard domains east of the Alps, and the seat of

a new university, founded by its princely ruler. This was a critical moment in the city's history. As the capital of the Savoyard possessions in northern Italy, Turin now began to establish its primacy over the other Piedmontese cities.

The recurring visitations of the Black Death after 1348 inflicted terrible demographic and economic losses on Turin. The ranks of the city's population thinned; in the surrounding countryside agricultural production fell drastically, as farms were abandoned and much of the land reverted to waste and scrub. Trade along the commercial artery between Lombardy and France dwindled, and revenue from the tolls charged on traffic moving through the city gates fell; manufacturing declined as labor became scarce and markets shrank. Turin's population and economic activity shrank to their lowest levels in the early fifteenth century. From about 1420 the frequency and ferocity of the plague epidemics began to diminish, and a gradual recovery began. But this recovery was slow and hesitant. More than a century would be needed to repair the economic and demographic losses inflicted by the plague. Figures for Turin's population, which provide a rough indicator of the pace of recovery, would not regain their pre-plague level until the later fifteenth century.

The impact of plague was exacerbated by the devastation wrought by the constant warfare between Turin's Savoyard rulers, their neighbors, and the ambitious Visconti rulers of Milan, between the mid-fourteenth and the mid-fifteenth century. Besides their own forces, the contending powers employed companies of mercenary troops commanded by their own captains, who sold their services to the highest bidder, and often acted as belligerents in their own right, marching where they pleased, and plundering whatever was in their path. Profiting from this endless warfare, the counts of Savoy (whose rising political power was recognized by their elevation to the title of dukes by the emperor in 1416) steadily expanded their domains in northwestern Italy. Turin's strategic position on the axis between the two parts of the Savoyard domains and its central location in their Piedmontese territories made it the fulcrum for their expansionist policies. They now had to direct their territorial ambitions eastwards into Italy, because the possibility of expansion west of the Alps was being cut off as the kings of France extended their hold over the region. In 1349 the French crown acquired the province of Dauphiné, which bordered on the ancestral lands of the House of Savoy, creating a major obstacle to any future expansion. In 1388 count Amadeus VII secured the city and county of Nice, but this was to be the House of Savoy's last significant territorial acquisition

west of the Alps. From this time onward their ambitions were focused on the politically fragmented territories of northern Italy, which offered a more fertile field for gain, and where they already possessed a firm bridgehead at Turin. From there Savoyard dominion spread steadily outwards into the rest of Piedmont. The city of Ivrea fell under Savoyard rule in 1313, Fossano in the following year, Savigliano in 1320, Chieri in 1347. In the later fourteenth century the Savoyards extended their reach further still: expanding southwards, they secured the strategic city of Cuneo in 1382, then Mondoví in 1418, while in the north they acquired the lordship of Biella in 1379, and an important prize, Vercelli, in 1427.

This successful territorial aggrandizement enhanced Turin's importance as the strategic hub of the Savoyard lands east of the Alps, and goes a long way to explaining why Turin became the effective capital of these lands in the first decades of the fifteenth century. Turin's central position in Piedmont made it the logical point from which the House of Savoy could conquer and administer a growing agglomeration of Italian territories. Meanwhile its new status as a regional capital stimulated its economic and demographic growth: in the course of the fifteenth century the court resided at Turin with increasing frequency, the officials who administered the Savoyard possessions in Piedmont were stationed there permanently, and the new university attracted growing numbers of students. This influx of new elements diversified Turin's population and social structure, enriched its culture, and created new sources of demand that stimulated its economy. Its social structure became more complex, as the old urban elite was supplemented by the nobles, professionals and bureaucrats brought in by the ruling dynasty. At the same time, other immigrants trickled in, bringing new crafts and commercial connections that aided the slow economic recovery that took off in the fifteenth century. Savoyard rule was interrupted in 1536, when a French army occupied Turin, but by then the city was far more diversified, socially and economically, than it had been when Thomas III seized power in 1280. By the time of the French invasion the rule of the dukes of Savoy was firmly rooted in Turin, and its ascendancy over the other Piedmontese cities was assured. When the French occupation ended in 1559, Turin would attain an even more dominant position, this time as the capital not only of Piedmont but of the entire Savoyard state.

2. *The Consolidation of Savoyard Rule.*

In August 1280 Thomas III of Savoy entered Turin and accepted its citizens' submission, establishing himself as their *signore* or lord. This event spelled the end of the autonomy they had enjoyed for the past century: although the communal government continued to function as before, henceforth it was subject to the will of its new lord. Thomas moved quickly and decisively to assert his authority. He did not attempt to alter the commune's institutions, or to tamper with the oligarchy of elite families that monopolized municipal office, recognizing that their support (or at least acquiescence) was necessary for stable government. So the city council and its elected consuls remained in place, their membership unchanged, and Thomas swore that he and his successors would govern with their advice. But they no longer constituted the city's sole sovereign authority; they were now the junior partners in a diarchic form of government. Thomas immediately promulgated a set of Statutes that established him as the supreme legislative authority, and regulated administrative procedures. To make sure that the council did his bidding he created three new executive officials to head the communal administration. The office of Podestà disappeared and was replaced by the Vicario and the Judge, who dispensed justice and maintained public order. A third new official, the Clavarius, was charged with keeping an eye on the city's finances. All three were to be appointed by Thomas and his successors as lords of the city, and were chosen for their loyalty. They were often courtiers, officers of the lord's household, or even (in some cases) creditors of the prince, who could recoup what was owed to them from the perquisites of their office. These princely appointees were required to be present at every council meeting, and the councilors could not reach a decision without their approval. These changes were improvised in response to the sudden change in Turin's political situation, in order to cement Savoyard control over the commune, but they created a form of government that would prove unexpectedly long-lived. The combination of a council representing the urban elite with executive officials representing the ruler would last into the nineteenth century.

By taking these steps Thomas gathered the reins of power into his own hands, and in retrospect it is clear that he inaugurated a new era in the city's history. After 1280 Savoyard rule over Turin would continue virtually unbroken down to the mid-twentieth century, interrupted only by two intervals of French occupation, in the sixteenth century

and under Napoleon. This outward appearance of the continuity and stability of Savoyard rule is however somewhat deceptive. We must be careful not to assume that Thomas III's seizure of power marked an irreversible turning point in Turin's history. Savoyard rule would remain precarious for decades to come. The political situation was still fluid; the citizens' loyalty to the House of Savoy was by no means assured, and external foes were constantly scheming to seize the city, with the aid of dissident factions within the walls. Another *signore* could easily have ousted Thomas and his heirs and taken their place at the head of the city. Nor did the Savoyard takeover render the civic elite and the city council powerless. They retained a great deal of freedom of administrative action, and clung with pride to their tradition of communal independence. Far from being docile instruments of their lord, they retained both the will and the capacity to resist his dictates. Relations between the councilors and their princely rulers were often contentious, and would remain so for centuries.

The first hint of political instability appeared quickly, not however as the result of external attack or internal dissension, but of a dynastic crisis within the House of Savoy that threatened its hold over its newly-won possession. Only two years after he seized Turin Thomas III died, leaving a four-year-old son as his heir, in the care of his widowed mother. Three years later the reigning count of Savoy, Thomas's uncle Count Philip I, died without heirs. The succession to the multifarious Savoyard possessions was now contested by Thomas III's two brothers, Amadeus and Ludovico, in a conflict that jeopardized his son's rights to Turin and the Piedmontese lands. In 1286 a settlement was worked out between the contenders through the mediation of King Edward I of England. He awarded the title of count of Savoy to the elder brother, who became Amadeus V, compensated Ludovico with an estate and a lesser title, and upheld the rights of their nephew, Thomas III's young son Philip, to the House of Savoy's Piedmontese possessions. In this way Piedmont was made into a separate principality, ruled by a junior branch of the dynasty as vassals of the senior branch, which ruled the county of Savoy itself and the other lands west of the Alps. This arrangement would last until the junior line died out in 1418. Philip came of age in 1294, and was invested with the lordship over Turin and what was now the Principality of Piedmont by Amadeus V in the following year. In 1301 he married Isabella of Villehardouin, heiress to the crusader principality of Achaea in southern Greece. Even though this resounding title remained devoid of any practical meaning – Philip journeyed to Greece in 1301 in a fruitless effort to take possession of his

wife's inheritance – from this time onwards he and his descendants would be known as the princes of Savoy-Achaea.

From 1295, therefore, Philip ruled Piedmont as his own principality, in an uneasy relationship with his uncle Amadeus V. But he did not make Turin his capital, preferring to hold court and administer his domains from his castle in the city of Pinerolo, in the Alpine foothills to the west. Pinerolo had long been a bridgehead for Savoyard expansion into the north Italian plain. It had fallen under Savoyard domination in the early thirteenth century, and had served as a base of operations for Thomas II and his son in their campaigns to conquer Piedmont. The princes of the Achaea line would not finally transfer their residence from Pinerolo to Turin until a century later, but in the end Turin's greater economic value and its strategic position as the point of departure for expansion into Lombardy convinced them to make it the capital of their Piedmontese lands. For a century, however, Pinerolo remained their capital and they paid only periodic visits to Turin.

Philip of Achaea did not neglect Turin, however. His chief concern was the maintenance of public order, which was continually disturbed by fighting between the city's leading families. Moreover he was by no means certain of the loyalty of these turbulent clans. So to consolidate his hold on the city, in 1317 he ordered the construction of a fortified residence at the Porta Pretoria, based around the existing Roman towers. The purpose of this new fortress was not so much to ward off external foes as to overawe the city's factious population and to serve as the headquarters for the prince's administration in the city. It housed his officials – the Vicario, the Judge, and their staffs – along with a garrison of about forty guards. It also served as a prison. (This new fortress was probably not an extension of the castle that William of Monferrato supposedly built in Turin after he occupied the city in 1275. Recent research has shown that his castle was not in fact located at the eastern gate, as was formerly believed: it was probably built at one of the city's gates, but its precise location remains uncertain). Over the next few years teams of laborers quarried tons of dressed stone from the Roman walls to serve as the foundation for the two massive towers that Philip's architects were adding to the eastern gate, in order to turn it into an urban fortress. The gate itself had long been walled up, and traffic had been diverted through a new gateway in the wall alongside it – the so-called Porta Fibellona, documented from 1208. The exact shape of Philip of Achaea's castle – which with many later modifications and additions would evolve into the Castello or Palazzo Madama that stands at the center of the city today – is not entirely clear from the surviving

documentation. It seems to have been roughly square in plan, and its towers apparently protruded beyond the line of the walls. The two octagonal towers on its eastern side were probably given their present form a century later, by Philip's grandson, Ludovico of Achaea, when he made the castle his permanent residence. The piazza in front of the castle dates from the mid-fourteenth century, when twenty-four adjoining houses were demolished to create an open space for defensive and ceremonial purposes.

The building of Philip of Achaea's castle produced a striking change in the urban landscape, dramatically affirming the prince's authority. The city council, by contrast, was not housed in such an imposing edifice. In the middle of the thirteenth century it had taken over the emperors' old palace, a building with a tower and portico located somewhere near the northern gate. But this building had been badly damaged in the factional fighting that convulsed Turin at that time, and was probably not fully habitable. The council therefore tended to convene for its meetings in one or another of its members' private houses, or in the Franciscan monastery. Its records were entrusted to the Franciscan brothers for safekeeping. This provisional arrangement seems to have continued for a long time, until finally in 1375 the council purchased a large house from one of the city's merchants to serve as its official residence. This house occupied the site where the city hall stands today: it was demolished in the mid-seventeenth century to make way for the present building.

The Mendicant orders of Franciscans and Dominicans had established themselves at Turin in the thirteenth century. Unlike the traditional monastic orders, which tended to locate their houses away from populated areas, the Mendicants saw their mission as that of ministering to the poor of the fast-growing cities, which the older orders were neglecting. The Franciscans were the first to arrive at Turin: they are first mentioned there in 1228, the year their founder, St Francis of Assisi, was canonized. They soon acquired a site for their church and monastery; their church – San Francesco – still stands on the same site today, in the heart of the old city, though not in its original form: it was rebuilt in the seventeenth century. The Franciscans enjoyed close, cordial relations with the urban elite and the city council – as is evident from the council's use of the Franciscan monastery for its meetings – and also with the Savoyard princes. The Dominicans came later. In 1271 their church and monastery – which still stand today on their original site – are mentioned as "newly founded". It seems that they quickly attracted a wide popular following, for in the early fourteenth century they demolished their original church and rebuilt it on a bigger scale,

and in 1351 they added another aisle to it, evidently to accommodate their growing congregations. This church, though much modified, still stands today. The Dominicans were the Church's chief guardians of orthodoxy and were zealous hunters of heretics, but in Turin they seem to have found very few signs of religious deviance to concern them. This is somewhat surprising, given the presence of groups of Waldensians (or "Poor Men of Lyon", the followers of the twelfth-century heresiarch Peter Waldo of Lyon) in the Alps to the west. Heretics were periodically discovered in other places in Piedmont, like the nearby cities of Chieri, or Saluzzo, or Pinerolo, but never in Turin. In comparison with these other cities, Turin's religious life in the later middle ages appears placid and unremarkable.

Judging by the reports from the episcopal visitations conducted in the later fourteenth century, Turin's clergy seem to have performed their pastoral duties satisfactorily. Such transgressions as are recorded were mainly sexual: there were occasional reports of concubinage or liaisons with parishioners, and at the end of the century the convent of San Pietro was rocked by a scandal involving several nuns who had taken lovers and borne children. Turin's clergy do not seem to have been particularly distinguished either by their zeal or their learning. They seem to have been untroubled by the divisions in the Church caused by the Great Schism in 1378, simply following the lead of their prince, who tended to adhere to the popes at Avignon rather than to their rivals at Rome. We know little or nothing of the spiritual and devotional life of their parishioners. Some evidence of their attitudes can be gauged from the apparent popularity of the city's religious confraternities – a new flagellant confraternity dedicated to the Holy Cross was established in 1346 – which took part in the annual procession celebrating the city's patron, St John the Baptist, on his feast-day. His cult was becoming a central element in what might be termed the city's civic identity. The citizens took pride in expressing their devotion to their patron saint, who was the focus of their collective loyalties and a manifestation of their sense of community; the city council paid the expenses for the annual procession in his honor, in which all the different groups of craftsmen participated, and his name was invoked at the opening of the new Statutes that were promulgated in 1360.

Philip of Achaea governed his Piedmontese principality along the lines laid down by his father. He was a peripatetic ruler, moving between Pinerolo and the other cities that owed him allegiance, constantly on the alert for any threat from the marquises of Monferrato and Saluzzo, the great feudatories whose lands bordered on his own. He pursued

a successful if limited policy of territorial expansion, and established his lordship over several nearby cities and territories, notably Ivrea, Fossano and Savigliano. Meanwhile he left the day-to-day administration of Turin to his Vicario and Judge, who resided in his new castle and governed in conjunction with the city council. The records of the council's deliberations have been preserved from 1325 onwards (with some gaps), so that from this time we can begin to see in detail how the city was actually run. But these records give no hint of the relations between the council and the prince's officials, or of the attitude of the ruling families to their new lord. On the surface all was apparently calm, but some families within the urban oligarchy still evidently resented the imposition of Savoyard rule. The basis of their hostility can be traced back to the middle of the previous century, when the civic elite had split into pro-Savoyard and anti-Savoyard factions, which fought one another bitterly. These fissures persisted after Thomas III seized control of Turin in 1280; some of the powerful urban clans that had opposed Savoyard rule remained unreconciled to their new ruler, and looked for ways to overthrow him.

These ancient enmities burst out in 1334, when two of Turin's most powerful families, the Zucca and the Sili, conspired to overthrow Philip of Achaea and install his rival, Marquis Frederick of Saluzzo. The ringleader was Giovanni Zucca, provost of the cathedral chapter, who enlisted the support of a fellow-canon from the Sili family. Their plan was secretly to gather a band of armed men loyal to their families, seize one of the city's gates, and admit Frederick and his troops while Philip of Achaea was absent from the city on campaign. But in May 1334, just as the plotters were about to act, Philip returned unexpectedly to Turin, forcing them to postpone putting their plan into action. The delay proved fatal, for details of the plot began to leak out. Early in September Giovanni Zucca gathered his men once again, ready to seize one of the gates as soon as Frederick of Saluzzo's troops appeared outside the city. But the troops failed to arrive on time, and meanwhile the gathering of armed men at Zucca's house had aroused suspicion. A general hue and cry was raised; the bell of the commune was rung, summoning the citizens to arms; the conspirators' attempt to capture the city gate was foiled, and they tried to flee. Some were arrested; others managed to join Frederick's troops when they arrived, too late. In the aftermath of the plot some of the less significant conspirators were executed, while Giovanni Zucca, his elite co-conspirators, and the entire Zucca and Sili families were banished, together with several non-noble families who had backed them.

Philip of Achaea died soon afterwards at Pinerolo, and was succeeded by his son James. Philip left his son in a strong position. The chief opponents of Savoyard rule in Turin had been defeated and exiled. To strengthen his hold over the city, in 1336 Prince James oversaw the formation of an association of non-noble families, sworn to support Savoyard rule and defend the public peace by armed force against the turbulent urban nobility. This association was comparable to similar groupings of non-nobles that had sprung up in the preceding century in other Italian cities, with the purpose of protecting non-nobles, or *popolani*, against the indiscriminate violence regularly perpetrated against them by the urban nobles. Later in the century this popular association would evolve into a defensive organization dedicated to the city's patron saint, the Società di San Giovanni Battista, which was formally constituted with its own statues in 1389. By organizing this association James of Achaea adroitly harnessed the longstanding resentment of Turin's common people against the families that constituted the city's ruling elite, and that had for so long prosecuted their feuds in the city's public places, without regard for the damage they inflicted on the rest of the population. After 1334 Savoyard rule over Turin was still not fully secure: other conspiracies were hatched and uncovered from time to time. But these plots all failed. The defeat of Giovanni Zucca's conspiracy by Philip of Achaea and the common people of Turin thus marked a turning point in the evolution of Savoyard domination over the city, and stabilized the new political order on a much firmer footing.

3. *The Impact of the Black Death.*

The Black Death, or bubonic plague, struck Turin in the summer of 1348. This was the first attack of a disease that would strike the city in recurring epidemics for more than three centuries to come. It was a mysterious disease, terrifying in its virulence, against which there were no known remedies. Today we know that it first reached western Europe in 1347, carried on Genoese ships from the Black Sea to Sicily, and that from there it spread rapidly, reaching Scotland and Norway by the middle of 1349, and wiping out perhaps a third of the continent's population at its first onset. We know too how it was transmitted, by the lice and fleas that lived parasitically on rats, and that communicated the infection to the human population. But in the mid-fourteenth century, when the plague first struck, none of this was known, and no counter-measures could be taken. Only gradually would governments come to understand

that the plague's effects could be at least mitigated by rigorous quarantine measures to exclude persons and goods that might carry the disease, and by isolating anyone in the city who became infected. In 1348 none of this was known, and the initial onset caught Europe's population and authorities by surprise, with terrifying effect.

By the beginning of the fourteenth century Turin's population had grown to about 1,100 families, or roughly 4,500 persons in all. After 1349 the city began periodically to compile registers of the population, or *estimi*, for fiscal purposes, and these enable us to track the catastrophic decline in the city's inhabitants as the plague struck again and again. The figures given in the *estimi* are somewhat lower than the real total, since they omit certain categories of people – the clergy, and the very poor who owned no property at all – but they provide a reliable indicator of the general trend of the city's population. The initial epidemic of 1348-49 may have carried off up to a third of the city's inhabitants, and the visitations that followed it, in 1361, 1381-84, 1398-1400, and 1420-21, caused a steep, cumulative decline. By the time of this latter epidemic the population was reaching its lowest level: the tax-register compiled in 1415 enumerated only 625 families, or less than 3,000 souls, a loss of roughly one-third compared to the pre-plague total, despite a big influx of immigrants that filled some of the gaps. Thereafter the intensity of the plague diminished, the epidemics became less frequent, and the *estimi* reveal that from this time a hesitant, painful demographic recovery began. Over the next century the city's population more than doubled, reaching 1,398 households or about 8,400 inhabitants by 1510.

The plague does not seem to have struck all classes of the population equally, although in the imagery of the time Death was depicted as sweeping away nobles, clerics and peasants with an indiscriminate hand. The analysis of the family names listed in the *estimi* suggests that the upper classes may have fared somewhat better than the rest of the population. Some noble lineages contracted, but none disappeared, while some even ramified and grew: the Borgesio clan shrank from 21 branches before the plague to 13 by the early fifteenth century – still a substantial figure – but the Gorzano actually increased from seven branches to eight, and the Della Rovere from four to six. The losses among non-noble families seem to have been greater, judging by the many family names that vanished from the tax-registers between 1349 and the early fifteenth century, to be replaced by the names of new immigrants. The *estimi* also reveal that the structure of Turin's households changed in response to the massive losses caused by the plague. The number of

households headed by single women decreased, presumably because widows were finding more opportunities to remarry. At the same time there was a dramatic rise in the number of extended households, in which several sons and their wives lived together under one paternal roof, indicating that families broken by the plague tried to regroup. These extended households became much more common than before, alongside the single-family households that had been the norm before the onset of the plague.

To offset the crippling loss of population, Turin's city council tried to facilitate immigration by offering inducements in the form of tax privileges and exemptions from service in the city militia. Some of the more distinguished immigrants – merchants, manufacturers and professionals – were given formal rights of citizenship as *habitatores*, as a reward for contributing their wealth and their skills to the city's economy. Most of the immigrants however were simple farmers and agricultural laborers who trickled in from the countryside. In the decades after 1348 the area around Turin became increasingly desolate and empty. Many people died of the plague; many of the survivors moved to the cities, drawn by the hope of better working conditions, and driven by fear of the marauding companies of mercenaries that scoured the countryside. From the mid-fourteenth century fighting intensified all over the region as the counts of Savoy and the great Piedmontese feudatories battled among themselves, and against the aggressive Visconti rulers of Milan, who were seeking to expand into Piedmont. These regional wars benefited Amadeus VI, the so-called "Green Count" of Savoy, who reigned from 1343 to 1383. He commanded regional leagues against the Visconti, and extended his Piedmontese territory at the expense of the marquises of Saluzzo and Monferrato. But the constant warfare had a devastating effect on the rural population. Peasants fled from unprotected villages and farms, and only remained in places that promised a measure of safety, for example around the castle built by the Beccuti family to guard their estates at Lucento, west of Turin.

Depopulation changed the way the land was farmed. The total cultivated area fell dramatically until the early fifteenth century; forest and scrub reclaimed much former arable land. Before the Black Death grain production had dominated; now the area devoted to cereals shrank, while the proportion devoted to pastureland, orchards and vineyards grew. The area of irrigated land increased, as owners strove to increase the productivity of their farms, often joining in partnerships to dig canals and ditches. A characteristically Piedmontese method of mixed cultivation, the *alteno*, in which grain and vines were grown in alternating rows, became far more common, perhaps because it offered the peas-

ants greater self-sufficiency: the same plot of land provided both bread and wine. Despite the thinning of the population, however, the underlying pattern of landownership barely changed. The *estimo* of 1415 reveals that about half of the agricultural land was held by a small group of big owners, representing only a small percentual decline since before the plague, while the percentage held by small farmers had only increased by a small margin. Half the population owned less than the minimum cultivable area necessary for subsistence. The large estates were leased out in parcels to tenant farmers in return for rent in cash or produce, and the performance of labor services.

The majority of Turin's population would have been composed of small farmers and agricultural laborers, who would have left to till their fields during the daytime, returning at night to their houses within the protective perimeter of the city walls. A smaller proportion of the population was made up of craftsmen and women, mainly engaged in the textile trades. In the fourteenth century Turin became a center for the production of inexpensive woolen cloth destined for the regional market, but not designed to compete with more costly high-grade textiles imported from Flanders or Milan. The production and sale of Turinese cloth was controlled by a number of local merchants, some of whom grew rich from their activities. They contracted out the work to different categories of craftspeople, who were not organized in guilds. Weaving was done by individual artisans, male or female, in their homes. The dyers (along with the practitioners of other "noxious" trades) practiced their craft in the suburbs, as the law required, in order not to pollute the city's water-supply. Finishing the cloth was also conducted in the suburbs, at a fulling-mill (or mills) powered by water-wheels driven by the flow of water along canals diverted from the fast-flowing river Dora. Turin's council paid close attention to the woolen textile industry, for maintaining the quality of its products was a matter of honor for the city as a whole. The city Statutes promulgated in 1360 devoted considerable space to prescribing the methods to be used in manufacturing the cloth, and the standards of quality to be observed.

In the dire economic conditions of the late fourteenth century Turin's production of woolen cloth began to decline. The city council cast about for ways to revive it, but with little success. The city fathers also made efforts to foster other crafts, to compensate for the fall in the woolen textile trade, and to combat the general malaise that was afflicting the city's economy. To this end they encouraged craftsmen to establish themselves in the city by offering them bounties and tax-exemptions. Their efforts were facilitated by the ready availability of wa-

ter power from the canals that ran from the Dora, north of the city, where a small industrial suburb was starting to form. So from the end of the fourteenth century we encounter references to a number of new enterprises there: sawmills, a machine for stripping tan-bark from tree-trunks, machines for grinding, a trip-hammer for metalworking, and at least one paper-mill. Here too were the flour-mills that ground the city's grain. These installations belonged to the princes of Achaea; as feudal lords they owned the water-rights along the river and the canals, and they leased out the mills to the manufacturers, Turinese or immigrant, who were setting up new trades and manufactures. The flour-mills were leased permanently to the city council. Naturally, not all these new initiatives prospered. Capital was in short supply, markets unpredictable. Even the elements were hostile. Periodically the mills sustained damage from floods, as in 1408, when a particularly violent flood burst the banks of the canals and swept away the mills and machinery. But in the long run some of the new trades would prosper, albeit modestly: by the middle of the fifteenth century paper-making and the metal trades were beginning to take off.

4. *The Later Savoy-Achaea Princes, 1334-1418.*

James of Achaea ruled his Piedmontese principality in the shadow of his forceful cousin, the "Green Count" of Savoy, Amadeus VI, who treated him as a subordinate in his campaigns to extend the influence of the House of Savoy in northern Italy against the Visconti and the marquises of Saluzzo and Monferrato. Prince James chafed under his uncle's control and finally attempted to assert his independence. In 1355 he petitioned the Emperor Charles IV to become his direct vassal, in order to be free of the feudal ties that bound him to his overbearing cousin. Amadeus reacted quickly to this threat: he declared James dispossessed of his Piedmontese lands, and occupied them. In March 1360 he entered Turin and assumed personal authority over the city. He then compelled James to exchange his lands in Piedmont for a group of fiefs in Savoy, safely on the other side of the Alps. With his troublesome cousin thus neutralized, Amadeus was free to pursue his designs against the Visconti and the great feudatories of Piedmont. Two years later, however, he readmitted James to his good graces and reinstated him as lord of Turin and Piedmont, this time unequivocally as his vassal. In 1367 James died, leaving two young sons, Amadeus and Ludovico, as his heirs. Philip, his son by his first marriage, was excluded from the

succession. Amadeus assumed the regency on behalf of the young Achaea prince, his namesake, but Philip intrigued against him, seeking to vindicate his right to the succession. The intrigues were soon discovered and Philip was made captive; he died soon afterwards, probably murdered in prison at his uncle's orders. The Green Count was now firmly in control of all of the House of Savoy's lands, on both sides of the Alps.

Amadeus VI's intervention against James of Achaea in 1360 produced an important change in Turin's government. As a way to assert his lordship over the city, and at the same time to win the favor of its ruling oligarchy in his dispute with his cousin, Amadeus ordered the redrafting of the city Statutes. The Statutes of 1360 consolidated into 331 heterogeneous chapters the various laws enacted in the past by the commune, together with the Statutes issued by Thomas III in 1280. The result was a somewhat disorderly compilation, but it was destined to have a long and distinguished life: it would serve as the fundamental law regulating the duties and prerogatives of the city council and the various municipal officials until the nineteenth century. A manuscript copy was kept in the city hall for the public to consult, chained up to prevent its removal. This bound manuscript, known as the "Codice della Catena", is still proudly preserved in the city archives today. The Statutes reasserted the prince's role as supreme legislative authority. The council could issue laws and regulations, but only with the consent of the prince's Vicario and Judge. The Statutes defined the powers of the various municipal officials. Chief among them were the four Clavarii, elected in rotation from among the council's membership. They were in charge of the city's finances and alone had the power to call meetings. Besides defining the council's administrative structure and legislative powers, the Statutes detailed the various administrative functions it was to discharge. It saw to the upkeep of the walls, the bridges over the Dora and the Po, and the city hall. It posted the guards at the city gates. It appointed the city's surgeon, the master who taught in the city school – a *doctor gramaticae* is mentioned in 1346 – and the minor city functionaries. Every year it fixed the dates for the harvest and the vintage to begin – a reminder that Turin's economy was overwhelmingly agrarian. It voted on the prince's requests for taxes and loans, and drafted the citizens to perform labor services when he required. The Statutes also contained an important innovation: for the first time the membership of the council was fixed, at eighty members, who were divided into two equal classes of nobles and commoners. Officials were to be chosen equally from the two classes. This division was not new;

for some time non-nobles had occupied seats on the council, so the Statutes were simply ratifying an existing practice. Vacancies in both classes were filled by cooptation, emphasizing the council's oligarchic nature. Members were almost always chosen from the same narrow circle of leading families, generation after generation; entry for new men was difficult, though by no means impossible.

The formal separation of the council's membership into two classes reflected the division within the ruling elite, between the score or so of noble lineages that had long dominated the city, and a group of newer families that had risen more recently to wealth and influence. The power of the old noble lineages was grounded primarily in their landed wealth, and in their activities as moneylenders; the newer families, by contrast, had grown rich primarily from manufacturing, trade, or the professions, although they would also have invested in land, both for its economic value and for the social status that landownership conferred. Turin's elite was becoming more complex and diverse. The ranks of the old noble clans had thinned somewhat with the passage of time: the exiled Zucca and Sili faded away after their failed coup in 1334, while other lineages died out. The demise of the formerly powerful Zucca and Sili marked the final defeat of the noble faction that had fought against Savoyard rule since the mid-thirteenth century, and the victory of the opposing faction, led by the Borgesio, Beccuti, Della Rovere and Gorzano. But the oligarchy of old noble families remained extremely influential, despite the turnover in its membership, the rise of non-noble families demanding a share of power, and the imposition of princely rule by the House of Savoy. Amadeus VI's Statutes of 1360 deliberately recognized the existence of the class of non-noble council members as a counterweight to the old elite, in order to strengthen Savoyard rule.

The princes of Savoy-Achaea also made use of popular resentment against the city's elite to bolster their political ascendancy. A clear indication of social tension was the constant friction between the workers in the textile trades and their employers over wages. At one point the linen weavers addressed a petition to the city council demanding that it force their employers to pay a living wage; in 1395 the weavers of woolen cloth refused to work for the Turinese merchants who employed them, and threatened to work for the merchants of Moncalieri, who paid better wages. The workers were in a relatively weak position, however, because they were not organized in guilds. Another indication of social tension was a conspiracy led by a dissident member of the Borgesio family in 1383, in which he tried to mobilize the common people against the city council. The plot failed, but after Borgesio was arrested

a large crowd of plebeians demonstrated before the city hall, demanding his release. These undercurrents of tension help explain why Prince Amadeus of Savoy-Achaea, who had ruled Turin since coming of age in 1378, approved the refoundation of the armed association of commoners, the Società di San Giovanni Battista. In 1389 he approved the statutes for the new association; it was apparently a revival of the armed association formed in 1336, which had fallen into disuse. The avowed purpose of the new association, like the old, was to maintain public order, and to protect plebeians from the violence of the urban nobles. To this end it could mobilize a force of 400 armed men, all from the lower classes, led by their own officers. They stood ready to assemble in an emergency, when summoned by the ringing of the society's own bell. The Società di San Giovanni Battista was clearly a lower-class organization; pointedly, its statutes denied entry to any members of the city's six leading noble families.

Prince Amadeus died in 1402, to be succeeded by his brother Ludovico. By this time the Achaea princes were choosing to reside at Turin rather than at Pinerolo. Shortly after his accession Prince Ludovico took a step that would further enhance Turin's importance in comparison to the other Piedmontese cities; he established a university there. His decision seems to have been prompted by a temporary migration of professors and students from the University of Pavia, fleeing the fighting that was then threatening their city. In 1404 Ludovico acceded to their request and created a university, or *Studium generale*, for them at Turin. He then secured a Bull from Pope Boniface IX and a charter from the Emperor Sigismund authorizing the new institution. It was intended to train students from the Savoyard states, but it also attracted foreigners from other parts of Italy, and eventually from France, England, the Low Countries and Germany. The first three decades of its life were marked by uncertainty and frequent interruptions, however, as the students and professors migrated periodically to other cities. Sometimes they did so to escape the plague, but they also moved around in response to tempting financial offers, for their presence, the rents they paid and the purchases they made, represented an economic windfall for any city that played host to them. So the community of students and professors who formed the university transferred itself to Chieri in 1427, then to Savigliano, before settling definitively at Turin in 1436. The new university's main strength was its faculty of Law, whose professors outnumbered all the other faculties combined. Turin's faculty of Theology, usually the dominant part of any medieval university, was relatively small, because the teaching of this discipline was entrusted to clerics from

the two Mendicant orders. The emphasis on legal studies seems to have been, at least in part, a response to the demand for men trained in the law to staff the growing Savoyard bureaucracy. Although it was not specifically established as an outgrowth of the government, Turin's University nonetheless served it by turning out a steady stream of trained men destined for official positions – a function it would long continue to discharge.

5. *The Fifteenth Century: A Slow Recovery.*

Prince Ludovico of Achaea was the last of his line. When he died without legitimate heirs in 1418, Turin and his Piedmontese possessions reverted to the senior branch of the dynasty, in the person of Amadeus VIII, whom the emperor had promoted from the rank of count to that of duke two years earlier. Duke Amadeus at once secured oaths of fealty from all the cities and vassals in Piedmont that had owed allegiance to the princes of Achaea. Now for the first time the Savoyard lands on both sides of the Alps were united under a single ruler. Amadeus VIII continued the expansionist policies of his father and grandfather in northern Italy, but he preferred to use the arts of diplomacy rather than the military force they had employed. Meanwhile he worked hard to weld his heterogeneous lands into a single political unit: the Statutes he promulgated in 1430 were intended to be a general law-code valid throughout his domains.

Amadeus VIII formally constituted Piedmont as a principality for his eldest son – also named Amadeus – in August 1424. In a splendid ceremony his father invested him with the newly-minted title of prince of Piedmont, which would henceforth be the title for the heir to the Savoyard throne. When the young Amadeus died in 1431 his brother Ludovico inherited the title of prince of Piedmont, and when Amadeus VIII abdicated three years later it was Ludovico who succeeded him as ruler of all the Savoyard lands, east and west of the Alps. As soon as he assumed power over the principality of Piedmont, Ludovico in 1433 issued a new Statute reorganizing Turin's city council into three equal classes of members: *nobiles*, *mediocres*, and *populares*. His aim was evidently to give greater weight to the commoners, in order to counter the influence of the urban elite. He also set up a small executive council, to deal with the city's business when the full council was not in session, made up of twenty-four members drawn from all three classes. This reform was not really successful. The oligarchy of old families still domi-

nated the council, although it was obliged increasingly to share power with new families emerging from below. By the early sixteenth century the tripartite division had lapsed and the council had reverted to its old division into two classes of nobles and *populares*. By then the locus of political power within the council was shifting. The smaller council was becoming the real focus of authority, dominated by representatives of the most prominent families, and the larger council was meeting less frequently. And by creating a new class of officials, the Syndics, to aid in managing the city's business, the reform of 1433 produced another lasting change. At first the Syndics dealt mainly with legal matters, but by the end of the century they had effectively replaced the four Clavarii as the city's chief executive officials. Their number was now fixed at two, one elected from each class of members. They presided over council meetings, acted as the city's chief executive officials, and represented the city at public ceremonies.

Turin was now the effective capital of the new principality, for since the demise of the Savoy-Achaea line Pinerolo had lost what residual political importance it still possessed. When the dukes visited Piedmont their court now resided at Turin, in the castle built by Philip of Achaea, although the facilities it offered were woefully inadequate: for lack of space many courtiers and attendants had to lodge in the city's inns or with private citizens. It was also poorly furnished: tapestries had to be brought from the castle at Pinerolo to decorate the rooms for the wedding festivities of Amadeus VIII's daughter in 1428. On state occasions like this, the piazza in front of the castle became the scene of open-air festivities and tournaments, making Turin the ceremonial center of Piedmont, the stage on which the political rituals glorifying the ruling House were enacted. The city's ceremonial role underlined its newly-attained political importance as the administrative center of the Savoyard territories east of the Alps. The council set up by the princes of Achaea to govern Piedmont had been based at Pinerolo, but after 1418 it moved about peripatetically from place to place, like the university, until in 1436 Duke Ludovico I issued an edict fixing both these institutions permanently at Turin. The presence of the court, the governing council and the university established Turin unequivocally as the chief city of Piedmont. Their presence also accelerated the diversification of the city's social structure by introducing an influential new class of citizens that began to wield power alongside the old ruling families. As a result of its new political role, Turin's elite was becoming more complex and heterogeneous: professionals and bureaucrats had begun to supplement the noble clans that had long dominated political life.

The presence of the ducal court and the university also enhanced Turin's cultural life. Already under the princes of Achaea the court had been a center of artistic patronage, and it maintained this role under the dukes of Savoy after 1418. They commissioned artistic and decorative work for their various residences at Chambéry and Annecy, at Amadeus VIII's castle at Ripaille by Lake Geneva, and at the castle in Turin. From about 1411 the Turinese painter Giacomo Jacquerio worked as one of the team of artists employed by the ducal court. He came from a family of painters; his father Giovanni had contributed to the decoration of the "Codice della Catena", the manuscript of the city Statutes kept for public consultation in the communal archives. Giacomo was a versatile artist, producing easel paintings, frescoes, wooden sculptures, designs for stained glass, and decorative items for his ducal patrons. His position as court painter helped him secure other commissions; between 1426 and 1430 he executed what is perhaps his most important surviving work, a series of frescoes for the monastery of Sant'Antonio di Ranverso, just outside Turin. Besides the ducal court, the new university also provided some enrichment to the city's cultural life. From the middle of the fifteenth century a few humanist scholars taught there as professors of rhetoric or law. But they did not stay long and did not make a lasting impression, so that the university remained largely untouched by the new currents of Renaissance scholarship. The great Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus, who received his doctorate in Theology from the University of Turin in 1506, has left us a somewhat disparaging account of what he considered its tradition-bound intellectual tone.

In the course of the fifteenth century the dukes of Savoy made some effort to beautify Turin, endeavoring to make it worthy of its new role as the capital of their Piedmontese domains. There was much work to be done, for the urban landscape was extremely unprepossessing. Fine architecture and monumental buildings, either public or private, were conspicuously lacking. Turin retained a strongly rustic character, with stables and barns attached to many of the houses, and farm-animals roaming the unpaved streets amid piles of refuse. The requirement in the Statutes that the citizens keep the streets clean was evidently not enforced. Housing was uniformly primitive. The urban nobles resided in large houses, fortified for defense, while the common people for the most part occupied little single-story dwellings of brick and timber, often with thatched roofs, which posed a constant danger of fire. Many property-owners had added balconies and porticoes to their houses which encroached on the streets, despite ordinances from the city coun-

cil to respect the line of the public thoroughfares. In 1464 Duke Ludovico took a first tentative step towards improving the city's appearance and hygiene by obtaining a papal Bull ordering all the clerical property-owners to move their barns and stables out to the suburbs. Whether this order was actually implemented is however far from certain. In 1490 Duchess Blanche issued new regulations for public hygiene, explaining that she had chosen Turin as her residence and wished it to appear more decorous; again it is not clear whether her orders were actually obeyed.

The most significant change in Turin's urban landscape came at the end of the century with the construction of the new cathedral. The complex of three churches dating back to the Lombard era was demolished and replaced by the present building, the first and only example of Renaissance architecture in the city. The initiative for building the new cathedral came from Cardinal Domenico della Rovere, bishop of Turin from 1482 to 1501. He came from one of the city's elite clans, and he enjoyed the favor of Pope Sixtus IV, who reigned from 1471 to 1484. Sixtus raised him to the cardinalate in 1478, and granted him numerous rich benefices, which allowed him to underwrite the cost of the new cathedral. He was appointed bishop of Turin in 1482, but he was an absentee prelate who rarely resided there. He spent most of his time at Rome, where he was a prominent member of the papal court and a patron of the arts; it was here that he acquired his taste for the architectural style in which Turin's new cathedral was built. His aim in commissioning it was evidently a desire to leave his own and his family's mark on the city, but he also intended it to be a concrete symbol of Christian renewal. "What we more greatly desire", he wrote, "is that by means of these living stones we may reform the Church through spiritual edifices". As its architect Cardinal della Rovere chose a Tuscan, Bartolomeo di Francesco da Settignano, otherwise known as Meo del Caprina (or Meo da Caprino), who had worked in Rome since the 1460s, and with whom he had probably been associated there. Turin's cathedral therefore bears a strong resemblance to the new churches built at Rome in the later fifteenth century, with its sober, symmetrical façade, restrained ornamentation, and luminous interior. Late in 1491 the old Lombard churches were demolished, and on July 22, 1492 Duchess Blanche laid the foundation stone of the new cathedral on the site they had formerly occupied. A team of skilled stonemasons was brought in from Florence to direct the work of construction, apparently because the local craftsmen worked in brick and were unaccustomed to building in stone. The marble for facing the building was quarried at Chianocco in the val-

ley of the Dora, and ferried downriver on barges. By the spring of 1498 the new cathedral was finished.

The city council seems to have had no part in the schemes for beautifying and improving Turin. It was concerned with the tasks of day-to-day administration: maintaining order, managing the city's finances, finding ways to expand the economy. Partly as a result of its efforts a number of new crafts were established in the course of the fifteenth century, contributing to a slow economic revival. In 1425 the council issued a new set of regulations for the woolen textile industry, seeking to halt its decline by reorienting production from the traditional coarse cloths to higher quality fabrics suitable for export. The council offered incentives to experts from Milan to settle in the city and teach Turin's weavers to produce the new type of cloth. The experiment seems to have been successful, and production increased. Similarly in the mid-fifteenth century the council offered subsidies to several silk manufacturers to settle in Turin and practice their craft, again with positive results. By the end of the century the raising of silkworms was spreading in the countryside around Turin and a silk-weaving industry was starting to develop. This marked the beginning of the industry that would become the mainstay of Turin's economy from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Another initiative by the city council sought to develop the manufacture of paper at Turin; this effort was favored by the copious supply of water and the ready availability of water-power, both essential for this industry, but the results were disappointing. On the other hand printing proved more successful, helped no doubt by the demand for books at the university. In 1474 the first printers, two men originally from Langres in northern France, set up their shop in Turin. During the decade or so that they were in business they turned out a number of religious and legal texts. By 1536 about a dozen firms of printers had plied their trade at different times in Turin, producing a total of about 250 titles. By then there were about ten booksellers in the city, catering primarily to the university. Other retail businesses were prospering too. A survey taken in 1523 listed over two hundred artisans and shopkeepers dealing with the public, and by then the city also had at least fourteen inns offering food and lodging – of varying quality – to travelers.

Some of the stimulus for economic growth came from outside. From the early fifteenth century a number of Milanese merchants established themselves at Turin. Some were in the retail trades, selling metal goods, furs, and other articles. Others traded in hides and leather, which were readily available in the surrounding countryside. Yet others were active

in long-distance commerce. By the end of the century there are indications too that one or two Florentine and Genoese bankers had begun to operate in the city. In 1424 a Jewish family was given permission to settle in Turin – the first recorded Jewish presence in the city since the days of St Maximus, it would seem. Amadeus VIII accorded them his protection, probably in the hope that they would be a source of revenue, and under pressure from him the city council grudgingly allocated them a house in which to live. After an uncertain start – when plague struck the city in 1429 the Jews were expelled, but soon returned – the community slowly grew. Amadeus VIII's Statutes of 1430 laid down that Jews were to live apart from the Christian population, but this rule does not seem to have been enforced, probably because Turin's Jews were too few for it to have any practical effect. The Statutes also required Jews to wear a distinguishing badge, but permitted them to have their own places of worship and butcher's shops. Turin's Jews seem to have been mainly engaged in the retail trades, and in pawnbroking and small-scale credit operations; in 1447 a Jewish loan-bank was set up to serve the university students, but it did not prosper. The Jews paid an annual tax to the ducal authorities, which protected them. But the city council, many of the clergy, and the general population did not welcome their presence, especially as Franciscan preachers increasingly took to whipping up anti-Jewish sentiments by denouncing the Jews as usurers battening on the poor and enemies of the Christian faith. Signs of tension between the small Jewish community and the Christian population recurred from time to time, although there are no recorded outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. In 1533 the council petitioned Duke Charles II to expel the Jews from the city, but he apparently refused.

