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most important sieges and, above all, the strategy of his most brilliant campaigns – among
which that of 1706 – are studied. In this way, the multiple facets of his military career are
brought to light, ranging between the extreme poles of war, from physical participation to
combat (Eugenio was wounded three times) up to the strategic and economic preparation
of whole campaigns, having a vast European and Mediterranean significance.
Finances and the War
Enrico Stumpo
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth century the Dukes of Savoy only made limited
recourse to the national debt. Even during the many wars they were engaged in, they pre-
ferred to resort to direct taxation on landed property and to taxing the most important
consumer goods: salt, grain, flour and wine. To cover their military expenditure they
adopted early on a system perfected later by countries such as Sweden and Prussia: finan-
cial contributions from the various European powers with which, from one time to the
next, they were allied.
During the War of the Spanish Succession, Vittorio Amedeo II in fact obtained
43,276.939 lire in financial help from England and Holland, equal to 49.3 per cent of his
military expenses. This policy was continued in the following period too: in the first half
of the eighteenth century, the Savoys obtained about 81 million Piedmontese lire, overall,
from their various allies.
During the War of the Spanish Succession, Vittorio Amedeo II also made use of the
resources of the cities of Turin and Cuneo, launching various issues of state securities
guaranteed by the revenues of the two cities. So Turin, the capital of the duchy, made large
contributions by loaning several million lire through the Monte di San Giovanni Battista,
which were underwritten by numerous members of the aristocracy and upper middle
classes. In exchange for the sums invested, these persons obtained annual interest of 4 or
5 per cent, paid on the revenues of the city, which, despite the war, continued to be plen-
tiful.
Governing the Besieged City
Donatella Balani
Turin was besieged by the Franco-Spanish army for almost four months, between 13 May
and 7 September 1706. Threatened since the previous summer, the city had had time to
prepare a high-level defensive system and to organise an efficient system of services for the
civil population that had remained outside the walls. The municipal government worked
intensely, well documented by the frequency of the convocations of councils and congrega-
tions and by the number of issues discussed and decreed: it was above all engaged on ensur-
ing that Turin’s more than forty thousand citizens had sufficient provisions and the indis-
pensable goods for daily activities, as well as those necessary for repairing damaged fortifi-
cations and buildings. The city government made a lot of acquisitions, stocked large quan-
tities of non-perishable foodstuffs and kept commercial channels with the outside open for
as long as possible. It also took care to rationalise consumption and to combat abuses. It
was especially attentive to the weaker segments of the population, controlling the price of
bread and providing food to the poorest assisted by the hospices and charity associations.
It also endeavoured to ensure acceptable hygiene conditions and guarantee order in the
city.
During the siege, cooperation between the ducal government and the city administration
proved to be fundamental, as both put aside past differences to work together in harmony.
As had previously occurred in the past, the municipality found itself playing the role of
financial mediator between the citizens and the duke, overwhelmed by the expenses for the
defence of the capital and for the war. On several occasions the municipal council decreed
the issue and sale of securities guaranteed by the municipal heritage and the crown prop-