Disputes over the presence of the Jews at Turin were a periodic source of contention between the dukes and the city council, but they paled into insignificance compared to the perpetual friction over taxation. The dukes drew revenue from their share of the city's tolls, the fines levied by the Vicario and the Judge, and the leasing of the mills on the Dora to the city. Disagreements over these revenues led to constant disputes, especially when the dukes demanded more money for the lease on the mills, which the council was unwilling to concede. There was friction too over the dukes' demands for extra taxes to pay for the wars they were fighting in Lombardy: in 1449 Duke Ludovico went so far as to arrest the members of the city council to make them consent to a new tax. Wealthy citizens were subjected to demands for forced loans, contrary to the city's privileges, causing the council to protest. It was true however that the financial relationship between the city and the dukes

was not entirely negative. The periodic visitations of the court to Turin, and the permanent presence of the ducal council and the university, with its numerous students, created a demand for goods and services that brought considerable benefit to the city's artisans and shopkeepers.

The presence of the ducal court and the university generated social tensions, however, adding to the problems of public order that the city council and the duke's Vicario strove in vain to overcome. The growing hostility between the Savoyard and Piedmontese nobles who frequented the court spilled over into Turin's streets: rival nobles and their retainers settled their scores in public, brawling in defiance of the city authorities. The university students too were a perpetual source of disorder. They fought with one another, committed thefts, and assaulted the citizens. When arrested, they claimed clerical privilege and refused to be tried by the Vicario and the Judge. The council petitioned the duke to disallow the students' claims to be tried as clerics, and increased the citizen guard to 200 men in an effort to suppress the violence. The Società di San Giovanni Battista had been dissolved after Amadeus VIII came to power, and this citizen militia, first constituted in 1336, offered the only means for maintaining public order. But it was hardly equal to the task. Like every city at the time, Turin was a dangerous and turbulent place. Men habitually went about armed, and were quick to use their weapons. Violence tended to peak during public festivities: the carnival season in particular was a time of heightened disorder, when the crowds of revelers, disguised and masked, gave cover to criminal activity.

Turin's so-called "Abbey of Fools" was especially active during the festive seasons. Like its counterparts in many other cities at this time, it was an association of young men that performed a curious mixture of functions, partly festive, partly ludic, partly disciplinary. It received official recognition from Duke Ludovico, who granted it a charter in 1434, perhaps in an attempt to domesticate an organization that already existed outside the law, and to temper its subversive potential. The Abbey was headed by an elected "Abbot", a young man from one of the city's leading families, and according to its statutes, its membership was made up of "good citizens", all of them male. It staged carnival festivities and mystery plays to entertain the citizens, and provided a liveried guard of honor for visiting dignitaries. This guard, up to one hundred strong, doubled on occasion as a kind of police force to maintain the public peace. The Abbey was thus in some ways the successor to the Società di San Giovanni Battista, which had disappeared after Amadeus VIII took power; the Abbey made its first appearance shortly after the armed as-

sociation was dissolved. Yet although it might on occasion act as an informal police force, it also subverted the public peace. Its members attacked the duke's unpopular Savoyard men-at-arms in the streets, and fought with the university students – in each case, it seems, the intent was to defend the honor of Turin's citizens against outsiders. The Abbey also took it upon itself to uphold its own version of public morality, through the crude popular rituals of the *charivari*, designed to humiliate and ridicule – often very brutally – those who contravened the norms of accepted behavior, especially in sexual matters. Widows who married younger men were subjected to coarse insults and serenaded with "rough music"; cuckolded husbands, or men deemed to be under their wives' thumb, were humiliated by being made to ride backwards on an ass; young women who left to marry outside the city were made to pay a tax to the Abbot and his Fools; widowers who remarried were compelled to pay the cost of a banquet for the members of the Abbey.

6. *The End of Savoyard Rule, 1465-1536.*

From the mid-fifteenth century Turin's role as the capital of the Savoyard lands in Piedmont helped stimulate its economic and demographic growth. By the time a lasting peace settlement between the warring Italian states was signed at Lodi in 1454, the dukes of Savoy were in control of most of Piedmont, from the Val d'Aosta in the north, to Mondoví and the Genoese border in the south. Equidistant between the northern and southern frontiers of the Savoyard possessions, and astride the road from Lombardy to the provinces west of the Alps, Turin was now the strategic and governmental center of the Principality of Piedmont. Within the Savoyard lands as a whole it was still overshadowed by the old capital at Chambéry, where the ducal court usually resided, but the center of gravity of the Savoyard state was now shifting inexorably eastwards. Turin's importance rose as the dukes came to recognize that their Italian provinces now constituted the demographic and economic heart of their state: Piedmont was wealthier, more populous, and more urbanized than their mountainous domains to the west. It was also the gateway to the rich plains and cities of Lombardy that they coveted. In the final stages of the wars with Milan, Duke Ludovico I directed his campaigns from Turin; he and his successors convened the assembly of Estates that represented their different lands there with increasing frequency; the personnel of the ducal council – now officially known as the "Council Resident at Turin" – grew in size as it acquired

new functions, and new territories to administer; the university attracted students as the only institution of higher learning in the Savoyard domains, and – officially at least – as the only university that the dukes' subjects were permitted to attend.

Turin's rate of growth was starting slowly to outstrip that of the other Piedmontese cities, thanks to the influx of population attracted by the city's new-found political importance. Bureaucrats moved there to work for the dukes; nobles from the countryside settled there, to be close to the new focus of political power; students converged on the university; artisans and merchants migrated there to provide this new urban elite with the necessities and luxuries they desired. The total number of professionals – lawyers and physicians – grew steadily. These new immigrants – merchants from Lombardy, nobles from Savoy, lawyers from different parts of Piedmont, a handful of Jewish merchants and physicians – speeded the transformation of Turin's social structure, diversifying the urban elite and enriching its culture. Their presence contributed significantly to consolidating Turin's position at the head of Piedmont's hierarchy of cities. Turin's rise to primacy among the Piedmontese cities can be followed through their respective population statistics. As could be expected, Pinerolo, the old capital of the princes of Savoy-Achaea, was most affected by Turin's rise; at the beginning of the fifteenth century Pinerolo had a substantially bigger population than Turin, but once the seat of government was moved to Turin, Pinerolo's population started to fall, until by the end of the century Turin had overtaken its former rival. Moncalieri, Chieri, Savigliano and Cuneo were all larger than Turin in the early fifteenth century, but in the course of the century the demographic gap narrowed as Turin's rate of growth exceeded theirs, until by the early sixteenth century Turin had more or less achieved parity with them. Mondoví and Vercelli however were still considerably larger, and in fact Turin would not surpass these two cities and become the largest city in Piedmont until the later sixteenth century, after it replaced Chambéry as the capital of the entire Savoyard state.

Rule by the dukes of Savoy thus conferred a significant benefit on Turin: it was the chief motor of the city's growth. But it had negative effects too. Turin's role as capital meant that the city would be caught up in the generation of dynastic struggles that followed the death in 1472 of Duke Ludovico I's son Amadeus IX, later known as "The Blessed" because of his saintly life. Amadeus IX left his young sons in the care of his widow, Yolanda of France, who assumed the regency on their behalf, as was customary. As so often happened during a minori-

ty, however, she faced challenges to her authority: a regent's power was never considered equal to that of a crowned adult prince, and challengers could claim legitimacy by posing as defenders of the young prince's true interests against the regent. Yolanda was unpopular, for she was perceived by the Savoyard nobility as unduly favorable to the interests of her brother, King Louis IX of France. In 1476 Amadeus IX's ambitious younger brother, Philip of Bresse – known also as Philip Lackland – rebelled against the regent. He immediately moved to capture Turin, in order to control its castle with its store of weapons and artillery, and the ducal administration that functioned there. A year later, Duchess Yolanda retook the city from him by force. In 1483 her son Charles I came of age, and immediately took possession of Turin. Then on his death in 1490 his widow, Blanche of Monferrato, acting as regent for their young son Charles John Amadeus, quickly seized control of the city. When the boy died in 1496 it was the turn of Philip of Bresse to take over the city once again, this time as duke in his own right, but he reigned for only a year. His young son Filibert succeeded him, but his reign too was destined to be short. Only in 1504, with the accession of his younger brother as Duke Charles II, did the sequence of brief, troubled reigns and disputed minorities come to an end. Throughout these conflicts all the contending parties sought to control Turin as the key to controlling the principality of Piedmont.

This prolonged instability had an adverse effect on the tenor of life at Turin. Public order, tenuous at the best of times, was undermined by the constant, often violent changes of ruler. Yet the city's cultural and religious life does not seem to have been negatively affected. Professors came and went at the university, and the ducal court continued to commission works of art. The painter Gian Martino Spanzotti, originally from Vercelli, came to Turin in 1494 at the request of the Duchess Yolanda. He established a workshop and produced paintings for the city's churches, including altarpieces and a fresco for San Domenico. Macrino d'Alba, another representative of the school of Vercelli, was active at the same time fulfilling commissions for various local churches and monasteries. Spanzotti's pupil, Defendente Ferrari, who worked in his Turinese studio in the 1490s, would become the leading painter of the next generation in Piedmont. Inspired by the influence of Cardinal Domenico della Rovere, ecclesiastical patronage of the arts increased. His successors as bishops of Turin, his nephew Giovanni Ludovico della Rovere, and then the latter's nephew Giovanni Francesco, continued the family tradition of artistic patronage.

The growth of ecclesiastical patronage of the arts at the end of the

fifteenth century suggests that a renewal of cultural vitality was taking place in the Church at Turin. The even, placid tone of the city's spiritual life continued as before; Turin produced neither saints nor heretics; the parish clergy attended to their pastoral duties. But something new was stirring. Several new devotional cults had begun to develop, which were destined to occupy a central place in the spiritual life of the city until modern times. Rooted in the city's social and political structures, these cults expressed the self-awareness of the urban community, while also fostering support for the House of Savoy. Duchess Yolanda of Savoy deliberately promoted the cult of her late husband, the Blessed Amadeus IX, in an effort to deepen popular support for the dynasty. It was far outshone, however, by the cult of the Virgin of the Consolata, centered at a shrine in the ancient church originally dedicated to Sant'Andrea in the northwestern corner of the city. This cult was actively promoted by both the city council and the ruling dynasty. Its devotees venerated a miracle-working image of the Virgin, which had originally been discovered in the early twelfth century by a blind man, according to a legend that gained increasing currency through the fifteenth century as the cult grew in popularity. The city council mounted processions to invoke the protection of the Virgin of the Consolata when the plague struck or when bad weather threatened the harvest. Along with the Consolata, another cult was growing up around the Holy Sacrament, or Corpus Domini, as the result of a miracle that supposedly took place in Turin's main marketplace, close to the city hall, on June 6, 1453. The story goes that a soldier had stolen a vessel containing the sacred Host from a church at Exilles in the mountains to the west, and was on his way through the city, when the mule carrying his plunder balked and fell, scattering its load on the ground. The Host however remained miraculously suspended in the air, shining with a supernatural light, until the bishop and a group of priests were able to coax it safely into a chalice. They then carried it in a triumphal procession to the cathedral. This miraculous event quickly gave rise to a civic cult, fostered and patronized by the city council. Within a short time a commemorative pavilion was erected on the site of the miracle, and every year the council organized a procession of the city's clergy and religious brotherhoods in its honor. Eventually, as the pavilion fell into disrepair, the council took charge of building a church dedicated to the Corpus Domini on the site. It was completed early in the seventeenth century as the city's own church, where the city council held official services on feast-days.

In 1513 the diocese of Turin was elevated to the rank of archbishopric

by Pope Leo X, who separated it from the archbishopric of Milan, to which it had been subject since the days of St Maximus. The promotion was clearly attributable to political rather than spiritual motives. In 1511 Pope Julius II had elevated the bishopric of Saluzzo to the rank of archbishopric at the request of its ruler. The result was a serious loss of authority and revenue for the bishop of Turin: fifty-five parishes were transferred from his see to the new archbishopric. Determined to make up for this loss, and determined not to be outmatched by his rival the marquis of Saluzzo, Duke Charles II successfully petitioned Leo X to make Turin an archbishopric too. The new archbishop did not hold sway over an extensive area; he was given only two subject sees, Ivrea and Mondoví. But Turin's elevation to archiepiscopal status was a further indication of the primacy the city had now achieved in Piedmont. In 1517 a distinguished prelate, Claude de Seyssel, was appointed archbishop. Like his predecessors for most of the past century, he came of aristocratic stock, but he was not a scion of the Piedmontese nobility, as they had been: his family ranked high among the feudal elite of the duchy of Savoy. He had had a long career, first as a student and teacher of the Law at the University of Turin, then as an adviser at the French court. He was a distinguished scholar, connected to the Christian humanists in France associated with the great Lefèvre d'Etaples. He was the author of a number of theological works and an important political treatise, *La grant monarchie de France*. Late in life he grew disillusioned with politics and the court, and decided to devote himself to spiritual concerns and pastoral work. Once elevated to the archiepiscopal throne he showed himself to be an exemplary prelate. During a famine in 1519, a year before his death, he organized poor relief measures and presided over the establishment of a municipal pawnshop, the Monte di Pietà, to advance loans to the poor at minimal interest. The Monte however was destined to have a short life: it would succumb to the political turmoil that was shortly to engulf Turin and Piedmont.

In 1494 the relative political calm that had followed the Peace of Lodi in 1454 was shattered by a French invasion of Italy, which initiated a cycle of wars between France and Spain for dominance in the Italian peninsula that would last until 1559. This long-drawn struggle confronted the dukes of Savoy with an insurmountable dilemma. France was too close and too powerful to permit them to remain neutral, as they wished. They became pawns in the struggle, because Turin and their lands in Piedmont constituted the natural avenue for French armies marching into Italy, and so their states became a battleground for the two great powers. Again and again French armies crossed the Alps into Pied-

mont on their way to conquer parts of the peninsula. These repeated invasions left a trail of devastation behind them and undermined the dukes' authority. In 1494 King Charles VIII of France led his army across the Alps on his way to conquer the Kingdom of Naples. On November 5 he arrived at Turin. Outside the city he was greeted with rowdy songs and dances by the Abbey of Fools. At the western gate he was greeted – more decorously this time – by the regent, Duchess Blanche, and her young son. They presented him with a fine charger, named Savoye, and were persuaded to advance him a loan on the security of the duchess's jewels. The French king spent the night in the castle at Turin, then hastened on his way the next morning. In the following year he again passed through Turin on his way back to France, after conquering Naples. This conquest however was short-lived. Charles VIII's invasion provoked a counter-attack by King Ferdinand of Aragon, whose army swiftly expelled the French from Naples. The epic conflict between the French and Spanish crowns for control of Italy had begun.

In 1499 Duke Filibert II permitted the new king of France, Louis XII, to march through his territories on his way to conquer Milan. Once again, however, the conquest proved ephemeral. Within a few years the French were expelled from Milan by a Swiss army, and the Swiss Confederation, now at the zenith of its military power, began to pose a grave new threat to the integrity of the Savoyard state and to the ambitions of its rulers. Since the mid-fifteenth century the dukes of Savoy had been working to gain control of the small, independent city-state of Geneva, which was almost encircled by their provinces of Savoy, Bresse and Vaud, at the western end of Lake Geneva. The city of Geneva was a tempting prize for it was far bigger and richer than either of the Savoyard capitals, Chambéry and Turin. Its population at this time was roughly twice that of Turin, and it formed an important commercial hub on the trade route between the Rhône valley and the Swiss Cantons. Geneva was governed by a prince-bishop, and in the middle of the fifteenth century the dukes of Savoy had secured the right to appoint him; this enabled them to extend their political influence over the city. By the early sixteenth century they were well on the way to establishing their direct sovereignty over the city, through the agency of the bishops they appointed. It is likely that if the dukes of Savoy had managed to fulfill their plan and make themselves full sovereigns of Geneva, they would then have made it their capital city, leaving Turin as a secondary provincial center. But in the end their bid to annex the city would fail in the face of powerful opposition from the Swiss Confederation, and Turin would assume the role of capital of their states.

The threat that the dukes of Savoy might secure control of Geneva however provoked a backlash against them and the bishops they appointed: an opposing party of citizens countered Savoyard influence by securing support from the Swiss cities of Berne and Fribourg. In 1525 Duke Charles II intervened directly in Geneva and expelled the bishop's opponents, but in the following year they returned with aid from Berne and seized control of the city. Charles II now faced a critical situation. Geneva was slipping from his grasp and there was little he could do to recover it, for he was caught up in a new war that had just broken out in northern Italy between King Francis I of France and Charles V, the emperor and king of Spain. In 1525 Francis led yet another invasion of Italy through the Savoyard territories in a bid to reconquer Milan. It failed disastrously: his army was routed at Pavia and he himself was taken prisoner. Francis made peace, leaving Charles V master of the Italian peninsula. Duke Charles of Savoy now pursued a delicate balancing act between his two powerful neighbors, Francis I and Charles V, who was now securely in control of Milan. In this interval of peace the duke again turned his attention to Geneva, where the bishop's political situation was rapidly deteriorating. His opponents, backed by Berne, which had now adopted the Protestant Reformation, were encouraging Protestant preachers to stir up the populace against the clergy and against the bishop. Demands grew for the abolition of the Mass and the institution of Protestant worship. This Duke Charles could not tolerate, for it constituted a direct threat not only to the authority of the bishop but also to the Catholic faith, which as a Catholic ruler he believed he was bound to uphold. So late in 1535 he laid siege to Geneva, determined to bring its rebellious, heretical citizens to heel, and to conquer the city for himself.

Events now moved out of his control. The year 1536 would be catastrophic for the House of Savoy. In the space of three months Duke Charles saw his states overrun by French, Spanish and Swiss armies. For some time Francis I had been planning another invasion of Italy, aiming once again to conquer Milan from Charles V. This time however the French army would not bypass Turin, as it had in the past, but capture it and hold it. In January the invasion began. The French army quickly occupied all the Savoyard territories west of the Alps, and their capital Chambéry. Next to fall was Geneva, the city that might have become the new Savoyard capital. In February, as the French army was occupying Savoy and preparing to march into Piedmont, the Canton of Berne, now Francis I's ally against the Emperor and Duke Charles, defeated the Savoyard force besieging Geneva. The Bernese army then oc-

cupied the Savoyard province of Vaud to the north of the city. Berne imposed the Protestant Reformation at Geneva, expelled the bishop, and installed a friendly city council to govern the city in his place. Soon John Calvin would be invited to Geneva to become its spiritual leader. Geneva and the province of Vaud would later become dependencies of Berne and the Swiss Confederation. Both these territories were now definitively lost to the House of Savoy.

Finally, Turin fell without a fight. In March 1536, as the French army was approaching the city, Duke Charles tried desperately to organize resistance. He ordered the citizens to labor at strengthening the fortifications, and attempted to install a garrison of Spanish soldiers hastily provided by his ally the emperor. The citizens, however, offered him no support. Long subjected to demands for loans and taxes by the chronically indebted Savoyard fisc, they showed no enthusiasm for work on the fortifications, and refused to advance money to pay for the Spanish garrison. Their refusal doomed the duke's hopes of defending Turin. On March 27 he bade farewell to the city council and left the city by river for Vercelli, accompanied by his soldiers, courtiers and officials. On April 1 the French army reached the outskirts of Turin and a herald demanded that it surrender. The Syndics and the city council sent a courier to the duke, asking what they should do; he replied that they must do what necessity dictated. On receiving his reply the Syndics went out to parley with the French commander, and after receiving assurances that he would respect the city's laws and privileges, they opened the gates and the French troops marched in. They would remain for the next sixteen years.

Chapter v
Capital of an Absolutist State, 1536-1798

1. *Turin under the Old Regime.*

Turin was twice occupied by invading French armies: in 1536, and again in 1798. These two occupations mark the opening and closing of a new chapter in the city's history. During this period the heterogeneous territories ruled by the House of Savoy evolved into a centralized bureaucratic monarchy, governed from Turin. In 1563 Duke Emanuel Filibert moved the capital there from Chambéry, the ancestral seat of the dynasty, on the other side of the Alps. From this time onward Turin's primacy within the entire Savoyard state, and not merely over the other Piedmontese cities, was assured. Emanuel Filibert's decision concluded a crucial period of historical evolution for Turin: from being the eastern outpost of the Savoyard rulers in the late thirteenth century, it had become the regional capital of their Italian domains in the fifteenth century, and finally, in the sixteenth century, it became the center of their whole state. Elevation to the status of capital accelerated Turin's growth: at this point political factors rather than geographical location became the chief determinants of its social and economic development. The history of Turin and the Savoyard monarchy were now inextricably intertwined.

Throughout this period the Savoyard rulers systematically strengthened the machinery of their state, turning it into a model absolutist monarchy of the Old Regime. (Historians use this term to describe the couple of centuries before the French Revolution, when monarchical rule was in the ascendant all over Europe). It defined itself as absolutist, in the sense that authority was concentrated in the hands of the ruler alone, and was not limited by representative assemblies. Its structure was hierarchical, mirroring the social order, in which power was a function of birth. The monarch's court, where the flower of the nobility gathered, represented the apogee of both social status and political power. The social order was permeable, however, for non-nobles could rise in rank through wealth or service to the state. The monarchs were not despots; they were obliged to obey the fundamental laws of the state,

and to rule benevolently, dispensing justice and upholding the God-given social order. Turin occupied a central place in the structure of the absolutist state as the residence of the Savoyard rulers and their court, and the headquarters of their expanding bureaucracy, whose tasks were to administer justice, increase revenue, build up the army, and maintain order.

In the eighteenth century, the Savoyard rulers, their ministers and their bureaucrats strove to make government more rational, more efficient, and more enlightened, in an effort to bring it into line with the philosophical principles of the age. Their avowed aim was to procure the general good, or as it came to be called, "public happiness", through conscientious administration guided by reason rather than the blind force of tradition. This was an essentially paternalistic conception of government: the benefits of enlightened rule flowed from the top downward, not from the bottom up. Since the population as a whole was held to be ignorant and irrational, it was the duty of the sovereign and his ministers to discipline them for their own good, and to assure their moral and material welfare. The first duty of the lower orders, as taught by both the secular and the religious authorities, was to obey the powers that be, and gratefully accept the benefits their benign rule conferred.

As successive Savoyard rulers worked to construct the apparatus of their state, they also strove to expand, strengthen and beautify Turin. Within the framework of their absolutist monarchy, the capital city was assigned several key functions, both symbolic and practical. In a practical sense, it was the place where the ruler, the court and the central bureaus of the government all resided: it was the physical locus of political authority, the site of sovereignty. It was also the military heart of the state, designed to protect the rulers from danger: in 1706 it fulfilled this vital function by resisting a determined French siege and thus preserving the state and the dynasty from dissolution. Its symbolic functions, however, were equally important. Turin served as the dynasty's showplace, advertising the benefits of its rule, and representing in iconic form the power and glory of the House of Savoy. Its regular streetplan and architectonic unity were consciously conceived as representations of monarchical power and of the order the absolutist state was seeking to instill throughout its domains. Turin's grand avenues and broad public spaces were planned as a gigantic open-air theater in which the monarchs could act out the rituals of power, flanked by their courtiers and the high officials of their state, before an admiring populace.

Throughout the Old Regime, therefore, the Savoyard rulers paid very close attention to the planning of Turin. They were deeply involved

in the design, construction and beautification of their capital city. In accordance with an architectural master-plan that originated in the early seventeenth century, and was then elaborated and implemented in stages, they systematically extended the city beyond its cramped medieval core. Their architects adorned Turin with buildings whose refinement and occasional ebullience counterpointed the strict regularity of the gridiron plan. The cumulative result of these two centuries of effort by the Savoyard rulers and the architects who served them is the classic example of baroque town-planning that we admire today in Turin's historic center. It rectilinear grid and the elegant façades are the conscious products of the architecture of absolutism, in dramatic contrast to the suburbs that spread out beyond the baroque center in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and which are the product of very different social and architectonic imperatives.

2. *The French Occupation, 1536-1563.*

A French army occupied Turin and western Piedmont at the beginning of April 1536, while a Spanish army advanced from Lombardy and occupied the eastern region. The Savoyard state seemed to be on the verge of dissolution; Duke Charles II held only a tiny enclave of territory around Vercelli. The civic leaders of Turin were left to negotiate on their own with the invaders. Eschewing heroics, they calculated that they would serve their city best by coming to terms with the invader, rather than by standing a siege and suffering the sack that would inevitably follow. Once they had struck their bargain to safeguard the city, the city fathers adapted quickly to the French occupation, and in time they even managed, with shrewd pragmatism, to turn the new situation to their advantage.

In this emergency, loyalty to the House of Savoy was trumped by a more pressing concern for public safety. The city fathers realized that resistance would be both futile and dangerous, for Turin was indefensible: the fortifications were dilapidated, and the French army was overwhelmingly strong. Their decision to surrender was based on loyalty to their city, their *patria*, and on their belief, grounded in a tradition stretching back to the communal era, that their first duty was to ensure the welfare of the citizens. For patriotic Italian historians in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these were unpalatable facts. Turin's rapid surrender and complaisant accommodation with the occupier did not fit the grand narrative they were constructing, of an up-

ward march to national unity led by the House of Savoy. To them, Turin's leaders were guilty of disloyalty, cowardice, and deficient patriotism, so they passed over this ignominious episode in near-silence. (Such a view is of course anachronistic, for it projects nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism back into the sixteenth century, when it had not yet begun to take form). Current research is revealing, however, that the French occupation was a period of decisive importance both for Turin and the Savoyard state, because of the cultural and institutional innovations it brought in its train.

Turin's adjustment to occupation proved difficult at first, in part because of the abrasive personality of the French military commander, the Sieur de Montjehan, but more particularly because war continued between the French and Spanish forces in Piedmont until 1538. Montjehan declared his contempt for the city's privileges and pressed the council for money to pay his troops; the council resisted his demands and dispatched envoys to his master, the king of France, pleading for fiscal redress and for reforms in the administration of justice. Francis I lent a ready ear to their requests. He was eager to conciliate his new subjects, because his ultimate aim was to annex Piedmont and integrate it into his kingdom. So in 1539 he established a French-style court of appeals, or *Parlement*, in the city, with jurisdiction over Piedmont, and a Chamber of Accounts to supervise the financial administration of the province. By doing so he created two institutions that the dukes of Savoy had never been willing to establish at Turin. After the French occupation ended the Chamber of Accounts and the Parlement would live on as central institutions of the Savoyard state.

Relations between the French crown and the citizens of Turin now entered a relatively harmonious phase, helped along by an interval of peace that lasted until 1551. The French administration began to consolidate its hold on Piedmont, and to integrate the province into the French monarchy. The governors who succeeded Montjehan were instructed to win popular sympathy by ensuring that their rule was fair and just. Although the taxation they imposed was higher than it had been under the dukes of Savoy, they won widespread approbation by improving the administration of justice, and by disciplining their troops very strictly – a novelty that attracted favorable comment. They also made it their policy to appoint Piedmontese officials to administrative positions. A symptom of the favorable attitudes French rule was engendering is provided by an incident in January 1543, when the citizens of Turin joined with the French garrison in repelling a surprise attack on the city by the Spanish. Too much meaning should not be read into

this episode, but it suggests a calculation by the citizens that a change of masters would not have been to their advantage.

One aspect of French rule was however troubling for Turin's citizens and their leaders: this was the infiltration of Protestant beliefs into the city, facilitated by the movement of troops, some of whom sympathized with the Reformed faith, and by a clandestine influx of Protestant preachers and books. The Turinese authorities were especially sensitive to this danger because of the religious revolution at Geneva, which was now firmly in the Protestant fold. The French governors, like Guillaume du Bellay, the patron of Rabelais (who served as his physician and spent some time at Turin with him), were little inclined to take a firm line against the spread of heterodox ideas. Small wonder, therefore, that the city fathers and the clergy were alarmed. So the council petitioned Turin's new high court to enforce Francis I's recent edicts against Protestantism, and paid famous preachers to deliver rousing Lenten sermons denouncing the errors of the Reformers. These measures enjoyed only limited success, however, for by the time the French occupation ended, a community of Protestants had established itself in the city: it would be rooted out by the restored Savoyard government.

In 1547 Francis I died. His successor, Henry II, pressed ahead more vigorously with the policy of integrating Piedmont into the French monarchy. In August 1548 he traveled through Piedmont to see his new domains at first hand, and made a grand entry into Turin, where he was greeted by salvos of artillery and displays of fireworks. Relations between the citizens and the French occupiers began to deteriorate however, after war broke out again between the French and Spanish crowns in 1551. The French authorities made increasing demands for taxes and for the billeting of soldiers, and the region was ravaged by the armies of both sides. In this atmosphere of deepening crisis Duke Charles II died at Vercelli in August 1553. He had steadfastly refused to recognize the French conquest of his ancestral lands, which now passed – in name at least – to his son Emanuel Filibert. The new duke was then living as an exile from his ancestral lands: he had grown up at the court of the Emperor Charles V, and was rising to become one of the emperor's most renowned generals. Charles V recognized Emanuel Filibert as heir to the Savoyard domains, and formally invested him with them at a ceremony in Brussels – far from Piedmont – in 1554, but Emanuel Filibert remained a prince without a state. All that would change, however, as a result of the decisive victory he won for the emperor at Saint-Quentin in 1557, which brought an end to the Franco-Spanish wars, and opened the way for his restoration as duke of Savoy.

In the mean time French fiscal pressure on Turin was intensifying. In 1555 the council was forced to mortgage the income from the city's mills, its chief source of revenue, in order to meet the governor's demands for money. Nonetheless the city's economy does not seem to have suffered; in fact, judging by the numbers of professional men and merchants who were migrating to Turin and becoming citizens, the city seems to have prospered, thanks in part to the profits to be made by supplying the armies campaigning in the region. The influx of new citizens reinvigorated the city's ruling oligarchy. These new men merged into the civic elite and acceded easily to seats in the city council, for membership was not restricted to a circle of ancient families, as was the case in many Italian cities, such as Venice or Milan. The result was that Turin's civic elite was constantly revitalized by the rise of new families from below. And far from being crushed by foreign domination, this elite was showing remarkable resilience in difficult times, successfully defending the city's privileges. It would soon face a new challenge, however, following the restoration of Duke Emanuel Filibert, known (for good reason) as "Iron-head". He set out to curb the city's independence, initiating a tug-of-war between the dukes and the city council that would continue, intermittently, for a century and more.

3. *The Savoyard Restoration, 1563-1630.*

The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, signed on April 3, 1559, ended the wars that had convulsed the Italian peninsula since 1494. Among its many provisions, the treaty restored Duke Emanuel Filibert of Savoy to his hereditary domains, as a buffer between France and the Spanish duchy of Milan. Early in December 1562 the French garrison finally evacuated Turin, and on February 7, 1563 the duke made his formal entry to the city, accompanied by his consort, Margaret of Valois. The civic militia escorted the ducal couple along streets hung with tapestries as a sign of public jubilation, through three temporary triumphal arches erected for the occasion, until they reached the archbishop's palace, which Emanuel Filibert had decided to take over and use as his residence.

Emanuel Filibert's grand entry served a crucial symbolic function. It demonstrated that Turin, and no longer Chambéry, was now the capital of the entire Savoyard state. Emanuel Filibert took over the archbishop's palace as a more commodious residence for himself and his court, and proceeded to modify and expand its accommodations. He chose it in preference to the old castle of the Savoy-Achaea princes, which

he considered cramped and indecorous, for he was accustomed to the splendors of Charles V's court. In his eyes, Turin too appeared rustic and provincial, lacking in fine buildings and amenities, so from the first he dreamed of transforming it architecturally to make it worthy of its new status as his capital. Chronic shortage of funds prevented him from carrying out his plans, however, so during his reign Turin remained a city without architectural distinction. Its transformation into a grand baroque capital would come in the next two centuries, under his successors.

Emanuel Filibert did however effect a radical change in the city's fabric by building a new citadel at its southwestern corner. The construction of the citadel marks the first alteration in Turin's ground-plan since Roman times. Part of the duke's purpose in constructing the citadel was obviously defensive; the French invasion had shown how easily Turin could be conquered. In 1564 Emanuel Filibert brought in one of the foremost military engineers of the time, Francesco Paciotto of Urbino, who designed the citadel according to the latest principles of military architecture, on a pentagonal plan, with massive bastions at each corner. The foundation stone of the citadel was laid in September 1564, and by March 1568 the work was finished. Emanuel Filibert then presided over the ceremony of dedication, and supervised the placement of the artillery along the citadel's walls.

The purpose of the citadel was not only to protect Turin from external enemies, however. It was also designed to overawe the population, and to strengthen the duke's authority. The euphoria of Emanuel Filibert's return faded quickly, and relations between him and the city council deteriorated. Disputes arose over taxation, over lodging for the courtiers who had accompanied the duke on his return, and over the billeting of his soldiers. Housing was in short supply and there was little room to lodge this sudden flood of new arrivals. The duke demanded that the citizens provide lodging; the city council contended that this was contrary to the city's privileges. The councilors were ready to stand up for their rights against their new master, just as they had against the French governors. The construction of the citadel eventually provided quarters for the duke's soldiers, but his courtiers were not properly lodged until the alterations to the archbishop's palace were completed in 1578. Finally in 1580 the duke agreed – in return for a substantial payment – that the city's privileges exempted the citizens from any requirement to provide lodgings for his men.

The presence of the duke's soldiers and courtiers was of course linked to Turin's new status as the capital of the whole Savoyard state. Emanuel

Filibert established his court there, and during his reign it gradually grew, until by 1580 it numbered perhaps 120 persons, far more than under the Savoyard princes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Under his successors it would grow bigger still. The function of the court was threefold: it served as the duke's residence, as a ceremonial center where he enacted the rituals of state, and as the headquarters of his government. His ministers were also leading members of the court; the duke deliberated with them there, and there he received foreign ambassadors and dignitaries. The residential departments of the court catering to the duke's personal needs – the household, the bedchamber, and the stables –

Map 3.
Turin in 1572.

were all staffed and commanded by members of the nobility. The presence of persons of exalted rank, waiting on the duke and taking part in the daily ceremonial round under his eye, was calculated to enhance the luster surrounding his person. In return the courtiers gained access to the patronage he dispensed: being present at court was the key to social and political advancement. So as the court grew it became a magnet drawing members of the nobility from all over the Savoyard domains to Turin, creating a dynamic that helped stimulate the city's demographic and economic development.

So too did the steady growth of the government bureaucracy. Emanuel Filibert reconstituted the French Chamber of Accounts and the high court of appeals, which he renamed the Senate of Piedmont, making them key institutions in the government. In the course of the next century the number of officials, clerks and underlings employed in the administration, now concentrated at Turin, would rise steadily until they numbered in the hundreds. With their families and servants they formed a significant increment to the city's population, and a significant source of demand for its tradespeople. At the same time, the steady trickle of nobles, bureaucrats and professional men drawn to Turin by the new opportunities it offered accelerated the changes taking place in the city's social structure. This influx leavened the citizen body with new elements, continuing the process of diversification already under way since the later middle ages.

Emanuel Filibert launched numerous initiatives to stimulate economic development in the capital city and in the state. He encouraged the planting of mulberry trees to increase the production of silk, much of which was exported in its raw state to the big manufacturers of Lyon. Following traditional practice, he tried to induce foreign artisans and experts to settle in Turin. A number of Lombard merchants and artisans were granted citizenship in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, bringing new trades and new capital to enrich the city's economy. Among the new immigrants there was also a small number of Jewish merchants. The duke encouraged them to settle in the hope that their capital and their international trading connections would benefit the rather backward economy of his state. The Jews were organized as a self-governing community with their own leaders, under the direct protection of the dukes, and paying tribute to them. Their status was defined by an agreement with the dukes, or *condotta*, which was periodically renegotiated. In 1565 Emanuel Filibert granted a new condotta to the Jews in Turin and throughout his states, which would form the basis for their relationship to their rulers for the duration of the Old

Regime. It marked the start of a systematic effort to increase Jewish immigration because of its supposed economic benefits. Turin's Jewish community grew slowly but steadily, until by the eighteenth century it had become one of the largest in Italy.

Turin's status as capital was enhanced by the refoundation of its university, which had ceased to function amid the upheavals of war. In 1560 Emanuel Filibert issued a decree re-establishing the university, but relocated it from Turin to the rival city of Mondoví. The city fathers of Turin protested, and a bitter contest ensued between the two cities for the privilege of housing the university, and enjoying the profits it brought with it. In 1566 the Senate ordered that the university return to its original home, but the city of Mondoví refused to accept the verdict. Finally – and in return for a handsome payment – Turin's city council secured an order from the duke that definitively restored the university to their city. They provided it with premises close to the city hall and supported it with an annual subsidy. Once restored, the university began to attract a number of distinguished teachers, especially in the faculty of Law, its most important branch.

One further factor enhanced Turin's new status as the Savoyard capital and conferred a new spiritual significance on it. In 1578 Emanuel Filibert ordered the transfer of the Holy Shroud to Turin from Chambéry, where it had reposed for over a century. The Shroud, supposedly the winding-sheet in which Jesus Christ had been buried, was one of the most precious relics in Christendom. It is first mentioned in the mid-fourteenth century, when it was in the possession of a noble family in eastern France. In 1453 Duke Ludovico of Savoy acquired it from this family and placed it in the chapel attached to his palace at Chambéry. He and his successors then set about promoting the cult of the relic, as a way of enhancing their own prestige. On special occasions they had it exhibited publicly to adoring crowds. Pope Julius II proclaimed a feast-day for it (May 4), and declared the chapel that housed it a goal for pilgrimages. The Shroud's miraculous reputation was thus well established by the time Emanuel Filibert decided to transfer it to Turin. His ostensible reason was to gratify a desire expressed by Carlo Borromeo, the saintly archbishop of Milan, to view the relic; in order to spare him the fatigues of the journey across the Alps, the duke ordered that the Shroud be brought from Chambéry to Turin. It seems evident, however, that he also ordered the transfer of the relic to demonstrate symbolically that ducal authority and all its attributes had moved irrevocably from Chambéry to the new capital, Turin.

The citizens of Chambéry protested, but in vain. In September 1578

the relic was transported across the Alps, and was conveyed solemnly into Turin by the archbishop, a small phalanx of bishops, the duke and his court, the foreign ambassadors, and the highest government officials. A month later Archbishop Borromeo arrived on pilgrimage from Milan to venerate the Shroud. Afterwards the relic was placed in a casket in the cathedral, pending the construction of a special chapel to house it. After several false starts, this chapel would finally be built a century later, to a breathtaking design by Guarino Guarini. It still stands today, though grievously damaged by fire in 1997. Guarini designed it to link the cathedral to the royal palace, emphasizing the spiritual power of the House of Savoy as patrons of the relic, and the sacral quality of their rule. From the moment of its arrival in Turin the Holy Shroud became a central element in the city's identity, elevating its spiritual prestige and making it a center for pilgrimages and massive demonstrations of popular devotion. On special occasions, both secular and religious, the dukes would have the Shroud brought out and ceremonially displayed to the crowds that gathered from far and wide to venerate it in Piazza Castello. The Shroud thus united the House of Savoy and the city of Turin symbolically, as joint guardians of this priceless relic, enhancing the renown of both the city and the dynasty.

Emanuel Filibert's son Charles Emanuel succeeded him in 1580. His fifty-year reign would be more turbulent than that of his father; it was marked by recurrent wars, and two terrible visitations of the plague, in 1598-99 and 1629-30. However, despite the impact of plague, war and a long-term economic depression after about 1620, Turin continued to grow. A census taken in 1571 listed 14,244 inhabitants, which by 1612 had risen to 24,410, and which would continue to rise – though more slowly – through the coming century. By 1702 the population had almost doubled again, to 43,806 souls. Much of this growth, in an era of economic crisis during which the populations of most of Italy's great cities stagnated or declined, can be attributed to Turin's new importance as a capital city, which drew people and resources to it not only from Piedmont but from all over the Savoyard state, and beyond. Turin had acquired a vitality that the old urban centers could not match.

Under Charles Emanuel the government and the court grew fast. Expenditure on the court rose steadily, for unlike his parsimonious father, Charles Emanuel loved pageantry, and did not hesitate to spend lavishly on his pleasures. Under him the court of Turin gained a reputation as one of the most refined in Europe. Charles Emanuel patronized artists and writers, among them the baroque poet Giambattista Marino, the political philosopher Giovanni Botero (who served as tutor to

the duke's sons), and the painter Federico Zuccaro, who decorated the long gallery between the ducal palace and the old castle, to show off the duke's collections of art and curiosities. Dynastic occasions – triumphal entries, marriages, births and baptisms, the conclusion of treaties – were celebrated with sumptuous festivities, indoors in the great hall of the old castle, or outside in Piazza Castello. Charles Emanuel took a leading part in devising these entertainments. Typical of the outdoor festivities was the tourney staged in 1608 for the double marriage of two of his daughters to princes from Mantua and Ferrara. The leading courtiers, decked out in bizarre finery and mounted on caparisoned steeds, acted out jousts and mock combats before a throng of spectators. The indoor entertainments were equally extravagant; in 1618 Charles Emanuel had a naval combat staged in the hall of the Castle, with a fantastical ship and sea monsters disporting themselves in an artificial lake.

4. *Architectural Transformation: Baroque Turin.*

The creation of a grand ceremonial space in front of the ducal palace and the old castle initiated a sequence of changes in the city's layout. This development started as a consequence of the festivities for the marriage of the heir to the throne in 1619 to Princess Marie-Christine, daughter of King Henry IV of France. To welcome the couple, a new gateway was erected well to the south of the city wall. This "Porta Nuova" was then joined to the rest of the city by a loop of new walls, fortified with bastions at intervals. Inside the new extension a straight axis linked the ducal palace and Piazza Castello to the new gateway – today's Via Roma – designed as a processional route for formal entries. Halfway along it a piazza was laid out – today's Piazza San Carlo – lined with the residences of noble families, fronted by porticoes. The remaining space in the new zone was arranged as a grid extending the Roman street-plan, but with wider thoroughfares to accommodate the wheeled traffic – including carriages – that was becoming increasingly common. Turin was beginning to break out of its original Roman perimeter, in the first of three phased extensions that in the course of the coming century would roughly double the area enclosed by its fortifications.

To direct Turin's development Charles Emanuel created a special panel of architects and military engineers (whose expertise was essential for laying out the new fortifications), charged with overseeing every aspect of planning. This panel, named the Council of Buildings and Fortifications, was headed by the chief ducal architect. It determined the



Map 4.
Turin in 1640.

layout of streets and piazzas, regulated the height and decoration of façades along the main streets, and handled mundane matters like the specifications for building materials, drainage, and paving. It paid very close attention to the issue of defense, ensuring that the city's fortifications were constantly strengthened and modernized. This committee would continue (under a variety of names) to supervise the building and rebuilding of Turin until the end of the Old Regime. It became the instrument through which successive Savoyard rulers exercised direct personal control over the design of their capital city: architectural planning was a matter to which the absolute monarchy paid particular attention.

The extension of Turin that Charles Emanuel decreed in 1619, the "Città Nuova" or New City as it came to be called, would only fill up slowly, however. It was not designed to increase the living space within the city. The duke's primary aim was aesthetic; he set out to make his capital city grander and more elegant, by adding a spacious, symmetrical new zone to the disorderly medieval core. Over the next decades the building plots in the New City, many of which were donated by the dukes to favored recipients, gradually filled up, and the new zone was integrated with the old city. The New City however contained a far higher proportion of aristocratic residences and ecclesiastical foundations than Turin's old mercantile core. The look of the New City was also radically different. Its houses, noble palaces and churches were built in a more regular architectural form, distinct from the ill-assorted buildings of the central core. In time these would be replaced by new structures, and today only a few vestiges of Turin's medieval buildings remain in the area around the city hall. This slow, piecemeal rebuilding gradually changed the face of the old city, bringing it more into line with the architecture of the new zones that grew up around it.

Charles Emanuel's New City was followed by two other planned extensions. In 1669 Duke Charles Emanuel II ordered the addition of a new zone to the east of the city, stretching almost to the bridge over the Po, and from 1713 a third zone was added on the western side of the city by his son Victor Amadeus II. As with the New City, both were designed primarily for aesthetic and ceremonial purposes. The eastern extension filled up only slowly. It became home to numerous convents and monasteries, on sites often donated by the ducal government, and to numerous public buildings: the mint, the academy for the nobility and the new Jesuit College, the university, government offices. By ducal order, too, a ghetto was created there for Turin's Jews in 1679: until then they had been free to live where they could in the city, but now they were enclosed in one of the blocks in the new zone. The ghet-

toization of Turin's Jews seems to have been part of a deliberate policy aiming to group various elements of the city's population, deemed in some sense alien, into specific enclaves. At the same time as the ghetto was established, other supposedly marginal sectors of the population were also being confined: the poor in the new municipal poorhouse not far from the ghetto, the sick and aged in the new hospital close by, and Protestant converts in a special hospice.

The third extension of Turin in the early eighteenth century was radically different in character from the first two. It became a predominantly aristocratic quarter, dotted with the palaces of important families. In contrast to the earlier extensions it was notably lacking in ec-

Map 5.
Turin at the end of the 17th century.



clesiastical foundations, because the Savoyard government at that time was engaged in a bitter dispute with the papacy and would not countenance the establishment of new monasteries and convents in the city. This third extension marked the last phase in Turin's urban expansion. Thereafter the government's architects devoted their attention to beautifying the existing urban fabric, replacing the old structures in the center of the city with modern, regular architecture. From the 1730s they undertook a prolonged campaign to straighten the city's main east-west axis – the Roman *decumanus*, today's Via Garibaldi – reconstructing the façades of the buildings along it to a standard pattern.

Finally the eighteenth century witnessed the completion of a circle of princely residences around Turin. Charles Emanuel I started this process by building suburban villas at Mirafiori and the Regio Parco; he also began a residence for his daughter-in-law, the Duchess Marie-Christine, at the site known as the Valentino, by the river Po. In the mid-seventeenth century her son Charles Emanuel II constructed a hunting-lodge at Venaria Reale, to the west. It became the nucleus of a small planned township, built along a grand avenue leading to the ducal residence. His son, Victor Amadeus II, had this hunting-lodge transformed into a sumptuous royal residence by his architect, Filippo Juvarra, who also rebuilt the old castle of Rivoli, and constructed the dynastic mausoleum at Superga, and the exquisite rural retreat at Stupinigi. By the middle of the eighteenth century Turin was ringed by a garland of satellite residences which, like the elegantly ordered city itself, proclaimed the power and glory of the House of Savoy.

5. *The Church Militant: The Counter-Reformation at Turin.*

The concentration of new monasteries and convents in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Turin attests to the resurgence of the Catholic Church after the Savoyard restoration. These new ecclesiastical foundations were vigorously sponsored and financed by the dukes, the nobility and the civic elite. In the climate of religious polarization that spread across Europe after Luther's breach with the papacy, the dukes of Savoy consciously portrayed themselves as orthodox Catholic rulers and embattled foes of heresy, reigning over a population united in its loyalty to the Catholic faith. Although the dukes and the city council might differ on political and fiscal issues, they were united in their detestation of Protestantism. So in collaboration with the archbishops they used every means at their disposal to cleanse the city of heresy, and turn

it into a bastion of Catholic orthodoxy, stemming the advance of heresy from Calvin's Geneva, across the mountains. The transfer of the Holy Shroud to Turin can be seen as an important element in this program, sanctifying the city and its rulers, and furnishing them with a potent weapon in defense of orthodoxy. With such powerful backing, the Counter-Reformation soon triumphed at Turin. Heresy was easily vanquished, but that victory was only the first stage in a process that aimed to transform and discipline the religious beliefs and practices of the entire citizen body.

In many ways, the arrival of the Jesuit Order can be taken to mark the onset of the Counter-Reformation at Turin. The Society of Jesus was founded by St Ignatius Loyola, and recognized by Pope Paul III in 1540. It quickly became the spearhead of the Catholic counter-offensive against the Protestants. In 1560 Duke Emanuel Filibert and Archbishop Girolamo della Rovere invited the celebrated Jesuit preacher Antonio Possevino to Turin, to lead the fight against the Protestants who were actively preaching there. The Protestants were quickly silenced or expelled. Other Jesuits soon arrived in Turin, and within a few years the Order had established itself in donated premises, and had founded a college to educate the sons of the nobility. Much of the Jesuits' rapid success was attributable to the support they attracted from influential donors. The most important of these was Aleramo Beccuti, the last of his line, who died childless in 1574 and bequeathed his family's extensive property to the Jesuits. Aided by this bequest, the Order embarked on the construction of a new church, dedicated to Turin's earliest Christian martyrs. The foundation stone of their church of the Santi Martiri was laid in 1577. It was designed by the Milanese architect Pellegrino Tebaldi with a spacious interior designed for preaching to large congregations, and a façade in the Mannerist style – an architectural innovation in the Turinese context.

The Jesuits were only one – though the most influential – among a number of religious orders that established themselves in Turin. The influx would continue down to the end of the seventeenth century; by then more than a dozen new orders had founded houses in Turin. Some of them were contemplative, avoiding engagement with the world, like the Sisters of the Visitation from Annecy, invited to the city in 1638 by Duchess Marie-Christine; others embraced the active life and devoted themselves to preaching and education, or to caring for the sick and the poor. Such were St Vincent de Paul's Fathers of the Mission, called to the city in 1655 to dispense relief during a famine, or the Fathers of St Joseph, called in during the famine of 1677 for the same pur-

pose. The latter would be the last of the new orders to found establishments in Turin; by the end of the century the wave of religious enthusiasm generated by the Counter-Reformation had largely spent itself, and because it was locked in conflict with the papacy, the government was refusing to permit the establishment of any new religious foundations in the city.

Meanwhile Turin's parish clergy were feeling the influence of the reforms ordered by the Council of Trent, which revitalized the Catholic Church doctrinally and institutionally in the mid-sixteenth century. In accordance with its decrees the archbishop founded a seminary to train priests in 1567, and instituted regular visitations to ensure that services were conducted with due decorum, that congregations were correctly instructed in the tenets of their faith, that church buildings and sacred vessels were properly maintained. The result of better training and supervision was a slow but steady improvement in the moral and educational level of Turin's clergy down to the end of the Old Regime. Guided by this better educated, more committed priesthood, Turin's parishes acted as the mechanism through which the more intense devotional life of the Counter-Reformation was propagated among the citizens. This was a highly disciplined form of Catholicism, demanding closer adherence to theological orthodoxy than had the more loosely defined faith of the middle ages. The parish clergy and the Inquisition were constantly on the watch for signs of deviancy: witchcraft and folk-beliefs, formerly tolerated, were proscribed, along with any hint of Protestant beliefs. The laity were enjoined to pay careful attention to their religious duties, to obey their priests, and to avoid blasphemy, gambling, drunkenness and other sins. In this way the Counter-Reformation gradually inculcated a new mentality among the laity, making them more obedient, and more conscious of the basic teachings of their faith.

A vital element in the religious revival that overtook Turin from the mid-sixteenth century was the formation of religious confraternities, whose members joined together to cultivate a more intense devotional life. One or two of these brotherhoods had existed in the middle ages, but by the sixteenth century they were in decline. From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century about a score of new confraternities appeared in Turin. Some were organized like a guild by craftsmen to celebrate the patron saint of their trade; some were devoted to specific cults like that of the Virgin, or the Holy Sacrament (very important at Turin following the miracle of 1453), or a particular saint, like St Roch, the guardian against the plague; some were organized for charitable work. Thus the confraternity of the Misericordia assumed the duty

of comforting condemned criminals, accompanying them to the scaffold, and giving them Christian burial. Another charitable brotherhood, the confraternity of the Holy Spirit, maintained a hostel for converts to Catholicism. It was an offshoot of a confraternity originally founded at Rome to convert that city's Jews. The Turinese branch however made few Jewish converts: it converted many more Protestants from the Waldensian valleys, or even from Geneva. Its most famous convert was the Genevan Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who abjured Protestantism in the confraternity's church in 1728 (as he later recalled with distaste in his *Confessions*).

The membership of these confraternities was overwhelmingly male, and as time passed, also increasingly exclusive. In the enthusiasm that accompanied the foundation of a confraternity it often happened that brethren from all classes of society would gather together, but over time the membership tended to take on a distinct class composition: certain confraternities became predominantly aristocratic, others predominantly plebeian. The brothers would meet regularly in their own premises, usually a chapel or oratory in one of the city's churches, where they conducted their devotions, which in some cases included flagellation. To cover the cost of their communal activities, the brothers would assess themselves a monthly fee. It paid for the annual banquet in honor of their patron, for their robes and the sacred apparatus – crosses and statues – they carried in processions, for the burial expenses of dead brothers and aid to their widows and children.

Undoubtedly the most significant of these new confraternities was the Compagnia di San Paolo, or Brotherhood of St Paul, supposedly founded in 1563 by twelve pious laymen to preach against the Protestants then active in Turin. Under the spiritual guidance of its Jesuit advisers the Compagnia grew fast. The brothers practiced an intense devotional life in their own oratory, and undertook a growing range of charitable works: a house for reformed prostitutes, another for maidens whose chastity was threatened, and a pawnshop making small loans to the poor, reviving the old Monte di Pietà, which had foundered in the troubles of the mid-sixteenth century. During one of the recurrent famines that struck Turin, in 1580, the Compagnia set up a poorhouse to care for the destitute, which however soon fell into desuetude. It was the first of several abortive initiatives in which the Compagnia, the city authorities and the state banded together to fight against poverty, culminating in 1717 with the establishment of a comprehensive system of state poor-relief. The Compagnia di San Paolo however was far from typical of Turin's confraternities. The range of its activities, and the exceptionally influ-

ential nature of its membership (it attracted many noblemen and high state officials), set it apart from the common run of Turin's religious brotherhoods. And unlike the other confraternities, it was destined to prosper in a distinctly worldly way. Through its charitable activities it attracted many rich bequests, so that by the eighteenth century it had grown into a well-endowed financial institution. Unlike many of Turin's confraternities, it survived the upheavals of the French Revolution and, by an extraordinary quirk of institutional evolution, subsequently hived off its financial operations to create a bank, while still preserving its original identity as a devotional brotherhood. Today the Compagnia di San Paolo still exists, together with its offshoot the Istituto Bancario San Paolo, now the biggest bank in Turin, and one of the biggest in Italy.

6. *Political Conflict and Economic Crisis.*

Public festivities often have a way of bringing latent political conflicts to the surface. The feast-day of St John the Baptist, Turin's patron saint, was customarily celebrated with a great bonfire in the city's main piazza, ceremoniously lighted by the duke in the presence of the court, the high officials of state, the civic leadership, and a throng of citizens. Tradition dictated that the syndics, representing the city, would hand the duke the torch with which to light the bonfire, but at the celebration in 1618 a dispute erupted: the governor of the citadel attempted to grab the burning brand, the syndics resisted, and a scuffle ensued. The governor's gesture highlighted in a dramatic way the conflict that had been brewing since Emanuel Filibert's restoration, between the duke's men – courtiers and soldiers – and the civic elite. By trying to upstage the syndics the governor was attempting to assert the primacy that he and the duke's high officials claimed over the city council. His attempt failed: the syndics held onto the torch and duly handed it to the duke. But the incident highlighted the complex and contentious relationship that had developed between the dukes and the leaders of their capital city, and the challenge that the growth of the court and the ducal government posed to the civic elite.

This relationship however must not be construed as one of simple binary opposition, as the duke and his men vs. Turin's city council. Manifold tensions existed, to be sure, especially over taxation. Charles Emanuel's court was expensive, and his ambitious foreign policy involved the state in a series of costly wars. Charles Emanuel demanded that the city pay extra taxes and advance large loans to him, despite the

council's protests that this was contrary to their privileges. The central issue thus became the city's privileges, which the council saw as its first line of defense against the duke's fiscal demands. For his part, the duke sought to undercut these privileges by challenging their legality, and also by granting exemptions from them to members of his court and to the tradespeople who supplied it, to his soldiers living in the city, and to the population that began to move into his New City after 1619. This attempt to make the New City a separate jurisdictional area ultimately failed, but it constituted a serious attack on municipal privilege, and further soured relations between the councilors and the duke.

Yet the relationship between the urban elite and the dukes was symbiotic as well as contentious. Many of Turin's families, both plebeian and elite, profited from their connections to the government, as suppliers to the army or purveyors to the court, or as bankers advancing loans – at substantial rates of interest – to pay for the duke's wars. Such for instance were the wealthy Baronis, Carello, Ferraris and Georgis families, who figured among the city's financial elite. Several of them were newcomers to Turin: the turnover in the civic elite was now proceeding at a faster pace. One of the most successful of these new men was Giampietro Cane, an immigrant from Monferrato, whose financial operations, centering on loans to the government, quickly propelled his family into the upper reaches of the civic elite. Other representatives of Turin's elite held positions in the ducal government. Such was the celebrated Gian Francesco Bellezia, also from a family only recently settled in Turin. Educated in the law, he was elected to the city council and became syndic in 1630, when the epidemic of plague was at its height. Unlike some of his colleagues, he did not desert his post, but directed the measures to contain the epidemic and maintain order. Subsequently he held many other municipal offices, and his portrait hangs in the great meeting-room of Turin's city hall as a tribute to his services. But Bellezia also held important offices in the ducal bureaucracy, serving as chief Savoyard envoy at the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia in the 1640s, as a judge in the Chamber of Accounts, and finally as president of the Senate of Piedmont. His career highlights the constant osmosis between the municipal elite and the ducal government. Men like Bellezia offered the dukes the expertise their government needed; service in the ducal bureaucracy offered wealth and social advancement to rising families like Bellezia's.

The relationship between Turin and the state authorities was conditioned by two underlying factors: constant war, and a deepening economic malaise. From the early seventeenth century the city was hit by

frequent famines, while its trade suffered from the commercial decline that was then spreading across Europe. Meanwhile the fighting in Piedmont and northern Italy, in which Duke Charles Emanuel was deeply involved, aggravated the economic depression, and added significantly to the burden of taxation. This combination of a deteriorating economic climate and expanding military conflict exacerbated the already tense relations between Turin and its rulers, which reached their lowest point after the death of Duke Charles Emanuel in 1630. By then northern Italy had become a battleground in the Thirty Years War, which had started in 1618 as a religious conflict in the Habsburg empire, but rapidly widened into a struggle for European hegemony between France and Spain. Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister to Louis XIII of France, decided to widen the war in northern Italy. In 1631 he forced the new duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus I, to become his ally in a bid to conquer the duchy of Milan from Spain. In 1637, at the height of this conflict, Victor Amadeus died suddenly. He left the Savoyard state in the care of his widow, the French-born Duchess Marie-Christine, on behalf of his young sons Francis Hyacinth and Charles Emanuel. The new regent faced immediate challenges to her authority from a pro-Spanish faction at her court, headed by her late husband's brothers, Princes Thomas and Maurice, who considered her too subservient to French interests. They could count on wide support among Turin's civic elite, increasingly alienated by the government's fiscal demands, and piqued by the regent's refusal to reconfirm the city's privileges when she assumed power.

In June 1638 Richelieu compelled the regent to renew the alliance with France. The princes and the pro-Spanish faction at court saw this as a direct threat. The death of the young Duke Francis Hyacinth in October was the signal for overt hostilities. The princes obtained aid from the Spanish governor of Milan, and set out to conquer Piedmont from the regent. In July 1639 Prince Thomas occupied Turin without a fight, thanks to the support of the townspeople and the civic leaders. The French troops holding Turin for the regent were confined to the citadel and besieged there. But the military aid Thomas expected from the Spanish governor of Milan failed to materialize, and in May 1640 a French army began to besiege the city. A double siege now ensued: the French garrison in the citadel was still holding out against Thomas and his men, who were occupying the city itself, while they in their turn were besieged by the French forces dug in outside the city walls. In September Thomas was forced to surrender, and two months later Marie-Christine returned to Turin. To show her displeasure at the city's sup-

port for the princes she forced the syndics to kneel before her and seek forgiveness, which she grudgingly accorded.

In 1642 a settlement was patched up ending the civil war, and in 1648 Marie-Christine formally handed over power to her son Charles Emanuel II. He was fourteen years of age and thus technically able to govern in his own right, but she would remain the effective ruler of the state until her death in 1663. The expansion and rebuilding of Turin, halted by plague, economic depression and civil war, now slowly resumed. Duchess Marie-Christine, or Madama Reale as she was known in deference to her royal blood, directed the program of urban beautification. Her architect Amedeo di Castellamonte rebuilt the ducal palace, which had been badly damaged during the siege. It became the residence of her son, the young duke, who established his court there, while she moved her court to the old Castle, thereafter known as Palazzo Madama in her honor. Perhaps as a riposte to the rebuilding of the ducal palace, the city council in 1659 began to reconstruct its tumbledown medieval city hall in the new baroque style that was beginning to sweep the city. In 1669 Charles Emanuel II initiated the second extension of Turin, eastwards towards the river Po, but the city's expansion was held back by the famines that periodically struck it, straining its resources and overwhelming its rudimentary system of poor relief.

These famines followed a grimly familiar pattern. At midsummer, news of a bad harvest would drive up the price of grain in the city market, and trigger a rush to stockpile supplies. The bakers would raise the price of bread, which was the staple – or in some cases the only – food for most of the population. Prices would go on rising inexorably, reaching their highest point in the spring, just before the new harvest was gathered in. If, as sometimes happened, this harvest too proved meager, the outcome was doubly disastrous. The city's poor, always perilously close to the margin of subsistence, would find it impossible to feed their families. They would besiege the church doors in search of charity and beg for alms in the streets, joined by crowds of desperate peasants who flocked in from the countryside. The city fathers, the clergy, the Compagnia di San Paolo and other charitable brotherhoods, in consultation with the ducal authorities, strove as best as they could to feed the masses of starving people. The council decreed maximum prices for bread and grain, punished hoarding, and tried to import grain from abroad, but these measures produced little practical effect: prices still rose, hoarding still went on, people starved. The cost of importing grain and subsidizing the price of bread created a mountain of debt, so that Turin's financial position steadily deteriorated.

Terrible famines struck Turin in 1627-28 (this one rendered even more fearsome by the plague of 1629-30), in 1649, in 1677-79, and again in 1693-95; others, less grave, recurred in between. In each of these crises the authorities responded by trying to herd the beggars into improvised poorhouses, and by distributing bread from door to door to the needy. All these efforts however failed to evolve into a permanent structure of poor relief, until the government undertook a full-scale reform in 1717. From that date Turin's paupers were forbidden to beg in the streets and were ordered to be confined in the new poorhouse, where they were made to work and attend religious services. (In practice however these regulations were unenforceable: charitable citizens went on handing coins to beggars, and the beggars did their best to avoid being locked up). Even this ambitious reform failed to produce a system of poor-relief that could respond effectively to a major crisis. When another bad famine struck Turin in 1733, the same dismal sequence of events unfolded: an influx of desperate country people came to the city in search of charity, joining the hordes of beggars who roamed the streets, and filled the new city poorhouse far beyond its capacity.

One economic development in this time of hunger and hardship, however, which would have important implications for the future, was the emergence of a new industry at Turin: mechanized silk-spinning. In 1663 the city council gave permission to two entrepreneurs, Giovanni Francesco Galleani and Girolamo Pinardi, to build a water-powered spinning mill on one of the canals diverted from the river Dora, north of the city. Pinardi came from Bologna, where the complex technology for mechanical silk-spinning had originated. Until this time silk was spun by hand, mostly by female labor: Galleani and Pinardi's mill marked a decisive innovation, with the potential not only to increase the quantity of spun silk produced, but also to improve its quality, for machine-spun thread was finer, stronger, and more regular than the hand-spun variety. Following their example, other local entrepreneurs set up spinning mills in the industrial suburb north of the city. Other cities in Piedmont adopted the new technology, notably Racconigi, which quickly became the main center of silk production for the entire region. By the early eighteenth century Piedmont was exporting a growing volume of high-grade silk thread, or "organzine" as it was called, to the weavers of luxury textiles in Lyon, Holland, London, and other parts of Europe. Meanwhile local technicians were perfecting the machinery itself; by the middle of the eighteenth century Piedmontese silk-spinning mills were reputed to be the best in Europe.

7. *The Reform of the Municipality*.

In 1675 Duke Charles Emanuel II died unexpectedly, leaving his widow, the Duchess Marie Jeanne-Baptiste, as regent until their young son Victor Amadeus came of age. Like the previous duchess-regent, this second Madama Reale proved to be an energetic ruler. Brought up at the French court, she was inspired by the example of Louis XIV's absolute monarchy, and on taking power she undertook a comprehensive program of reforms based on French models. Turin occupied a central place in her projects, especially after her original agenda was given added urgency by the famine of 1677-79. This crisis forced her to widen the scope of her plans and reorganize Turin's system of poor-relief, which in turn led her into a radical restructuring of the city's public services and public spaces. The new (and still largely unoccupied) eastern extension of the city, which her husband had initiated a few years before, provided her with a *tabula rasa* on which to place the new institutions she created: the ghetto, the poorhouse, the hospital, the hospice for Protestant converts. She also made use of this space to found new educational institutions, setting up a Military Academy to educate the sons of the nobility, and granting a site to the Jesuits, where they built an imposing new College (designed by the regent's chief architect, Guarino Guarini).

Madama Reale's reforms also made Turin into an important money-market. In 1680 she created the mechanism for a state debt, the Monte di San Giovanni Battista, administered by the city of Turin and dedicated to its patron saint. It issued bonds that paid interest, secured on the income from the city's gabelles. The model on which the regent based this new institution was evidently the French state debt, whose bond issues were underwritten by the city of Paris. The guarantee that the interest would be paid punctually by the city fathers of Turin inspired confidence among potential investors, enabling the government to raise substantial loans with relative ease. During the wars that soon broke out against Louis XIV the Monte became the state's principal source of credit, contributing materially to the victory over France. The establishment of the Monte would also have an important long-term effect. It stimulated Turin's development as a financial center, turning the city into a hub of international banking, a position it consolidated in the course of the eighteenth century.

Madama Reale's reforms left a permanent mark on Turin's urban fabric and on its municipal institutions, but she had failed to bend the

city council to her will. It was left to her son, Victor Amadeus II, to crush the council's resistance, terminating a conflict that had gone on intermittently since the Savoyard restoration. As soon as the young duke came to power in 1684 he set out to modernize the institutions of the state and its capital city. In his dealings with Turin, Victor Amadeus cleverly outmaneuvered the city council by turning its strategy of appealing to ancient privilege against it. In December 1687 he informed the councilors that their membership had fallen to about two-thirds the number required by the statutes of 1360 and 1433, and that he himself would fill the vacancies. Most of the candidates he proposed were his own men: courtiers or state functionaries. The councilors protested furiously, but they could not argue with the law, and in March 1688 they had to vote in the duke's appointees. Victor Amadeus had executed a minor *coup d'état*. In 1708 he ordered another reshuffle of the council's membership, and when places fell vacant in subsequent years he ordered the council to vote in his own candidates. The result was a radical transformation in its composition. Before 1688 it had recruited its members from Turin's old civic nobility, leading merchants and professional men; after 1688 they were offset by a growing lobby of the duke's men. This change mirrored the transformation that had taken place in Turin's social structure since it became the seat of the court and the government, as a new elite of nobles and officials appeared, parallel to Turin's old civic elite. In a sense, therefore, Victor Amadeus's remodeling of the city council simply reflected this diversification, by merging representatives of the new state-centered elite with the old urban oligarchy.

8. *The French Wars and the Siege of Turin*.

Whatever plans Victor Amadeus might have had for other civic reforms, they were overtaken by the outbreak of war with France in 1690. From the start of Marie Jeanne-Baptiste's regency Louis XIV had treated the Savoyard state as a satellite, imposing a military alliance on the regent, and arranging for Victor Amadeus to marry a French princess, Anne of Orleans. Victor Amadeus was eager to escape from this tutelage, and the outbreak of war between France and a coalition of European powers led by William III of England in 1689 provided him with the chance to break free. In 1690 he joined this alliance, provoking immediate retaliation. A French army overran Savoy, penetrated into Piedmont, and headed for Turin. Frantic preparations were made to with-

stand a siege, but eventually the French army marched away. Again in 1693 and in 1696 the French army moved up as if to besiege Turin, but on each occasion the city was spared. Turin's citizens did not show great enthusiasm for the struggle. They evaded guard duty in the civic militia and protested when the duke demanded billets for his soldiers. Faced with constant demands for taxes, the city council resisted, protesting that the citizens were too poor to pay. These protestations were not unfounded; economic conditions worsened as the war dragged on, and a particularly severe famine struck the city in 1693-95. Nevertheless the Monte floated loans year after year, contributing significantly to the state's war finances. Finally in 1696, however, the latest bond-issue found no buyers. The economic situation had become desperate, money was short, and the state's credit was exhausted. Victor Amadeus was compelled to make peace.

The war with France resumed in 1703. The cause was the dispute over the Spanish Succession, which Louis XIV claimed for the Bourbon dynasty following the death of King Charles II of Spain in 1700. The threat that the union of the French and Spanish crowns posed to the European balance of power led to the formation of an alliance, led by England and the Dutch Republic, supporting the Habsburg claims to the Spanish empire. Victor Amadeus II joined this alliance in 1703. He was almost encircled: French troops had occupied the Spanish territory in the duchy of Milan, and pressed into Piedmont from there, while another French army invaded across the Alps. Victor Amadeus's situation was extremely precarious, for this time Louis XIV was determined to conquer his lands outright and annex them. One by one Victor Amadeus's fortresses fell, until by the summer of 1705 Turin was the only obstacle still standing in the way of the French conquest of Piedmont. It was Victor Amadeus's last redoubt, and he made every effort to defend it, conducting a census of the city's population to see how many mouths would have to be fed in the event of a siege, gathering provisions and ammunition, and strengthening the fortifications. In the late summer a French army began to besiege the city, digging trenches and setting up batteries, but sickness and the onset of bad weather forced the besiegers to withdraw early in the autumn.

Victor Amadeus had gained a respite, but his situation was desperate. His army was greatly outnumbered by the French, who now held most of Piedmont. Early in May 1706 Louis XIV concentrated a large army around Turin once again, determined to capture it at all costs. The events of the next few months were a climactic moment in the city's history. If Turin fell, the French would be able to occupy the rest of Victor

Amadeus's domains without difficulty, and he would become a fugitive, perhaps permanently dispossessed of his lands. But although he faced overwhelming odds, he still held a few cards. A relief army of Habsburg troops, paid for by his English and Dutch allies, and commanded by his cousin Prince Eugene of Savoy, was preparing to march through Lombardy to aid him. Turin itself would not be an easy nut to crack: its fortifications were extremely strong, it was well supplied with cannon, well provisioned, and well garrisoned. This time too the population was determined to resist, knowing the fate that awaited them if the city fell: in contrast to the previous war, there was little evasion of duty in the citizen militia, and citizen morale did not break under the intense bombardment unleashed by the besiegers.

The French commanders initially threw a cordon around Turin, but concentrated most of their men and guns on its western side, with the aim of reducing the citadel, for once it fell, the rest of the city would be bound to fall too. For a time, communication with the outside world was still possible, though dangerous. Cattle and sheep could still be driven into the city and herded into the piazzas, where they were kept as provisions on the hoof for the duration of the siege. But by the middle of June the city was totally encircled, and subject to constant bombardment. Victor Amadeus had been directing the defense until then, but he now departed the city with a contingent of cavalry, to harass the enemy's communications. He left an Austrian general, Marshal Daun, in command of the garrison, with instructions to coordinate the defense of the city with the syndics and the council, who remained at their posts. The ducal family departed, seeking refuge in the neutral city of Genoa, carrying the crown jewels and the Holy Shroud with them. By now the besiegers had advanced their trenches close to the citadel, and their artillery was systematically battering its walls to open a breach. The opposing armies were also fighting underground, in the maze of tunnels and counter-mines that radiated out from the citadel. French soldiers fought to penetrate the tunnels and gain access to the citadel, to be met in hand-to-hand combat by the defenders. In one of these subterranean battles a courageous Piedmontese soldier named Pietro Micca detonated a mine to block a tunnel against a party of French grenadiers, sacrificing himself and entombing the attackers. His heroism was not fully recognized or rewarded at the time, but in the nineteenth century he would be hailed as a patriotic icon, the incarnation of the "warrior spirit" that inspired the Piedmontese monarchy to lead the unification of Italy.

At the end of August the relieving army under Prince Eugene reached

Turin and made contact with Victor Amadeus's little force. Knowing that time was running out, the French commanders launched three desperate assaults to capture the citadel. Each was repelled with heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile the relieving army took up position opposite the weakest sector of the French lines, between the Dora and the Stura, northwest of the city. At dawn on September 7 Prince Eugene and Victor Amadeus attacked the French lines, and after a hard fight, began to roll them up. This was the signal for the garrison to conduct a sortie, backed up by battalions of the city militia. The French army started to break up. The soldiers abandoned their artillery and equipment and streamed westwards, towards the Alps and home. At mid-afternoon Victor Amadeus and his cousin entered Turin in triumph, and attended a *Te Deum* in the cathedral, followed by a celebratory banquet. Meanwhile hundreds of wounded and dying soldiers were carried into the city, to receive whatever care the overtaxed convents and monasteries could provide. The siege had been very costly in human life. About 25,000 men, or over half the French army, were either captured, killed or wounded in the course of the siege and the final battle; the defenders lost a total of about 5,200 men, along with a few dozen civilians killed by the French bombardments.

The victory was momentous, and its repercussions were felt throughout Europe. Louis XIV had been humbled, and Turin and the Savoyard monarchy saved. The defeated French armies evacuated the Italian peninsula, which ceased to be a theater of conflict. At the Peace of Utrecht that ended the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, Victor Amadeus's allies rewarded him for the climactic victory he had won outside the walls of Turin. Thanks especially to British diplomacy, and to the special favor of his cousin Queen Anne, Victor Amadeus was granted the former Spanish kingdom of Sicily, and thus elevated to royal rank. A few years later, in 1720, he would be forced to exchange Sicily for another kingdom, Sardinia, but he did not forfeit his kingly title. The House of Savoy had now joined the crowned heads of Europe, and Turin became a royal city, the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia.

9. *Turin, A Royal Capital.*

After 1713 Victor Amadeus II returned to the task of internal reform. Several of his reforming initiatives would have a direct impact on Turin. In 1717 he reorganized the central bureaucracy of the state, dividing it into separate departments with clearly defined areas of re-

sponsibility. To house the new departments of state, a long block of offices was built a few years later on the northern side of Piazza Castello, communicating directly with the palace – formerly ducal, now royal. The uniform façade of these offices still looks out onto Piazza Castello today. A special building was erected next to the offices, to house the state archives; it was probably the first purpose-built archive in Europe. Then in 1738 an opera-house was added to this complex of buildings, for the use of the court and the nobility. (It burned down in 1936 and was replaced by the modern structure that occupies the site today). In this way the area of the city close to the royal palace took on a distinctive character, becoming the domain of the court and the high officials of state, clearly differentiated architecturally and sociologically from the city's core.

During the French wars the University of Turin had ceased to function. As the wars drew to a close Victor Amadeus set about refounding it, as an institution geared to producing trained men who would enter the government, the professions, or the Church, and there render loyal, efficient service. To this end the king took over control of the university from the city council, transforming it into a royal institution, and moving it into a new building, close to the new government offices. In 1720 the new university opened its doors to students. It was staffed by professors in part recruited locally, in part brought in from outside, and was organized in three Colleges of Law, Medicine and Theology, with the addition of a College of Surgery in 1729. Certain aspects of its curriculum aroused alarm among traditionalists: the first professor of physics was dismissed for citing Galileo rather than Aristotle in his lectures. However science, and practical subjects like surveying, accounting and architecture, were central to the curriculum. It was also assigned the critical duty of directing the school system throughout Piedmont. Victor Amadeus II had taken the momentous step of creating what was perhaps the first secular school system in Catholic Europe, taking education away from the religious orders that had hitherto dominated it. The university became in effect the department of state in charge of education.

Conscious of the glory of his newly-won crown, Victor Amadeus set himself the task of enhancing the dignity and elegance of Turin's urban fabric. Here he was served by Filippo Juvarra, one of the great masters of the high baroque, who had learned his craft in Rome as both an architect and a stage-designer. His buildings have a distinctly theatrical quality, which perfectly matched his master's desire for striking monuments to adorn his capital and proclaim his greatness. Juvarra designed

a number of new churches and added the magnificent baroque façade to Palazzo Madama, giving Piazza Castello a dramatic new architectural focus. He also created a symmetrical piazza at Porta Palazzo to serve as a dramatic new entry-way on the northern side of the city. Much of his work was done outside Turin, at the royal palaces at Venaria Reale and Rivoli, both of which had to be reconstructed after the French wars, at the dynastic mausoleum atop the hill at Superga, and at the elegant hunting-lodge at Stupinigi, which he designed for Victor Amadeus II at the very end of his reign.

Juvarra forms a link in the continuum of talented architects who completely transformed the face of Turin between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, creating the baroque city we admire today. Guarino Guarini's late seventeenth-century designs for the church of San Lorenzo, the chapel of the Holy Shroud, and Palazzo Carignano, provided models of daring architecture that later architects would seek to emulate. Juvarra on the other hand used the architectural language of the high Roman baroque to dignify and glorify Turin in a style befitting its new status as a royal capital. His pupil Benedetto Alfieri continued in this tradition, while Alfieri's contemporary Bernardo Vittone pursued an entirely different path: schooled by a close study of Guarini's work, he specialized in designing small churches, like Santa Chiara or Santa Maria di Piazza, whose delicate curves and subtle light effects usher in the rococo. The work of these architects was admired by the travelers who visited Turin, and – especially in the cases of Guarini and Juvarra – influenced architects far beyond Piedmont. In their hands Turin evolved from an undistinguished provincial center into a definitive exemplar of baroque architecture and urbanism.

We have a very good idea of the people who lived in the city from the census taken at the time of the siege in August 1705, which gives us a detailed snapshot of Turin's population. It is especially valuable because censuses as detailed as this are a rarity, not just in the Savoyard state but in all of Europe at the time. Some of the original census returns are lost, but most remain, so that we possess the data for over 33,000 people, or roughly three-quarters of the population within the city walls. The census rolls list the city's inhabitants block by block, house by house, enumerating each family member by name, with their ages, places of birth, and occupations. We can extrapolate from this information to form a general picture of Turinese society in the last century of the Old Regime. But at the same time we must be aware of what the census does not tell us. It does not count the ducal family; or the monastic clergy (numbering almost two thousand according to a sepa-

rate survey in 1704); or the students and teachers at the city's two academies; or the soldiers quartered in the city; or the Jewish population (which we know from a separate census totaled about 770 people at this time); or the homeless poor and the floating population of transients, although it does enumerate close to a thousand refugees who had fled from the advancing French armies. Nor does the census cover the industrial suburbs, inhabited by a workforce employed in the tanneries, ropeworks, metallurgical plants, fulling-mills and silk-spinning mills located outside the walls. From other sources we know that the suburbs clustered north of the city, or around the bridge over the Po – the Borgo Dora and Borgo Po as they were now called – had between one and two thousand inhabitants at this time, representing a significant sector of manufacturing activity not included in the census.

Several basic demographic patterns are immediately apparent. The population was young: more than 60% of those enumerated were under thirty years of age. Most families were small. Well over half of them had only one or two children; big families were the exception, because couples married late, in their mid- to late twenties, which limited the number of children they were likely to produce. Families with more than three children were more common in the upper reaches of the population, suggesting that family size was to some extent a function of wealth. A very high percentage of Turin's inhabitants were recent immigrants, according to the birthplaces given for them in the census rolls: only about one-third of the heads of households had been born in the city. This demonstrates that Turin's rapid demographic growth was the result of migration rather than the natural increase of its residents. Cities were notoriously unhealthy places, where deathrates exceeded birthrates, so that immigration alone could produce growth. Most of Turin's immigrants were poor artisans and laborers who came from villages within a narrow radius of the city. Immigrants with skills or training, on the other hand, tended to come from much greater distances, sometimes from other parts of Italy, or France. Their skills made them more readily employable and thus more mobile.

The census demonstrates that Turinese society was highly stratified. At the top of the social pyramid were nearly three hundred titled families, about three and one-half percent of all the families listed, generally living in large households with many servants. Another segment of the elite was made up of high state functionaries, some of them titled. Below them was a large middling group of physicians, lawyers and other professionals. This concentration of nobles, state officials and professionals was greater than in a typical provincial city, and is attribut-

able to Turin's status as a capital. Taken together, nobles, bureaucrats and professionals far outnumbered the wealthy businessmen, described as "bankers" or "merchants", engaged in long-distance trade, the textile industry, or finance. The lower strata of the population consisted of many types of working people. The largest single category was made up of domestic servants, who accounted for nearly 10% of those on the rolls, with women outnumbering men. They were followed by people engaged in services: porters, tailors, dressmakers and shoemakers, persons in the food trades. The textile trades – spinning and weaving wool, linen and silk, dyeing, lacemaking – made up nearly 3% of the total. As one would expect in a city growing as fast as Turin, the census lists a number of persons in the building trades, mainly carpenters and masons. The demographic profile of Turin that emerges is that of a typical Old Regime capital city, with a larger-than-normal proportion of elite residents. If however we include the population of the suburbs, not counted in this census, the picture becomes less typical: Turin was not just a city of nobles, bureaucrats and servants, but was beginning to develop as a center of manufacturing as well.

10. *Society and Culture in the Eighteenth Century*.

The seventeenth century had been a grim time of plague, war and famine; the eighteenth century, the last century of the Old Regime, would prove slightly kinder to the people of Turin, until its closing decade. Between the siege of 1706 and the French invasion of 1796, Turin was spared the ravages of war. Piedmont was the scene of bitter fighting during the War of Austrian Succession, between 1743 and 1748, but the war did not come close to Turin. The economic climate also grew slightly more benign. The famine of 1733-34 proved to be the last in the cycle of deadly crises that had gone on for the past century and more. Serious food shortages recurred, to be sure, but they were less dangerous. The city grew: by 1796 its population had almost doubled, to 76,756, plus another 4,643 in the industrial suburbs. An important factor causing this growth was the expansion of manufacturing, especially in the silk industry. Turin's silk merchants were numerous enough to form a guild in 1714; the total of spinning plants in the city and its suburbs gradually increased, until by 1787 there were fifty-six in all, some powered by water, some still by hand – not counting those owned by Turinese merchants in the surrounding countryside. Signs of prosperity were evident. Old buildings in the city's core were being recon-

structed and enlarged, and in the surrounding countryside, especially on the hills across the river Po, some of Turin's better-off citizens were building villas where they could withdraw from the heat and squalor of the city in summer. For the lower classes, life was still precarious, but for these well-to-do citizens at least, it was getting better. There were more amenities, more possibilities for diversion for those with money to spend and leisure to spend it. The streets were now lighted at night by hundreds of oil-lamps, to guide pedestrians and discourage crime. Mountebanks and traveling players performed on improvised stages in the piazzas. There were more carriages in the streets; there were cafés where people could meet to discuss the day's news, and a few purveyors of luxuries, like chocolate and spirits. The book trade was flourishing. Bookshops offered a wide range of titles, not only from local presses, but also from abroad, even including books and pamphlets banned by the censors. From 1740 there were regular winter seasons at the new opera-house, while another theater, owned by the prince of Carignano, offered performances of plays and operas. Turin was also home to a school of violinists and string players, headed by the virtuoso Giovanni Battista Somis, who were renowned all over Europe.

Victor Amadeus II's diplomatic and military actions during the wars against Louis XIV not only elevated him to kingly rank; they made Turin for the first time into a city of international significance, linked diplomatically to the principal European capitals by a constantly changing network of alliances. The major powers all dispatched ambassadors to the court of Turin. Partly because of this heightened political profile, foreigners now frequented the city in greater numbers. They came too because of the vogue for the Grand Tour, now the preferred way for young gentlemen to complete their education by visiting Italy's cities and admiring their antiquities and their artistic treasures. For travelers from France or Britain, Turin offered a convenient place to rest and recover after the dangerous journey over the Alps. What they found, however, was not the customary destination on the Grand Tour. Gentlemen – and gentlewomen like the celebrated Lady Mary Wortley Montagu – did not come to Turin to view the picturesque remnants of antiquity, which the city lacked. They came to study it as a model of order, careful planning, and good government. Many left accounts of their impressions. For their benefit the first guide-book describing Turin's monuments was published in 1753, for the tercentenary of the Corpus Domini miracle. Guide-book in hand, visitors would admire the Military Academy, which was attended by many young foreign noblemen, the cannon-foundry at the Arsenal, the royal palaces and the residences

of the nobility, and the well-tended farmland around the city, with its elegant villas. Catholic visitors noted the profusion of religious foundations and churches; Protestants tended to comment negatively on the bigoted religiosity they discerned in the city, and especially at the court. Every visitor was struck – though not always positively – by Turin's regular street-plan and the uniform façades of its buildings.

Many travelers observed that two different social milieus coexisted at Turin, which they called the court and "the town". They judged the latter, the domain of the educated and well-to-do middle classes, much more "amusing", in the words of the Président de Brosses, who visited Turin in the 1730s. In "the town" there were several salons they could frequent, presided over by lively hostesses, where literary figures and townspeople rubbed shoulders, gambled, and engaged in conversation. By contrast, most visitors found the court dull and stuffy. The sovereign and the royal family were bound by rigid protocol, following an unvarying routine of religious observances, meals, and receptions. Protocol prevailed even on supposedly informal occasions like the great hunting parties at Venaria Reale or Stupinigi. Moreover King Charles Emanuel III imprinted his own unbending piety on the court, proscribing discussion of subjects he deemed irreligious or immoral. The courtiers had to be careful about what they said, and were discouraged from talking to foreigners: they believed that spies were everywhere, and that indiscretions would quickly find their way to the sovereign's ears, bringing down retribution. This oppressive atmosphere seems to have extended also to "the town", for there were reputed to be informers even in the private salons. The famous libertine Giacomo Casanova, visiting Turin around 1760, complained that it was the most restrictive of all Italian cities. The government did not look well on philosophical speculation and the free exchange of ideas, even outside the confines of the court. Many intellectuals and writers fled from this chilling atmosphere, so contrary to the spirit of the Enlightenment. An emblematic case is the great Piedmontese dramatist Vittorio Alfieri, who in his *Autobiography* recalled his loathing for the repressive tone of Turin's cultural life, which forced him into self-imposed exile.

The king, his court and his bureaucrats dominated Turin not only culturally, but politically too. Victor Amadeus II had shorn the city council of much of its autonomy, and it no longer tried to challenge royal authority. Victor Amadeus had in effect converted it into an outgrowth of the state, taking its orders directly from the sovereign. So we see Victor Amadeus's successor, Charles Emanuel III, regularly intervening in its affairs: in 1745 to supervise the provisioning of the city

during a wartime emergency, in 1752 to enforce the rules for the election of councilors, in 1759 to require tighter accounting of the city's revenues. In 1767 the king issued a comprehensive new regulation for the city council, following up the edict of 1687. The councilors accepted it with alacrity and without question – in striking contrast to the confrontation that had erupted in 1687. Royal bureaucrats took the lead in directing the city's economic life. They fostered the formation of craft guilds as a way to increase production, maintain quality, and mediate relations between employers and their workers. The king's architects and engineers continued to supervise the rebuilding projects for beautifying and rationalizing the urban environment. The king's executive officials, the Vicario and the Judge, assumed an ever-greater role in running the municipality, at the expense of the councilors. In all these spheres of activity, the king and his indefatigable minister Giambattista Bogino were following the maxims of enlightened absolutist government: the goal of their reforms, in Turin as in the state as a whole, was to make government more rational, more efficient, and thus more beneficial to society at large.

11. *The End of the Old Regime.*

The year 1773 was marked by two decisive events. The first was religious. Under pressure from many of Europe's Catholic sovereigns, Pope Clement XIV dissolved the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits were banished from Turin, forfeiting the dominant position they had held for two centuries in the city's spiritual life and in its educational system. Their numerous properties, including their College, were taken over by the government. Their expulsion marked a victory for state officials eager to reduce the influence of the Church, for a broad segment of the clergy critical of the Jesuits' theology and devotional practices, and for the adherents of the Enlightenment, who saw the Jesuits as the embodiment of all that was reactionary and obscurantist.

The second event was political. Charles Emanuel III died in February 1773. His death led at once to a radical change in state policy. Within a few days the new king, Victor Amadeus III, dismissed his father's right-hand man Giambattista Bogino, and the leading administrative technocrats who had run the government under him. In their places he appointed an entirely new group of ministers, drawn from the high aristocracy and linked to the court: the antithesis of the old ministerial elite, which came from lowlier stock and had risen to power through

technical competence. The new ministers lacked practical experience and were less adept at handling the reins of power than the old bureaucratic elite, so for much of his reign Victor Amadeus III's policies faltered. The court and the government were rife with intrigues and divisions, which led to frequent changes of ministers, and undercut the stability of the regime. But in one sense the change was positive, for it relaxed the tight control the old king and Bogino had exercised over every aspect of life in the Savoyard state, and opened the way for rapid social and cultural change.

The effects of this change of regime were quickly felt at Turin. Travelers began to remark on the new freedom they observed in social and intellectual life, and on the new respect now accorded to men of letters. Charles Emanuel III and Bogino had had no time for writers and philosophers. Furthermore they had distrusted any form of spontaneous association that was not tied to the state, so that academies, discussion circles, and Masonic lodges, common in other Italian cities, barely existed at Turin. The first Masonic lodge did not appear there until 1765, decades later than in most other cities in the peninsula, and was only able to form because of the support it received from the heir to the throne. After 1773 all this changed, however, and a profusion of new associations suddenly blossomed, in a kind of Indian Summer of the Old Regime, among them a Patriotic Society, an Agrarian Society, the Sampaolina Academy, all devoted to the public good. Two more Masonic lodges were founded, their hundreds-strong membership overlapping and dovetailing with that of the academies. The spread of Freemasonry provides an indicator of the spread of Enlightenment principles among the elite. Freemasonry shared with the Enlightenment a belief in the brotherhood of mankind and in the betterment of human life through the right use of reason. Intellectual life at Turin, hitherto inward-looking, quickly adopted a cosmopolitan outlook. Educated people followed events abroad, through the medium of foreign periodicals and books, and the *Biblioteca Oltremontana*, the city's foremost journal of opinion which appeared in the 1780s. The war in the American colonies, and then events in France in 1789, were eagerly watched and debated by Turin's citizens.

A complex new relationship had emerged between the government and the educated classes, who were beginning to look upon themselves as a political force in their own right, as the voice of public opinion, more rational and more moral than the actions of statesmen. One sign of this new relationship was the formation of the Royal Academy of Sciences in 1783, under the patronage of Victor Amadeus III. The Academy had

originated as a so-called Private Society, formed in 1757 by a little group of scientists, some of whom were attached to the university. Charles Emanuel III had refused them official recognition, but his successor granted it. In 1783 the Academy held its opening session, and next year was given the hall of the former Jesuit College as its meeting-room, which the fellows redecorated with Masonic symbols. The Academy took its place in the international network of scientific societies, from Berlin to Paris, St Petersburg to London; its *Mémoires* circulated across Europe, and it enrolled leading foreign scientists as corresponding members: Benjamin Franklin, the pioneer in the study of electricity, Joseph Priestley, the chemist, Leonhard Euler, the mathematician, and Pierre de Laplace, the astronomer. Unlike Turin's private academies, however, it was an arm of the state; it had been coopted by royal patronage, to become the government's chief repository of scientific expertise, superseding the university. From the moment of its foundation it was called upon for advice on all manner of issues of military and industrial technology.

In 1787 the government requested the Academy's opinion on an urgent question: the crisis in the silk industry. Piedmont's principal export industry had been hard hit by competition from cheaper silk, imported from Asia, and by an epidemic of disease that had destroyed the crop of silkworms. Thousands of workers were thrown out of their jobs. The collapse of the silk industry was part of a growing economic malaise that was overtaking the region. Grain prices had been rising for the last decade and more. The harvests were bad in 1778 and 1783, forcing the city council to incur a heavy debt by purchasing grain; the supply was not keeping up with the city's needs. The harvest of 1788 was adequate, but the following winter turned bitterly cold. Thousands of beggars, many of them unemployed silk workers, were camping in the streets: the city was in the grip of a severe economic downturn. To give them some protection from the cold the municipality opened the cattle stalls outside the city gates. As the savage winter ended, news began to arrive of the momentous events taking place in France. The convocation of the Estates General in May 1789 marked the start of the revolution. A terrible decade of political conflict, war, and economic hardship had begun, which would bring down the Savoyard monarchy and end the Old Regime.

The news from France galvanized public opinion in Turin. The information in local and foreign news-sheets was soon supplemented by the arrival of the first émigrés fleeing the new order taking shape in France, who told horrific tales of a world turned upside down. Opinion at Turin was divided between those who supported the old order, sympathizing

with Louis XVI in his hour of trial, and those who favored the revolution. The government was alarmed; the archbishop led his clergy in denouncing the revolution as monstrous and atheistical. Censorship and spying intensified. In Turin, agents of the Vicario reported on subversive conversations, and tried to uncover the underground clubs of revolutionary sympathizers that began to proliferate. These tensions burst into the open in June 1791, when the arrest of a university student provoked a riot. Protesting at his arrest, students rampaged through the streets, supported by crowds of workmen and artisans. To calm the disturbance the government disavowed the arrest and dismissed the official who had ordered it. An uneasy calm returned to the city, but the outbreak of war between revolutionary France and Austria in April 1792 raised political tensions to a new pitch. A fresh wave of émigrés arrived from France, among them some members of the royal family, whom Victor Amadeus welcomed to his court. His government was now determined to take a firm line against the revolution, both abroad and at home. This determination hardened in September, when the French revolutionary armies attacked Savoy and the county of Nice, and quickly occupied them. Victor Amadeus III's government now found itself in a state of open war with France. In January 1793 the occupation of the transalpine Savoyard territories was followed by the execution of Louis XVI, a calculated act of defiance by the French revolutionary government against the crowned heads of Europe. In the spring of 1793 Victor Amadeus III joined the coalition of powers that Great Britain was forming to crush the revolution.

With the outbreak of war against revolutionary France the atmosphere in Turin became even more highly charged. Repression increased, for in addition to the political dangers confronting it, the government now faced a fast-deteriorating economic situation, aggravated by the mounting costs of the war. The army was deployed to guard the Alpine frontier, while detachments of solders were stationed in the cities of Piedmont to suppress revolutionary agitation. As in previous conflicts, Turin was called upon to play its part: the Monte issued state bonds, and the municipal authorities raised a company of gentlemen volunteers to defend the city and the crown. The civic elite remained staunch in its support of the monarchy, but among the citizens there was growing disaffection. Grain prices continued to rise, and unemployment was increasing. The silk trade, still not recovered from the crisis that had hit it a few years earlier, was seriously damaged by the war, which cut off its main export market in France. Economic distress created a ready audience for revolutionary propaganda. By the end of 1793 two under-

ground clubs at Turin were conspiring to kill the king, seize the citadel, and open the gates to the French. In May 1794 the plot was uncovered: two ringleaders were executed, but many of the plotters escaped.

In the summer of 1794 a French army penetrated the Ligurian coast and occupied Genoa, threatening Piedmont with invasion from the south. To add to the government's difficulties, the harvest that year proved disappointing; grain prices continued their steady upward movement, and the city council of Turin was forced to import grain to feed the population, overloading the already heavy municipal debt. Another bitterly cold winter followed, and again the municipal authorities had to open the stalls at the gates to house the thousands of paupers crowding the streets. No relief was in sight. The cycle of bad harvests continued in 1795, and again the city council had to spend large sums to bring in supplies of grain to feed the poor and the unemployed. The terrible economic situation and the proximity of the French army fuelled the spread of revolutionary propaganda. Outmatched militarily, unsure of the loyalty of its subjects, internally divided, and bankrupted by the cost of the war, Victor Amadeus III's government was on the verge of collapse.

The final blow soon fell. In April 1796 the French army stationed in Liguria, now commanded by the young Napoleon Bonaparte, burst into southern Piedmont and routed the Savoyard forces. On April 28 Victor Amadeus was forced to sign an armistice, admitting French garrisons to his main fortresses and effectively turning what was left of his kingdom into a satellite of France. Bonaparte then marched on to conquer Lombardy from the Austrians. Early in 1797 he dictated a peace settlement by which the Austrian emperor abandoned Lombardy to him. He then established two sister-republics of revolutionary France in northern Italy, the Cisalpine Republic in Lombardy and the Ligurian Republic around Genoa. Piedmont was now hemmed in on all sides by French territory or French allies. Victor Amadeus III had died at Turin on October 22, 1796. In April 1797, following the French conquest and occupation of Lombardy, his successor, Charles Emanuel IV, was forced to sign a treaty of alliance with France. The Savoyard state had lost all freedom of action and now continued to exist only at the pleasure of the revolutionary government of France.

Life at Turin in this last year of the Old Regime was gloomy and oppressive. Grain prices remained very high, food was in short supply, unemployment reigned. Rebellion flared up in the surrounding countryside, as peasants demanded cheaper food, lower rents and better conditions from their lords. In the city, the beleaguered government had

long ago closed down every forum for public discussion, from political clubs to Masonic lodges. The periodical press had been silenced, foreign news-sheets proscribed, bookshops closed. Lectures were no longer held at the university, lest they bring together large groups of students and provoke riots. The municipal authorities kept a wary eye on potential subversives. But there was little they or the king could do to save the city and the state from final dissolution, which came in the closing months of 1798.

In November Great Britain formed a new coalition against France. In response the French government demanded that Charles Emanuel honor the alliance between them. Then, without waiting for an answer, on December 6 France declared war on the Savoyard monarchy. A French army crossed the frontier from Lombardy and occupied Turin: no resistance was offered, because both the city fathers and the king knew it was useless. Granted a safe-conduct by the French commander, Charles Emanuel IV, the royal family, and the court departed from Turin on December 8. Their destination was Sardinia, the one remaining Savoyard territory, where they were destined to remain, virtual exiles, for the next sixteen years. Until their return in 1814, except for a brief interval in 1799-1800, Turin would remain under French occupation.

Chapter VI

Between Revolution and Reaction, 1798-1830

1. *Turin in the Era of the French Revolution.*

A traditional way of life abruptly ended and a new era began for the city of Turin and its people in December 1798. That month the old royal capital experienced the full force of the French Revolution in the form of military occupation and the abdication of the Savoyard monarch, Charles Emanuel IV. As the French troops approached, the king abandoned the city and went into exile with his court on the island of Sardinia. These traumatic events marked the opening stage in Turin's transformation from a center of a Catholic, aristocratic society of orders into a more secular society dominated by a more open elite of propertied notables. In the process Turin would gradually lose its character as a fortress-capital of an absolutist monarchy and evolve instead into a modern bourgeois city in the nineteenth century.

The era of French dominance over the former Savoyard capital came in two separate phases. In the wake of the king's abdication, the first and more radical phase commenced in December 1798 amid the rhetoric of liberty and equality and celebrations by local supporters of the revolution in the streets and public squares of the city. That month saw not only the disappearance of the monarchy and its replacement by a republican form of government, but also the elimination of the aristocracy's privileged status. Two days after the king had gone into exile, the French authorities abolished all noble titles and distinctions, and prohibited the use of livery, weapons or coats of arms. Additional decrees eliminated any remaining feudal privileges and monopolies regardless of their origins or legal status, and denied title holders the right to compensation or even payment of back taxes and dues. The new rulers of Turin also launched a major assault on the power and influence of the Catholic Church. During the first two months of republican rule, they closed the local seminary, abolished the professorial chairs in Theology and Canon Law at the university, got rid of the tithe, clerical legal immunity, and the inquisition, limited the prerogatives of bishops, and reduced the number of religious holidays.

This radical phase proved to be short lived, however. After the annexation of Piedmont to the French Republic in February 1799, the new provisional government in Turin had neither the time nor the opportunity to accomplish a great deal. From the outset, it was saddled with the financial burdens of the war, beset by internal divisions between moderates and radicals over reform and relations with the military authorities, and devoid of popular support outside the city. The brief republican experiment in Turin ended in May 1799 when a coalition of Austrian and Russian forces invaded Piedmont, defeated the French, and occupied the city.

A second and far more important phase of French dominance and authoritarian modernization began in the spring of the following year when Napoleon Bonaparte returned to Italy. After his troops defeated the Austrian army at the battle of Marengo, the French leader recaptured Turin in June 1800. A cloud of economic uncertainty and political instability continued to hang over the city for another two years until Napoleon arranged a general political settlement for the Italian peninsula in September 1802. Under the terms of that settlement, Piedmont was once again annexed and soon became a part of the French First Empire. As a consequence, the people of Turin now became subject to the Code Napoleon and French administrative and judicial systems.

2. *Napoleonic Turin.*

From the outset, the absorption of Piedmont into the French empire entailed a profound physical transformation of the old capital. One of Napoleon's first edicts called for the demolition of the city walls as well as most of the urban fortifications. While this edict had the strategic objective of dismantling military defensive structures, it also carried a powerful symbolic message that Turin was no longer the fortress-city of the Savoyard dynasty. At the same time, French authorities introduced a new concept of comprehensive urban planning that aimed to convert the former royal capital into an "open city", a rationally designed center of commerce and services. In the areas of the city affected by the demolition, Napoleon's planners envisioned the construction of new bridges, roads, and public squares that improved communications, enhanced French authority, and celebrated imperial power.

While their ambitious project produced little in the way of concrete results beyond the actual demolition of the fortified walls and the con-

struction of a splendid new stone bridge over the Po between 1810 and 1813, the French did impose a more rational organization on the city. Thus, for instance, they abandoned the old system of dividing the city into 145 blocks, each named after a saint. Instead, they subdivided Turin administratively into four districts – Po, Dora, Moncenisio, and Monviso – that reflected the four directions of traffic radiating out from the center of the city. In a similar vein, they introduced in 1808 a system of sequential civic numbering, based on the model applied in Paris only three years earlier that greatly facilitated the flow of information and the movement of goods and people within and out of the city.

Napoleon's dismantling of the old fortress-city of absolutist monarchy went hand-in-hand with his continuation of the republican campaign against the institutional power of the Roman Catholic Church after 1800. The contemplative religious orders, in particular, received harsh treatment at the hands of the empire. The new government closed twenty-nine monasteries and convents in Turin alone, expropriated their properties, and auctioned them off to private buyers. Napoleonic authorities also suppressed the old lay confraternities and cut the number of parishes in the city from seventeen to eight, exercising rigid control on the activities of those that remained. A new catechism was imposed, touting loyalty to the emperor as a religious obligation, while an imperial edict made the celebration of "Saint Napoleon" a holy day. By means of such measures, the French authorities succeeded in reducing the Catholic Church's organizational presence, wealth, and role in the city.

Napoleonic France supplanted the old monarchical and religious practices and institutions in Turin and the surrounding territory of Piedmont with a new set of legal and administrative procedures and structures that introduced civil equality and exalted the values of imperial authority, efficiency, rational progress, and public utility. The imposition of the Code Napoleon, in particular, transformed the juridical system that had structured Turin's traditional social hierarchies. To begin with, it reconfirmed the abolition of all the legal distinctions and privileges that had once separated the nobility from other segments of the propertied classes, and extended civil rights and religious toleration to Turin's small, but talented Jewish community. More generally, Napoleonic legislation treated marriage as a state-regulated civil contract rather than a religious sacrament and legalized divorce. French laws attacked other traditional practices governing family relations under the old regime by abolishing primogenitures and entails and by requiring a more equitable distribution of inheritances among all legiti-

mate sons and daughters. At the same time, Napoleon introduced a modern commercial code, eliminated the city guilds, which had incorporated roughly two-thirds of the trades people in 1792, and removed tariff barriers and other obstacles to production and trade. These legal reforms cleared the way for important new institutions in Turin like the chamber of commerce, a stock exchange, and a business tribunal, all designed to promote contacts between city's business groups and the agronomists, merchants, and entrepreneurs from the more advanced French economy.

The modernizing thrust of Napoleon's civil and commercial codes also carried over to the administrative systems he imposed on Turin in order to make the city and its citizens more responsive to the imperatives of the central government in Paris. Accordingly, French authorities expanded the power of the mayor at the expense of the city council, introduced more systematic accounting methods, and streamlined local government agencies to increase their efficiency. The restructured municipal administration assumed in turn expanded responsibilities for policing the city, improving public health, caring for the needy, and overseeing the operations of the hospitals.

The Napoleonic police, in particular, brought an unprecedented degree of methodical attention and organizational efficiency to the tasks of law enforcement and social control in Turin. Applying a system already tested in Paris, they required an array of new documents from identity cards and internal passports to residential and work permits in order to regulate the comings and goings of the people within the city. In each district, commissariats or police stations were set up, headed by commissioners who provided their superiors with daily reports on the state of public order in their respective areas. Since homicides and other violent crimes remained comparatively rare, police officials concentrated their efforts on controlling the floating population of vagabonds and homeless people who were held responsible for begging, thefts, purse-snatchings, and other crimes against property. In fact vagabonds accounted for 11% of all arrests in the years between 1806 and 1810. As part of their crime-fighting campaign, police also increased their physical presence in the problem areas of the city during the peak periods of illegal activity and intensified their surveillance of the trades and enterprises most closely associated with crimes against property such as bars, coffee houses, hotels, lock smiths, and fencers of stolen goods.

The twin goals of centralization and standardization informed Napoleonic administrative policies in the areas of hospitals, public health, and social assistance as well. French authorities developed an in-

frastructure for more modern medical care by tightening the administration of Turin's hospitals to accentuate the professional role of the doctors, curative care, and research, while reducing the presence of the Catholic clergy and the charitable functions of these institutions. Thus, they designated the city's major hospital, San Giovanni, a national hospital under the control of the Ministry of the Interior in Paris. The reorganized medical center specialized in curable and non-infectious diseases, while new institutions were created to assume its former responsibilities for the incurably ill and for other categories like pregnant prostitutes, poor women, unwed mothers, and abandoned babies.

In a similar vein, French administrators moved aggressively to deal with Turin's perennial problems of over-crowding, poor nutrition, inadequate public hygiene, and pauperism that had endangered public order in the past and contributed to the spread of infectious diseases such as typhus, pleurisy, and smallpox. Already in 1801, a new Superior Council of Health (Consiglio superiore di Sanità) was set up to inspect hospitals and other related public health institutions, to regulate medical practitioners, to collect data on physical conditions of the population, and to adopt measures to control the spread of disease. To reduce the consumption of rotten or spoiled foods, for instance, public health officials imposed tighter regulations on the city's markets and butchers. Napoleonic administrators achieved their greatest success in combating one of the most feared infectious diseases, smallpox. In 1804, committees were set up to implement a program of mass vaccinations. Despite initial fears of the population and opposition from the Catholic Church, the committees persisted in their campaign and were rewarded for their efforts in 1813 when the numbers of deaths from smallpox fell from an average of several hundred in previous years to a mere twenty-three. French administrators were equally systematic and ambitious in their efforts to bring care of Turin's indigent, elderly, handicapped, and orphans under the control of the secular state. New institutions were created to identify, count, and classify these groups, and to develop appropriate reward or punishment mechanisms to instill the values of family and work in the recipients of their services.

The imperial ambitions of the French regime also extended to the cultural life of the Piedmontese capital. As part of a larger strategy to rally the more enlightened elements of the local nobility to the Empire, Napoleon enlisted the support of prominent reform-minded figures from private intellectual circles in Turin like the Accademia dei Concordi and the Pastori della Dora. The emperor nominated Prospero Balbo, scion of a distinguished old family and former Savoyard government minis-

ter and ambassador, as rector of Turin's University in 1805. Balbo's intellectual prestige, diplomatic and political experience, and familiarity with Parisian circles enabled him to use his position to dominate virtually all aspects of local educational and intellectual activity. In addition to the university, colleges, and elementary schools, the new rector exercised authority over a wide array of institutions that included the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Agriculture, astronomical observatory, library, and museums. Balbo and his collaborators also launched the first major effort to coordinate research and education in Piedmont. The rector oversaw a reformed imperial university divided into nine specialized schools for medicine, surgery, veterinary medicine, sciences, mathematics, law, language and classics, painting, and music. The thirty-six professors who presided over these schools included the leading luminaries of the Piedmontese scholarly community. During the same period, the revived Academy of Sciences became a center for scientific, literary, philosophical, and historical discussions, a point of contact with scholars from the most prestigious centers of learning in Europe, and a launching pad for careers in the university.

At least on the surface, Napoleonic France's ambitious array of legal and administrative reforms did appear to eliminate, undermine, or transform most of the institutions, traditions, and practices that had governed the economic and social life of the Turinese people for centuries. Above all, the French authorities profoundly modified the legal and institutional structures of the city in ways that greatly increased its role as a center of economic and commercial activity in Piedmont. The sale of Church lands, the elimination of important obstacles to trade and production, the promulgation of modern commercial legislation, and the development of new means of communications and public works projects, for example, helped lay the foundations for the long-term economic growth and expansion of the city in the nineteenth century.

The chief beneficiaries of these developments were ambitious men from the professional and commercial classes. The French regime knocked down many of the institutional and legal barriers to political and social integration at the highest levels of Turinese society. With their emphasis on efficiency, personal achievement, and equality, imperial reforms embodied values that were inimical to narrow and exclusionary forms of aristocratic power. As a result, they paved the way for the emergence of a new and broader local elite, whose positions depended less on birth and privilege than on landed property and professional expertise. From the outset, the sale of Church properties, real estate speculation, contracts for public works, and remunerative careers

in the Napoleonic bureaucracy created unprecedented opportunities for men from the worlds of commerce, small manufacturing, finance, and the free professions to increase their wealth, status, and prestige.

At the same time, the emperor's concern with stability and consensus led French authorities to include and even favor the older aristocratic families in the distribution of lucrative public offices and posts at the court of Prince Camillo Borghese, the French governor of Piedmont, Parma, and Liguria. Such rewards and the prospect of regaining some of their old social and political influence gradually persuaded a number of prominent aristocrats to put aside their traditional loyalty to the House of Savoy and to assume important posts in the Napoleonic state. Enterprising nobles, like Camillo Benso di Cavour's father, Marchese Michele, also took advantage of the profitable investment opportunities that resulted from the abolition of restrictions on crop cultivation to expand their landed estates and wealth.

The resulting process of aristocratic-bourgeois fusion found its most visible expression in the imperial governing class of Turin and in the new social hierarchy which Napoleon attempted to develop after 1808. The municipal council, for instance, included former titled nobles (one-third), professional men, especially lawyers (one-fourth), as well as a number of merchants, bankers, and landowners. These groups also provided the members of the new imperial nobility and knightly orders founded between 1808 and 1814. Finally, the same mix of old-line aristocrats and bourgeois gentlemen and their wives began to rub elbows at the parties and other events of Napoleonic high society, which was organized around the court of Prince Camillo Borghese and his wife, Princess Paolina Bonaparte in Turin.

Nonetheless, the short-term achievements of French administrative reforms did not live up to their proponents' hopes and expectations. To begin with, Napoleonic police and welfare officials lacked the funds and manpower to implement fully their innovative methods and policies intended for managing Turin's growing population of poor and indigent. Ambitious plans for a state-run system of welfare agencies, homeless shelters and soup kitchens, for instance, had to be substantially scaled back and those institutions that did function tended to be inadequate, overcrowded, and filthy. Similar shortcomings limited the effectiveness of the new police force in controlling the city's huge transient population or reducing the problem of begging. The French preference for corrective punishment led, in practice, to the mass arrest of beggars and vagabonds, an approach that accomplished little. Those people arrested wound up being "buried alive" in over-crowded, parasite-infested

prisons, where they often waited for years to receive a trial. Likewise, French measures to reduce the role of the Catholic Church did not have a measurable impact on the religious convictions and practices of the local population. Indeed, there were few signs of a drop in religious observance between 1798 and 1814, while only a minority of Turin's upper class and intellectual elite embraced the enlightened, anti-clerical ideas advanced by the French Revolution.

The immediate impact of the French occupation and Napoleon's economic policies on large segments of the city's population compounded the problems of implementing administrative reforms. On the whole, the years between 1798 and 1814 did not represent a period of growth and expansion for the economy of Piedmont and its capital city. The devastation and enormous costs of the Napoleonic wars reduced imports, fueled inflation, and intensified tax pressures so that by 1802 officials estimated that from one-fourth to a third of the population were in desperate need of assistance. The departure of the Savoyard court and many noble families from the city hit especially hard the producers of luxury goods. The ensuing political reorganization of the Italian peninsula accentuated these difficulties by cutting off local economic groups from their old markets to the east and by redirecting their goods and trade towards France where they had to compete with favored French producers. Turin's subordinate place in the French Empire and the burdens of taxes and requisitions further weakened its manufacturing sector and reduced the city's role in the exportation of Piedmontese silk and rice. Demographic trends reflected the short-term consequences of French economic policies. The city's population, which had steadily increased in the last three decades of the eighteenth century, dropped by nearly a third in the first two decades of the new century.

The authoritarian character of Napoleonic modernizing reforms, which treated the people of Turin as the passive recipients of orders from above, magnified the discontent and resentment provoked by economic hardship, and thereby further sabotaged the efforts of the French authorities to create a broad base of active support for the regime. Despite the lure of new honors and opportunities, only a small minority of the old landed aristocratic families embraced the imperial order with any enthusiasm. Most of the nobles who participated in the public life of the Napoleonic empire did so with reservations, while many other old titled families, who did not go into exile, remained sullenly hostile toward a foreign regime that reduced their role in the state, denied them their traditional independence, severed their attachment to the House of Savoy, and offended their religious beliefs with its attacks on the in-

stitutions of the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, the French also faced the steadfast opposition of the Turin's clergy, who continued to exercise a strong influence over the mass of the population in the city. For the laboring classes, in particular, French modernization meant, in the short run, a lower standard of living, increased unemployment, compulsory military conscription, and the loss of the forms of protection that they had previously received through their guilds and paternalistic ties to the aristocracy.

Still these hardships and discontents rarely provoked open revolts or organized resistance to the French regime even after Napoleon's military fortunes began to decline in 1813. Even with the military draft and heavy tax burdens imposed by the emperor's wars, opposition rarely extended beyond small groups of educated young men, who were principally concerned with defending Piedmontese culture. In fact, the French imperial era in Turin and the surrounding territory came to an end without much excitement or disturbances. In the spring of 1814, departing French forces, for instance, encountered little hostility from the local populace, while the arrival of Austrian troops aroused no particular enthusiasm. A convention signed in April by Prince Borghese and representatives of the Savoyard monarchy and the Austrian emperor prepared the way for the orderly retreat of the French back over the Alps later that month. On May 8, 1814, Austrian troops under the command of General Ferdinand von Bubna-Littitz entered Turin. The victorious great powers initially promoted a policy of moderation and compromise by setting up a mixed council of Napoleonic and Savoyard loyalist nobles to guide the transition to a restored monarchical system. The early return of Victor Emanuel I from exile in Sardinia, however, effectively sabotaged hopes of a moderate restoration.

3. *Restoration Turin.*

When the newly restored Savoyard monarch made his triumphant re-entry into Turin on May 20, 1814, even his physical appearance betokened a sweeping rejection of everything associated with the French Revolution and Napoleon and an unadulterated return to the past. Victor Emanuel I and his entourage, recalled Massimo d'Azeglio who stood in Piazza Castello that day, "were all dressed in antiquated style, with powdered hair in pigtails, and eighteenth-century tricorn hats à la Frederick II". Appropriately, the first royal edict, issued the following day, aimed to turn back the clock to the pre-1789 era by abrogating all leg-

islation and legal codes introduced by the French and by restoring the Royal Constitutions of 1770 and any subsequent revisions and additions decreed by his predecessors prior to June 1800. In one fell swoop, the new regime eliminated the principle of equality before the law, civil marriage and divorce, while resurrecting the patriarchal prerogatives of the family, the old civil restrictions on Jewish and Waldensian communities, and the central role of the Catholic Church in public life. In line with these changes, the king dismissed all those men who had cooperated with the "usurper" state that had preceded him and excluded them from positions in his regime. Victor Emanuel I's program of integral restoration also carried over to the monarchy's economic policies. His officials halted the public notification of mortgages, which had facilitated economic transactions, reintroduced old tariff barriers both at the borders and within the Kingdom of Sardinia, and revived the guilds and preexisting industrial privileges.

Not surprisingly, the titled nobility and the Catholic Church emerged as the chief beneficiaries of the newly restored monarchical order. Although Victor Emanuel I and his entourage did not go so far as to revive feudal bonds, they did reinstate aristocratic primogenitures and other privileges and pursued policies that openly favored the nobility in the selection and promotion of state officials. The attempt to return to a caste system was evident at the municipal level, where aristocratic families enjoyed once again official corporative representation after 1814. Turin's local administration was put back in the hands of a general council of sixty decurions who were chosen for life. The decurions were divided into two categories with the first coming from the nobility and the second from the other classes of citizens. Much as in the past, titled decurions had their own special places in church and at court, and enjoyed the rights of precedence at state and church functions. In a similar fashion, the reconstituted Royal Military Academy of Turin accepted almost exclusively the sons of aristocratic families.

The House of Savoy also reinforced aristocratic caste-consciousness in Turin at the level of high society by making its highly traditional court the focal point and exclusive setting for much of the nobility's social activities. The rigid etiquette observed at the court of Victor Emanuel I ensured that titled status remained a virtual prerequisite for admission to royal festivities. There appears to have been equally little informal mingling between the aristocracy and other urban social groups in the decades after 1815. As the French ambassador reported in the 1820s, between nobles and the non-nobles "the separation that defines social customs is complete, profound, and without exception". In her mem-

oirs of her childhood in Restoration Turin, Baroness Olimpia Savio recalled how the "only point of contact allowed then between one class and the other" came on Sundays and holidays when the nobles and "those who were among the better sort in the city touched elbows" as they promenaded under the arcades near the royal palace.

Victor Emanuel I was no less generous in his treatment of the Roman Catholic Church, which he viewed as an essential ally that provided a theological justification for absolutism and promoted popular devotion to the Savoyard dynasty. Accordingly, the king allowed the Church to revive and re-endow its religious orders, while his concordat with the Vatican reinstituted ecclesiastical courts in the Kingdom of Sardinia. The Jesuits benefited, in particular, from the re-establishment of a monarchical order that gave them sweeping authority over social welfare policy, education and censorship. Since the great powers formally sanctioned the sale of ecclesiastical properties during the French occupation, the convents and monasteries did not regain their old prominence in Turin after 1814, but their diminished role was filled by thriving local parishes headed by the secular clergy, who came to dominate the religious life of the city.

These institutional changes coincided with the conscious revival of a traditional Catholic culture that treated the fall of Napoleon as a sign of divine intervention in human affairs and reaffirmed the essential tenets of religious faith in all areas of civic life and at official events. Thus, on May 20, 1814, a *Te Deum* was celebrated in the main cathedral of the city in honor of the returning king, whose procession stopped to venerate the Holy Shroud. For its part, the municipal government chose to celebrate the return of the Savoyard dynasty by building a church dedicated to the Virgin Mary on the site where the king had crossed the Po on his re-entry into the city. In recognition of the renewed solidarity of throne and altar in the Kingdom of Sardinia, Pope Pius VII made an official visit to Turin a year later where he and the king jointly celebrated a rare public display of the Shroud. At a more practical level, the greatly enhanced importance of the Catholic Church within the city found expression in the re-establishment of religious holidays banned by the French, the abandonment of the catechism imposed by Napoleon, and the strict observance of the sacraments. At the same time, religious orders and associations resumed their traditional role as dispensers of philanthropy and charitable services to the sick, elderly, orphans, and others in need.

The alliance of the Savoyard dynasty with the Catholic Church came, first and foremost, at the expense of the principal religious minorities,

the Waldensian Protestants and the Jews. Already in May 1814, the first edict of the Restoration deprived both groups of the civil and political rights that they had enjoyed during the Napoleonic era. In theory, the edict revived old exclusionary policies that forced the Jews, in particular, back into the ghetto, denied them access to the university, certain professions and state service, and prohibited them from owning land. In their actual application, the monarchy had little choice but to modify these policies in recognition of the changes that had taken place during the previous decade and a half. A royal edict of January 1816, for instance, gave the Waldensians permission to keep the properties they had acquired outside of their historical territories and to exercise trades and professions forbidden to them before 1798. For their part, Jewish families were given up to five years time to sell the properties they had purchased during the French occupation, and even this requirement was not strictly enforced. Moreover, Jews also preserved the right to exercise certain previously banned professions and were no longer required to wear identifying arm bands. While Turin's Jewish community did have to return to their urban ghetto once again, the new government granted various dispensations that allowed Jews to remain outside their residential zone at night "in cases of necessity" as long as they "returned by nine o'clock at night".

Victor Emanuel I's administrators displayed a similar selectivity in their approach to Napoleon's reforms in other areas as well. Many of the French policing measures and fiscal policies, for instance, remained in force. Local authorities continued to require that workers in Turin carry employment cards used by the Napoleonic Empire to document their work status and track their movements in the city. The newly restored monarchy also maintained in place the property tax first introduced by the French, while abandoning certain practices of the Old Regime such as the torture of suspects and the punishment of the condemned on the rack.

Overall, the attempt of the House of Savoy to cancel all traces of the previous regime had its greatest impact on the cultural life of the capital city. Although the government of Victor Emanuel I did not employ executions, prisons, or banishment as part of its strategy, it imposed a climate of moral and intellectual repression that left a mark on the city's educational and cultural institutions. At the level of primary and secondary education, his officials made a concerted effort to turn the clock back by purging officials who had collaborated with the Napoleonic regime and by closing the French lycées that had educated the male children of the local elite for a generation. The government reintroduced a

pedagogy and discipline typical of the old order that largely excluded girls and emphasized religious devotions and cults, a rigid system of prizes and punishments, and rote memorization. The University of Turin also underwent a purge of its faculty after its closing in May 1814, a purge that hit the disciplines of Theology and Medicine with particular force. The university reopened in October under the guiding influence of the Jesuit Order with tightened standards for admission of students and strict controls on faculty schedules in order to produce "devout, loyal, studious" students. Newly appointed clerical prefects imposed a strict discipline on university students, monitoring their attendance at religious services, their observance of monthly confession, and their participation in spiritual exercises. A similar climate of rigid censorship affected Turin's publishing industry, its journals and magazines, and its theaters, at least in the first years of the Restoration.

The Savoyard monarchy also adopted an ultra-conservative approach to economic matters after 1814 with the goal of halting or reversing changes that had taken place during the previous decade and a half. With Turin once again serving as the regional center of financial and commercial policy-making, the new government raised protective tariffs on agricultural products significantly, reduced the tax burdens of rural landowners at the expense of consumers, and imposed sweeping restrictions on agricultural lease-holding in order to bolster the old, but declining sharecropping or *mezzadria* system. Restrictions on exports as well as imports aggravated the already difficult economic situation after 1815 by provoking a sharp drop in the foreign purchases of silk, Piedmont's principal product for exportation, which accentuated a growing balance-of-trade deficit. The tangible shortcomings of these policies for the people of Turin quickly became evident in the first years of the Restoration. In 1816 and 1817, high duties on agricultural products aggravated a crisis provoked by a series of bad harvests. The resulting famine led to food shortages and a sharp rise in pauperism in the capital that forced the municipal authorities to organize an emergency distribution of soup and bread to head off mass starvation. To make matters worse, an outbreak of typhus hit the city in the spring of 1817, driving up the death rate still further that year.

Despite such misery and suffering, the principal threats to the regime of Victor Emanuel I in the years after 1814 came less from revolts by the urban laboring classes and the poor than from the seething discontents and resentments within Piedmont's traditional aristocratic military elite. At the highest levels of local society, contrasting moderate and conservative visions of state organization and policy fueled conflicts

that pitted father against son and brother against brother. Angelo di Saluzzo recalled in his memoirs how ideological and private conflicts in this era became so intertwined that "the discord [was] often with the family [and] the diversity of political principles became the motive for personal animosities". Indeed, in no other city on the Italian peninsula did frustrations within the old privileged orders give rise to so much bitterness and acrimony as in Turin, where they erupted into open rebellion, criminal trials, and the forced exile of young men from some of the most illustrious noble families.

4. *The Revolution of 1821 and Reaction in Turin.*

From the moment of his re-entry into Turin in 1814, Victor Emanuel I's stubborn refusal to make any meaningful concessions to new social and political realities that had emerged during the French occupation aroused mounting opposition from enlightened elements of the old nobility and from the increasingly self-confident professional classes of Turin. Efforts by cautious reformers like Prospero Balbo to remove the most retrograde aspects of the Restoration legislation, but not advocate constitutional changes, met with scant support from the throne and did little to ease discontent. On the contrary, their efforts to blend innovation and tradition disappointed the liberal opposition without softening the resistance of advocates of intransigence at court and in the government. As a result, a growing number of ex-officials of the French administration, teachers, students, and merchants began to join secret societies or sects. By 1818, Turin had become the hub of a sectarian network of conspiratorial groups throughout northern Italy, committed to the goal of arming the people and forcing the princely rulers to introduce constitutions. Meanwhile, the reactionary policies of the government and the mistreatment of those families associated with the French imperial regime angered and frustrated a group of idealistic, young aristocrats, for the most part army officers, led by Santorre Derossi di Santarosa, Carlo Asinari di San Marzano, Giacinto Provana di Collegno, and Guglielmo Moffa di Liseo. Motivated by a contradictory blend of Italian nationalism, Piedmontese military expansionism, constitutionalism, and loyalty to the House of Savoy, these men spearheaded a military revolt in March 1821 to force the abdication of Victor Emanuel I and his replacement by the supposedly more liberal Prince of Carignano, Charles Albert.

The origins of the Piedmontese Revolution of 1821 lay in develop-

ments elsewhere on the Italian peninsula and in Spain. Military revolts triggered revolutions the previous year in Spain and Naples that raised the hopes and expectations of both moderates and democrats in Piedmont for political change in the Kingdom of Sardinia. By the beginning of 1821, conversations and discussions in the cafés, theaters, and private residences of Turin revolved around the question of reform and the relative merits of the moderate Neapolitan and more democratic Spanish constitutions, while increasingly frequent clandestine meetings of the various secret societies signaled the intention of the sectarians to seize the initiative. Political tensions in the city escalated dramatically in January when radical students occupied a number of buildings of the University of Turin and the government responded with force, injuring thirty protesters and arresting another sixty. During the same period, the young aristocratic officers began to negotiate with the heir to the throne and a generational contemporary of theirs, Charles Albert, the dynastic figure whom they hoped could guide the monarchy toward constitutional government and take the lead in a national war of independence against the Austrian Empire in northern Italy. At least initially, Charles Albert's contacts with the officers and his apparent willingness to play such a role encouraged them in their conspiratorial activities.

When democrat groups and elements of the army in the provinces launched a revolt in the second week of March, they forced the hand of the military conspirators in Turin. On March 10, 1821, a provisional government based in Alessandria proclaimed the democratic Spanish Constitution of 1812 and declared war on Austria, in the name of the "Kingdom of Italy". Two days later, an army insurrection took place in the capital city, with the rebellious troops echoing the demands of their provincial compatriots for the Spanish Constitution. In the wake of the insurrection, Charles Albert and Prospero Balbo urged the king to grant the demands of the military conspirators. A week later, the revolutionaries in Turin found their public voice with the launching of the *Sentinella Subalpina*, a new newspaper that promoted the ideals of "constitutional liberty", "independence", and "national unity".

Victor Emanuel I, however, quickly dashed the hopes of the young aristocratic officers in the capital that they could reconcile dynastic loyalty with political reform, when he abdicated in favor of his brother, Charles Felix, rather than grant a constitution. For his part, Charles Albert failed to live up to the expectations of the liberal officers during his brief period as regent in Turin. While he did grant the Spanish Constitution, he did so only on the condition that Charles Felix approved the decision. More importantly, he refused to lead a war against Aus-

tria and ordered the army mutineers to return to their barracks. After Charles Felix proclaimed that he would not recognize any change "in the form of government", the young prince fled the city, which fell under the control of the revolutionaries. The new government lasted only a week before its lack of popular support, its failure to win over influential moderate aristocrats like Balbo, and its abandonment by Charles Albert left it isolated and vulnerable to forces loyal to the monarchy. In early April royalist troops, supported by Austrian forces, defeated the Piedmontese rebels on the battlefield at Novara. The leaders of the insurrection fled into exile in Geneva and Austro-Savoyard forces re-entered Turin in the second week in April. The capital remained occupied for an additional two years by the Austrian army before it withdrew in 1823 at the request of Charles Felix.

The Piedmontese Revolution of 1821 ushered in another era of authoritarian reaction and repression in the Kingdom of Sardinia and its capital city, but one that was considerably harsher on paper than in practice. Before his re-entry into Turin in the fall of 1821, the new king ordered swift trials and punishments for the insurgents as well as a sweeping purge of the army and bureaucracy, according to the principle that all state employees "should not think even a little differently about the nature of the government, but should be entirely devoted to it". Over 3,800 people were arrested, but more than half got off with light sentences. Military conspirators received the harshest punishments, with seventy-one of them given death sentences and many others condemned to long prison terms. In practice, only three men were executed, since most of the aristocratic rebel officers managed to escape into exile with the help of friends and relatives within the ruling circles. Unlike his brother, Charles Felix had little regard for Piedmont's military elite and he did not hesitate to reduce the size of the army by eliminating the regiments most heavily involved in the insurrection. Those civilian officials who had openly participated in the rebellion were removed from their positions, but in most cases they wound up receiving only temporary suspensions or transfers to other posts. In the wake of these purges, Charles Felix decreed that all civil and military officials, titled nobility and clergy must take an oath of allegiance to the throne in a series of public ceremonies in Turin in March 1822. Likewise, the elements of the professional and commercial middle classes suspected of involvement in the insurrection were put under police surveillance; others were banished from the capital for a year or two. Throughout the capital city, the police tightened security in the wake of the failed revolution, carrying out frequent checks of pass-

ports and work permits and intensifying their patrols of bars, cafés, and other public locales.

Much as his predecessor in 1814, Charles Felix's most repressive measures in 1821 targeted the cultural and intellectual institutions in the capital. Royal authorities shut down the University of Turin, which remained closed for an entire year. During that period, the government removed or suspended a number of prominent professors, annulled degrees and examinations taken after the beginning of the insurrection, and dismissed all university students, with the exception of those enrolled in the schools of Medicine and Surgery. When the university reopened, the Jesuits were put in charge of the colleges of Theology, Literature (Lettere), Medicine, and Surgery. The new post-revolutionary cultural climate in Turin also affected the local press, where the brief season of revolutionary journalism embodied in the *Sentinella Subalpina* gave way to an era dominated by the reactionary press. With generous donations from the throne, in 1822 the conservative lay organization, Catholic Friendship, launched a paper, *L'Amico d'Italia*, purportedly to promote "good journalism" in the city, but in practice to attack all real or perceived manifestations of liberalism, and to preach obedience to the legitimate rulers and to the "strong" values of the Catholic Church. At the same time, the importance of Turin as a center of high society and court life diminished in the decade after the Revolution of 1821. Charles Felix's dislike of the city and his distrust of his own governing class led him to reduce to a minimum the ceremonies of court and to spend as much time as possible away from Turin, staying in his various royal castles in the countryside or else visiting his territories in Savoy, Nice, and Liguria.

The image of Charles Felix's reign as one of blind reaction, however, should not obscure signs of vitality in a number of areas of the city's economic and cultural life during the decade of the 1820s. After the Congress of Vienna and the annexation of Genoa in 1815, Turin began to acquire a renewed administrative and political importance as the seat of an enlarged and strengthened Savoyard state. The expansion of the city and the growth of its population attested to the royal capital's changing role. Nearly twice as many people found employment in the public sector in 1815 as in 1802, despite the fact that the restored government laid off roughly a fifth of the old officials for collaborating with the French authorities. By the mid-1820s, the population of the city and its surrounding suburbs had surpassed the 100,000 mark.

The influx of immigrants into the royal capital from all areas of the enlarged kingdom stimulated a new era of private real estate develop-

ment, in which the chief protagonists were the professional middle classes and the urbanized nobility. In an effort to integrate the old and the new, the monarchy provided tax breaks and other incentives to steer expansion along the extended historic arteries of the city, emphasizing the pivotal role of large piazzas and broad, straight avenues for private residences beyond the perimeter of the old eighteenth-century city walls. New construction in these years took place largely to the south with the development of the Borgo Nuovo, an area that became the privileged locale of the wealthy propertied classes between the 1820s and 1840s. At the same time, the king oversaw a number of important public initiatives that included the construction of new bridges and the restoration of the palace of the Accademia delle Scienze as well as various historic churches and government buildings in the center of the city.

Despite the restrictions imposed on intellectual activity during the reigns of Charles Felix and his predecessor, important developments also took place within Turin's artistic, literary, scientific, and publishing communities. A number of prominent local artists like Giacomo Spalla and Giuseppe Pietro Bagetti, who had established their reputations under the French imperial regime, were quickly readmitted to the Savoyard court and received important commissions from the Restoration government in the years after 1814. For his part, Charles Felix dedicated himself to the revival and restructuring of the Accademia di Belle Arti under the direction of the painter from Nice, Giovanni Battista Biscarra. The official reopening of the Academy in 1824 coincided with the purchase by the throne of the Egyptian archeological finds gathered by Bernardo Drovetti who had served as French ambassador to Cairo. The Drovetti collection, which contained artifacts spanning virtually the entire history of that culture, provided the basis for the Museo Egizio in Via Accademia delle Scienze, which became the second most important museum of Egyptian antiquity in the world after the Cairo museum. Moreover, the 1820's also saw a flowering of interest in historical narratives, especially on the Middle Ages. By the end of the decade, Turin provided a home for the first great archival collection of Italian medieval documents. Likewise, the city's scientific community benefited, after the heavy purges of 1821, from growing investments by the monarchy in the education of doctors and surgeons that rewarded, in particular, a generation of internationally known medical experts, who had received their training under the French Empire. In a similar vein, the "rigid and suffocating" censorship of the early years of the Restoration did not prevent Turin from becoming a major center of the Italian publishing industry. Ambitious local entrepreneurs like

Giuseppe Pomba and Giorgio Paravia pioneered the first vertically organized companies that integrated the activities of printing, publishing, and book-selling and produced a number of important works of scholarship and literary significance in these years.

As developments in the publishing sector suggest, the decade of the 1820s offered the first indications of Turin's potential as a center of economic and commercial activities. During these years, a more favorable royal budgetary balance attested to a small, but promising revival of economic life in Piedmont. Charles Felix's government invested a growing share of state resources to improvements in the road system, which facilitated the flow of commercial traffic between his capital and the provinces. By 1827, the king's confidence in his country's economic recovery led him to follow the recommendation of Turin's Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce and decree the institution of triennial expositions "to promote the expansion of the arts and industry". The first industrial exposition, two years later, offered an important showcase for entrepreneurs like the Sella family, the ceramic manufacturer, Richard, and the publishers Paravia and Pomba, who all went on to play enduring roles in the economic life of Italy in the ensuing years.

The relative calm in Turin that characterized the years after 1821 came to an end in 1830 as a result of events in France. The July Revolution in Paris, the fall of the Bourbon king, Charles X, and the accession to the French throne of Louis Philippe and the Orleanist dynasty in the summer of that year, followed by the Belgian and Polish revolutions and successive insurrections in central Italy in 1831, sparked a resurgence of sectarian political activity in the Kingdom of Sardinia. While Turin remained less touched by the unrest than other areas of the realm like Genoa, it nonetheless became the home base for a new secret society, the Knights of Freedom (Cavalieri della libertà), in the winter of 1830-31. The conspirators, who included a former member of the king's bodyguard, a surgeon, and a number of young lawyers and junior officers, were plotting an insurrection to overthrow the monarchy and introduce a constitutional regime, when they were discovered and arrested in early April. In this climate of "shadows and suspicions", Charles Felix passed away in his royal capital and Charles Albert became the new Savoyard monarch on April 27, 1831, ushering in a remarkable new era in the history of the city and the Italian peninsula.

Chapter VII

Capital City of the Italian Risorgimento, 1831-1864

1. *Turin in the Mid-Nineteenth Century.*

In the decades between 1831 and 1861, Turin underwent remarkable transformation. From a minor dynastic capital, as much French as Italian, on the periphery of the peninsula, the city evolved into the command center of the movement for national unification. Indeed, the history of Turin and that of the emerging Italian nation became inseparably intertwined in these years. Few contemporary observers in the early 1830s, however, would have predicted the extraordinary role that the House of Savoy and its royal capital came to play in Italy three decades later. The succession of Charles Albert to the throne of the Kingdom of Sardinia in April 1831 did not appear to mark any break with the traditions and policies of his predecessors. A decade after his brief flirtation with the Piedmontese liberals in 1821, the new king came to the throne as a deeply religious man, a stalwart defender of the Catholic legitimist cause in Europe, and a relentless adversary of radicalism at home. His initial treatment of the University of Turin, for instance, suggested little change from the policies of his predecessors. The university remained closed throughout much of 1831 and 1832 as a result of royal concerns about public order. The following year Charles Albert provided an even more graphic demonstration of his fanatical hostility to revolution when he brutally repressed the democratic supporters of Giuseppe Mazzini in Piedmont. After his police uncovered a conspiracy to launch a revolt in the summer of 1833, the king ordered that all those involved in the plot be brought before military tribunals. At the insistence of the throne, the harsh punishments imposed by the tribunals, including a dozen death sentences, were carried out immediately without the possibility of appeal. At the same time, the king's self-proclaimed role as defender of Roman Catholicism led him to expand the power of the Church hierarchy, the Jesuits, and other religious orders over education, censorship, social welfare, and municipal government.

2. *The Reforms of Charles Albert.*

Nonetheless, these early developments of Charles Albert's reign did not signal a new era of reaction and repression as many feared at the time. In sharp contrast to his predecessors, the new ruler simultaneously embarked on an ambitious program of bureaucratic, legal, and economic reforms that lead to a cautious modernization of his kingdom and its capital city over the next two decades. From the outset, these reforms aimed to strengthen the absolute monarchy by transforming it from an arbitrary despotism into a more efficient administrative and consultative institution. Ideally, such a monarchy would deepen the support of its subjects by providing them with tangible social and economic benefits. Already in 1831 and 1832, Charles Albert moved to make his regime more efficient and centralized by creating a Council of State and setting up new governmental commissions to reform the Savoyard legal system and to find more effective ways of combating the recurring problem of cholera epidemics. The work of these commissions bore their first fruit in the second half of the decade with the promulgation of new civil, criminal, and commercial codes, the *Codici Albertini*, which incorporated features of the most progressive legal systems on the continent, while perpetuating the authority of the Church and noble patriarchs in the area of family life. Charles Albert also introduced a series of economic reforms to promote freer trade and stimulate production and investment within his realm. Between 1834 and 1847, the crown slowly dismantled the old protectionist system in the Kingdom of Sardinia, reducing tariffs on foreign grain and manufactured goods and repealing bans on the export of raw silk and other local products. During the same period, his officials negotiated twenty-six commercial treaties with other European and American states in these years. Closer to home Charles Albert eliminated the guilds in 1844 in order to create a more open labor market. He also carried out public works projects that reduced unemployment, built much needed economic infrastructures, and improved communications. One of the most important initiatives in this regard was a state plan developed in the mid-1840s to encourage the construction of a railroad system in Piedmont by private companies with the involvement of local financiers, landowners, and foreign investors. His government took the lead by building a new line between Turin and Genoa in 1845. Finally, to promote investment and the flow of capital, the crown approved the founding of the Banks of Genoa and Turin between 1844 and 1847.

Charles Albert's desire to broaden the base of popular support for his dynasty also informed his social and cultural policies. While he left educational and charitable activities in the hands of the Catholic Church, he intentionally favored those religious orders engaged in educational and social work at the expense of the more contemplative orders and tightened state regulation of existing Catholic charities. At the same time, the king encouraged popular educational and welfare activities by new voluntary associations that began to emerge in the 1830s. Thus, his government sanctioned the founding of the first nurseries, schools, and poor houses by private individuals, for the most part prominent aristocratic moderates like Cesare Alfieri, Roberto d'Azeglio, Camillo Benso di Cavour, and Carlo Boncompagni. In the years after 1835, these men began to carve out a new role for themselves by promoting a number of educational, charitable, and cultural initiatives that would prepare the social terrain for those political reforms that, according to Alfieri, were needed to "combat revolution". D'Azeglio, his wife Costanza, and other female relatives from the Costa della Trinità and Luserna di Rorà families led the way in these areas, sponsoring new workhouses and poor relief shelters in the wake of the cholera epidemic of 1834. Cavour's similar concerns led him to collaborate with Count Carlo Beraudo di Pralormo in the reorganization and reform of the religious charities, or Opere pie, in 1834. Moderates also became involved with the problems of popular education, founding in 1839, for instance, a new organization to promote the diffusion of children's shelters and schools throughout the realm. Their activities led one local citizen to boast in 1840 that "the charitable institutions are the first and greatest marvel of Turin" and "would honor a metropolis three times its size". The monarchy also undertook prison reform by issuing new guidelines in 1839 to enhance the moral and civic re-education of the prisoners.

Charles Albert's ambitions were even more extensive in the cultural arena, where his initiatives consciously exalted the past achievements and glories of the House of Savoy in order to stimulate popular pride in and allegiance to the monarchy. From the outset, he employed monuments, symbolic rituals, buildings, paintings, and historical reconstructions in Turin to invent a tradition of royal grandeur that enhanced the prestige of his dynasty both at home and elsewhere on the Italian peninsula. Beginning in 1831, the king launched a campaign of architectural and pictorial commissions to modernize and redecorate the royal residences of Turin, Racconigi, and Pollenzo. He also oversaw the construction of public monuments in the major squares of his capital, each narrating a great moment in civil and dynastic history. By the end of

his reign, Turin, which previously had almost no such public displays, could claim more monuments than virtually any other Italian city. Likewise, to raise his capital's profile as an artistic center of European importance, Charles Albert founded the Royal Gallery of Paintings, which put on public display his family's collection of art works. Admission to the museum was free on certain days of the week to encourage popular attendance. Similar objectives led the throne to promote a host of other cultural institutions in the capital city in the 1830s and '40s, including the Royal Subalpine Delegation for the History of the Fatherland, the Council for Antiquities and Fine Arts, and the Society for the Promotion of the Fine Arts. The same years saw the expansion of the Library of the Royal Palace, the construction of a new seat for the Academy of Fine Arts, and royal financing of works by leading Piedmontese scientists and scholars like Giovanni Plana, Amedeo Peyron, and Amedeo Avogadro. Finally, to promote his policies of dynastic grandeur and consensus, Charles Albert introduced new public festivals or resuscitated older ones that celebrated royal weddings, military victories and other glorious moments in the history of the House of Savoy with parades, fireworks, sports competitions, and masked balls.

3. *Turin in the Age of Charles Albert.*

This imposing array of royal initiatives had a decided impact on the capital city and the king's more affluent subjects. Economic and administrative reforms, in particular, brought about a slow but perceptible change in the city's relations with the rest of Piedmont. The shift to a freer trade policy and the ensuing expansion of commercial activity, for instance, accentuated Turin's role as a great emporium for the surrounding territories and a key link in the movement of goods and services from elsewhere in Europe. State investment in new public works projects further encouraged these tendencies by introducing improvements in transportation and communications that increasingly opened the city up to the more advanced economies of Europe. At the same time, Charles Albert's more efficient and interventionist royal administration magnified the importance of his capital city as the place where the crucial economic, political, and cultural decisions were made that affected the entire Kingdom of Sardinia. Finally, Turin was also emerging by the late 1840s not only as a center of state action, but also as a city where new activities, enterprises, technologies, and the institutions needed to support them were being developed and promoted.

The growing prominence of the royal capital stimulated a demographic and territorial expansion that had begun in the mid-1820s, but accelerated in the 1840s. By the late 1840s, the population of Turin and its periphery was approaching 140,000, a 70% increase over levels at the end of the Napoleonic era. More than a third of the urban residents in 1848 had come from other areas of Piedmont, drawn by the expanded employment opportunities in the public sector and the rising demand for the services of merchants, shopkeepers, artisans, and domestic servants in the city. To accommodate this growing population, the urban expansion of Turin continued apace in the 1840s. By 1846, the city extended not only to the area south of the old walls, but also to the north and west, in the direction of Porta Susa, Borgo San Donato and Vanchiglia.

An expanding class of landowners, public officials, lawyers, merchants, bankers, and manufacturers were the chief beneficiaries of Turin's enhanced importance as an economic and administrative center. These groups, in particular, steadily increased in numbers, prestige, and influence during the reign of Charles Albert. The opulence and importance of the urban propertied classes found visible expression not only in their elegant homes, furniture, carriages, and clothing, but also in the changing rituals of Turin's high society. A small but talented segment of the old aristocracy began to abandon its caste prejudices in order to collaborate with these "new men". For his part, Charles Albert contributed to this process through his support of voluntary charitable and educational initiatives that encouraged, in turn, the growth of more diverse social groups.

Various developments testified to the gradual emergence of a new hybrid social elite in Turin, based less on inherited status than work and property. By the middle of the century, for instance, the city had 150 cafés, catering to an exclusive and affluent but socially mixed clientele. The same period also witnessed a softening of caste barriers in the Royal Theater (Teatro Regio). Much like the San Carlo Theater in Naples, the Royal Theater was built adjacent to the royal palace and was dominated by the presence of the king, whose central box was surrounded by those of the nobility. By the early 1840's, newly ennobled and bourgeois notables occupied a number of boxes, albeit the smallest, most crowded, and furthest removed from the royal box. A similar trend was evident in the new upper-class clubs that emerged in these years. In 1839, a Società di ballo, or dance club, was founded to encourage mixed socializing between nobles and wealthy non-nobles. Two years later, Cavour and his titled friends took an additional step in this direction

by launching the Società del Whist, an English-style gentlemen's club that provided a gathering place for all currents of respectable society in Turin. Significantly, the list of the Whist's founding members included not only influential aristocrats, but also distinguished middle-class professional men, wealthy bankers as well as a number of prominent magistrates and army officers.

The same hybrid elite also contributed to a more general reawakening of cultural, civic, and political life in Turin during the 1840s. In these years, new voluntary associations sponsored lively debates and discussions on such issues as urban planning, the provision of services to newly developed areas, and the problems of public health in the city. Despite the continued presence of the royal and religious censors, Turin still managed to become the home for a thriving press. By the late 1840s, more than fourteen daily and weekly periodicals were being published in the royal capital. While they avoided explicitly political issues to escape the wrath of the censors, these publications did discuss openly major social issues like pauperism, child labor, prisons, public assistance, and popular education. The same papers also gradually broadened their discussions to include the principal economic issues of the day, from free trade and the development of railroads to the introduction of new methods of production and communications.

In this fashion, Turin became a community of public-spirited men, who would go on to play leading roles in the movement for Italian unification, and acquired a public forum to exchange and debate new ideas and reform proposals. Local moderate aristocrats, in fact, became the most widely read and influential writers on the peninsula in these years. Between 1844 and 1847, for instance, Cesare Balbo's *Of the Hopes of Italy* and *Summary of the History of Italy*, Massimo d'Azeglio's *The Most Recent Events in Romagna* and *Proposal for a Program for Italian National Opinion*, and Ilarione Petitti's *Of Italian Railroads and Their Best Organization* all appeared in print. Such works helped to establish Piedmontese dominance over the moderate liberal movement for national unification and thereby linked increasingly the Kingdom of Sardinia to the cause of Italy even before 1848.

The Subalpine Agrarian Association, the foremost institutional expression of this new civic dynamism, emerged in the spring of 1842. The association officially aimed to promote improved methods of farming and stock-raising. At the same time, it pursued the broader social mission of encouraging practical collaboration between nobles and upper-middle classes. Its roster of members testified to its apparent success as a socially integrated body. Not only did it attract landowners and farm-

ers, but also men with little or no connection to agriculture. In the first year, more than 500 professionals, 211 government officials, and 80 merchants, manufacturers, and bankers became members. For his part, Charles Albert supported the project by recognizing the association as an official royal institution. The initiative received an enthusiastic reception as well from influential middle-class spokesmen like Lorenzo Valerio, who praised it as "the widest and most useful application of the principle of association ever" in Piedmont. From a group of 36 founders in 1842, the organization grew to over 2,700 by the end of 1844.

The evolution of the Subalpine Agrarian Association, however, quickly revealed the difficulties and limits of inter-elite collaboration in Turin before 1848. On the one hand, the association gave new middle-class men an unprecedented organizational base to advance their own projects and their own claims to genuinely equal status. At a less exalted level, the association also provided a forum for the expression of long-standing bourgeois resentments at the privileged status, arrogance, and condescension of the old nobility. On the other hand, aristocratic moderates appeared reluctant to accept the social consequences of their own political reforms. They certainly seemed to be offended by the lack of deference displayed by their middle-class colleagues who refused to accept passively their presumed leadership. The ensuing factional struggles within the Agrarian Association between 1844 and 1846 increased in intensity and bitterness until the government was finally forced to intervene and take charge of nominating its officials and regulating its meetings and topics of discussion.

Neither the vibrant new cultural and civic initiatives of Turin's educated classes nor their internecine social conflicts appeared to have much of an impact on the lives of the majority of the city's population, who still remained closed off within their old mental and physical spaces in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. A short distance from the fashionable public squares like Piazza San Carlo, where the upper classes passed their leisure time in theaters, cafés, and gentlemen's clubs or else simply strolling under the arcades, there existed a very different city of dark, dirty, insecure, and foul-smelling streets inhabited by humble working families, more than 10,000 beggars, 2,000 prostitutes, and countless petty criminals. Stratified by their varying levels of misery and desperation, these people were concerned less with the issues of constitutions and political participation than with the challenges of daily survival.

During the reign of Charles Albert, Turin suffered from a chronic

shortage of popular housing, since the new residential areas were reserved for the propertied classes. As a consequence, the capital city had a population density three times that of the city of Florence. Overcrowding contributed to a situation that made the lives of the Turin's common folks short and hard in the late 1840s when the average life expectancy was still only thirty years. Their work-days lasted twelve to fourteen hours when they had jobs, their food remained insufficient and of poor quality, their standards of personal hygiene and public sanitation were dangerously low, and heavy wine drinking in the city's five hundred bars continued to be their principal form of relaxation. Not surprisingly, the same groups had the highest levels of infant abandonment, infant mortality, and illegitimacy (one in four births) in the kingdom and were the principal victims of the epidemics that continued to sweep the city with regularity during the reign of Charles Albert. Moreover, with one-third of the men and nearly half the women still illiterate, the laboring classes of Turin remained in the thrall of ancient prejudices and superstitions. To make matters worse, the difficult situation of the urban poor no doubt deteriorated even further with the sharp decline in economic conditions on the Italian peninsula and throughout much of Europe between 1845 and 1847. A series of harvest failures, which more than doubled the price of food staples, hammered the local economy and fueled popular discontent, setting the stage for the extraordinary wave of revolutions that swept the continent in 1848.

4. *Turin in 1848: A Moderate Preventive Revolution.*

The economic crisis of the late 1840s magnified social tensions and weakened support for the established order in Turin, much as in other cities across the European continent. By the fall of 1847, a tacit alliance of the reform-minded middle classes and the economically distressed popular classes began to take shape in the capital city. On October 1, 1847, a public gathering of 5,000 people near the Valentino to celebrate the king's birthday wound up chanting slogans attacking the Jesuits and calling for national unification and liberal reforms. The violent repression of the demonstration by the police served only to intensify tensions in Turin. In fact, the historic center of the royal capital became the scene of almost nightly protest marches in October and the following months that were distinguished from similar events in other Italian cities only by their orderly character. These demonstrations coincided with a renewal of demands from moderate reformers for greater self-government,

civil liberties, an end to censorship, and a more assertive "national" foreign policy. The same period also saw an increasingly public campaign against the titled aristocracy. Even respectable figures in the local establishment like Pier Alessandro Paravia began to speak of the "dislike that boils up in us bourgeois against the nobility", a view echoed by foreign observers like the British ambassador who warned in November that a "class war… [is] not far off". Anti-aristocratic sentiments took a variety of forms from graffiti, proclaiming "death to the nobles" to anonymous pamphlets that attacked the hereditary nobility and demanded their immediate elimination as "dangerous enemies of constitutional liberty" and sources of "civil discord".

In an attempt to ease social tensions and curry the favor of middle-class public opinion, Charles Albert slid reluctantly in the direction of political reform in late 1847. Initially, he adopted a more pronounced anti-Austrian stance and dismissed a number of unpopular government ministers. When these steps failed to placate the opposition, the king followed the example of his fellow Italian rulers, Pius IX and Leopold II of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, by granting a range of reforms at the end of October that limited the powers of the police and censors, strengthened the Council of State, and introduced the principal of elected municipal councils at the local level. Such concessions, however, succeeded only in raising liberal and popular expectations for change and, above all, increased the pressure on Charles Albert to grant constitutional reform.

In the face of this increasingly assertive reform movement, the king received contradictory advice from his divided aristocratic advisors. Hardliners like Count Clemente Solaro della Margarita argued for a policy of royal intransigence even at the risk of a head-on collision with the opposition. Other conservatives like Marchese Vittorio Amedeo Sallier de La Tour and Count Carlo Beraudo di Pralormo accepted the need for the king to introduce a constitution, but advocated one that included a chamber of hereditary peers. The leading aristocratic moderates like Camillo Benso di Cavour, Cesare Alfieri, and Roberto d'Azeglio, dismissed the idea of an "aristocratic high chamber" as antiquated and no longer acceptable to middle-class opinion. They called instead for a document that guaranteed genuinely representative institutions as the only way to avoid violent insurrections, defuse demands for an "ultra-democratic constitution", and insure a peaceful renewal of the country's ruling classes.

This moderate position won the day in the Piedmontese capital after a separatist revolt erupted in Sicily in January 1848, followed by the

February Revolution in France, which overthrew the Orleanist monarchy and sowed panic among the crown heads of Europe. These events had an especially dramatic impact on the Italian peninsula where a new political order had apparently triumphed by the end of March 1848. By then urban insurrections in Vienna and elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire had forced the Austrians out of northern Italy and every state on the peninsula had undergone sweeping political changes. Against a background of public meetings and street demonstrations in Turin and mounting nationalist unrest elsewhere on the peninsula, on February 8, 1848 Charles Albert promulgated a constitution, the so-called *Statuto*. Although the royal document left a number of questions unanswered, it clearly envisioned a government that was monarchical and representative, with legislative power shared by the king and two chambers: an elective lower chamber and an upper chamber whose members were appointed for life by the throne.

The importance of the Statuto, which appeared in its full form in March 1848, extended well beyond the borders of Piedmont, since it provided the model for the monarchical-constitutional order of the newly unified Italian national state after 1861. From its inception, the Piedmontese constitution marked an uneasy compromise between royal authority and parliamentary politics that reflected its origins in a climate of fear and social unrest. On the one hand, it explicitly recognized a number of fundamental liberal principles. Thus, while it proclaimed Roman Catholicism as the "Religion of State", it guaranteed the emancipation of the principal religious minorities, the Waldensian Protestants and the Jews, who now were assured freedom of association, conscience, and opinion as well as equal rights of citizenship. At the local level, the Statuto increased the prerogatives of elected municipal councils and thus opened the door to political participation by previously excluded social groups. On the other hand, the new constitution also attributed sweeping powers to the monarch. The king remained the "supreme head of the state" and as such he enjoyed a monopoly of executive authority, commanded the armed forces, controlled foreign policy, and made nominations to all state offices.

The proclamation of the Statuto reflected, in turn, the larger success of Turin's moderate elite of liberal nobles and bourgeois notables in guiding political developments in Piedmont during the winter of 1847-48. Under the charismatic leadership of Roberto d'Azeglio, who enjoyed both aristocratic prestige and a popular following, the moderates oversaw the formation of a municipal guard to exercise control over the piazzas in the capital. In this fashion, they were able to guide the

demonstrations in a direction that promoted constitutional reform, but contained mass enthusiasm and avoided more radical initiatives. As a result, Turin stood out as the only major city on the Italian peninsula where violent uprisings did not occur in 1848. The moderates crowned their success with the first "national celebration" in late February, a carefully choreographed event of parades and masked balls, in which the populace played their assigned and largely passive roles.

The following month Turin's international profile rose dramatically when it became the command center for a war of national liberation and dynastic expansion against the Austrian Empire. In the wake of a popular uprising in Milan and the proclamation of a republic in Venice, Charles Albert declared war on Austria and entered Lombardy on March 23, 1848. This decision catapulted the Savoyard king to the head of an extraordinary, but fragile coalition of Italian rulers that included both Ferdinand II of Naples and Pope Pius IX as well as the Austrian emperor's cousin, Leopold II, Grand Duke of Tuscany. Charles Albert's longstanding fear of popular revolution and his desire to enlarge his kingdom dictated his commitment to the national cause and his hesitation in exploiting his initial military advantages. The resulting delays in the Piedmontese army's advance into Lombardy enabled the Austrian commander, Count Radetzky, to carry out a strategic retreat, maintain his lines of communication with Vienna, and await the arrival of reinforcements. To make matters worse, the Savoyard ruler's ill-concealed policy of dynastic aggrandizement aroused the growing distrust of the other Italian rulers and thereby helped to shatter the initial wave of cooperation that had unified the various states on the peninsula. By mid-May, both the pope and the Neapolitan king had withdrawn their forces from the war, leaving the outcome of the military conflict almost exclusively in the hands of the Piedmontese forces.

While Charles Albert did succeed politically in merging the Lombard provinces into an expanded constitutional kingdom of northern Italy with its capital in Turin, he fared considerably worse on the military front. On July 24, 1848, Austrian forces administered a devastating defeat to the Piedmontese army at the battle of Custoza. The following month the armistice of Salasco compelled the House of Savoy to abandon Lombardy and Venetia. Nonetheless, the Savoyard ruler's dynastic ambitions led him to go to war with Austria again in mid-March 1849, this time in the hope of exploiting Vienna's heavy troop commitment in the struggle against the Hungarians. Once more the Austrian army demonstrated its overwhelming superiority. Less than two weeks after the war had resumed, Radetzky crushed the main body of

the Piedmontese army at the battle of Novara on March 23, 1849. In the wake of this defeat, Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emanuel II, who had to negotiate a peace settlement with the victorious Austrians.

Thus, the extraordinary wave of revolution that had raised patriotic hopes to a fever pitch in Turin in 1848 concluded the following year in bitter disillusionment, defeat, and disarray for both moderate and democratic proponents of reform and national independence. The first defeat of the Piedmontese army at Custoza in the summer of 1848 drove moderate political forces everywhere on the peninsula into retreat. Those constitutional liberals, who were not dismissed or overthrown, faced mounting popular opposition and often wound up allying with their reactionary adversaries in defense of order and property. Democratic forces in the isolated republican bastions of Venice and Rome enjoyed a certain prestige and popularity for their determination to fight on, but ultimately they fared little better, succumbing in 1849 to the superior military might of Austria and the France of Louis Napoleon.

Predictably, the failure of revolutions led to a second restoration on the Italian peninsula championed by Austria with the support of Pius IX and Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. As early as May 1848, frightened Neapolitan moderates supported a *coup d'état* by Ferdinand II that led to the suspension of parliament and a return to royal absolutism in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Most other Italian princes followed suit, abrogating the constitutions they had reluctantly granted in 1848 and relying on Habsburg forces to reassert autocratic power in their respective states.

The one great exception to the triumph of absolutism and reaction in Italy after 1848 could be found in Turin. In the short run, three circumstances distinguished the political situation in the Savoyard capital from that in other capitals on the peninsula. First, the House of Savoy emerged from the revolutions as the only dynasty in Italy that was not dependent on Austrian influence and military might. Secondly, Turin was the capital of the only post-1848 Italian state to retain a constitution with an elected parliament that shared governmental responsibilities with the monarchy. For his part, the new Savoyard ruler, Victor Emanuel II, accepted constitutional procedures if only to pre-empt the democratic opposition at home and to win moderate liberal support for his anti-Austrian policies. The survival of the Statuto allowed political development in Turin to diverge in significant ways from the other regional capitals during the next decade. Lastly, with the entrance of

Turin's native son, Count Camillo Benso di Cavour, into political life after 1848, Piedmont acquired an exceptionally able leader, who distinguished himself both as a dynamic reformer at home and as the outstanding statesman on the peninsula in the 1850s. As a result, a new governing order took shape, capable of sustaining a strong executive while gradually eroding monarchical independence and assuring the political participation of large segments of the urban middle classes.

5. *Political and Economic Modernization in Turin: 1849-1856.*

The years after the revolutions of 1848 ushered in a new wave of reform initiatives in Turin that would have enduring consequences not only for the city and the Kingdom of Sardinia, but also for the political future of the Italian nation after 1861. From its inception, the Statuto introduced an important shift in the social composition of Piedmont's political class. The titled nobility assumed a much more modest presence within the new parliamentary institutions that arose in the course of 1848. The change was immediately evident in the elections of April, the first of the constitutional era. Few nobles chose to stand for the elections; those who did emerged triumphant in only 32 of 204 colleges represented in the Chamber of Deputies. A sharply reduced aristocratic political presence was no less striking at the local level. The elections of November 1848 in the city of Turin produced a new municipal council that included only 22 aristocrats among its 80 members, a far cry from the two-thirds majority of the decurions they had enjoyed only a year earlier. Men drawn from the ranks of the professional middle classes, commerce, and banking now moved in to take their places.

Despite their shrinking presence, aristocratic notables continued to dominate the political leadership of the city and state during the following decade. In fact, they headed two of the major parliamentary groups that developed after 1848. On the one hand, a majority of the titled deputies identified with the coalition of conservative royalists led by Count Ottavio Thaon di Revel that enjoyed close ties to the Catholic Church and the court and had a solid base of support in the diplomatic corps, the military hierarchy, and the countryside. On the other hand, aristocratic reformers like Camillo di Cavour and Massimo d'Azeglio, the brother of Roberto d'Azeglio, continued to furnish both the leadership and ideas for the moderate center-right group that controlled most of the governments in the ensuing decade.

Turin became the front line in a series of bitter skirmishes between

these two factions, in which Cavour rapidly emerged as the dominant political figure in Piedmont, first as minister of agriculture, trade and navigation in a government led by D'Azeglio in 1850 and then as prime minister after 1852. The second son of a prominent old-line aristocratic family, Cavour combined many of the stereotypical virtues of both the nobility and the bourgeoisie. After resigning his commission in the officer corps, he became a successful commercial farmer on his family's estates, a respected expert in political economy, and an early advocate of railroads before embarking on a career in politics in 1847. At the same time, his cousin described him as "an aristocrat by birth, taste, and nature" who considered the old nobility to be "by nature superior to the bourgeois classes". This blend of aristocratic presumption and bourgeois values shaped Cavour's moderate political principles. By the 1830s he had begun to formulate his central idea of the *juste milieu* or middle path, in which government avoided the extremes of absolutism and anarchy by following a program of gradual orderly progress. Thus, he was an outspoken foe of democratic and republican ideas and movements, who also opposed the excessive influence of Catholic traditionalists in public, which he viewed as a dangerous obstacle both to innovation and freedom of thought in general. His travels abroad, and especially his long stays in Great Britain, convinced him of the need for free trade and economic development, together with timely social reforms, to improve the conditions of the masses and give them a stake in the established order.

Cavour found ample opportunities to translate his political principles into practice from 1850 onwards when he embarked upon an ambitious program to modernize Church-state relations, the economy, and political life in Piedmont. The moderate aristocratic leader encountered the fiercest opposition in his efforts to curb the privileged status and independent authority of the Catholic Church. Tensions between the papacy and the Piedmontese state grew steadily from 1848 onwards over issues of principle and policy. After the revolutions of that year, Pope Pius IX became an uncompromising anti-constitutionalist and defender of the Church's temporal power, precisely at a time when the House of Savoy was adopting a new constitutional system and displaying expansionist ambitions in northern Italy. The easing of censorship in Turin and the rest of the Savoyard kingdom further aggravated the situation, since it opened the way for the publication of articles in the local press highly critical of the Vatican and the Church. To make matters worse, Monsignor Luigi Franzoni, archbishop of Turin from 1831 to 1862, was an intransigent opponent of any concession to "the new times". For

their part, most Piedmontese moderates saw the special status of the Church in their state not only as a direct violation of the guarantees of civil equality in the Statuto, but also a threat to the secular authority of the new constitutional regime.

The moderate campaign to remedy this situation took the form of a series of reforms introduced into the Turinese parliament between 1850 and 1855. The first and most important came in 1850 when the D'Azeglio government, with the strong support of Cavour in the Chamber of Deputies, proposed to eliminate separate courts for clergy, abolish the right of criminals to sanctuary in churches, give the state the authority to veto gifts and donations of property to Church bodies, and limit the number of religious holidays. In the following years, the government introduced additional measures to legalize civil marriage and abolish religious orders and monasteries that performed no charitable or educational functions.

These proposals met with the uncompromising opposition of Church authorities, who used their influence in the countryside and at court against the government. Although the Vatican had already accepted in other Catholic countries most of the changes in Church-state relations proposed in the Savoyard kingdom, the Piedmontese Catholic hierarchy refused to concede anything that limited its prerogatives and instead attempted to sabotage the reforms at every turn. Cavour and the moderates did not hesitate to respond in kind against their clerical adversaries. Harsh measures were taken against the excesses of the Catholic press, while intransigent clergy, including Archbishop Franzoni, were arrested, imprisoned, and even banished. To neutralize the power of the Catholic opposition in parliament, Cavour went so far as to manipulate the electoral laws to exclude ecclesiastics voted into the Chamber of Deputies and to invalidate elections where parliament deemed that the clergy had used their spiritual authority to influence their parishioners.

Although these measures enabled Cavour to out-maneuver the clerical right in the short run, their long-term effects were less salutary. First of all, the bitter struggles between Church and state that played out in Turin guaranteed the identification of Piedmontese liberalism with anti-clericalism. The two adversaries became locked into intractable positions of principle that precluded compromises and justified extreme measures on both sides. Once Turin became the nucleus of the movement to unify Italy, bad relations worsened as the Savoyard state not only extended its secularizing laws unilaterally to the newly annexed provinces, but also became a mounting threat to the temporal power of the Church.

As a result, after 1870 what had begun as an antagonism between Piedmontese moderates and clerics became a national problem of enormous importance: the hostility of the Catholic Church and its faithfulness to the Italian national state.

The efforts of Cavour and the moderates in Turin to secularize the Piedmontese state also shaped in fundamental respects the structure of political alignments and the institutional division of powers between throne and parliament in the 1850s. To begin with, they helped to overcome the sharp polarization of left and right in the years 1848-49, paving the way for the *connubio* or marriage between the center-left and center-right that assured Cavour of the parliamentary majorities for reform at home and a national policy abroad. At the same time, religious controversies provided the setting in which the ambiguous relationship between the monarchy and parliament in the Statuto came to be defined in ways that curbed the independence of the king and ensured the primacy of the Chamber of Deputies. Much as in religious matters, these political compromises hammered out in Turin during the 1850s were then extended to the rest of the country and became the defining features of the new Italian state after 1861.

Cavour had an equally profound impact on economic and financial policies. Here he attempted to achieve three interrelated objectives: improve state budgetary balances, raise the standard of living of the population, and increase private profits. As minister of trade, Cavour implemented a policy of free trade to favor Piedmont's entrance into European markets, stimulate export of her "natural" products, and lower the cost of imported machinery and manufactured goods. Accordingly, he arranged new commercial agreements with a dozen countries in western and central Europe during his first two years in office. These agreements opened the way for Cavour to cut duties on a wide range of agricultural and manufactured products in the summer of 1851 that effectively transformed Piedmont from protectionism to free trade. Although customs revenues fell, they were more than offset by the growth in trade and a general improvement in the Piedmontese economy. A rise in international agricultural prices sparked farm exports, while the greater availability of imported machinery favored mechanization of the textile industry. Significantly, the success of Cavour's policies in the 1850s established a precedent that was then extended from Turin to the new Italian nation in 1861.

Upon taking charge of the ministry of finance, Cavour also turned his attention to the problem of the state's budgetary deficits, which had surpassed its revenues in 1850 due to wartime expenditures and repa-

rations to Austria. Initially, he adopted a series of fiscal measures aimed at previously exempted activities and privileged segments of the population. Direct taxes were introduced on a host of new items, while the remaining feudal privileges like primogeniture were eliminated. In addition, he tightened management of state monopolies and made the financial administration more efficient in order to increase government revenues. To meet the immediate needs of the treasury, he expanded the sale of state bonds and negotiated an international loan from foreign banks.

At the same time, Cavour boldly involved the government in various infrastructural improvements to encourage and stimulate economic development and private initiative in Turin and the surrounding territories. To reorganize the system of credit, he doubled the capital of the Banca Nazionale (formed in 1849 through a merger of the Banks of Genoa and Turin) in 1852 and the following year made it central bank of the state. During the same period, he promoted the establishment of additional private financial institutions and oversaw the expansion of the existing savings banks (*casse di risparmio*) with an eye to increasing the availability of commercial credit in the country. The founding of stock exchanges in Turin and Genoa between 1850 and 1855 worked in a similar direction by encouraging the growth of new joint-stock companies and additional instruments of capital formation. Such measures paved the way for joint public-private collaboration, often orchestrated directly by Cavour, to expand rail lines, modernize the port facilities of Genoa, develop irrigation projects, and build new roadways. Railroad construction and the expansion of transatlantic shipping, in particular, stimulated the development of a Piedmontese machine industry, heavily dependent from its inception on state subsidies and contracts.

The pursuit of these many projects entailed risks as well as rewards. Cavour's reliance on foreign and domestic private loans to finance his initiatives, for instance, produced an alarming increase in the public debt, which climbed from less than 120 million lire in 1847 to 725 million by 1859, when interest payments were absorbing more than a fifth of state revenues. Moreover, his preference for joint ventures favored the growth in Turin of a small, politically connected, oligarchy that dominated whole sectors of the economy and blurred the distinction between private enterprise and public power. Still, the rewards of Cavour's policies were undeniably impressive. By 1861, the Savoyard kingdom's railroad system was larger than that of any other Italian state, covering 40% of the total for the entire peninsula. The 1850s also saw the value of Piedmontese trade triple with the increased export of textiles, oils, wines, and rice, while local industries flourished. By the end of the

decade, Turin was the capital of the economically most modern state on the Italian peninsula, and as such it served as the model that other regional states attempted to emulate by lowering tariffs and pursuing foreign investment.

6. *Turin at the Forefront of the Italian Cause, 1850-1861.*

Despite these impressive achievements, the integration of Piedmont into the larger arena of national life in the 1850s took place less at the economic level, where inter-regional contacts still remained limited, than at the level of politics and culture. Turin served in these years as a national "think tank", where solutions to the Italian jigsaw puzzle were proposed and debated. In the wake of the failed revolutions of 1848, the capital of the Savoyard monarchy became the haven for thousands of political refugees fleeing from the reaction sweeping the peninsula. Their presence in Turin made it an increasingly "Italian" city. Here the Statuto and a nascent parliamentary system guaranteed greater freedom of the press and expression of opinions than elsewhere. As a consequence, the years between 1850 and 1860 saw the flowering of political journalism and publishing in Turin. Writers, scholars, and political figures from other regions found not only hospitality and security in the Piedmontese capital, but also productive employment, collaborating on newspapers and journals, teaching at the university, and taking positions in the thriving publishing industry. One enthusiastic Neapolitan émigré went so far as to claim that Turin had become "the Mecca, the Jerusalem, the Holy City of the Italians".

Of course, not all segments of the local population greeted the resulting arrival of twenty to thirty thousand aristocrats, intellectuals, politicians, and military men from all parts of the peninsula with undiluted enthusiasm. One pamphlet published in Turin in 1850 likened them to the "ten plagues of Egypt renewed in Piedmont in the nineteenth century". More traditional elements of aristocratic society, in particular, saw their intimate little world of "family, legation, regiment, and court" threatened by the sudden influx of immigrants from other regions, whom they considered as little more than "an intrusion from Italy [...] into our house". They displayed their displeasure not so much in any public pronouncement as in their social ostracism of the émigrés, their insistence on speaking their Piedmontese dialect rather than Italian, and their constant mockery of those nobles like Cavour and D'Azeglio, who had embraced the liberal-national cause.

Nevertheless, the exiles contributed greatly to the "Italianization" of political and cultural life in Turin where they introduced a decidedly more cosmopolitan atmosphere during the 1850s. To begin with, many of them had been prominent cultural and political figures in their old states. Accordingly, they brought with them distinctive cultural values, political talents, and contacts from their respective regions of origin that necessarily affected the character of public discourse in the city. On the whole, these exiles showed little inclination to assimilate into Turin's old society, preferring instead to keep their ties to their old regions and to promote larger national aspirations. Daily exposure to talented individuals from other parts of the peninsula broadened the horizons of their local collaborators among Turin's professionals, bankers, merchants, and intellectuals, who began to participate actively in political debates and activities. Once they had arrived, these cultural pilgrims from the rest of Italy contributed greatly to the renewal of the old royal capital's intellectual life. Turin's new cultural vitality found expression, first of all, in the large number of theaters that provided an impressive range of musical and theatrical productions in the 1850s for the expanding audience of military officers, students, and the prosperous middle classes. The same decade saw Turin emerge as a major information hub on the peninsula, with thirteen daily newspapers that provided both opinions and news, as well as fifty-three magazines and newspapers, dedicated to politics, science, literature, the fine arts, and industry. The resulting debates and discussions help to make the provincial city a hothouse, in which a genuinely national public opinion began to take form.

Significantly, the process of Italianization extended beyond Turin's upper classes. The city's most widely read newspaper, *La Gazzetta del Popolo*, specifically targeted a popular readership of small shopkeepers, artisans, and craftsmen with its low prices and simple language. From its founding in 1848 onward, the paper promoted the moderate liberal cause at home and an expanded role for Piedmont on the Italian peninsula. In a similar vein, Italian became the public language of parliament and replaced Latin in the school curriculum. As a result, the increasing political and cultural integration of Piedmontese moderates and liberal-minded elites elsewhere combined with growing support from the popular classes to make Turin the center of Italian patriotism in the mid-1850s. By then, a broad consensus had developed that Piedmont was the only state that combined the free institutions, economic resources, military might, diplomatic expertise and political will necessary to unify the peninsula and create an Italian nation.

The decisive role played by Cavour, Victor Emanuel II, and the political leadership in Turin in the campaign to unify Italy, however, does not mean that there was anything preordained or inevitable about what they accomplished. On the contrary, this campaign was an extremely contingent and unpredictable process that could have been easily derailed on a number of occasions. Cavour's real genius lay less in his long-range planning than in his talent for exploiting opportunities and improvising in the face of unforeseen international and domestic challenges and constraints that confronted him after 1855. While he agreed with most other moderates in the early 1850s that Italian independence from Austria was a desirable goal and that Piedmont needed allies among the Great Powers, he had little knowledge or experience in foreign affairs. During his first years in government, he showed scant interest in foreign policy, generally, and seemed to have no strong feelings about either the rest of Italy or Italian unification. On the whole, he was reluctant to confront Austria in the first half of the decade and did so only in response to pressure from influential émigrés or to neutralize the initiatives of democratic radicals. When the Austrian government seized the property of Lombard refugees residing in Turin, for instance, the prime minister immediately lodged an official protest with the Great Powers and had parliament set aside a special fund to help compensate the victims. Cavour was also a late and reluctant convert to the idea of Piedmontese participation in the Crimean War of 1855. When his government joined the anti-Russian coalition, it did so not in pursuit of national objectives but out of fear that a Franco-Austrian alliance would leave Piedmont encircled and isolated. Even after the war ended in the winter of 1855-56, Cavour remained a reluctant nationalist, who went to the peace conference in Paris with little enthusiasm and modest territorial demands that were in any case rejected by the Great Powers.

Nonetheless, the Crimean War did elevate the prestige of Turin and the Savoyard state on the peninsula and encouraged fundamental changes in Cavour's thinking about the Italian question from the spring of 1856 onwards. The hostilities left in shambles the conservative bloc of Austria, Russia, and Prussia that had previously guaranteed the territorial status quo in Italy. The defeat of Russia, in particular, transformed one of the staunchest defenders of the old order into a revisionist power alongside the French emperor, Napoleon III, who aimed to exploit national sentiment in Italy to redraw the map of Europe and enhance the influence of France. As a result, Austria emerged from the war as the sole defender of the diplomatic status quo of 1815. The breakdown of the old Concert System created opportunities for Cavour to exploit dif-

ferences among the Great Powers to advance his state's interests on the peninsula. At the same time, the war triggered a surge of pro-Piedmontese sentiment among both moderates and segments of the democratic left in other Italian states that led to the founding of the National Society, an organization launched in 1857 to promote Savoyard leadership of the independence cause. Together, these international and regional developments encouraged the prime minister to adopt a foreign policy designed initially to extend the boundaries of his regional state in the north and establish its influence over the rest of Italy. This shift represented a major change, for it marked the first time that a group actually in power had agreed to embrace the cause of Italian nationalism, a cause that now acquired a new respectability since it was no longer associated exclusively with the revolutionary left.

From his base in Turin, Cavour embarked in the years between 1856 and 1859 upon a daring, but ambiguous and opportunistic foreign policy whose principal objective was not so much national unification as the dislodging of Austria from Italy. On the one hand, his government broke diplomatic relations with Austria (1857) and sought to increase instability on the peninsula by encouraging discontents, exploiting insurrectionary movements, and rallying patriotic support for Piedmont in the other regional states. At the same time, he attempted to convince the Great Powers that Piedmont was the most secure bulwark against revolution and the most reliable guarantor of European diplomatic interests on the peninsula. These policies did not yet reflect a clear vision of the Italian question; rather they were designed to disrupt the status quo on the peninsula and to position Piedmont so that it could take advantage of any new opportunity that might arise.

Such an opportunity arose in the spring of 1858, when the French emperor, Napoleon III, reached an understanding with Cavour, in which he guaranteed his country's military cooperation with Piedmont if the latter found a diplomatic pretext for a war with Austria. The outbreak of hostilities between the two allies and Austria in the spring of 1859 initially produced results that seemed to exceed Turin's expectations. The defeat of the Austrian forces at the battles of Magenta and Solferino ensured the Franco-Piedmontese occupation of Lombardy. The withdrawal of Austrian troops, in the meantime, created a power vacuum in central Italy, where the flight of the old rulers from Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Papal Legations converted frightened local elites to the idea of union with Piedmont as the only alternative to democratic revolution. While Cavour suffered a major setback and temporarily resigned from office in the summer of 1859, when Napoleon III signed a

separate peace with the Austrians, he regained the initiative early the next year. After his reappointment as prime minister in January 1860, he engineered plebiscites in Tuscany and Emilia that legitimized the annexation of much of central Italy to Turin and the House of Savoy. To win the support of Napoleon III, he ceded the historic territories of Savoy and Nice to France, a move that alarmed the British and antagonized important segments of Piedmontese public opinion. Even with this sacrifice, the people of Turin could be justifiably proud of what their native son had achieved by the end of March 1860. In a period of less than two years, their city had become the capital of a greatly enlarged state that now included Lombardy, Emilia, and Tuscany – the most modern and prosperous regions on the Italian peninsula.

The Piedmontese prime minister had little time to rest on his laurels, however, as unexpected events in southern Italy quickly confronted him with new challenges. After revolts erupted in Sicily in April 1860, Giuseppe Garibaldi led an expeditionary force, the legendary one thousand "Red Shirts", to support the uprisings and liberate the island. After their arrival in Sicily the next month, Garibaldi's forces won a series of remarkable military victories. Buoyed by their successes, the Red Shirts launched an invasion of the mainland in August. These developments represented a threat to the moderate leadership and the monarchy in Turin on a number of fronts. Not only did they introduce the possibility of constituent assemblies and a democratic republic in the south, but they also raised the prospect of eventual attacks on Rome and Venice that risked provoking war with both France and Austria.

In anticipation of Garibaldi's defeat of the Bourbon army and his impending occupation of Naples in early September 1860, Cavour prepared a bold, but risky plan to recapture the initiative from the left and forestall any hostile foreign intervention. Days after Garibaldi entered Naples, he launched an unprovoked invasion of the Papal States by the Piedmontese army that succeed in occupying two-thirds of the pope's territories by the end of September. Cavour justified this direct challenge to the diplomatic status quo as the only way to prevent revolution and block an advance on Rome by Garibaldi. At the same time, he arranged for Victor Emanuel II to head the invading army in order to exploit the king's influence over Garibaldi.

Cavour's daring gamble paid off as events in the fall of 1860 quickly demonstrated. His decision to have the king lead the army proved especially astute, when a devoted Garibaldi handed over all the territories he had conquered to Victor Emanuel in late October. Cavour moved swiftly to consolidate these gains and avoid any constituent assemblies

by holding plebiscites that approved Piedmontese annexation of the new territories by early November. The process of political unification culminated in the first months of 1861 with the election of the first parliament and its recognition of Victor Emanuel II as the first King of Italy with its national capital in Turin.

Turin remained at the center of power, especially in the pivotal first six months after unification. The extraordinary events of the years 1859-1860 confronted Cavour's government with the task of devising a new system of administration, law, political representation, education, and communications for the entire country as rapidly as possible without the luxuries of long preparation and careful deliberation. In order to present a unified front to the Great Powers and assure a uniform system

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Map 6.

Map of the city and neighborhoods of Turin as a national capital (1862).



of basic civil and political freedoms to the rest of the peninsula, the Piedmontese statesman simply extended in a uniform manner the bureaucracy, constitution, and legal, financial, and educational systems first developed in Turin to the rest of the country. As the national capital, the city underwent a rapid face lift with the construction of new state office buildings and the development of broad avenues, public parks, and other services needed to accommodate its expanded governmental responsibilities and growing army of civil servants.

Turin enjoyed only a brief moment in the national political limelight, however. The sudden and unexpected death of Cavour in June 1861 deprived the city of the only political figure in whom most local citizens could identify. To make matters worse, the limited material and human resources of the House of Savoy made it virtually impossible for Turin and its political class to dominate Italy in the way that the Prussian monarchy and Junker aristocracy did after they had unified Germany. As a result, the process of state-building in the new Kingdom of Italy entailed greater concessions to the other old regional states, concessions that further eroded the city's claims to national leadership. Such developments foreshadowed a far more traumatic event, the transfer of the national capital from Turin to Florence in January 1865.

Chapter VIII
Crisis and Rebirth, 1864-1914

1. *Hard Times in Turin.*

In September 1864, the people of Turin received the unexpected and devastating news that the city was about to lose both its ancient status as the home of a royal court and its recently acquired status as the capital of the new unified nation. That month the Italian government made public a secret agreement with Napoleon III of France. According to its terms, the French emperor promised to evacuate his troops from Rome within two years, on the condition that Italians transferred their national capital from Turin to Florence within six months. The "September Convention", which had been negotiated in secret with little or no consultation from parliament or the monarch, came as a bolt out of the blue to the city's residents. Although the Chamber of Deputies had voted in favor of Rome as the eventual capital of Italy in March 1861, most local people had assumed that the move would take place in some distant moment in the future.

Not surprisingly, such a dramatic break with the city's past and identity provoked an immediate reaction of outrage and disbelief from the populace. The municipal council, for its part, denounced the agreement, while the local newspapers whipped up popular resentment by attacking the decision to transfer the capital as a gross injustice and a betrayal of Piedmont. In truth, anti-Piedmontese sentiment among the other regional political groups over perceived Savoyard dominance of state administration and governmental affairs contributed both to the decision and to the way it was implemented. In anticipation of disorders, the authorities brought troops into Turin from outside Piedmont, dressed in full battle gear. When angry crowds poured into the principal squares, Piazza San Carlo and Piazza Castello, to protest the loss of the capital, soldiers responded with bayonet charges and volleys of rifle fire that quickly transformed the center of the city into a battlefield. The ensuing violence left in its wake a heavy toll of 50 dead and 130 wounded demonstrators.

The bloody clashes of September 21 and 22, 1864 marked the be-

ginning of one of the most difficult periods in the history of Turin. The transfer of the capital meant more than wounded pride and a loss of political status for the city and its residents. It entailed the departure of important institutions and groups, which had either long defined Turin's identity or made the city an important cultural and intellectual center on the peninsula in the 1850s. At the same time, the transfer entailed the sudden loss of jobs that had provided work directly or indirectly for a sizable segment of the local population. Nor did the resulting demographic, economic, and social crises of the 1860s and early 1870s mark the end of the city's trials and tribulations. Turin suffered additional setbacks in the 1880s and '90s as a result of a global agricultural depression, a prolonged tariff war with France, and a wave of financial scandals and bank failures.

This sequence of crises in the late nineteenth century, however, forced municipal leaders to develop a new vision of the former capital as the city that "works and thinks". Beginning in the 1880s, a broad coalition of interests from the university and business community began to develop and promote an alternative identity for Turin. In their view, the city had to reinvent itself as a center of modern economic production, where science and technology linked with industrial enterprise to create a modern society of wealth, progress, and social harmony. Significantly, the vision of the 1880s largely became a reality in the decade after 1900, but with unintended as well as intended consequences. On the eve of World War I, Turin had emerged both as one of the major centers of Italy's industrial "take-off" and as the home of the country's most disciplined and militant Socialist labor movement.

2. *Dilemmas of an Ex-Capital.*

The violence of September 1864 did not delay the transfer of the capital to Florence. That process unfolded in three stages in the spring and summer of 1865. In April and May, the parliament in Turin closed its doors. In the months that followed, first the government ministries and then the rest of the state bureaucracy followed suit, shutting down their operations in the city, packing up, and moving to the new capital. By the end of the summer, the only remaining political institution in Turin was its municipal government. In a belated effort to soften the blow, the national government provided the city with substantial monetary compensation in the form of an initial 100 million lire grant and an annual subsidy.

Financial assistance did not ease the psychological impact of this sudden change on the people of the ex-capital. The mayor, Emanuele Luserna di Rorà, captured the feelings of many of his constituents when he reacted to the financial settlement by angrily asserting that "Turin is not for sale!" To begin with, the departure of the capital entailed a seemingly catastrophic loss of political status. The relegation of the city to a provincial center on the periphery of the country seemed to make a mockery of the Piedmontese elite's pretensions to being the new Italy's political mentors in the development of national institutions and diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe. At the same time, the transfer ruptured the ancient symbiosis between the city and the monarchy, threatening the powerful identification of the local populace with the royal family. Bitterness over Victor Emanuel II's passive acceptance of the transfer spilled over into public view in February 1865, when the municipal council boycotted the court's annual carnival festivities and crowds in Piazza Reale booed the king. The city's crisis of identity also found cultural expression in a surge of "Piedmontism". This municipal reaction blended a sense of wounded pride, hostility towards an "ungrateful" Italy, regrets about the wisdom of unification, anxiety about the future, and nostalgia for the good old days when, in the words of the Countess Balbo Bertone di Sambuy, "we in our little Piedmont used to be quite happy without these brothers from another bed".

The people of Turin had good reason to react to the loss of the capital as if it were the end of world, since it did seem to threaten not only their collective identity, but also the economic future of the city. Despite the Cavourian reforms of the 1850s, Turin remained a center of consumption, with little productive activity that was not dependent upon the presence of the court and state institutions. While half of the active population was employed in some form of manufacturing, no more than a quarter worked in what we would consider industrial factories. Most were either home workers or employed in small artisanal enterprises that manufactured textiles or processed food products. Turin's elevation to the status of national capital in 1861 only accentuated these characteristics. Between 1858 and 1864, the population soared from 179,635 to 220,000, reflecting the dramatic growth of jobs in the civil service and in those sectors of production that met the needs of a national political and administrative center. During the same years, municipal authorities committed themselves to forty-seven new public works projects to beautify the city and adapt it to its new role as capital of Italy. In September 1864, one-seventh of Turin's active population found employment directly in the public sector, while another 20%,

for the most part, shopkeepers, artisans, construction trades people, and domestic servants, provided services or products to the various branches of the government and state institutions.

In this context, the rapid departure in the spring and summer of 1865 of the court, international diplomatic corps, parliament, government ministries, public offices, and state monopolies, along with companies tied to the state, had effects that rippled throughout the local economy. To begin with, the sudden drop in demand imposed severe cuts in production that hurt many smaller family-run operations, especially those providing luxury goods such as vermouth, silk, liquors, and chocolate, with particular force. Local jewelers, for instance, reduced their staffs by more than a third once their wealthy clients had departed for Florence. For similar reasons, hotels, shops, and cafés suffered a sharp drop in business. As a consequence, large numbers of artisans, small merchants, and luxury-goods producers went out of business between 1864 and 1870. In the same years, the textiles, machine, leather goods, and printing sectors stagnated. Predictably, the city's booming real estate market also took a major hit after a three-year period when investments in urban property had yielded annual returns of 20%. In the second half of 1865, rental rates and returns on investments in real estate plummeted in virtually areas of the city and they remained low for the rest of the decade. Likewise, the ranks of the joint stock companies, which had doubled in number during the speculative fever of the early 1860's, contracted abruptly after the transfer. In fact, fewer than half of these companies were still existing in 1866.

As one might expect, the loss of the capital and its economic repercussions affected all segments of local society. The population of Turin, which had grown steadily in the previous decade, fell sharply from its peak of 220,000 in 1864 to 191,500 by 1868. The exodus of the most dynamic and youthful groups tied to the state also resulted in declining birthrates and an aging population in these years. Both old aristocratic families and other segments of the propertied classes with a long history of public service had to uproot from their ancestral homes and cherished way of life in order to follow the court and state bureaucracy south to Florence. Those wealthy families who remained behind in Turin tended now to shift their investments back to the countryside, thereby depriving economic sectors vital to the city's prosperity of much needed capital. The transfer of the capital had an even more tangible and painful impact on Turin's lower-middle class and workers due to the loss of government jobs and drastic cuts in the staffs at court and within the military hierarchy. Laid-off service employees joined

artisans, construction workers, domestic servants, and other manual laborers in the reduced state railroad and armaments plants to flood the ranks of the city's unemployed, who still numbered over 20% of the population in 1871. The resulting hardships were compounded by epidemics of cholera in 1866 and 1867 that led to the death of some 1,300 residents of the city.

Finally, the cultural life of Turin lost much of its luster after 1864 with the exodus of that talented group of emigrant intellectuals who had played a vital role in the media, performing arts, and academia during the decade and a half after 1850. Their departure, along with that of the national political elite, had a crushing effect on local newspapers and magazines, many of which ceased publication in 1865. To make matters worse, the surviving press lapsed into a "piedmontist" cultural reaction that led to a period of self-isolation and nostalgic provincialism. The year 1865 also marked the onset of a period of decline and crisis at the University of Turin. With the transfer of the capital, the university lost some of its most eminent scholars and scientists who moved on to other institutions, at a time when many Catholic intellectuals voluntarily withdrew from active participation in public life in accord with the wishes of the Vatican. Moreover, the academic community lost the national scientific societies and the technical offices of the civil and military authorities that now relocated to Florence. Not surprisingly, the University of Turin ceased attracting the best students in Italy as it had in the 1850s.

After an initial wave of protests and demonstrations, the city fathers attempted to come up with a more constructive response to the situation created by the loss of Turin's governmental role. Within the municipal council, the sole remaining political body in the ex-capital, a small group of aristocrats, bankers, merchants, and lawyers developed policies to deal with the immediate problems of social and economic distress and to nourish a new sense of identity in the local populace. While they continued to rely on traditional forms of social assistance and philanthropy, the city fathers were more innovative in their approach to public health. In 1865, for example, they instituted the first *Ufficio sanitario*, or Public health office, to ensure the qualifications of health inspectors and the implementation of modern public health policies in the city. Under the guidance of this office, local authorities responded far more effectively to the traditional scourge of epidemics. When a new outbreak of cholera hit Turin in 1873, policies of isolation of the sick and disinfection of locales reduced the number of deaths to only five. The municipal council devoted even more time and energy to the "pa-

triotic education" of the citizenry. The civic leaders did so by involving the middle classes, in particular, in a variety of initiatives that included the construction of new patriotic monuments, the promotion of cultural institutions like the National Museum of the Italian Risorgimento, sports events, mutual aid societies, and public concerts that encouraged popular identification with national values and pride in Piedmont's contributions to the unification of Italy. The municipal council had less success in promoting industrial development in the decade after 1865. Despite repeated promises to increase the availability of energy sources for local industry, the city fathers made little headway in this area where supplies remained woefully inadequate.

Nonetheless, predictions of the ex-capital's imminent demise proved to be premature as the city began to show signs of a modest revival in the 1870s. After its initial drop, the population of Turin, for instance, increased at a faster rate than that of the rest of the peninsula in the decade after 1871, though less than other major urban centers like Milan. By 1881, the city had nearly a quarter of a million residents or 30,000 more than in 1864. Demographic growth testified, in turn, to renewed opportunities for work in the public sector and to a gradual expansion of the city's industrial economy. Between 1871 and 1881, the ranks of domestic servants and artisans continued to shrink, while the number of people employed in manufacturing rose by 44% and accounted for nearly half of the increase in total population. Such gains led one enthusiastic observer, Vittorio Ellena, to proclaim in 1880 that "the battle for the industrial transformation of the region has been won". In his parliamentary report of that year, Ellena emphasized, in particular, the vitality of the local chemical industry and textiles. Finally, the decade of the 1870s saw new initiatives in the city's financial sector with the founding of the Banca di Torino and the Unione banche piemontese e subalpina, which joined an already well-developed sector that included the Banco sconto e sete, the Banca industria e commercio, and the Banca della piccola industria. As a result, by the end of the decade Turin had further consolidated its position as the top financial and banking center in the country.

3. *Injury to Insult: Agricultural and Banking Crises, 1880-1894.*

The people of Turin had little time to enjoy the fruits of the modest recovery in the 1870s. Indeed, the city had to absorb a series of major economic blows during the following two decades. A new round of dif-

ficulties arrived with the agricultural depression of the 1880s. Already in 1875 the competition of cheaper grains from the North American plains, the Argentine pampas, and the Russian steppes began to drive down agricultural prices on the markets of central Europe. By 1880, the full impact of the foreign competition, overproduction, and collapsing prices hit the Italian peninsula. The ensuing agrarian crisis had a pronounced impact on Piedmont's agriculture, since rice, the region's most important commercial crop, was especially hard-hit by foreign competition from Asian growers. The resulting drop in farm incomes and property values hurt not only growers, but also the urban elite who had made substantial capital investments in agriculture after 1865. At the same time, the crisis forced many small lease holders and day laborers to abandon the countryside and head to the city in search of work. Here they swelled the ranks of the unemployed and provoked mounting fears about public order. Difficulties in agriculture affected the urban economy in other ways by reducing commercial and industrial activity in Turin. The expansion of rice production in the previous decade, for instance, had involved the chemical and food processing industries along with insurance companies and banks located in the city. It was not by chance then that a new national agricultural interest-group association, the *Lega agraria*, or Agrarian League was founded in Turin in 1885 to lobby the government for protective tariffs on wheat, rice, and other key commercial crops of the Po Valley. In collaboration with influential industrial interests, the Agrarian League achieved its primary objective two years later. The new agricultural tariffs imposed in 1887 raised substantially import duties on wheat, rice, sugar beets, and hemp, the principal products of northern commercial farms.

The sharp hike in agricultural tariffs, however, had only a limited impact on the recession in the countryside. More importantly, the government's adoption of protectionism helped to spark a commercial war in 1888 with France, Italy's principal trading partner, which further damaged Piedmontese agriculture and Turin's struggling economy. After efforts to work out a satisfactory agreement with Paris failed to make headway, Italian authorities denounced the existing trade treaty of 1881. The French retaliated by applying their highest rates to all Italian exports and "differential rates", higher than those paid by anyone else, to certain Italian specialties. While the country as a whole suffered from the loss of a market that had absorbed two-fifths of nation's exports, the damage was magnified in Turin, the principal transit center for Italian products bound for France and England. As one observer later recalled, "the French rejected all at once our silk, our wines, our oils;

all at once they withdrew the capital that they had loaned us to establish our new industries".

In the late 1880s and early '90s, the onset of a major crisis of the Italian financial system, in which Turin's banks played a major role, compounded the problems created by the agricultural depression and the trade war with France. In response to falling profits and land values in the countryside, wealthy investors and the principal local banks had begun to shift their capital out of agriculture and into a speculative boom in urban real estate in Rome and Turin, where land prices soared five to ten-fold after 1885. Turin's leading investment banks, the Banco sconto e sete and the Banca di Torino, in particular, were heavily involved in the purchase of building properties and in loans to the construction industry. When the construction boom collapsed in the winter of 1887-88 and real estate prices plummeted, these banks found themselves in very difficult straits, with loans that became harder to collect and properties and unfinished projects that they could not unload.

A panic among depositors provoked a run on the Banca di Torino and the Banco sconto e sete in early 1890. Their collapse marked only the beginning of a chain reaction of failures that swept through the entire banking community during the 1890s. In fact, the leading figures of Piedmontese finance were implicated in the downfall of the city's principal financial institutions, from the Credito Torinese and the Banca Subalpina to the Banca Popolare di Torino and the Banca di Torino, which managed to hold on until 1898 before shutting its doors for good. Nor were the losses from the banking crisis limited to the city's wealthy venture capitalists. More than a hundred million lire in small and middle-sized savings from the provinces also went up in smoke with the collapse of the real estate bubble and the accompanying bank failures. While a few small financial institutes survived, Turin had lost its position as the preeminent banking center of Italy, a status that the city had enjoyed for three decades.

This extraordinary combination of agricultural, banking and commercial crises plunged the city into a period of economic depression and mass misery during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The silk industry, already in difficulty before the 1880s, was dealt a lethal blow by the disruption of exports to France. In other sectors, large numbers of small factories and shops closed down, while construction came to an abrupt halt as prices for real estate fell from five to six times below their old values. The repercussions quickly showed up in the legal system. Between 1890 and 1891, the Tribunal of Turin, alone, decreed nearly twice

as many bankruptcies than it had in the entire period from 1879 to 1886. The crisis also enveloped the city's stock exchange, where one official reported in early 1891 that "stocks, even the best, are steadily falling". These circumstances produced levels of social distress that had not been seen since the worst years of the Napoleonic era. In addition to massive unemployment, the 1890s witnessed the impoverishment of the middle classes, a dramatic increase in the numbers of vagrants wandering the city, the resurgence of crimes against property, and the revival of mass emigration.

4. *Reimagining Turin as the City that "Works and Thinks".*

Even in the midst of this period of economic crisis and social distress, an alliance of university and municipal leaders was already at work promoting an optimistic new vision of Turin as a great center of production, work, and science. Their vision found expression in the early 1880s in the publication of a volume of essays, entitled *Torino*, and in the national exposition of 1884, both of which touted the city's many material and intellectual resources. This largely cultural and ideological campaign, which preceded and anticipated Turin's industrial take-off after 1900, drew its main inspiration from the doctrines of positivism, the dominant philosophical school in late nineteenth-century Italy. Already the reigning intellectual orthodoxy of the French Second Empire in the middle of the century, positivism claimed to provide a new science of society based on positive facts and the scientific method. As such, it envisioned a world of material progress guided by science and technology, rather than religion or tradition. In the hands of its Turinese advocates, positivism held out the promise of harnessing the forces of science and technology on behalf of industry, wealth, and military power. The resulting material prosperity, they argued, would also provide political benefits by inoculating the masses against the germs of both violent revolution and clerical reaction and thus usher in a new era of social peace and inter-class harmony.

In the decades after 1880, the vision of a scientifically organized society appealed to a broad spectrum of political and social forces in the ex-capital. Moderate liberals, in the tradition of Cavour, readily identified with its notions of regulated social progress and institutional modernization, while the old democratic left, associated with the *Gazzetta del Popolo* and the Free Masons, enthusiastically embraced its secular ideal of science and progress as an antidote to the spiritual appeals of

Catholicism. At the same time, positivism's promise of a society based on scientific reason found supporters within the local branch of the Socialist party, where the "socialism of the professors" espoused by anticlerical, middle-class intellectuals still exercised a powerful influence.

By the 1880s, the science faculties at the University of Turin had already made the city a major center of positivism on the Italian peninsula. Filippo De Filippi, professor of Zoology, for instance, gave the first lecture in Italy on the theories of Charles Darwin in 1864; his successor and later rector of the university, Michele Lessona, was a pioneering translator and popularizer of Darwin's works. In a similar vein, Giulio Bizzozero, founder of the General Pathology Laboratory at the university, spearheaded the development of the field of social medicine, especially in the areas of infectious diseases and infant mortality, while Luigi Pagliani founded the Hygiene Society that developed the basic strategies of public health for the entire country. Arguably, the most prominent exponent of Turinese positivism, Cesare Lombroso, was appointed professor of Forensic Medicine at the university in 1878. Still widely recognized the founding father of modern criminology, Lombroso transformed the field from the legalistic study of crime to the scientific study of criminals and, in the process, became a major exponent of the more humane treatment of the convicted. In the same period, the physicist and electrical engineer, Galileo Ferraris emerged as the "only great Italian applied scientist of the nineteenth century".

Turin's scientific community did not limit their activities to purely theoretical issues within the university. Leading academicians also applied their expertise to prepare the city for industrial development by pursuing technical solutions to the city's energy, water, and sanitation problems. Ferraris, for instance, established the School of Electrotechnology within the Italian Industrial Museum in order to combine the theoretical study of electricity with its practical application. Under his tutelage, the School served as the principal training center for a generation of Italian electrical engineers who served in the country's civilian and military bureaucracies. As a result of such initiatives, the Industrial Museum, which had been founded in 1862 by the government to promote the diffusion of technology, became a nationally renowned center of industrial culture by the end of the century. Moreover, Ferraris pioneered the development of electrical power for production and transport, both through his invention of alternating current electrical motors and through his involvement in the introduction of electrical street lighting to Turin. In a similar fashion, members of the scientific and medical faculties worked to ease the problems created by factory life

and urban demographic growth on public health and order. University medical experts, for example, took the lead in developing a Municipal Office of Sanitation, to replace the old parish-based Catholic Congregations of Charity. The effectiveness of the new office in the prevention of disease helped to make Turin a model for other large cities throughout Europe by 1900.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the most important educational developments for the industrial future of the city came in the field of engineering. While the Technical School for Engineers had existed as part of the University of Turin since 1859, it underwent a rapid phase of expansion in the last two decades of the century. Indeed, by 1885 it had emerged as the largest center in the country for the training of mostly civil engineers who then went on to find employment in public works and the booming construction industry. With the real estate and banking crises of the late 1880s and early '90s, the Technical School shifted its focus to the preparation of students in industrial engineering. By 1905, enrollments and degrees granted in this field alone accounted for more than half of the School's total. In the following year, the Technical School merged with the Industrial Museum to form a new engineering university, the Royal Polytechnic of Turin, which became the Italian equivalent of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the twentieth century.

For their part, local authorities contributed to the fruitful collaboration between the scientific community and the city through the University Consortium, a body constituted in 1878 with the involvement of the municipality, the Province of Turin and surrounding provinces. From its inception, the Consortium functioned as an institutional incubator of innovation at the university, funneling public funds to the scientific and medical faculties in order to support their research and to upgrade their equipment and laboratories. More importantly, in the mid-1880s, Turin's aristocratic mayor, Count Ernesto Balbo di Sambuy, and other municipal leaders realized an ambitious plan for the construction of a new "city of science", a modern campus in the Valentino district with up-to-date facilities that gave a powerful boost to research and teaching in the sciences and the field of medicine.

The proponents of science and secularism were not the sole protagonists on the urban scene in the late nineteenth century, however. Even in the decidedly hostile environment created by the reigning positivist intellectual school in Turin after 1880, local Catholic groups also made their own distinctive contribution to the cultural preparation for industrial development. The rise in social tensions provoked by the eco-

nomic crises of these years exposed the inadequacies of traditional clerical charitable activities and led to a new type of mutual aid organization, the Catholic Workers Union, which had been founded in 1871. Turin and Piedmont took the lead nationally in the development of these mixed associations that embraced a model of inter-class cooperation to bring together industrial workers with artisans, merchants, and employers. In addition to medical care in time of illness, members received a variety of services, from access to a circulating library to employment services and recreational activities. At the same time, the founding of new parishes in the working-class neighborhoods on the periphery of the city and the renewed growth of the principal religious orders led to the expansion of evening trade schools, nurseries, and other forms of assistance for workers.

The optimism of Turin's industrial boosters rested upon more than the power of positive thinking, even in the darkest years of economic decline. One sector in particular, the cotton industry, avoided the worst effects of the agricultural and banking crises and managed to achieve significant growth in the decades between 1880 and 1900. To begin with, the principal cotton manufacturers in Turin were self-financing family operations that were less dependent on large-scale capital markets and therefore less exposed to the effects of the bank failures in the early 1890s. This sector gradually expanded its markets from the region to the national level and, in the last years of the century, developed new international outlets for its products in Latin America. The cotton industry further benefited from the involvement of a number of Swiss manufacturers who immigrated to Turin in these years, bringing with them financial, technological, and managerial innovations. Developments in this sector contributed to the formation of a new group of entrepreneurs who served as a model for the rest of the city's business class. They and private bankers like Geisser, Kuster, and the Ceriana brothers were well-situated to seize the opportunities that began to appear with the cyclical upturn in the Italian economy as the nineteenth century came to a close.

5. *Industrial Take-Off in Turin: 1901-1914.*

By the spring of 1901, the Italian peninsula had already entered into a period of unparalleled industrial growth. With the chemical, metallurgical, and engineering sectors leading the way, manufacturing production more than doubled, the annual rate of growth reached record

highs, and capital investments in plan and equipment rose by 114%, while the relative importance of agriculture in the national economy sharply decreased. As the older textile firms completed their conquest of the domestic market and enlarged their export activities, modern steel, hydroelectric, and machine industries arose. In a highly favorable international economic climate, the state, capable entrepreneurs, and new commercial banks helped stimulate the greatest relative economic advance of any European country in the years from 1896 to 1908.

Turin rapidly emerged as a major player in the general economic expansion of these years. Indeed, the old royal capital enjoyed the highest rate of industrial growth of any city in the country during the first decade of the new century. Already in 1903 Turin ranked among the top three urban centers in numbers of workers, energy consumption, and mechanization of production. Between 1905 and 1911, its industrial population more than doubled, while warehouses and factories accounted for one-fifth of all the new constructions in the city. From outset, Turin's industrial take-off displayed certain distinctive features. In contrast to developments elsewhere, armaments, machinery, and electrical equipment played a relatively minor role in the city's transformation. The most impressive growth in Turin took place instead in the engineering sector, with the fledgling automobile industry leading the way. Guided by a new generation of captains of industry, this sector saw its workforce expand five-fold in just six years. By 1911, it employed one-third of the city's entire manufacturing population. Moreover, firms in this sector were distinguished by their adoption of the most modern organizational, technological, and marketing innovations.

One company above all others most clearly embodied the new industrial Turin that began to emerge after 1900. The Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino, or Fiat, developed into one of the most dynamic enterprises in the country in the decade and a half after its founding in 1899. In the summer of that year, the young entrepreneur, Giovanni Agnelli, joined with a small group of wealthy private investors from the aristocratic and financial communities of Turin to launch the auto manufacturing company. From the outset, Agnelli embraced innovative advertising and promotional techniques to create and expand a market for cars. He was instrumental, for instance, in exploiting the success of Fiat in the first automobile races to raise the profile of the company and increase its prestige. At the same time, Agnelli developed a commercial network to expand export markets. In 1902, Fiat already had import agents in the United States and France; foreign consumers accounted for roughly two-thirds of the company's sales by the middle of the

decade. The young entrepreneur and his aristocratic partners, however, did not share the same vision of the company. The nobles' commitment to the automobile sector expressed less an enterprising spirit than their abiding fascination with sports in general and the racing car, in particular as new sources of adventure and leisurely diversion. For his part, Agnelli understood early on that the imperatives of profitability required the firm to look beyond the sports market and to seize the opportunities for production of automobiles on a much vaster scale.

The fledgling automobile industry, which tended to concentrate in Piedmont, grew rapidly at the opening of the twentieth century from seven companies in 1904 to sixty-one by 1907. The rapid proliferation of auto manufacturers came to an abrupt halt with the international financial crisis of that year, which compounded difficulties created by the collapse in share values on the local stock market in 1906. Fiat shares, for instance, which had peaked at 1,885 lire during the initial phase of expansion, fell from 445 to 17 lire in the first nine months of 1907. In general, the financial downturn resulted in enormous capital losses for the over-expanded sector and imposed a drastic restructuring on an industry already beset by problems of limited markets and high production costs. In fact, the vast majority of companies founded in the opening years of the decade failed as a consequence. The few firms that survived, however, were well situated to exploit the opportunities that arose in the wake of the crisis.

Fiat and Agnelli emerged as the chief beneficiaries of the harsh retrenchment and restructuring that took place in the automobile industry. Already in 1906, the young industrialist forged an alliance with the Milanese Banca Commerciale Industriale that enabled him to weather the immediate financial crisis. More importantly, the bank's resources freed him from any further dependence on the venture capital of his aristocratic partners and thus permitted him to pursue more aggressively his innovative ideas on production and distribution. Agnelli looked to the United States, rather than Germany or England, for his inspiration. Twice in the years before 1914 he went personally to Detroit to study the systems employed by Henry Ford in his plants. Following the example of the American auto manufacturer, he reorganized the production processes in his operations. Fiat became one of the first companies in Italy to build factories that used the standardized parts and assembly-line methods as well as the latest techniques of scientific management to accelerate the rhythms of production and expand output. At the same time, Agnelli pursued a policy of vertical integration, taking over his competitors and diversifying the range of his company's products. As a

result, by 1914 Fiat not only accounted for half of all the car production in Italy, but also controlled affiliated companies that manufactured ball bearings, radiators, marine motors, airplane and diesel engines, railroad cars, trucks, and trams.

Pioneering captains of industry like Agnelli found powerful political allies in a new generation of municipal authorities who were firmly committed to the goal of transforming Turin into a modern industrial metropolis. Under the administrations of the mayors, Secondo Frola (1903-1909) and Teofilo Rossi (1909-1915), the city introduced a number of measures designed to reduce the costs of production, increase access to more affordable electrical power, improve the technical qualifications of the labor force, and modernize communications, transportation, and social services. To begin with, they gradually reduced the tax burdens on manufacturing enterprises, transferred public properties to industrial developers on highly favorable terms, and created other incentives to encourage the construction of new factories. City hall also took the lead in establishing a Municipal Electricity Plant to take advantage of the potential hydroelectric power of the Alps and thereby ease Turin's perennial energy problems. The plant proved to be a major success, facilitating the introduction of public lighting in the city and cutting substantially the cost of electricity in Turin in the decade prior to the Great War. Electrification, in turn, permitted the linking of the factories to the workingclass neighborhoods through the extension of municipal tram services that were among the lowest priced in Italy and eventually favored a gradual shift of manufacturing and population to new areas on the periphery of the city. The same years saw municipal authorities invest in trade schools with curricula that provided workers with the specialized skills required by industrial employers. In a similar fashion, they took steps to upgrade local telegraph and telephone services and to improve communications and transportation between Turin, the port of Genoa, and Milan. While these many initiatives resulted in a sharp increase in municipal spending, officials were able to cover the deficit with loans from the principal local banks, the Cassa di Risparmio and the San Paolo, which concentrated their financial investments in the city.

Such rapid industrial and technological modernization transformed Turin's image and role on the peninsula. After the hard times of the 1890s, an unprecedented prosperity enveloped the city as revenues from manufacturing and trade surpassed those from the professions and taxable incomes more than doubled between 1900 and 1910. For the city's middle classes, consumption of meat, butter, and wine rose sharply especially after 1908. The growing wealth of Turin's industrial and commercial elites

found tangible expression in the emergence of fashionable new neighborhoods in the city and foothills. Here expensive villas and apartment buildings arose that proudly displayed the Art Deco style, which made the city a major international center of this movement in modern architecture. The triumph of Art Deco in Turin was particularly ironic, since it was a style that arose in reaction to the industrial revolution. In contrast to the mass-produced products coming off the assembly lines of the city's factories, Art Deco created works of art that required a high level of craftsmanship and consciously drew its forms from nature.

The prosperous middle classes enthusiastically participated in a new urban culture of leisure that blossomed in those years and involved the cinema, sports, and other forms of voluntary group participation. In the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, Turin became an important center of Italy's embrionic movie industry. On the eve of World War I, the city had fourteen production companies and some forty theaters. The industry attracted a large number of actors and actresses to the city, including such celebrated divas as Eleonora Duse. Movies, however, had to take a back seat in popularity to sports among the city's leisure activities.

In fact, Turin emerged as the principal center for Italy's most popular sports in the years before 1914. Predictably, it was the capital of the new sport of auto racing, hosting the country's first road race in 1898 as well as the first national track race in 1900. Two years later, Giovanni Agnelli, himself, set the record for the Tour of Italy (*Giro d'Italia*) by covering 2,141 kilometers in 57 hours in his 12-horsepower Fiat. Turin played a similar pioneering role in the growth of professional soccer in Italy. The city was the home of the first Italian Federation of Soccer as well as the first national soccer championship in 1898. The following decade saw the rise of two local professional squads, Torino and Juventus, which would dominate the increasingly popular national sport in the ensuing decades. Turin also pioneered the development of cycling, a sport that enjoyed a broad base of support among both the wealthy and the working classes. The oldest cycling club in Italy, the Veloce-club Torino, was founded in the city's Valentino park in the 1880s. The Veloce sponsored the inaugural national championship as well as the first international professional races in the country. Turin's special status in the sporting world received a sort of official recognition in 1911, as the government chose to construct the National Stadium there to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Italian nation.

At the same time, the industrial transformation of Turin after 1900 introduced a renewed vitality and dynamism into the intellectual life of

the ex-capital. A number of new publishing houses joined the established firms in the sector like Pomba, Paravia, and Loescher to produce a steadily widening stream of investigative reports, economic texts, historical works, and professional manuals in the first decade of the century. During the same period, the readership of the local press more than doubled and the city's leading daily, *La Stampa*, began to challenge Milan's *Il Corriere della Sera* as the pre-eminent newspaper on the Italian peninsula. Under the direction of Alfredo Frassati, the Turinese paper enjoyed the collaboration of such prominent intellectual luminaries as the economist and post-war prime minister, F. S. Nitti, the renowned criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, Gaetano Mosca, theorist of elites, as well as the young Piedmontese economist, Luigi Einaudi, who would go on to become the first president of the Italian Republic after 1945. Many of the same men also played an active role in the launching of one of Italy's leading journals, *La Riforma Sociale*. With Einaudi as its editor after 1900, the journal provided in-depth analyses of the principal economic and social problems of the country for a larger "intelligent public".

Turin's middle classes had an opportunity to celebrate the impressive achievements of the previous decade and their city's new image as a center of economic and social progress, when the ex-capital played host to an international exposition in 1911, in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of Italian unification. Dedicated fittingly to the theme of "industry and labor", the exposition showcased the recent industrial progress of the city and offered a preview of the new scientific discoveries and technological advances on the horizon. By most accounts, the exposition was a smashing success. Many other nations took part with their own pavilions and the exposition attracted over seven million visitors to Turin from all over Italy and the rest of Europe between the end of April and mid-November 1911.

Still, not all segments of the local population shared equally in the material benefits of Turin's industrial transformation. The economic gap between the middle and working classes, in particular, actually widened in the years after 1900. While workers found greater opportunities for employment in the expanding manufacturing plants, their wages remained low and were largely absorbed by rising prices for food and rents. To make matters worse, the housing market did not keep pace with the demographic explosion in the city. Between 1901 and 1915, the population rose 43%. Even more dramatic increases took place in the new working-class neighborhoods on the outskirts of Turin, where the population rose by 500% from 1891 to 1911. The inhabitants of these areas had little contact with other social classes and lived under

conditions of chronic overcrowding, high rents, and elevated levels of tuberculosis, alcoholism, suicide, and infant mortality. At the same time, these conditions, together with the increasing standardization of work in the modern industrial sector, also provided a new set of shared experiences that lessened divisions within the labor force. In this setting, the emergence of relatively self-sufficient, working class neighborhoods favored the growth of a distinctive class identity and culture with its own sports, leisure time rituals, and social dynamics. This culture of factory and neighborhood created, in turn, unprecedented opportunities for innovative forms of collective action. In the decade leading up to World War I, Turin's new captains of industry would find imposing counterparts in the most disciplined and best organized labor unions in the country.

6. *In the Vanguard of the Italian Labor Movement.*

The beginning of the twentieth century ushered in a new era of remarkable changes not only in Turin's systems of production, but also in the organizational life of the city's working classes. The first local unions had already began to appear in the previous decade, especially after the founding in 1891 of the Chamber of Labor, which coordinated the new labor organizations on a territorial basis. The headquarters of the Chamber on Corso Siccardi nourished a distinctive form of sociability by providing a gathering place for laborers from all over the city and from diverse sectors of production. Here they enjoyed musical and theatrical events, pursued educational opportunities, and took part in meetings and rallies that extolled the virtues of brotherhood and collective solidarity. As a result, by 1900, Turinese workers had their own unions, newspapers, and cultural circles, circumstances that reflected their relatively high level of education and their intense pride in their professional qualifications.

Political developments at the national level provided a powerful boost to this fledgling labor movement in Turin after 1900. Under the leadership of Giovanni Giolitti, a native of Piedmont and the foremost Italian statesman of the pre-war era, the central government abandoned the repressive labor policies of the previous decades in an attempt to broaden the base of mass support for the liberal parliamentary order. In essence, Giolitti pursued a strategy designed to promote industrial expansion, while simultaneously satisfying popular demands for a higher standard of living through a more tolerant approach to organized labor,

progressive social legislation, and public works. In pursuit of these objectives, he recognized the legitimacy of unions, tolerated peaceful strikes, provided state aid to labor cooperatives, and respected the civil rights of the Socialist party.

The new policy of government neutrality in workplace disputes had an immediate impact on labor relations throughout the country. The number of strikes quadrupled in 1901, while the ranks of strikers increased ten-fold over the previous year. Turin anticipated this surge in labor militancy in 1900, when metalworkers went out on strike for higher wages and over-time pay, the ten-hour workday, and the abolition of piece-rates. Although the strike ended in defeat, it inspired other categories of workers to take action. Metalworkers walked out again in 1901, broadening their demands to include management's recognition of labor representation within the factories and obligatory union membership as a condition of employment. This strike and another work stoppage the following year by gas workers encountered broad support from laborers in other industries and trades, giving rise to the first general strike in the city's history early in the spring of 1902. By the middle of the decade, Turin had become the scene of strikes in virtually all sectors of the local economy as workers walked out in support of wage hikes, shorter hours, and labor representation in factory decision-making.

The surge in labor militancy coincided with the rapid growth and transformation of Turin's labor organizations, which moved decisively to the forefront of the Italian union movement. In the new climate created by the Giolittian system, the pace of unionization accelerated, so that by the end of the decade the local Chamber of Labor represented fifty-eight unions. Moreover, these years witnessed a major shift from trade to industrial unionism, which developed first in the automobile manufacturing plants and then spread to other sectors of the engineering industry. In February 1906, the Federation of Italian Metalworkers, or Fiom, was founded in Turin. The Fiom quickly established itself as the strongest, best organized, and most influential union in the country by winning major concessions from the auto industry. Later in the same year, Turin also became the home of the General Confederation of Labor (Cgil), the first umbrella organization representing chambers of labor and union federations throughout the country.

The discipline and militancy displayed by the local unions forced Turin's manufacturers in turn to take the lead in developing first regional and then national organizations of employers as counterweights to organized labor. After a year of discussion and preparation, Giovan-

ni Agnelli and a group of young entrepreneurs launched the Industrial League of Turin, with the stated purpose of defending "the collective interests of its members and industry" and promoting "understanding with the workers". Representing initially 200 firms, the new employers' organization expanded its network beyond Turin to the rest of Italy's northern industrial triangle. By the outbreak of World War I, its roster included over 600 firms employing 65,319 workers. At the same time, the Industrial League became the driving force behind the Italian Confederation of Industry (Confindustria), which was founded in 1910 to advance the interests of employers at the national level.

At least initially, the Industrial League of Turin responded constructively to Giolitti's more neutral stance on labor-management relations. The employers' organization showed a willingness to recognize the unions as legitimate representatives of the workers and to grant economic concessions. But in exchange, the Industrial League insisted that the unions recognize managerial authority in the workplace. In this fashion, its leaders sought to ensure social peace in the factories by means of disciplined contractual agreements that institutionalized labor conflicts and limited union demands to questions of wages and hours. Such an approach enjoyed a certain success in the four years after 1906, when the mediating role of the Industrial League resulted in a strike rate in Turin that was half that of Milan. Similar aims informed the stance of a consortium of auto manufacturers in their contractual negotiations with the Fiom in the winter of 1911-12. In exchange for wage hikes and a reduction in work hours, employer representatives insisted on the elimination of worker commissions in the plants, tighter work schedules, and compulsory arbitration. Divisions within the Fiom between moderates and revolutionary syndicalists, however, effectively sabotaged the efforts of the Industrial League to establish a system of bilateral negotiations. Inspired by radical elements, auto workers overwhelmingly rejected the proposed contract and went out on a strike that ended in a complete victory for the industrialists.

The defeat of the Fiom in 1912 ushered in a new era of bitter labor-management conflict, both in Turin and in the rest of the country, in the last years before World War I. An international recession in 1913 hit the Italian economy with particular force. Excessive inventories, slackening demand, and falling prices and profits in key industrial sectors led to cutbacks in production and growing unemployment. In this difficult economic conjuncture, Turin's industrialists turned against Giolitti and became increasingly intransigent in their dealings with the unions. In the spring of 1913, automobile manufacturers rejected re-

newed demands from the Fiom and threatened to fight the ensuing strike with a general lockout affecting the entire metal-making and machine-manufacturing sectors. Much to the outrage of the industrialists, the government threatened to deport the foreign-born president of the Industrial League and to withhold protection of the factories from worker violence in the event of a lockout. As a consequence, the three-month strike ended on terms largely favorable to the Fiom.

Developments in the auto industry reflected a more general climate of intensified social conflict and political polarization in Turin as the Great War approached. With the downturn in the economy, the Industrial League moved toward economic nationalism, calling on the government to protect domestic markets and promote national products. The Fiat executive and new president of the Industrial League, Dante Ferraris, supported the right-wing Nationalist political organization in Turin and helped fund that movement's newspaper, *L'Idea Nazionale*. The growing intransigence and conservatism of industrialists paralleled the increased radicalization of the Socialist party from 1912 onward. After a decade, in which positivist intellectuals had largely set the socialist agenda in the city, a new generation of militants began to step forward as spokesmen for an industrial workforce that was taking a more active role in the life of the party. Included in the ranks of the militants were the university students, Antonio Gramsci, Palmiro Togliatti, Angelo Tasca, and Umberto Terracini. From their base in industrial Turin, Gramsci and Togliatti, in particular, would go on to become the dominant figures of Italian left in the first half of the twentieth century. In the years between 1911 and 1914, these young radicals rejected the "cultural dilettantism" of the party's moderate old guard and identified instead with the fiery rhetoric and revolutionary extremism of the then socialist leader, Benito Mussolini, at the national level. More importantly, the Socialist party's shift to the left coincided with its growing political weight at the local level. In the first elections under universal male suffrage in October 1913, the Socialists captured three of the city's five electoral districts.

Thus, on the eve of World War I, Turin found itself at the front lines in an emerging war of position that pitted the opposing vanguards of Italian organized capitalism and labor. This struggle would not only dominate the life of the city for the better part of the twentieth century, but it would also make Turin a key battlefield in the larger social and political conflicts that tormented the Italian peninsula in the three decades after 1914.

Chapter IX
Turin between the Wars, 1915-1945

1. *Turin in the Age of War and Fascism*.

The outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 quickly overshadowed partisan political and social conflicts in Turin and elsewhere on the rest of the Italian peninsula. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Habsburg throne, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia at the end of July. Within a week, this local conflict mushroomed into a general European war as Germany, Russia, France, and England rushed to the aid of their respective allies. Italy took a more circuitous path into war. The outbreak of hostilities caught the Italian government of Antonio Salandra poised between two opposing alliance systems. A combination of diplomatic and domestic considerations led his government to declare Italy's neutrality in August 1914. In part, the government justified its decision, citing the army's lack of preparedness and Austria-Hungary's refusal to guarantee Italian territorial compensation. In the wake of the insurrections and riots in a number of Italian cities in June, Salandra also feared that military intervention might provoke renewed domestic disorders. The decision for neutrality suited the general drift of public opinion in Italy during the summer of 1914. Only a small group of nationalists and conservatives advocated belligerency in the first weeks of the war, either for reasons of national prestige or out of a sense of loyalty to the Triple Alliance.

This broad national consensus, however, began to disintegrate in the fall of 1914 with the halt of the German advance in the west and the beginning of an Austrian retreat in the east. A heterogeneous pro-war coalition of conservatives, nationalists, democrats, and dissident socialists emerged to advocate Italian intervention on the side of the Entente powers, England, France, and Russia. While this "interventionist" coalition represented only a small minority of the Italian public, their strategic influence in the media and other centers of power enabled them to seize the initiative from the less organized and politically fragmented neutralist majority. By the end of April, the Salandra gov-

ernment and the monarchy secretly negotiated and signed the Treaty of London with the Entente powers, committing Italy to enter the war within one month in exchange for sweeping territorial concessions. Meanwhile, a noisy pro-war campaign in the press and streets of the major cities created the illusion of popular support for intervention. The campaign culminated in the "radiant days of May" and Italy's going to war.

For the people of Turin, Italy's entrance into World War I ushered in an era of extraordinary violence, social conflict, and political turbulence. Much as in the past, the city occupied center stage especially at pivotal moments in the country's "age of catastrophe" between 1915 and 1945. Thus, Turin hosted Italy's largest wartime insurrection in the summer of 1917, an event that opened a new period of revolutionary agitation into the country. Three years later, the city was at the center of the massive factory occupations of 1920, which marked the end of the "Red years" and set the stage for the rise and triumph of Fascism. Fittingly, in the spring of 1943, Italy's first large-scale strikes in nearly two decades took place in Turin, signaling the beginning of the end for Mussolini and the Fascist dictatorship.

Neither war nor Fascism, however, changed the fundamental social and economic characteristics of the city that had taken root during the opening decade of the century. Between 1915 and 1945, Turin's population continued to expand, doubling in size, largely as a result of immigration linked to jobs in the automobile industry. Likewise, the sharp division between a socialist working class and a modern industrial bourgeoisie continued to dominate Turin's social and political life in these years. While the clash of these "two cities" produced monumental confrontations, it also acted as a powerful stimulus to innovation. As a result, Turin further consolidated its position in the vanguard of Italian capitalism. Lastly, the inter-war period anticipated important developments in the post-World War II decades. Well before the 1950s and '60s, for instance, Turin was already becoming an "Italian" city with people from many regions who had come to work in the factories and were gradually integrated into the fabric of urban life.

2. *Turin Goes to War.*

The outbreak of war served to intensify and sharpen pre-existing divisions within Turinese society. While most local citizens opposed Italian military intervention in August 1914 like the majority of their countrymen, the neutralist forces in the city were considerably more ag-

gressive and combative than elsewhere on the peninsula in support of their position. The socialist labor movement dominated the anti-war campaign in Turin, giving it a distinctively radical, intransigent, and class-conscious character. Popular hostility to militarism, which had already manifested itself in demonstrations against Italian intervention in Libya in 1911, surfaced the first week of August when 30,000 workers attended a socialist rally in front of the Chamber of Labor. The short-term economic effects of the European conflict only accentuated the anti-war sentiments of the workers. The sudden influx of 70,000 refugees, shortages of raw materials, and a drop in manufacturing orders expanded the ranks of the unemployed and provoked a sharp rise in prices that led to protest demonstrations in the spring of 1915.

A movement in support of Italian intervention in the war did emerge in the city during the winter of 1914-15. From the outset, the cause of intervention benefited from the traditional pro-government attitudes of Turin's moderate middle classes. The war camp received additional support from a growing number of industrialists, who came to see intervention on the side of the Entente as the best solution to the obstacles to trade, access to raw materials and capital created by the European conflict. The same business leaders and other local notables dominated the new municipal committees that arose in February 1915 to prepare the city for war. Rounding out the ranks of Turin's interventionist movement was a sizable contingent of the university students as well as small groups of hard-line nationalists and democrats, drawn for the most part from the city's cultural and social elite. The city's second leading daily, *La Gazzetta del Popolo*, mounted an aggressive press campaign in favor of the war, laced with strong anti-socialist and nationalist overtones. The pro-war movement achieved considerably less success in the Piedmontese capital than in other urban centers. In contrast to Milan and Rome, the neutralists remained in control of Turin's public squares, where they did not shy away from battling both nationalists and the police throughout the spring of 1915. Significantly, Turin was the only city in Italy to anticipate the declaration of war in May with a general strike of protest.

Broad local opposition to the war did not prevent the city from becoming a giant arsenal after the summer of 1915. Construction of new factory space alone increased more than five fold between 1914 and 1916, with the engineering sector continuing to lead the way. Preferential treatment from the state in contracts, taxes, and imports ensured that transportation and armaments sectors would drive the impressive industrial expansion that took place during the war years. Such assis-

tance also accelerated the process of industrial concentration in the basic sectors and the largest firms that had begun before 1914. Those firms possessed the technology and organizational scale required to meet the extraordinary demands of the wartime production. Moreover, their size gave them the political clout to win the most advantageous governmental orders. Spokesmen for the Industrial League, for instance, dominated the newly formed Piedmontese Committee of Industrial Mobilization, a regional body that fused private and public power in the coordination of industrial production, the resolution of labor disputes, and the determination of the companies with privileged "auxiliary" status. This status provided state-imposed labor discipline in the factories as well as other significant economic advantages to its recipients.

Fiat emerged as the chief industrial beneficiary of the wartime economy in Turin. Already the largest auto manufacturer in the country on the eve of war, Agnelli's company enjoyed a remarkable period of growth in the four years after 1914. Between 1915 and 1918, Fiat rose from thirtieth to third place among all Italian corporations, increased its capital more than seven-fold, quadrupled its production of motor vehicles, and enlarged its workforce from 3,500 to more than 40,000 or a quarter of all the workers in Turin. The same years also saw the firm diversify its production by taking over other enterprises and by setting up new companies. By the end of the war, Agnelli presided over an industrial empire that controlled three-fifths of Piedmont's engineering sector and accounted for 92% of the country's production of trucks and 80% of its airplane engines by the end of the war. At the same time, Fiat expanded its exports to Italy's allies, whose armies absorbed almost half of its production.

3. *Social Unrest and Revolutionary Agitation in Wartime Turin.*

The exceptional growth of Fiat and the rest of Turin's engineering sector after 1914 had a profound impact on the city's social structure and class relations. Above all, World War I propelled the Piedmontese capital into the ranks of the major European industrial centers. In the process, it accentuated and sharpened pre-existing social tensions and cultural contrasts in the rapidly expanding city. Despite high mortality and low birth rates, the urban population climbed from 456,440 to over 525,000 by 1918, the second largest increase of any city in the country during the conflict. Immigrants, who were drawn by jobs in the war industries, accounted for the lion's share of the population growth.

Within this increasingly diverse metropolis, the local captains of industry clearly faired the best in the wartime economy, garnering huge profits from their companies' military contracts in these years. Corporate earnings and profit margins in the key sectors climbed to unprecedented levels after 1915. It is estimated that Agnelli's personal income in the last two years of war exceeded 1.8 million lire, an enormous sum for the time. Industrial entrepreneurs and the rest of Turin's wealthy upper-classes continued to reside in the historic center of the city in neighborhoods that, for many contemporary observers, seemed largely untouched by the bloody conflict. The popular image of the historical center as an exclusive area, where the rich and the powerful spent their unearned profits on extravagant luxuries while the common folks suffered and sacrificed, fueled discontent and resentment in the city's working-class communities.

The historic center, in reality, also provided more modest housing for Turin's lower middle-classes, who, unlike their entrepreneurial neighbors, found themselves in difficult material and psychological straits as the war progressed. Between 1914 and 1918, the cost of living in the city tripled. Soaring inflation hit white-collar employees, small shopkeepers, and skilled artisans especially hard, since they lacked the means to protect themselves from the rapidly rising prices for basic necessities. The resulting resentments of the lower-middle classes were exploited by nationalist propagandists who attributed their difficulties to the supposedly excessive salary hikes, wasteful spending habits, and draft-dodging tendencies of the industrial workers.

In fact, huge profit margins in the war industries did make it relatively easy for some employers to grant generous monetary concessions to their workers and to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the unions. The automobile manufacturers, for example, agreed to increases of 50 to 75%, a minimum wage, and higher rates for overtime, night, and holiday work, in addition to a weekly contribution to the Fiom for the families of workers drafted into the army. Such concessions, however, did not lead to the enrichment of Turin's working class during the war years. On the contrary, wage hikes failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living, so that the real incomes of most industrial workers actually fell between 1914 and 1918. To make matters worse, larger pay packets came at the price of greatly accelerated work rhythms and intensified exploitation in the war industries. The military status of many factories also meant eighty to one-hundred-hour workweeks and rigid discipline with fines and other penalties for absenteeism or insubordination in the workplace.

The harsher conditions in the factories proved especially difficult for the newer elements of the industrial workforce, whose ranks doubled in size and whose composition underwent important changes after 1915. Despite draft exemptions for workers in strategic plants, the enormous demand for labor in the booming war industries attracted unprecedented numbers of women, teenagers, and the elderly as well as a large contingent of immigrants from other regions, Austrian prisoners of war, and colonial laborers recruited from Libya. None of these groups had had much prior exposure to the regimentation and pace of assembly line work, let alone under the conditions of wartime production. As a consequence, the unfamiliar and stressful work routine provoked mounting discomfort and discontent in the new labor force. Common hardships in the factories magnified the sense of isolation and shared grievances of workers who were already cut off from the rest of the population in their own neighborhoods on the periphery of the city. Here in these working class ghettos, immigrants, in particular, faced the terrible overcrowding, high rents, and inadequate services. These conditions made these neighborhoods a fertile recruiting ground for the extreme left of the Socialist party whose revolutionary pacifist propaganda found a sympathetic audience there.

Turin became the focal point of a more pervasive reaction on the Italian home front in 1917 against the hardships and suffering imposed by the war. Already in the spring of that year, soaring inflation and shortages of basic necessities sparked protests in a number of areas of northern Italy. Popular frustrations came to a head in Turin at the end of the summer, largely because of the municipal government's inability to solve acute problems of food provisioning. As a result, a growing population of workers found themselves having to wait in longer lines to pay higher prices for smaller rations of poorer quality food than their compatriots elsewhere in the country. These circumstances combined with simmering resentment over harsh working conditions, long hours, and iron discipline in the factories to ignite the explosive situation in the Piedmontese capital.

After a visit from Russian representatives sparked anti-war demonstrations in the middle of August, Turin erupted in violence in the last week of the month when another shortage of grain forced the city's bakeries to close temporarily. Massive public protests rapidly escalated into anti-war marches and a major insurrection as factories closed down and public transport halted. Despite efforts by moderate union leaders and socialist organizers to calm the situation, the crowds sacked stores, assaulted police stations, and erected barricades in working class neigh-

borhoods. The inability of the local police force to bring the city under control forced the government to call in the army, which employed tanks and machine guns first to repel efforts by workers to occupy the center of the city and then to restore order in the periphery. The city did not return to normal until the last few days of August and then only at the price of fifty deaths, hundreds of wounded, and more than 800 arrests. The Turin insurrection not only marked the high point of wartime revolutionary unrest, but was one of the most violent labor conflicts in Italian history.

The events of August 1917 further polarized social relations and political life in the city during the last year of the war. While the anti-war cause enjoyed strong support within the working classes and the Socialist party, it aroused little enthusiasm among the local middle classes. They responded instead to patriotic appeals and nationalist initiatives especially after the military disaster of Caporetto in the fall of 1917, when the Austrians occupied most of the region of Veneto and took 300,000 Italian soldiers as prisoners. In the wake of the worker insurrection and Caporetto, prominent conservative leaders in Turin founded the National Alliance, which joined with a number of other nationalist groups and *La Gazzetta del Popolo* to mobilize support for the war effort and against the supposed defeatism and treasonous subversion of the "internal enemies" on the socialist left. These pro-war groups made their presence felt in the city by organizing and promoting public participation in a series of patriotic events such as the ceremony of the "oath for victory" in the summer of 1918.

The return of peace late in the fall of 1918 did not put an end to the political conflict in Turin. Indeed, the divergent responses of the right and left to news of the armistice ending World War I revealed the deep-seated political and social divisions within the city. Nationalists and interventionists dominated the first victory celebrations in the Piedmontese capital at the beginning of November. Predictably, their rallies glorified patriotic values and paid homage to the monarchy, army, and the idea of territorial expansion of the victorious Italian nation. A very different sort of celebration took place the following day, when thousands of workers from the periphery marched to the center of the city to express their joy over the end of hostilities, but also to show their support for a "people's peace", the communist revolution in Russia, amnesty for political prisoners, and an immediate end to military discipline in the industry. Union and socialist party leaders also used the rallies to advance an ambitious post-war agenda of labor reforms that included the eight-hour day and management's recognition of workers councils in in-

dustry. Local industrialists were quick to recognize the likelihood of bitter labor conflicts ahead. As Agnelli informed his board of directors at the time, "the transition from the state of war to that of peace" in Turin promised to be one fraught with enormous risks and challenges.

4. *The Post-War Crisis in Turin.*

The end of World War I had immediate repercussions throughout Italy, for in no other victorious country were public expectations of sweeping change so pronounced and widespread. Italians from every walk of life came to see broad political and social change as an inevitable feature of the world emerging from the war. The economic realities of post-war Italy, however, precluded even the partial satisfaction of popular expectations. The war had taken a heavy toll on the economy: the pattern of industry had been distorted, the land exhausted, the balance of trade disrupted, and the railroad system allowed to deteriorate seriously.

The central role of the war industries in Turin's economy virtually guaranteed that the city would become a storm center of popular unrest and revolutionary agitation on the Italian peninsula after November 1918. Massive layoffs hit workers in the engineering and machine sectors as companies struggled to adapt to peacetime market conditions. Repercussions from the decision of Fiat, in particular, to dismiss 8,000 workers were felt throughout the city, since the automotive giant provided the model for other local enterprises. As a consequence, unemployment in Turin rose steadily before peaking in July 1919. To make matters worse, wartime inflationary trends accelerated after the armistice, eroding the living standards of workers and the lower middle classes. Prices, which had reached 300% of their pre-war levels in 1918, climbed to 465% by the end of 1920. Not surprisingly then, Turin became a major arena of the spontaneous cost-of-living riots that swept the country in the six months after the armistice.

In the first two years of the post-war era, the revolutionary wing of the Socialist movement was the chief beneficiary of the difficult economic situation in the city. The strength of the left became evident already in June 1919 when a general strike, called to commemorate the murder of the revolutionary leader, Rosa Luxemburg, shut down the city. Some 20,000 demonstrators came out into the streets where they clashed with the police in the center. More importantly, the Socialist party achieved impressive results in the parliamentary elections of No-

vember 1919. On the national level, the Socialists, who had run on an explicitly anti-war platform, emerged as the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies, the elected lower house of the Italian parliament. The left made an especially strong showing in Turin, where it won 62.8% of the vote, the second highest total of any city in the country.

In the wake of the elections, the political battleground in the Piedmontese capital shifted to the factories and the campaign to impose worker self-management in the engineering and automotive industries. As the home base of these industries, Turin provided a particularly favorable terrain for such an initiative, which capitalized on widespread worker dissatisfaction with the old unions and resentment of authoritarian discipline in the factories. An alliance between the most politically aware and technically qualified labor force in the country and an imaginative group of militant Marxist intellectuals associated with Antonio Gramsci and his journal, *Ordine Nuovo*, pushed Turin to the forefront of the country's revolutionary movement. Gramsci and his local collaborators embraced the idea of "factory councils" in early 1919 as Italian equivalents to the Russian Soviets that would give the workers a direct role in the running of the factories and prepare them for an eventual revolutionary seizure of power.

While the factory council movement enjoyed enthusiastic support among the rank and file in the city, it encountered resistance from a variety of directions. To begin with, the Ordine Nuovo group faced opposition from the national union establishment, whose leadership it challenged, as well as from moderate elements in the Socialist party, alarmed by its revolutionary aspirations. At the same time, the pre-eminent role of Turin in the movement aroused the municipal jealousies of labor groups in other Italian cities, making them reluctant to support Gramsci's initiatives. Above all, the factory councils aroused the fiercest opposition from Turin's industrialists, who viewed them as an unacceptable infringement on managerial prerogatives and began to organize a broad employer front against them.

In this setting, the decisive confrontation between organized capital and labor in post-war Italy took place in Turin during the spring of 1920. In mid-March, the issue of the factory councils triggered a series of conflicts in the engineering and automobile sectors that escalated into a massive general strike in April. At its peak, the strike involved half a million workers and threatened to paralyze the city as transportation and other public-service employees walked off the job. For their part, local industrialists seized the occasion to try to restrict, if not eliminate, the factory councils in the workplace. Accordingly, they responded to

the strike by preparing for a major shutdown of their plants and by subsidizing groups of volunteers to preserve order in the city and maintain vital municipal services. Despite strong mass support in the Piedmontese capital, the workers' cause suffered decisive setback when the leadership of the national labor movement and the Socialist party refused to extend the general strike to the rest of the country. With the local workers isolated from their comrades in rest of Italy, the confrontation ended the third week of April with a resounding defeat for the factory council movement.

The general strike of April in Turin prefigured a larger national confrontation in the fall of 1920. This time around the industrial leaders provoked the conflict with their steadfast refusal to grant any wage concessions to the unions. When managers ordered a lockout in one plant in Milan, it sparked a wave of factory occupations in early September that rapidly spread throughout Italy and eventually involved half a million workers. Once again the movement assumed its most massive and militant form in Turin, where 150,000 took part, red guards maintained discipline in the plants, and factory councils attempted to maintain production. As in the spring, divisions within the labor movement and Socialist party at the national level left the revolutionary vanguard in Turin isolated. Pressure from the government induced the industrialists make a few token concessions and strikers began to leave the factories in late September.

The final settlement gave industrial workers in Turin and elsewhere modest wage increases and thus the appearance of a victory, but the settlement was clearly a psychological defeat, since it fell far short of the sweeping social revolution they had come to expect. Disillusionment and dissension replaced the enthusiasm and militancy within the ranks of the Turin's labor movement. The onset of a new recession late in the fall of 1920, with its accompanying layoffs and weakened bargaining power for the unions further demoralized the workers. Turin, where the ranks of the jobless quintupled, was the city hit hardest by unemployment in the country during 1921. Employers took advantage of the new situation to cut payrolls, fire labor militants, and restore managerial authority in the factories. The inconclusive outcome of the strikes also sharpened ideological divisions within the Socialist party that culminated in January 1921, when Gramsci and other leaders of the extreme left withdrew to form the Communist party. The shift in political momentum from the left to the right was already evident in the municipal elections of November 1920. In Turin, an anti-communist coalition of moderate liberals and Catholics, with the support of the Industrial League,

capitalized on a middle-class backlash as well as low voter turnout to recapture control of city hall.

5. *The Fascist Conquest of Turin*.

While Turin was one of a principal hotbed of revolutionary agitation and labor militancy in Italy during the two "red years" immediately after World War I, the city played a decidedly marginal role in the rise and triumph of Fascism on the national level between 1921 and 1925. In the aftermath of the factory occupations and agricultural strikes of 1920, the new willingness of Italy's social and economic elites to experiment with violent, extralegal remedies for the ills of the "red tyranny" gave Mussolini's small extremist movement a renewed lease on life as the vanguard of a patriotic and class reaction against Socialism. From its original bases in Bologna and Ferrara, provincial Fascism, with its armed squads and punitive expeditions, spread rapidly to other zones of northern and central Italy. Within the span of a few months, this "chaotic ensemble of local reactions" propelled Fascism to political prominence on the national level.

Mussolini's movement met with a considerably less enthusiastic reception in Turin. The first branch or *fascio* in the city was founded in the spring of 1919 by the typographer and ex-anarchist, Mario Gioda and a group of pro-war interventionists, but it attracted less than a hundred members and did little more than distribute anti-socialist propaganda leaflets. The visibility of the local Fascists increased in the spring of 1921 when they sacked and burned the Chamber of Labor and Cesare Maria De Vecchi, a pro-monarchist with solid connections to the military authorities, court and aristocratic circles, assumed an increasingly dominant role in the organization. From the outset, two leaders embodied the deep social and political cleavages within Turinese Fascism between De Vecchi's conservative, militarist faction and a more populist, anti-establishment faction headed by Gioda. Although De Vecchi quickly moved into the inner circles of the Fascist leadership at the national level, the local organization enjoyed little success. Despite the growing prominence of Mussolini's movement in Rome and elsewhere in Italy by 1922, the Turinese fascio remained only a bit player on the municipal political scene, with no more than 580 members in a city of half a million people on the eve of the March on Rome.

Ironically, it was the very success of the Turin's industrial leaders in defeating the revolutionary challenge from the left in 1920 that helped

to limit the appeal of Fascism in the Piedmontese capital. In contrast to the commercial farmers and landowners of the Po Valley, the local industrialists were able to rely on their own strength and organizational resources rather than external force of Fascist punitive squads to achieve victory over the Socialist labor movement. Without any real threat of communist revolution on the horizon after 1920, many of them were more interested in re-establishing harmonious relations with their skilled labor force than in promoting another extremist group. In fact, some industrial leaders worried that the violent excesses of the undisciplined squads might provoke a resurgence of worker militancy and thereby undo their hard-won success. Although the Turinese fascio took part in a coalition of non-socialist parties, the National Bloc, in the parliamentary elections of 1921, it did so as a decidedly junior partner of the conservative and nationalist right. The outcome of the voting marked another defeat for a now divided left in the city and a personal triumph for De Vecchi, who was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. These results, however, did little to bolster the popularity or political clout of the Turinese fascio, which remained isolated in a political no man's land between a solidly leftist working class and confident moderate conservative industrial and political establishment when Mussolini assumed governmental power at the end of October 1922.

Local Fascists vented their anger and frustration over their marginal status in the city two months after the March on Rome during the so-called "Massacre of Turin", an event that briefly refocused national attention on the Piedmontese capital. For three days in mid-December 1922, the city became the scene of indiscriminate violence by roaming gangs of armed black shirts, who rampaged through working-class neighborhoods, sacking socialist and union offices and assaulting anyone whom they deemed to be a communist or a subversive. By the time the situation returned to normal, the Fascist raids were responsible for eleven to twenty deaths, including a communist municipal councilor, and another thirty wounded. Such violence quickly made Turin a national *cause célèbre*, alarming Fascism's conservative allies at court and in the government, the army, and the business community who expected Mussolini to restore order and curb the illegal excesses of the squads. To placate public opinion, the Fascist party leadership disbanded and reconstituted the local fascio in January 1923 and dismissed De Vecchi five months later after he had threatened Agnelli. Nonetheless, the Fascist party organization in the city continued to be beset by factional rivalries and frequent changes of leadership in the following years.

The violence and instability of the Turinese Fascist movement re-

flected in turn the larger difficulties facing Mussolini's regime in its efforts to establish its authority in the northern industrial center. What most distinguished the situation in Turin from that elsewhere in Italy was the presence of a large industrial working class, which remained tenaciously loyal to many of its old leftist cultural traditions and institutions after the March on Rome. This intractable social reality created a convergence of interests between the Fascist leader and the captains of industry that favored cooperation between the two at the expense of the local party. As the head of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli became the key figure in this de facto alliance. After the March on Rome, Agnelli developed a direct and privileged relationship with Mussolini that allowed him to bypass the Turinese fascists. As a result, the industrial entrepreneur enjoyed an unparalleled degree of independence in the running of his factories and in the direction of the city's leading newspaper, *La Stampa*, which he purchased in 1920s, even as the country evolved into a dictatorship. In exchange for concessions to Agnelli and his industrial colleagues on economic and labor issues, the Fascist leader received valuable financial support from the Industrial League of Turin in the parliamentary elections of 1924. Local industrialists also refused to abandon Mussolini after the brutal murder of the Socialist deputy, Giacomo Matteotti by Fascist thugs in the summer of that year threatened to bring down his government. The Industrial League called on the government to restore law and order by "crushing" the violent extremists within its ranks, but carefully exempted the Duce from responsibility in the crime.

Mussolini's decision to eliminate the parliamentary system and to impose an authoritarian dictatorship on Italy in 1925 did not fundamentally alter this set of understandings and compromises between Fascism and Turin's industrial elite. Thus, political stabilization in the Piedmontese capital in the late '20s came largely at the expense of the party's "old guard". Troublesome Fascist unionists and violent extremists were replaced by men like Count Carlo Nicolis di Robilant, who enjoyed the confidence of the local propertied classes. Of course, the defeat of party militants did not mean that the industrialists could dictate policy to Mussolini as they discovered in 1926 when the Duce imposed a high re-evaluation of the Italian lira against the wishes of the business community. Nevertheless, the industrial leadership managed to carve out a remarkably independent position of power within the ostensibly totalitarian regime that allowed them to expand their own private power at the expense of the workforce and Fascism's social welfare initiatives.

6. *Turin Under Fascism*.

Nevertheless, the transformation of Italy's constitutional parliamentary democracy into a full-fledged Fascist dictatorship did impose profound changes on the political routines and rituals of the city after 1925. New laws banned all opposition parties, unions, and associations. Other measures replaced elected mayors with state appointed officials and expanded the powers of the prefects over provincial life. The authorities devoted special attention to Turin's industrial workforce. Not only did they close their old socialist and union circles, but they replaced them with new mass organizations that promoted the goals and values of the regime.

The ensuing decade of Fascist rule did not alter, however, a number of long-term economic and demographic trends in the Piedmontese capital. During the inter-war years, the engineering, chemical, and electrical sectors all continued to expand, supplanting textiles, clothing, wool and leather as the leading local industries. Economic specialization and concentration also proceeded a pace, especially in the automobile industry, where Fiat came to enjoy a virtual monopoly of production and provided employment for roughly a third of the industrial workforce in the city by 1939. The Great Depression of the early 1930s actually bolstered the position of Fiat and the automobile industry as the center of economic power in Turin by bankrupting or forcing the restructuring of the other three industrial giants in the city: the telecommunications firm, Sip, Riccardo Gualino's diversified conglomerate, Snia, and the large holding company Italgas. A similar pattern of concentration occurred in the banking sector, where two institutions with close ties to Fiat, the Cassa di Risparmio and the Istituto San Paolo, came out of the depression years as the pillars of the regional credit system.

Despite the efforts of the Fascist regime to block migration from the countryside to the cities, Turin's population also continued to grow, rising from half a million in 1920 to nearly 700,000 by 1939. Immigration continued to account for most of the demographic expansion, since the city had the lowest birthrate among Italy's large urban centers. At first, the bulk of these new arrivals came from the surrounding region of Piedmont, but by the late 1930s, there were sizable communities of immigrants from other northern regions as well as from the south in Turin. Much as their predecessors, they settled in the working-class neighborhoods, which steadily expanded. As a consequence, demographic growth reinforced patterns of residential segregation in the city with the work-

ers on the periphery and the wealthy and middle-classes in the center and foothills. The increasing presence of folks from distant regions, however, did erode the old cultural unity and social solidarity of the pre-fascist working-class communities.

On the whole, the Fascist regime did not provide into any real improvements in the living standards for the great majority of Turin's citizens, although some social groups suffered more than others during the 1930s. Chronic problems of overcrowding, high rents, and inadequate basic services persisted throughout the inter-war years. Predictably, these conditions hit worker families the hardest. Nearly three quarters of these families lived in residences of one to two rooms; less than one percent had a bathroom and only four percent had modern heating. The Great Depression compounded the hardships of the industrial labor force by enlarging the ranks of the unemployed, by slashing hours of work, and by reducing wages and real incomes, which did not rise again until 1939-40 and then only briefly. While the large number of business failures and falling incomes also hit the lower-middle classes as well, these social groups and the upper ranks of skilled industrial workers benefited from Fascist policies and employer initiatives that assured them preferential treatment, economic aid, and improvements in social status. The regime's housing initiatives in the city, for instance, were designed, located, and priced to favor shopkeepers, artisans, and white-collar employees, whose numbers swelled with the expansion of governmental and corporate bureaucracies during the inter-war years. Only in the late-1930s did local authorities begin to construct inexpensive public housing in the working-class areas on the periphery.

Mussolini's government did introduce new social and cultural programs to promote national consciousness, rally mass support for Fascism, and undermine older class and provincial loyalties by regrouping people on the basis of sex, age, activity, and social group. State-sponsored organizations like the Opera Nazionale Balilla, for young people, the National Institute for Maternity and Infancy, and the National After-Work Foundation (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro) provided services and activities to tens of thousands of local residents. At the same time, Fascism attempted to leave its physical imprint on the city. In addition to the expansion and renovation of Via Roma, a principal avenue in the heart of the city, the regime oversaw the construction of five new bridges, two hospitals, a new stadium, the Turin-Milan highway, and a number of other buildings that provided headquarters for various Fascist organizations. Such initiatives, in tandem with the easing of the economic crisis and the success of public works projects in reducing unemployment, helped to improve the image of the regime in Turin and favored

its tacit acceptance by a large portion of the population by the mid-1930s, at least according to local police reports.

Nevertheless, public support for Mussolini and Fascism remained considerably more shallow and tenuous in the Piedmontese capital than elsewhere on the Italian peninsula. The regime found its solidest base of support among the city's lower middle classes, especially those employed in the public sector or in the corporate bureaucracy of Fiat, who saw their incomes rise during the inter-war era. These groups provided the most enthusiastic and committed participants in the organizational activities and public ceremonies of the Fascist party and its affiliated organizations. Mussolini had considerably less success capturing the hearts and minds of Turin's industrial workers. The failure of his regime to maintain, let alone improve, their standard of living limited its appeal in the neighborhoods on the periphery of the city. While the local Fascist labor organizations, or syndicates, could claim nearly 230,000 card-carrying members by 1940, contemporary observers all agreed that worker participation in them remained perfunctory at best. Deprived of independent representation and the right to strike, the rank and file had no effective means of protecting their jobs, working conditions, and wages. As a result, their attitudes toward Fascism and its institutions oscillated between hostility, if not rebelliousness, on the one hand and indifference and sullen resignation on the other. The workers of Fiat, for instance, gave Mussolini a coolly silent reception, when he came to the Piedmontese capital in the late 1930s to celebrate the opening of the company's huge new Mirafiori plant.

Although the regime encountered comparable attitudes in other urban centers of the north, its difficulties were compounded in Turin by the competition from industrial giants like Fiat, which offered its workers wage packages, leisure-time perks, and other benefits that the Fascist syndicates or party could not possible match. Consequently, the local population continued to view Agnelli as the real boss in Turin, a man whose power and prestige seemingly permitted him to negotiate as an equal with Mussolini. Even the city's industrial elite, who were among the chief beneficiaries of the regime's economic and social policies, provided at best only what a frustrated Mussolini described as "a purely formal commitment" to the Fascist order.

The dictator encountered similar difficulties in his efforts to win over the luminaries of Turin's culture and intellectual life. A few prominent figures like Vittorio Cian and Curzio Malaparte migrated over to Fascism from the Nationalist movement, but on the whole the local party was not able to develop a significant group of intellectuals or to pro-

duce much scholarship, art, or literature of note. Throughout the 1920s, the University of Turin remained an arena of anti-fascist resistance by some professors and students. The more aggressive intervention of the regime within the university the following decade accelerated the process of voluntary or forced submission to Fascism, but faculty support remained pro forma and pockets of resistance persisted, largely around issues of autonomy of scholarly pursuits and teaching. Likewise, the Polytechnic Institute of Turin, the toughest engineering school in Italy, increased its close ties with Fiat and the other larger firms in the city during the inter-war years so that its faculty could carry out their work with a minimum of political interference. Outside the academic institutions, the Fascist regime had equally little success in winning over a younger generation of local intellectuals and artists like Giulio Einaudi, Leone Ginzburg, Cesare Pavese, Norberto Bobbio, and Carlo Levi, many of whom would go on to play prominent roles in Italy's cultural life after 1945. While few of these men became active anti-fascists in the 1930s, they did remain mostly "afascists", influenced more by liberal mentors such as Piero Gobetti and Lionello Venturi than by Mussolini and the cultural arbiters of the dictatorship.

By the late 1930s, the fragile public support enjoyed by Fascism in Turin gave way to mounting distrust, fear, and hostility. As one government official conceded on the eve of World War II, "one has the sensation of finding oneself in a city that is not Fascist". Mussolini's shift to an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, his costly wars in Ethiopia and Spain, his emerging alliance with Hitler, his adoption of anti-semitic measures, and his increasingly harsh "anti-bourgeois" rhetoric alienated most segments of Turinese society. Industrial leaders began to voice their concern over the economic and financial consequences of the Duce's new course in domestic and foreign policy. Fear of the ambitions of German industry, mounting tax burdens, and disrupted commercial relations led Agnelli and other local entrepreneurs to join with the monarchy and the Vatican in counseling against Italian military entanglements with Nazi Germany. Mussolini's reluctant decision to remain neutral when Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939 met with widespread relief in the Piedmontese capital. The aging dictator's determination to bring his country into the war alongside his Nazi ally in the summer of the following year made such relief short-lived. After nearly two decades of collaboration with Mussolini, the captains of industry, the monarchy, and the Catholic Church were reluctant to risk the stability of the entire regime and their own established positions within it by provoking a confrontation with the Duce over the

war. Moreover, after Nazi Germany's rapid military advance in the west during the late spring of 1940, Fascism's principal institutional allies came to accept the idea of a war that promised to be very brief, require few sacrifices, and provide easy gains, as long as Italy did not "arrive late". On June 10, 1940, Mussolini made the official announcement from the balcony of his office in Rome that Fascist Italy was "going to war against the plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the west".

7. *The Experience of Total War in Turin.*

From the first day of Italy's involvement in World War II, nothing seemed to work out according to Mussolini's expectations. Two hours before the formal declaration, the British navy attacked an Italian submarine; the following day Allied airplanes began a bombing campaign on Italy's northern industrial cities. The Fascists' invasion of southern France began late and encountered strong resistance, so that Mussolini had little leverage in the discussions between France and Germany to reach a peace settlement. To make matters worse, the Duce's short, easy war did not materialize as he had expected when the confrontation between the English and German air forces in the battle of Britain failed to produce a decisive Nazi victory in the fall of 1940. Likewise, Fascist pretensions to rule the Mediterranean suffered a major setback in November when the British fleet launched a surprise attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto. The decision to invade Greece late in the previous month marked the first in a series of unmitigated military disasters for the dictator. The humiliating defeats on the battlefield and at sea brutally exposed to public view the fundamental failures of organization and leadership within the Fascist regime.

Beginning with the opening night of Italy's involvement, when Allied air raids killed seventeen and wounded another forty, the people of Turin experienced first hand the full impact of total war in the form of bombs, blackouts, hunger, cold and terror. The war from the air gradually intensified after the summer of 1940. In the first two years of the war, Turin was subjected to fourteen bombing raids, mostly at night time and with limited destruction and death. From the fall of 1942 to the summer of 1943, however, the raids increased in number, scale, and intensity. On the night of July 13, 1943 for instance, over seven hundred tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on the city, resulting in the death of nearly 800 and the wounding of more than 900 others. As a consequence of the bombing, one-third of the buildings in the city had been destroyed by the fall of 1943.

The traditional scourges of hunger and cold accompanied the terror, death, and destruction of the air raids as ingredients of everyday life. The efforts of Fascist authorities to impose rationing and wage-price controls failed to stem rising prices or avoid shortages of rationed commodities. A flourishing black market emerged and the cost of living in the city more than doubled in the first three years of the war. Even when rations were available, they were woefully inadequate, since the government set a limit of only 819 calories per person or one-third of the daily requirement. By 1942, roughly 40% of the families in the city suffered from some form of malnutrition. Energy shortages compounded the misery of the urban population by limiting the availability of heating during Turin's harsh winters and by bringing public transportation to a virtual halt. Already in the winter of 1940-41, government decrees limited heating in private residences to a maximum temperature of 16 degrees centigrade, a figure that was steadily reduced in the years that followed. Not surprisingly, the combination of the air raids, hunger and cold led people to abandon the city in droves, so that Turin had lost nearly half its population by the beginning of July 1943.

In the face of mounting military defeats abroad and hardships at home, the Fascist dictatorship began to unravel. Mussolini's stubborn refusal to consider a separate peace with the Allies magnified popular discontent. Once again Turin's industrial workers took the lead in acting on this discontent in the spring of 1943. A wave of spontaneous strikes in the city and Milan in March, the first independent working-class demonstrations in nearly two decades, signaled not only the re-emergence of labor militancy and political activism, but also the regime's rapidly eroding authority. Developments in Turin aroused the alarm of the Duce's old allies in the monarchy, the Vatican, and business community and bolstered their determination to find a solution that would extract Italy from the war and forestall a revolutionary social crisis on the peninsula. Opposition to the isolated and depressed Mussolini also grew within the Fascist party itself as the summer of 1943 approached. The landing of Anglo-American forces in Sicily, the bombing of Rome, and the prospect of an Allied invasion of the mainland set in motion events that led to the fall of Fascist regime in July. Backed by a coalition of moderate Fascists and the military establishment, on July 25 the king, Victor Emanuel III, removed Mussolini as head of the government and replaced him with General Pietro Badoglio, former commander-in-chief of the Italian armed forces. After Mussolini's ouster and arrest, the Fascist regime seemed to disappear with barely a whimper.

The fall of dictatorship, however, did not bring much of a respite to

the people of Turin. On the contrary, the years between 1943 and 1945 represented the worst period of World War II for the local population. The new government's delay in accepting the Allies' demand for unconditional surrender allowed Hitler to rush military reinforcements on to the peninsula. When Badoglio officially announced Italy's surrender and Allied forces landed on the southern mainland in early September 1943, the Nazis swiftly took control of Piedmont and of most of the country north of the battlefront, forcing the king and his prime minister to abandon Rome and retreat to the south. In the same month, Hitler rescued Mussolini from prison and installed him as the nominal leader of a German-sponsored Fascist state, the Italian Social Republic, with its base in the town of Salò, north of Milan.

The new regime enjoyed even less support than its predecessor in Turin. While the reconstituted Fascist party, the Republican Fascist Party (Pfr), claimed a membership of 11,000 in the city in mid-1944, no more than 500 were actively involved. The overwhelming majority of the people, including industrialists and workers, turned a cold shoulder to the new party. The political isolation of the Pfr in the Piedmontese capital encouraged its extremist tendencies as it evolved into a loose collection of violent paramilitary groups. Armed conflicts between the Pfr militias and a growing resistance movement only accentuated the misery of the city's residents caused by extreme shortages of food and energy. Turin's small but remarkably accomplished Jewish community suffered most directly the horrors of the Nazi occupation. After September 1943, they had little choice but to escape, hide or fight. The decision of the Republic of Salò to arrest and intern all Italian Jews in November led to the deportation of 800 local Jews, half of whom subsequently perished in concentration camps.

The inability of civil authorities to manage the war crisis in Turin forced the local residents to rely increasingly on the leading non-governmental institutions of the city, Fiat and the Catholic Church. Even before the summer of 1943, the automotive giant had developed its own private social welfare system to provide its employees with basic necessities such as food, wood, and clothing. The company also maintained the size of its workforce and payroll even as it cut back on production. After September 1943, Agnelli and Fiat attempted a difficult balancing act, collaborating with the Nazi authorities to protect the plants and jobs at the same time that they gave clandestine support to the resistance movement and established ties with the Italian government in the south. Catholic charitable organizations helped fill the void left by the disintegration of the Fascist regime by providing assistance to the needy,

while the local clergy offered sanctuary to Allied soldiers, wounded partisans, and Jews. Local Catholic officials also worked closely with the management of Fiat to create "a religious and morally healthy environment in the daily workplace".

At the same time, the power vacuum created by the disintegration of the Fascist regime allowed the re-emergence of political activity. A number of young liberal anti-fascists, for instance, joined with the survivors of older clandestine organizations to launch the Turinese Party of Action in the summer of 1942, while in the fall a network of Catholic friends founded the local Christian Democratic organization. Above all, the tightly disciplined and ideological motivated Italian Communist party enjoyed the greatest success in Turin during the war years, especially among the industrial workers. The Communists not only capitalized on the heroic myths of the Russian Revolution and the Red Army, but also won converts by strongly supporting worker economic demands, collaborating with other non-fascist parties, and supporting national reconstruction over violent revolution.

These new political forces had little opportunity to pursue any normal activities in the chaotic months between the fall of Mussolini and the armistice with the Allies. They were certainly not prepared to handle the situation created after September 8, by the disintegration of the Italian army and collapse of the municipal government. In the absence of any clear direction from Rome, the local military commander handed over the city to the Germans two days later. In this context, Turin's anti-fascist parties constructed a role for themselves as the political and military leaders of the armed resistance against the Nazis and the Republic of Salò over the following eighteen months. Although the Committee of National Liberation provided a degree of coordination among the various political forces, each party formed its own partisan bands in the surrounding mountains and countryside. Reflecting their strong popular base, the Communist "Garibaldi" units emerged as the largest of these bands with some 14,600 fighters operating by the beginning of 1945. As the Anglo-American forces swept up the peninsula and the military position of the German army rapidly deteriorated, the ranks of the Piedmontese resistance movement swelled in the spring. In anticipation of the end of the war, the partisans joined with the local population to launch a week-long insurrection that finally liberated the city on April 30, 1945. As one local observer subsequently recalled, when the Allied troops arrived in Turin a few days later, they found a city, in which "the streets were clean, the trams were circulating, the civic guards were at their posts, [and] the people were well-dressed".

Chapter x

Triumph and Decline of Italy's Industrial Capital. Turin since 1945

1. *Turin in the Aftermath of War.*

In April 1945, few residents of Piedmont's war-torn capital could have anticipated the dramatic changes that would take place in their city over the next half-century. During these decades, Turin would be in the forefront of an extraordinary process of global transformation that first elevated the city to the pinnacle of Italy's industrial economy, before imposing on it a new and uncertain identity as a post-industrial metropolis. As the embodiment of the Italian "economic miracle", Turin experienced more directly than other urban centers on the peninsula both the dizzying effects of accelerated industrial development and the shocks produced by the subsequent shift of manufacturing to new areas of the globe.

At the end of World War II, the local population had more immediate and pressing concerns that allowed them little time or energy to speculate about the future. After four years of air raids, foreign occupation, and partisan strife, the city faced the daunting challenges of survival, recovery, and reconstruction. From the outset, the Allied bombing campaign had hit Turin with particular force. By the end of the war, nearly two-fifths of the housing stock had either been destroyed or damaged, disrupting public services and leaving large numbers of families homeless. The same years saw a drop in population due to falling marriage and birth rates and a predictable increase in civilian and military casualties under wartime conditions. To make matters worse, local authorities had to contend with food shortages, inflation, a thriving black market, and a general climate of lawlessness that had flourished especially after the summer of 1943. Although Turin's manufacturing plants came out of the conflict with surprisingly limited damage, shortages of raw materials and disrupted markets delayed the recovery in industrial production. A year after the war, output still remained at half of its prewar levels. Low levels of production in turn meant that unemployment rates continued to be dangerously high. More than a year after the war,

there were 53,000 workers without jobs; in June 1948 the ranks of the unemployed had risen to 62,000.

At the same time, the experience of universal wartime hardships and suffering also helped to forge a new sense of community among Turin's residents that seemed to bridge the old divisions of class, culture, and neighborhood. In the immediate post-war years, this community found expression in a broad alliance of anti-fascist forces, in which the leftist workers collaborated with the democratic middle classes and the industrial elite in a joint effort to rebuild their city. The leading role played by the Communist and Socialist partisans in the patriotic wartime resistance to the Nazis initially assured their parties a prominent position in city government, the unions, and the factories. In the municipal elections in November 1946, the first under the new Italian Republic, the two principal Marxist parties prevailed, capturing 60% of the vote. Since Turin was the largest municipality in the country to be led by a "popular front" administration, the city became a showcase and testing ground for the reform projects of the Italian left. The unity of anti-fascist forces also carried over to the labor movement, with workers belonging to the Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties collaborating in pursuit of improved wages and work conditions in the factories. A similar optimism affected many of Turin's leading intellectuals, including a number of former Fascist fellow travelers, who came out of the years of dictatorship and war with the goal of creating a new democratic culture accessible to the masses.

A mix of immediate political vulnerability and long range economic considerations dictated that the management of the most powerful private institution and principal employer in the city, Fiat, cooperate with its union adversaries in the immediate post-war years. The victorious partisan forces had opened investigations of Giovanni Agnelli, who died at the end of 1945, and his designated successor at the helm of Fiat, Vittorio Valletta, for their wartime dealings with the Nazis, but both were eventually cleared and the latter regained his position early in 1946. In this delicate situation, Valletta focused on unemployment as the most immediate threat both to the economic future of the company and to the larger social and political order in Italy. Accordingly, he abandoned the standard market criteria in his hiring policies to ensure that Fiat's workforce remained stable at 64,500 throughout 1946. Similar concerns led the new Ceo to collaborate with elected internal factory committees, dominated by the parties of the left, in the administration of the company's benefits program. Such collaboration ensured that workers at Fiat continued to receive higher wages than those in other firms, good

health care coverage and other special benefits. Valletta also displayed a willingness to work with labor representatives on the management councils that the anti-fascist parties had introduced in the spring of 1945 to handle difficult personnel decisions, maintain discipline on the shop floor, and ensure the smooth functioning of production during the period of reconstruction.

It soon became evident that Turin's local leftist government lacked the necessary resources and authority to rebuild the war-ravaged city, create affordable housing for its homeless, and restore fundamental public services in a timely fashion. The slow pace of economic recovery in the first two years after the war hampered its efforts to deal with the problems of unemployment and inflation in the city. Moreover, the failure of the central government in Rome to pass legislation allowing the municipalities to introduce a local progressive income tax made matters worse, since it forced city administrators to rely on inadequate and regressive consumer taxes that hit the working poor hardest. The Communists and Socialists had no more success in their efforts to establish a comprehensive city plan to regulate the reconstruction and future expansion of the city in the interests of the general public. Above all, they lacked the political will to resist pressures from powerful real estate interests and the building-trades unions. Together the two allies exploited the post-war housing shortage and high levels of unemployment in the city to obstruct implementation of any town planning scheme and to engage in the speculative development of private housing with few rules or governmental oversight.

The Communist-Socialist coalition managed to hold on to Turin's municipal council until early in the 1950s, but in the years after 1947 the two parties governed in a dramatically altered international and domestic political environment. The onset of the Cold War brought to an end the brief era of anti-fascist cooperation both in government and in the factories. Collaborative arrangements gave way to renewed political conflict and escalating confrontations in the workplace, the outcome of which would shape the course of Turin's development in the ensuing two decades.

2. *The Cold War and the Defeat of the Left in Turin.*

The rapid deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first half of 1947 had immediate repercussions in Italian political life. Pressure from American officials, who made the

removal of the Communists from national leadership a prerequisite for economic assistance, encouraged a major reshuffling of the ruling parliamentary coalition in Rome that brought to an end the experiment in broad anti-fascist collaboration. In May 1947, the Christian Democratic prime minister, Alcide De Gasperi, resigned and then formed a new government that excluded the parties of the left. Instead he relied on a coalition of centrist and right-wing political forces to achieve his parliamentary majority. At the same time, pressure from Moscow led the Italian Communist party to abandon any further compromises with the "parties of the bourgeoisie" and to go into open opposition to the new government. By the end of 1947, the Socialist party agreed to take part in a united Democratic Popular Front with the Communists in preparation for the national elections of the following year.

The elections of April 1948 proved to be the most pivotal political event of the post-war era. In a bitterly fought campaign, unprecedented intervention by the US government, the Italian-American community, and the Roman Catholic Church combined with a soviet *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia in February to mobilize a massive anticommunist vote on the peninsula. The Italian electorate gave the Christian Democrats a stunning victory at the expense of both the parties of the left and extreme right. The Catholic party won nearly half the vote and gained an absolute majority (305 of the 574 seats) in the Chamber of Deputies, while the Communists emerged as the dominant party on the left, with 140 deputies compared to the 41 won by the Socialists. These results laid the foundation of a political system in Italy that would remain largely unchanged for the next four decades, in which the Christian Democrats dominated every government and western Europe's largest Communist party played the role of a permanent parliamentary opposition. Mounting political polarization also had a major impact on the previously unified Italian labor movement, which now divided into three rival union federations, the General Confederation of Labor (Cgil), which represented Communist and Socialist workers, the Social Democratic and Republican Italian Workers Union (Uil), and the Catholic Confederation of Free Italian Unions (Cisl).

In the years after 1948, the city of Turin found itself on the front lines of the Cold War. The United States government, especially in the early 1950s, viewed the Piedmontese capital as a crucial arena in the struggle against communism. The American ambassador, Clare Boothe Luce, for instance, did not hesitate to caution Valletta in February 1954 that her government's contracts with local companies were contingent upon substantial efforts to exclude leftist unions from any role in the

workplace. In the case of the chief of Fiat, the ambassador was already preaching to the converted. From the outset, Valletta's vision of a hierarchically organized factory in which each worker carried out productive functions dictated by management clashed with that of the left-wing unionists who envisioned a system, in which they regulated the workforce and participated in decisions on its utilization. Beginning in 1948, the deteriorating political and work climate in the plants and Valletta's increasing determination to restore tighter managerial control over wages and factory discipline and to accelerate the pace of production spelled the end of the era of cooperation between capital and labor. When news of the attempted assassination of the Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, reached Turin in the summer of that year, workers occupied the Fiat factories for two days and took sixteen company managers, including Valletta himself, hostage. In the aftermath of the occupation, Catholic unionists broke ranks with the Cgil, ending the post-war experiment in labor solidarity at the local level. A tougher new stance on the part of management became apparent in 1949 when Fiat responded to work stoppages by refusing to negotiate under duress and by attempting to curtail the role of the Management Councils in its plants.

The early 1950s saw the confrontation between capital and labor escalate into a full-scale offensive by Valletta and Fiat against the Communist dominated unions of the Cgil and Fiom. Management now refused to consult or work with the internal commissions controlled by the Cgil and increasingly restricted the prerogatives enjoyed by all elected members of the commissions on the factory floor. Company-appointed foremen began to assume most of their functions. As the campaign intensified, Fiat fired militant communist workers and other "turbulent elements", gathered information on the political opinions and activities of all employees, and favored more cooperative unions to divide the workforce and break strikes. Finally, Valletta imposed new work rules in Fiat's factories, rules that rewarded discipline, productivity, individual merit, and company loyalty, especially during strikes.

The employer offensive took its toll on the militant metalworkers' union, which lacked the full support of the national Cgil and faced mounting competition from the revival unions. Catholic unionists, in particular, showed less interest in defending the internal commissions than in taking advantage of management's promise of higher wages for increased productivity. More importantly, support for the Fiom began to erode among its own rank and file as a result of its frequent use of strikes as political protests and its failure to win increases in base pay, while it steadfastly opposed the introduction of individual monetary in-

centives. When new elections for Fiat's internal commission took place in 1955, Fiom lost its majority for the first time in the post-war era. Defeat in the country's largest factory had an immediate impact on the position of the union at Olivetti and other major firms, where its support dropped sharply. The setbacks suffered by the Socialists and Communists in the factories had their counterpart in the municipal political arena where the Christian Democrats had already led a coalition of Liberals, Republicans, and Social Democrats to victory in the elections of 1951, ending a six-year run of Communist mayors and opening a new era of center-right leadership in city hall.

Valletta took advantage of the defeat of the militant unions to impose a more authoritarian system of production and labor relations into the automobile factories. Much like his American counterparts, the Ceo of Fiat adopted a strategy of technological modernization that entailed formal hierarchical relations, strict discipline, and accelerated work rhythms in his plants. The management made all decisions on salary and work rules without any negotiations with labor representatives, who now played only a supporting role. The relaxed work schedules of the late-1940s that had allowed employees the opportunity to socialize, organize, or just play cards on company time became an early casualty of these new power arrangements. Other casualties were the forty-hour work week and the two-day weekend, standard demands of the unions after the war. Throughout the '50s, the leadership of Fiat insisted on a forty-four-hour work week, which it could increase to fifty-four hours during periods of peak demand for its automobiles.

Valletta relied on material incentives and a variety of other perks to sweeten the bitter pill of rigid discipline and long, harder hours on the assembly line. To encourage workers to get with the company's program, he rewarded increased labor productivity and reduced disruptions of work with wage rates that were well above the norm in the engineering industry. By the end of the decade, the most productive workers were receiving bonuses that could raise their incomes by as much as 30% above their base pay. Valletta also took advantage of the company's well-established internal network of health insurance, schools, summer camps, sports clubs, and other leisure-time organizations to nourish in the rank and file a feeling of belonging to a "big family". To reinforce the link between family and company, relatives of current workers received preference in all new hiring. In a similar fashion, the School of Fiat Students (*Scuola allievi Fiat*) favored the children of employees with the promise of preparing them for professional advancement within the factory hierarchy.

Valletta's strategic labor initiatives met with some success during the 1950s, a decade when much of Italy was still beset by problems of mass poverty, rural overpopulation, and urban unemployment. Under these circumstances, a place on the assembly line of the automotive giant represented a privileged work setting. Since Fiat employees received wages, job security, and other benefits not available to the great majority of the labor force, they tended to enjoy a special social status in the working-class neighborhoods where shopkeepers, for example, were more inclined to extend them credit on their purchases. Valletta and his managers, for their part, gained the flexible and disciplined workforce they needed to take advantage of the American-sponsored Marshall Plan to begin the mass production of automobiles for an expanding international market of consumers. This ambitious undertaking soon put Fiat and Turin in the driver's seat of Italy's post-war economic boom.

3. *The Economic Miracle in Turin.*

During the two decades between 1950 and 1970, Italy emerged as a major protagonist in the explosive growth of the world economy as global output of manufactured goods quadrupled and international trade grew ten-fold. The country's industrial production, new construction, exports, and investments all rose at rates that were among the highest in the world. From 1958 to 1963 alone, industrial output more than doubled, while exports and investments in manufacturing plants and equipment increased at an annual rate of 14%. International trade drove the expansion with new consumer goods like electrical home appliances supplanting textiles and food products as the country's principal exports. A number of factors contributed to the country's impressive accomplishments. The relatively low cost of labor combined with the discovery of natural gas in the Po Valley and the availability of cheap imported oil to enable Italian businesses to cut their overhead and take full advantage of the opportunities created by the European Common Market. The national government also contributed to the boom by carrying out major construction projects like the new highway system, and by pursuing monetary and fiscal policies that favored investment in industry.

The largest local firms, Fiat and Olivetti in nearby Ivrea, were especially well-situated to capitalize on these favorable circumstances. By the late 1940s, these companies had recovered from the war and either had reached or surpassed their pre-war levels of production. The scale

of their plants and the enthusiasm of their managers for an American vision of export driven expansion ensured that Fiat and Olivetti got the lion's share of the financial aid provided by the Marshall Plan. Fiat, for instance, received 22 million of the 58 million of the Marshall funds earmarked for the entire Italian engineering sector and accounted for half of all the American aid to the region of Piedmont before the summer of 1951. Valletta used the dollars to acquire the most advanced machine technology from the United States and to finance construction of a huge new assembly line for the mass production of commercial vehicles and private cars. At the same time, the Ceo of Fiat astutely cultivated relations with the leaders of the major state-controlled steel, oil, and construction industries to promote the development of a national highway system designed for private automobile transportation.

Valletta's investment and marketing strategies achieved extraordinary results from the mid-1950s onward. His new and expanded assembly line process dramatically increased productivity on the shop floor so that the completion of one car in the early 1960s required one-fourth the number of worker hours that it had in the late 1940s. By 1963, the company was able to churn out over a million commercial vehicles and cars per year in its three great plants, Mirafiori, Rivalta, and Lingotto. With the introduction of the Fiat 600 in 1955 and the Fiat 500 two years later, Valletta had two of the most affordable cars in the world and was thus able to launch a new era of mass motoring on the Italian peninsula and elsewhere in Europe. Between 1955 and 1970 the company manufactured more than 2.6 million "600s", in addition to another 3.6 million units of the "500" by 1975. The rapid multiplication of private cars on the highways and in the cities of Italy testified to the success of these popularly-priced models. In 1950 there had been only 342,000 cars in the country; by 1975 that number had reached fifteen million.

The enormous popularity of the "600" and "500" models assured Fiat a dominant position not only in the transportation sector, but in the national economy as a whole. During the 1960s the firm absorbed its few remaining competitors, so that it controlled 95% of all automobile production in the country at the end of the decade; only Alfa Romeo managed to survive as an independent manufacturer. At the same time, Fiat played a major role in the manufacturing of airplanes, ship motors, and trains. After 1965 it joined the ranks of the major multinational corporations by beginning construction of an assembly plant in the Soviet Union. Such growth meant that the Turinese automobile giant became the principal customer for a host of other industrial suppliers in the rubber, glass, plastic, and steel sectors. In this fashion, the compa-

ny's dominant position in the transportation industry made it the driving force that propelled the Italian economy forward in these years. Fiat management's decisions on production, according to some estimates, determined roughly 20% of all investments in the country by 1963-64.

Under these circumstances, Turin's elevation to the industrial capital of Italy became inseparably linked to its transformation into Fiat's "company town". Already in the late 1950s, roughly 80% of the industrial activity in the city revolved around the automobile industry. Precisely in a period when the transportation industry was enjoying its greatest growth, the local textile industry entered into crisis, while the clothing and food processing sectors accounted for a steadily shrinking share of employment in the city and surrounding province. As a consequence, the engineering sector became the dominant employer, providing jobs for three-quarters of the manufacturing workforce by 1971. Fiat, alone, more than doubled the size of its workforce in the Turinese plants from 47,700 to 115,000, or nearly half of all manufacturing workers in the province, in the two decades after 1951. During the same period, the company employed an additional 30,000 white-collar employees and managers, while the economic survival of countless others in the city's tertiary and commercial sectors depended upon its demand for their services and trade. The automobile giant exercised an equally commanding position in the world of mass communications through its ownership of *La Stampa*, the city's premier newspaper and the second most important Italian daily after Milan's *Corriere della Sera*. Not surprisingly, Fiat's ability to influence all aspects of Turin's development gave its leaders enormous clout in city hall, where no initiatives could be undertaken without their tacit approval.

The high visibility of Fiat automobiles contributed greatly to a new myth of Turin as the promised land of prosperity and good life. The explosive growth of automobile industry and mass motoring clearly facilitated the expanded participation of the city's middle-classes and the upper ranks of its skilled workers in the new consumer society that arose in western Europe in these years. Thanks to the booming economy, per capita annual income in the Piedmontese capital soared from 310,000 lire in 1950 to 1.1 million in 1969, a figure that far exceeded the national average. More and more local families were able to spend less of their income on food and to expand their consumption of cars, electrical appliances, clothing, travel and other amusements that would have been unimaginable luxuries a few decades earlier. Middle-class patterns of consumption became, in turn, the model for the city's working classes.

The extraordinary dynamism that characterized the city's economy in the two decades after World War II contributed as well to the vitality of Turin's cultural and intellectual life. With its two universities, numerous publishing houses, and wide range of magazines and journals, Turin served as a national laboratory, in which intellectuals from a variety of disciplines studied and debated the consequences of rapid industrial and social change. An innovative group of scholars associated with Giulio Einaudi and his publishing house stimulated a range of new interdisciplinary encounters and opened the city and the country as a whole to cultural and intellectual influences from the rest of Europe and the United States. Einaudi not only published important Italian novelists like Italo Calvino and Cesare Pavese, but also brought out translations of major foreign works and reintroduced to the reading public important intellectuals who had been in prison or exile during the Fascist regime. In these years, the city hosted important schools of history, philosophy, literature led by such international prominent scholars and writers as Franco Venturi, Norberto Bobbio, Primo Levi, and Mario Soldati. A similar openness to the latest trends in European culture also characterized the city's art world. After its move to a new building in via Magenta in 1959, the Turinese museum, the Galleria civica d'arte moderna, became one of the only two institutions in the country (along with the National Gallery of Modern Art in Rome) to organize exhibitions of contemporary artists at the international level.

The elevation of Turin to the status of Italy's industrial capital in the years of the economic miracle, however, entailed more than the cultural renewal and affluent consumers, enjoying the liberating blessings of material progress. Fiat's single-minded focus on the expansion of production at all costs came at the expense of any serious consideration of the potential impact such concentrated industrial development might have on the quality of life in the city. As a result, the business community and municipal leaders were woefully unprepared for the traumatic social changes their economic strategy unleashed at the local level, changes that fundamentally altered the cultural fabric of Turin and threatened to overwhelm its weak infrastructure of public order, transportation, sanitation, schools, and hospitals.

4. *Mass Immigration and the Challenges of Cultural Diversity*.

The years of the economic miracle coincided with a period of unprecedented mobility of Italy's population. Between 1955 and 1971,

more than 9 million Italians migrated from one part of the country to another as well as from the countryside into the cities. Above all, these decades witnessed a massive exodus of poor rural folks from the southern regions towards the industrial north. During the peak years of the miracle, 1958 to 1963, over 900,000 southerners moved from their ancestral homes to other parts of Italy in pursuit of steady work and higher wages. As the privileged destinations for the great mass of these immigrants, the major cities of Italy experienced the greatest increases in population.

While Turin had already become a magnet for immigration from other areas of Italy before World War II, this earlier phenomenon paled in comparison to the massive influx of southerners into the Piedmontese capital after 1950. The city, which had a population of 719,300 in 1951, mushroomed a decade later to 1,102,600 and then to 1,124,714 by 1967, a rate of growth that far exceeded that of the other major cities, Rome, Milan, and Bologna, in these years. The areas on the periphery of the industrial metropolis grew at an even faster rate, over 80%, between 1961 and 1967. The population in the zone around the Mirafiori plant, for example, skyrocketed from 18,700 to 141,000 in two decades, while the historical center actually lost population. Such demographic change was due almost exclusively to the influx of immigrants, with southerners accounting for nearly half all new arrivals by the early 1960s. By the end of the decade, Turin had emerged as the third largest "southern" city in the country, behind only Naples and Palermo.

A number of circumstances contributed to making Turin the principal destination for immigrants in those years. At the peak of the boom in the late 1950s, industrial expansion generated tens of thousands of new jobs each year and drove down unemployment rates to historic lows. The powerful appeal of Fiat and its automobiles as symbols of economic progress, freedom of movement, and the promise of a better life also helped to draw southerners to Turin. Northern recruiters encouraged these dreams, enlisting tens of thousands of the new arrivals in so-called "cooperatives" that provided cheap labor to factories without contracts, pensions, or insurance coverage. Valletta and Fiat played their part in the growth of immigration by deciding not to build factories in the south on the grounds that the area lacked the required markets, raw materials, labor skills, and power sources. The industrial leader's determination to concentrate automotive production in Turin thus dictated a certain pattern of development, in which a steady flow of poor folks from other regions ensured an abundant supply of labor, contained wages and gave management greater discretion in the selection of its workers. Iron-

Map 7.
Turin in 1969.

ically, Fiat and the other larger firms chose not to hire many southern workers initially, relying instead on an older pool of labor drawn from the northern countryside.

Explosive population growth quickly overwhelmed the city and its unprepared municipal leaders, exposing the serious inadequacies of Turin's housing market, schools, transportation systems, public health programs and other social services. Much as in the past, the recent immigrants bore the brunt of governmental failings. In the absence of any coherent city plan to regulate development or provide affordable public housing, Turin's chronic shortage of housing, for instance, assumed crisis proportions in those years. New arrivals found whatever lodging they could, often in cellars and attics of buildings in the run-down areas of the city or else in abandoned structures on the outskirts. Conditions were especially appalling in the improvised urban barracks where young immigrants shared a room, sleeping in turns in the same bed, while dozens of families shared common bathrooms. One investigation carried out in 1961 found that southern immigrants were typically crowded together two to four or more per room, half relied on external outhouses, and three-quarters lacked thermal heating or bath tubs. Only in the early 1970s did residential density drop to an average of one person per room. In a similar fashion, hospitals and schools failed to keep pace with demand. As a result of shortages of doctors, nurses, and hospital rooms, Turin experienced a sharp increase in infant mortality rates. Despite the construction of new schools in the second half of the 1950s, the number of classrooms remained insufficient for the growing numbers of students, who had to be taught in two or three shifts per day.

The indifference of Fiat's management and the reluctance of municipal authorities to address these problems made a bad situation worse. For his part, Valletta tended to look upon the city exclusively as a location for productive expansion. Technological progress and economic growth, in his view, would eventually lead to rising standards of living that would solve any short-term difficulties stemming from the flood of immigrants. Accordingly, he and the management of Fiat saw little need for any systematic intervention to ameliorate social conditions in the city and surrounding suburbs. Taking their lead from Turin's dominant employer, municipal authorities adopted a largely laissez-faire approach to the acute housing problems of the immigrants. The delayed passage of an urban regulatory plan and its subsequent non-enforcement meant that private developers and speculators had a relatively free rein in the real estate market. They proceeded to construct huge cement apartment complexes that lacked parks and green open spaces or basic amenities

such as shops, libraries and access to public transportation. In the absence of adequate governmental regulation, soaring demand drove up land values and rents to levels that hit hardest the new immigrants and the urban poor. At the same time, construction of public housing was neglected, accounting for a mere 15% of the new buildings.

In addition to the problems of housing and social services, the influx of rural southerners into the city after 1955 also led to new cultural and ethnic tensions that fragmented and complicated the long-standing divisions of social class in the Piedmontese capital. Without connections and with limited skills, the new arrivals had to accept the lowest wages and the worst jobs. Local workers and the Communist party viewed them as politically unreliable threats to the unions, while the upper-middle classes blamed them for the rise in crime and other social ills. Since most of the immigrants came from rural villages, they had predictable problems in adapting to industrial work rhythms. These initial difficulties helped fuel negative stereotypes of southerners as people reluctant to work hard, lacking in drive and ambition, and happy to live off public aid. To make matters worse, the southerners brought with them customs and manners that aroused fear and disdain in an indigenous population proud of its city's traditions of order and decorum. The customarily reserved Piedmontese tended to assume their own cultural superiority over the backward immigrants, whom they judged to be congenitally irresponsible and lacking in self-control.

Although some landlords posted signs that announced "*non si affitta ai meridionali*" (we won't rent to southerners), most local residents reacted more with impatience than open hostility towards their new neighbors. They tended to blame the southern immigrants themselves, rather than rapid industrialization or inadequate public services, for the growing social problems that beset the city. In this perspective, the poor health of immigrant children was the product of their parents' ignorance; overcrowded housing conditions resulted from southerners having too many kids or from their lack of respect for the property of others, while crime in their communities was a natural outgrowth of southern character traits and primitive codes of honor. The local media, parties, and employers all seemed to agree that the immigrants must renounce their old regional cultures and accept the rules of civil society in Turin. For their part, however, the first waves of new arrivals from the south dreamed of returning home and thus showed little inclination to give up their old values and customs.

Cultural tensions and divisions within the city began to ease by the early 1970s with the gradual standardization of life styles that led most

people to have fewer kids, consume the same products, and buy their own homes. At the same time, efforts by the Catholic Church, unions, and political parties to enlist the support of the immigrants helped to reduce prejudice and the isolation of their communities. Finally a new wave of young workers, who arrived from the south in the 1960s, was less tied to their old communities and anxious to share in the benefits of the new industrial consumer society.

The easing of ethnic tensions in the city did not lead to a new era of social peace and political stability, however. On the contrary, Turin once again became a major battle zone in the impressive resurgence of labor militancy and student radicalism that enveloped Italy's urban centers in the late 1960s.

5. *Toward the "Hot Autumn" of 1969: The New Left in Turin.*

Some of the very circumstances that made Turin the industrial capital of Italy and the setting for chaotic urban expansion after 1950 also created the environment for a revival of labor militancy in the city's factories. By the early 1960s, the city's industrial workers differed in important respects from their predecessors. To begin with, their ranks included much larger numbers of rural immigrants and fewer women than in the past. As a group, they were much younger; nearly three-quarters of the workers in 1962 had been hired after 1953. Moreover, the predominance of assembly line production had reduced the need for specialized skilled labor and thus favored the growth of a more homogeneous workforce concentrated in huge plants, in which there was little differentiation in terms of age, sex, work, and wages. The situation in the factories of Turin was made all the more explosive by the hardships faced by the southern immigrants outside the workplace. Bad housing and inadequate services accentuated the anger and resentment of workers over the discipline and pace of work on the assembly line. These conditions, together with the rebellious peasant traditions of the recent immigrants and their desire for new consumer goods, set the stage for a turbulent era in Italian labor relations.

After ten years of relative calm, Turin re-emerged into the national spotlight as a hotbed of working class militancy in 1962. Significantly, this new militancy involved innovative forms of organization and decision making that relied less on union hierarchies than mass assemblies and elected delegates. After a series of strikes, marches, and demonstrations in the spring of 1962, a general work stoppage in July by met-

alworkers exploded into a series of violent and bloody clashes between police and demonstrators in Piazza Statuto that continued over two and a half days. Much to their chagrin, spokesmen for the Cgil and the Communist party discovered that they exercised little or no influence over the crowds of young rootless immigrant workers, who ignored their pleas for calm. An economic downturn in the middle of the decade temporarily dampened labor militancy by reducing employment opportunities and weakening the bargaining position of the unions. But with renewed industrial expansion in the winter of 1966-67, anger among the rank and file over increased mechanization, an accelerated pace of work on the assembly lines, and intensified managerial discipline, set the stage for another round of labor conflicts in the Piedmontese capital.

By the late 1960s, both international and local developments outside of the factories also began to have an impact on the attitudes and actions of the workers as well as on those of a younger generation of middle- class Italians. Much like their counterparts elsewhere in the western world, the young people of Turin experienced a revolution of rising expectations that altered their attitudes and behavior toward established authority, consumption, and sexuality. These cultural changes became intertwined with a new political radicalism that drew inspiration from such international developments as the Vietnam War, the Cultural Revolution in China, and the exploits of Che Guevara in Latin America. Emerging from the universities, this new radicalism was especially pronounced in Turin, home of Italy's first mass industrial revolution with its culture of technocracy, hierarchy and efficiency.

As a result of the educational reforms of the early 1960s, the University of Turin and other Italian universities faced an avalanche of new students. In a period of only six years, the number of students enrolled in the liberal arts, sciences, and education doubled locally, while the physical plant, faculty, curricula and teaching methods remained largely unchanged. By the second half of the decade, severe overcrowding, faculty neglect, and a host of other difficulties led to mounting discontent and frustration within the student body. The situation at the University of Turin first erupted into public view in February 1967, when radical students occupied the seat of the Liberal arts (Lettere) faculty in Palazzo Campana before they were evicted by the police called in by the rector. The student movement re-emerged with even greater force ten months later. In November, protesters first laid siege to the offices of the rector and then reoccupied Palazzo Campana, providing the model for a wave of similar occupations at other universities across the Italian peninsula in the following months.

The refusal of the Academic Senate to make any concessions led the student movement at the University of Turin in the spring of 1968 to pioneer the tactics of "cultural guerrilla warfare" as a way to undermine the traditional authority of the faculty. Activists interrupted lectures, confronted the professors, challenged their arguments, and pressured them to address contemporary political issues. At the same time, the student movement attempted to develop procedures that replaced "leaders" and formal hierarchies with mass assemblies, in which participants were collectively responsible for all decisions. Most of the student radicals broadly subscribed to a Marxist vision, but they tended to prefer direct action over what they dismissed as the "book fetishism" of revolutionary theory.

By the summer of 1968, the student movement began to find common ground with militant working-class activists in the city. As the academic year drew to a close, student radicals shifted their attention from the university to the factories, where they became involved in a series of labor protests and demonstrations over issues of work rhythms, wages, and discrimination. While the unrest in the industrial plants had arisen independently from events at the university, the young radicals helped nourish a climate of insubordination towards all authority, including that of the unions and the Communist party, among the workers. Similarly, they reinforced the preference of young workers for direct action and collective decision making by mass assemblies. The alliance of students and workers led to the formation of a "new left" embodied in small revolutionary groups like Lotta Continua (Continuous Struggle) and Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) that aimed to forge a new revolutionary consciousness in the industrial labor force of the city.

Beginning in the fall of 1968 and continuing into the following year, these groups attracted a broad following among workers in Turin and the other industrial cities of the north. Wildcat strikes, aggressive picketing outside of the factories, and eventually demonstrations within the plants themselves help to make 1969 one of the most tumultuous years in the history of the Italian labor movement. Much as in the past, the surge in the factory insurgency at the national level reached its apex in Turin at the Fiat plants during the summer of 1969. After a series of conflicts in the Mirafiori factory during the previous two months, a general strike called by the national unions on July 3 to demand a freeze on rents took a far more violent and radical direction in the Piedmontese capital, where demonstrators chanted: "What do we want? Everything!" Thousands of workers and students protested in front of the Fiat plant before heading out into the surrounding streets of the city, where

they threw up barricades and engaged in running battles with the police that continued into the night.

Developments in the "hot autumn" of 1969, however, soon exposed the limits of this revolutionary student-worker alliance. A new and more aggressive coalition of the major labor federations reasserted union authority both on the plant floor and in negotiations with management. By the end of the year, the mainstream labor leaders had won a national contract that contained important material conquests for the workers from equal wage hikes and the forty-hour week to increased vacation time and the right to assemble in the factories. Of course, the revolutionary groups denounced the contract as a sell out, but their view did not appear to be shared by the majority of workers, who supported their union representatives. Although strikes and other disruptions of work remained prominent features of industrial life in Turin and other northern cities throughout the next decade, their achievements fell far short of the revolutionary hopes and expectations of the radical student-worker alliance. The principal political groups of the new left also remained active after 1969, but in the changing economic environment of the 1970s, their casual attitude toward violence and their extremist rhetoric only contributed to an upsurge in terrorism and sectarian conflict.

6. *After the Economic Miracle: Turin since 1970.*

The Golden Age of unparalleled economic growth and expansion that had begun in the 1950s came to an abrupt halt in the early 1970s. A severe slump between 1973 and 1975 provoked a significant drop in industrial production and international trade, signaling the end of the long boom. The global economy did not collapse, but subsequent growth took place at a decidedly slower pace than during the years of the miracle. As a late arrival to the ranks of the major industrial nations, Italy was especially vulnerable to the new energy, financial, and market conditions that confronted the western world. The decision of the Opec states to raise the price of crude oil drastically in the fall of 1973, in particular, exposed the country's over-reliance on "black gold" to meet its energy needs. To make matters worse, Italy's labor movement, one of the strongest in Europe, limited the ability of companies to reduce their costs by cutting wages, while venture capitalists reacted to unrest in the factories by withholding new investments in industry and by transferring their wealth out of the country. Italy experienced the highest rate

of inflation in the western world, falling production, a growing underground economy, and soaring public deficits during the 1970s.

As the country's industrial capital, Turin felt the full force of the economic crisis. Most of the industries, on which the local economy relied, from textiles and engineering to machinery, food-processing, and chemicals, experienced difficulties, while the legendary typewriter company, Olivetti, was compelled to begin a traumatic conversion from machines to electronic products. Above all, the city's dominant firm appeared at the time to be sliding into irreversible decline. Fiat was beset by a host of problems: high levels of debt, rising oil prices, falling productivity on the assembly lines, outdated car models, and overexpansion abroad. By the late 1970s, the automotive giant and principal employer in the region faced the real risk of a bailout and takeover by the state.

It was in this grim economic setting that the citizens of Turin elected in 1975 the first municipal government of the left in a quarter century. The new Communist mayor, Diego Novelli, embarked upon an ambitious program to modernize transportation, expand public housing, improve social services, and curb real estate speculation in the city. Novelli's vision of urban development freed from the domination by the "large capitalist groups" did not prevent him from proposing innovative forms of collaboration between Fiat and city hall to ease social tensions and reduce labor problems in the factories. Nonetheless, the new municipal administration soon found itself caught between a rock and a hard place. Initial overtures to industrialists did not lead to any effective cooperation, and local business interests became increasingly critical of Novelli's plans. More importantly, the Communist-Socialist municipality had to shift its resources and attention away from reform projects, in order to deal with an explosion of violence from extreme left-wing groups in the city during the late-1970s.

Turin's special status as Italy's industrial capital put it squarely on the front lines of the urban guerrilla war unleashed by the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups. While the city had been the scene of kidnappings and assaults already in the early 1970s, the years after 1976 saw a sharp increase in the numbers of assassinations and attacks on police stations, party headquarters, and union halls. Indeed, the period from 1976 to 1980 was the time of greatest danger especially for those residents of Turin who occupied positions of public prominence. During these years, there were over a thousand reported acts of terrorism in the province that resulted in twenty-four deaths and left another forty-eight wounded. Included in the ranks of the dead were business

executives, journalists, lawyers and judges. Within the administration of Fiat alone, terrorists murdered three managers, while nineteen other mid-level administrators were assaulted or shot. As the decade drew to a close, the Red Brigades and Front Line, two of the most active groups in the city, became increasingly isolated at the same time that the national government finally launched a coordinated anti-terrorist offensive. Beginning in the winter of 1979-80 with the arrest of the leader of the Piedmontese brigade, Patrizio Peci, the police managed to capture a number of key figures in the local "armed party" of terrorism who cooperated in exposing the clandestine organizations in exchange for reduced prison sentences.

The war between the state and terrorist groups took place at a time of growing conflict between management and labor in the city's factories. Once again Turin became the focal point of a conflict that would have huge implications for the entire Italian labor movement. In the face of mounting economic losses and problems of absenteeism and sabotage on the assembly lines, the new Ceo of Fiat, Cesare Romiti, moved in the fall of 1979 to reassert managerial authority over factory discipline and employment. As a first step in this direction, the firm fired sixty-one "violent" workers at the Mirafiori plant in October. The following year Fiat escalated its offensive against the unions, when Romiti announced plans in early September 1980 to dismiss 14,000 workers immediately and place another 24,000 on fifteen month furlough due to falling car sales. Although the firm justified the actions as an economic necessity, labor activists featured prominently among the workers who were to be laid off or fired.

The union leaders reacted immediately by calling an open-ended strike and set up picket lines to block entry into the automotive factories. The work stoppage, which lasted thirty-five days, had a devastating impact on the city. In addition to paralyzing production at the automotive plants, the strike hurt a vast network of suppliers and merchants who depended upon Fiat for the bulk of their business. While the strike enjoyed the support of the most militant workers, the enthusiasm of the rank and file began to wane in the absence of any strike fund or pay checks. Fiat's management sharpened divisions within the workforce by promising to postpone temporarily the layoffs and to reduce the length of the furloughs. The decisive moment in the standoff came in the fourth week of the strike, when tens of thousands of Fiat managers, foremen and other mid-level staff, as well as a large number of ordinary workers, took to the streets of Turin, demanding an end to the strike and a return to work. After the march, growing divisions within

their membership led the unions to capitulate and sign an agreement with the company in exchange for a few token concessions.

7. *The Decline of an Industrial Capital: Turin since 1980.*

The victory of Fiat in the fall of 1980 marked a major turning point in the history of Italian industrial-labor relations. In its aftermath, the balance of power shifted decisively against the industrial workers who gradually lost most of the gains of the previous decade. More importantly, the years between 1981 and 1991 saw a dramatic reduction in the number of jobs in large-scale industry as Italian firms shifted their production abroad to areas with lower labor costs. These developments had major consequences for the Piedmontese capital. The metropolitan area of Turin lost some 90,000 industrial jobs during the decade. As usual, Fiat led the way, investing heavily in robotics, cutting its local workforce in half, and moving its investments and productive activities abroad in these years. By the early 1990s, there were high rates of unemployment in the city, while per capita income had fallen in relation to other cities in the country. With the disappearance of so many jobs in the huge factories, the city began to lose population. From a peak of nearly 1.4 million in the 1970s, it had fallen to 900,000 by the late 1990s. As the end of the century approached, the militant industrial working class that had once been a central protagonist in the social and political life of the city and the nation was little more than a distant and fading memory.

For the management of Fiat, on the other hand, the 1980s represented an "Indian Summer" of renewed expansion and prosperity. During the decade, a strategy of diversification consolidated Fiat's status as Italy's largest industrial group with interests in a wide array of sectors from newspapers and telecommunications to insurance, investment banking, and tourism. In the mid-1980s, the Fiat group controlled nearly a quarter of the Italian stock market through several hundred subsidiaries and associated companies. Drastic restructuring of its operations, massive government aid, and the success of a new model, the "Uno", allowed Fiat's automotive division to be relatively competitive in European markets, while preserving its largely protected domestic market in the second half of the decade.

This recovery proved, however, to be short-lived. The defeat of the unions in 1980 created the dangerous illusion in the ranks of senior management that all their problems had been resolved. Moreover, the shift of the Fiat group under the leadership of Romiti in the 1980s from a fo-

cus on industrial production to financial operations came at the expense of technological innovation. As a smaller company than the other major international auto makers, Fiat lost its competitive advantages in the early 1990s when Italy opened to the rest of Europe and the world. The firm's share of the domestic market, which had once stood at 60%, fell steadily during the decade to a low of 20% in the early 2000s. During the same period, Fiat's export market in Europe shriveled by 50%, while its investments in the emerging markets of Poland, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina failed to live up to expectations. To make matters worse, Fiat failed to build an international alliance comparable to those of Renault and Nissan or Daimler and Chrysler. By 2002, inadequate models, falling sales, heavy debts, lagging technology, and plummeting share values raised fears that Fiat might abandon car production altogether. Above all, the crisis of the automotive giant signified the end of an era when Italian industry rested upon the Fordist model of great entrepreneurial families, gigantic factories, and mass production.

The decline of Fiat, the pillar of Turin's economy and of its identity as the industrial capital of Italy, has had a major impact on the metropolitan area and its residents in recent years. The automotive giant, which had once provided employment for 140,000 people, now provided jobs for barely 30,000. And even those who still had jobs often found themselves out of work in 2005, since the company's factories were closed periodically, sometimes for a number of weeks, because of the lack of demand for cars. The vast network of fifty-nine local suppliers, who had long relied on Fiat for most of their business, have faced enormous challenges, since they often lacked technology, capital, and marketing experience to compete for alternative customers. As a consequence, they too have had to cut staffs, laying off or furloughing half of their 15,600 workers and thereby swelling the ranks of the unemployed in the city. As jobs disappeared, the city's population continued to shrink, dropping to 860,000 by 2003. Not surprisingly, a recent public opinion survey by *La Stampa* found that more than half of those surveyed ranked finding employment as their greatest concern, while 48% thought that the economic situation of their families was worsening. A new wave of clandestine immigrants from the Balkans and North Africa has further added to the tensions and fears occasioned by Fiat's retreat from the city. Concentrated in decaying ghettos between Porta Nuova and Porta Palazzo, these ethnically and culturally distinctive communities became associated in the public mind with a perceived upsurge in crime, prostitution, and drug-dealing, which became major political issues during the 1990s.

Although Fiat continues to make cars in 2005, Turin is no longer the great industrial capital of Italy or a one-company town, dominated by the contending forces of a single giant corporation and a large militant working class. On the contrary, today the companies in the province are distinguished by the small scale of their operations with 90% of them having fewer than fifty employees. As a result, the Piedmontese capital has mirrored the misfortunes of Fiat after years of losing jobs and prestige. Much as in the past, Turin faces once again the daunting task of reinventing itself and forging a new identity suited to its status as an increasingly deindustrialized urban center.

Even before the death in 2003 of Gianni Agnelli, the last family patriarch of the Fiat group, local business and political leaders began to promote a new "post-industrial" vision of the city, captured in the slogan, "Turin – always on the move". The success of their strategy depends on the development of two key areas: mass tourism and a group of dynamic companies producing for niche markets. The first area seeks to take advantage of the city's beautiful architecture, fine food, and physical proximity to the mountains and to excellent wine growing areas to transform Turin into an international tourist destination. A major step in this direction came when the city won the competition to host the Winter Olympics in February 2006. In preparation for the events and the massive influx of visitors they will draw, 5 billion Euros have been invested in improving Turin's infrastructure. Works in progress include a new subway system, high-speed rail links to Paris and Milan, and a new central railroad station. Such improvements not only will make the city more accessible; they have already helped ease the effects of crisis in the auto sector by providing employment in public works projects. The second area, which encompasses the auto design company Pininfarina, aerospace firms, and food processing companies, relies on stylish and high quality production for luxury markets. Whether these sectors can fill the enormous void created by the decline of Fiat and provide the basis for Turin's new economy remains to be seen.

Appendix

Chronological Table

218 B.C.E	Hannibal crosses the Alps and destroys the settlement of the Taurini, probably on the site later occupied by Turin.
58 B.C.E	Julius Caesar begins the conquest of Gaul, using the future site of Augusta Taurinorum as a base.
25 B.C.E (ca.)	Foundation of Augusta Taurinorum by Emperor Augustus.
398 (ca.)	St Maximus, first bishop of Turin.
493	Establishment of the Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy.
569	Conquest of Italy by the Lombards, who establish a kingdom.
773	The Lombard kingdom is conquered by Charlemagne and absorbed into the Carolingian empire.
887	Deposition of Emperor Charles the Fat: dissolution of the Carolingian empire.
950 (ca.)	The March of Turin is established by King Berengar of Ivrea and granted to Arduin "the Smooth-Faced". His descendants rule the March until 1091.
962	Otto I founds the Holy Roman Empire, incorporating northern Italy and the March of Turin as part of it.
1045	Marriage of Countess Adelaide of Turin to Count Oddo of Savoy.
1091	Death of Adelaide. The March of Turin breaks up. Turin is ruled by its bishops.
1149	First documentary reference to a communal government at Turin.
1183	Peace of Constance between Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa and the Lombard League recognizes the autonomy of the north Italian cities.
1200 (ca.)	The communal government now dominates Turin's political life.
1280	Thomas III of Savoy becomes lord of Turin, inaugurating rule over the city by the House of Savoy.
1282-1418	Turin is ruled by the descendants of Thomas III, the princes of Savoy-Achaea.
1348	First epidemic of the Black Death (bubonic plague).
1360	Statutes issued for Turin's municipal government by Count Amadeus VI.
1404	Foundation of the University of Turin.
1418	Death of the last Savoy-Achaea prince; henceforth Turin is under the direct rule of the dukes of Savoy.

1494-1559	Wars between France and Spain for hegemony in Italy.
1536	French occupation of Turin.
1563	Duke Emanuel Filibert makes Turin the capital of the Savoyard State.
1578	Transfer of the Holy Shroud from Chambéry to Turin.
1619	First expansion of Turin by Duke Charles Emanuel I.
1639-40	Turin is besieged during the civil war between Duchess Marie-Christine and Princes Thomas and Maurice of Savoy.
1669	Second expansion of Turin by Duke Charles Emanuel II.
1706	A French army besieges Turin and is defeated.
1713	Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy becomes king of Sicily, then (1720) of Sardinia. The third expansion of Turin begins.
1720	Refoundation of the University of Turin by Victor Amadeus II.
1783	Foundation of the Turin Academy of Sciences.
1792	Outbreak of war between King Victor Amadeus III and revolutionary France.
1796	Napoleon Bonaparte conquers Piedmont.
1798	A French army occupies Turin. King Charles Emanuel IV departs into exile in Sardinia.
1799	The French army withdraws from Turin.
1800	Napoleon reoccupies Turin.
1802	Piedmont is annexed to the French First Empire.
1814	The French retreat from Turin. Victor Emanuel I returns from exile in Sardinia to restore the Savoyard dynasty.
1821	Piedmontese Revolution, leading to the abdication of Victor Emanuel I. Charles Felix ascends to the throne and defeats the revolutionaries.
1831	Death of Charles Felix. Charles Albert assumes the throne of the kingdom of Sardinia.
1848	Charles Albert promulgates the Statuto as the constitution of the kingdom of Sardinia. The Piedmontese army is defeated by Austria at the battle of Custoza.
1849	The abdication of Charles Albert after the Austrian victory at the battle of Novara. Victor Emanuel II becomes king.
1852	Count Camillo Benso di Cavour becomes prime minister of the kingdom of Sardinia.
1855	Piedmont joins the anti-Russian coalition in the Crimean War.
1859-61	The Italian peninsula is unified under the leadership of Cavour and Victor Emanuel II.
1861-65	Turin is the capital of the new Italian nation.
1899	The founding of Fiat (Fabbrica italiana automobili Torino).
1906-10	Founding in Turin of Italy's leading labor and management organizations Fiom, Cgil, Industrial League of Turin, and Confindustria.
1915	Italy enters World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. Turin is transformed into a giant arsenal.
1917	Italy's largest anti-war insurrection takes place in Turin.

1918	End of World War I.
1919	Founding of Turin's first fascio di combattimento.
1920	Strikes in Turin's engineering and automobile industries mark the end of the "red years".
1922	March on Rome, formation of the first Mussolini government, and the fascist "Massacre of Turin".
1924	Matteotti's assassination provokes a crisis that culminates with Mussolini proclaiming an end to the Liberal parliamentary order in Italy.
1924-29	Consolidation of the Fascist dictatorship.
1940	Italy's entrance into World War II.
1943	First strikes take place in Turin. The Fascist regime collapses and the Nazis occupy Turin.
1945	End of World War II and the death of Giovanni Agnelli, founder of Fiat.
1946	End of monarchy and the founding of the Italian Republic.
1948	Victory of Christian Democrats in the first parliamentary elections of the republican era.
1955	Defeat of Communist unions in elections for factory internal commissions in Turin.
1955-63	Peak years of the economic miracle and mass immigration in Turin.
1967	Beginning of the radical student movement at the University of Turin.
1969	A wave of strikes and confrontations mark the peak of the revolutionary student-worker alliance.
1975	Election of a Communist administration under Diego Novelli in Turin.
1976-80	Peak years of terrorist violence in Turin by Red Brigades and Front Line.
1980	Decisive confrontation between Fiat and the labor unions that ends in the defeat of the unions.
2003	Death of Gianni Agnelli, grandson of the founder of Fiat.

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Genealogical Table: The House of Savoy




Francis Hyacinth † 1638
Charles Emanuel II † 1675
Victor Amadeus II, King of Sicily 1713, of Sardinia 1720, abdicated 1730, † 1732
Charles Emanuel III † 1773
Victor Amadeus III † 1796
Charles Emanuel IV † 1819
Victor Emanuel I † 1824
Charles Felix † 1831
Line of the princes of Carignano
Charles Albert I † 1849
Victor Emanuel II, King of Italy 1861, † 1878
Humbert I † 1900 (assassination)
Victor Emanuel III, abdicated 1946, † 1947
Humbert II, last King of Italy 1946, † 1983

Table 1.

Turin's population census.

Source: data from the official censuses of the Kingdom of Sardinia, of the Kingdom of Italy and of the Italian Republic processed by Pietro Castiglioni.

Year	*Turin's population*	*Year*	*Turin's population*
1400	4000	1840	92 159
1560	20 000	1857	104 355
1631	36 649	1861	204 715
1704	37 306	1871	212 644
1715	44 906	1881	252 832
1720	47 816	1901	329 691
1730	54 764	1911	393 112
1740	58 832	1921	495 025
1750	58 128	1931	613 342
1760	63 202	1936	640 205
1770	66 721	1951	725 667
1780	69 894	1961	994 089
1790	76 504	1971	1 190 688
1800	61 446	1981	1 143 378
1810	67 162	1991	991 870
1820	71 078	2001	864 671
1830	90 845		

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